Pre-registration
Nigeria's May 2023 elimination of the petrol subsidy under President Tinubu produced a fiscally favourable but socially costly trajectory: federally-retained revenue rose, the primary fiscal balance improved relative to the 2018-2022 baseline, but headline CPI inflation accelerated and household real-consumption proxies weakened in the 12-24 months post-removal. The pre-registered claim is that, in a synthetic-control design with a Sub- Saharan African oil-exporter donor pool (Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea), Nigeria's primary fiscal balance share of GDP improves by at least 1.5 percentage points 2023-2025 vs synthetic counterfactual AND CPI inflation rises by at least 6 percentage points more than the synthetic counterfactual. The null counter-claim is that Nigeria's fiscal improvement is statistically indistinguishable from the donor-pool path once oil-price terms-of-trade and naira devaluation are netted out — i.e. the subsidy reform did not deliver fiscal repair distinct from windfall mechanics.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Not supported if EITHER (a) synth_did CATT on primary_fiscal_balance over 2023Q3- 2025Q4 is less than +1.5 percentage points of GDP at p_perm < 0.10, OR (b) the inflation acceleration relative to synthetic counterfactual is less than +6 percentage points cumulative, OR (c) both the fiscal and inflation effects are inside the placebo distribution (indicating the reform did not produce a detectable break).
formal test & threshold
test: synth_did_dual_outcome_with_permutation threshold: CATT_2023Q3_2025Q4(primary_fiscal_balance_share_gdp) > 1.5 ppts at p_perm < 0.10 AND CATT(cpi_yoy) > 6 ppts cumulative at p_perm < 0.10
Method
- Template
synth_did- Clustering
country- Sample
- 6 countries · 2010 – 2025
- Evidence type
- causal
Primary: synth_did with NGA treated from 2023Q3 and oil-exporter SSA + MENA donor pool. Secondary: Callaway-Sant'Anna DiD. Tertiary: local projections with quarters-since-removal interaction. Robustness includes excluding Angola (its own 2023 fiscal adjustment) and excluding 2024Q1 naira-redenomination noise.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
primary_fiscal_balance_share_gdp outcome | world_bank_wdi:GC.NLD.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2 | level |
cpi_inflation_yoy outcome | world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2 imf:PCPIPCHtier 2 | yoy |
real_household_consumption_pc outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.PRVT.PC.KDtier 2 | log_level |
fuel_pump_price outcome | world_bank_wdi:EP.PMP.SGAS.CDtier 2 owid:fuel_pricestier 2 | log_level |
subsidy_removal_indicator treatment | constructed:binary = 1 for NGA from 2023-06-01 onwardtier 5 | binary |
brent_oil_price control | fred:DCOILBRENTEUtier 1 imf:POILBREtier 2 | log_level |
usd_exchange_rate_official control | world_bank_wdi:PA.NUS.FCRFtier 2 | log_level |
terms_of_trade control | world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2 | level |
us_policy_rate control | fred:FEDFUNDStier 1 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — africa_nigeria_fuel_subsidy_removal_2023
Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.3137, |gap|/pre_sd=1.3, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
Pre-registration
- Claim: Nigeria's May 2023 elimination of the petrol subsidy under President Tinubu produced a fiscally favourable but socially costly trajectory: federally-retained revenue rose, the primary fiscal balance improved relative to the 2018-2022 baseline, but headline CPI inflation accelerated and household real-consumption proxies weakened in the 12-24 months post-removal. The pre-registered claim is that, in a synthetic-control design with a Sub- Saharan African oil-exporter donor pool (Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea), Nigeria's primary fiscal balance share of GDP improves by at least 1.5 percentage points 2023-2025 vs synthetic counterfactual AND CPI inflation rises by at least 6 percentage points more than the synthetic counterfactual. The null counter-claim is that Nigeria's fiscal improvement is statistically indistinguishable from the donor-pool path once oil-price terms-of-trade and naira devaluation are netted out — i.e. the subsidy reform did not deliver fiscal repair distinct from windfall mechanics.
- Falsification rule: Not supported if EITHER (a) synth_did CATT on primary_fiscal_balance over 2023Q3- 2025Q4 is less than +1.5 percentage points of GDP at p_perm < 0.10, OR (b) the inflation acceleration relative to synthetic counterfactual is less than +6 percentage points cumulative, OR (c) both the fiscal and inflation effects are inside the placebo distribution (indicating the reform did not produce a detectable break).
Synthetic-control estimate
- shape: synth_did
- treated_country: NGA
- event_year: 2023
- n_donors: 3
- donor_weights (top): {'AGO': 0.6937, 'DZA': 0.3063, 'COG': 0.0}
- pre_rmse: 0.18548260748761344
- pre_period_sd: 0.245083775361187
- mean_post_gap: 0.3136971673850269
- end_period_gap: 0.04969634417188373
- post_period_years: [2023, 2024]
- placebo_p_value: 1.0
- n_placebos: 3
- method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG; imf:PCPIPCH→ cpi_inflation_yoy (outcome, n=9066)
Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:29+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Data-gated on IMF GFS quarterly fiscal series for Nigeria (often lagged) and CBN inflation data. The June-2023 naira float is a confound; the spec controls for it rather than excluding it because the political package was bundled. Run target after IMF Article IV 2025 update releases full-year 2024 fiscal data.