IESET.

Hypotheses

Every entry is pre-registered in git before any data is examined. Falsification criteria are committed alongside the spec. 1471 of 1809 are public verdicts; the rest are searchable as pre-registered, pending, or not-yet-public specs.

verdict supported partial refuted pending
axis channelfiscalregulatorymonetaryinstitutional
school outcomevindicatedrebuked· grey = pending
1809 of 1809
within current view470 supported821 partial180 refuted338 pending
HypothesisVerdictAxesSchools predictingSample
In an OECD panel 1980-2023, the 5-year cumulative growth of private credit to non-financial corporations (BIS WS_CREDIT) is positively associated with the subsequent (t+1 to t+5) volatility of non-residential fixed investment and with downward revisions to ex-ante TFP growth forecasts.
supported
+16
1980-2023
Abenomics' combined monetary-fiscal expansion lifted Japanese inflation and output partially but failed to durably escape the deflation equilibrium, consistent with NK models of near-permanent ZLB traps.
supported
2008-2020
Albania's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Argentina's December 2015 cepo lift produced a discrete official-peso devaluation and higher short-run monthly inflation, while BCRA reserves did not collapse over the next 90 days.
supported
2015-2016
Argentinian chronic inflation reflects foreign-currency obligations (dollar-denominated debt, dollarised expectations) and repeated fiscal dominance in a non-sovereign currency, not a generic 'money printing' failure.
supported
1971-2023
Argentina's 2019 PASO shock generated an immediate official-FX break, reserve loss, and inflation pass-through; the 2020 base-money expansion was followed by a lagged inflation pickup by Q4.
supported
2019-2020
Armenia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Bangladesh's apparel-export-led growth model 1985-2024 — anchored by the 1985 establishment of the EPZ regime, the MFA-quota dynamics pre-2005, the EU Everything But Arms preferences from 2008, and a sustained labour-cost advantage — produced cumulative real GDP-pc-PPP growth that converges toward the SAARC peer mean (IND, PAK, NPL) and a manufacturing value-added share rise of at least +5 percentage points 1985 to 2019.
supported
1975-2024
Japan's Abenomics programme (2012-12 onward, with three "arrows": aggressive monetary easing under Kuroda BOJ, flexible fiscal policy, growth-strategy structural reforms) produced a measurable inflation- expectations break and a labour-market tightening through 2019, but did NOT produce a sustained acceleration in real GDP-pc growth relative to the Japan 2002-2012 trend.
supported
2002-2023
Pakistan's recurring IMF-programme cycle 1988-2024 — at least 23 IMF arrangements over 36 years, including major SBA/EFF/RCF programmes 1988, 1993, 1995, 2008, 2013, 2019, 2023 — reflects a pattern of stabilisation-without-reform: short-run BoP support followed by fiscal slippage and renewed crisis.
supported
1990-2019
Australian fiscal expansion during 2008-2009 GFC response prevented recession entry, consistent with MMT claim that currency-issuer fiscal space in high-unemployment regimes produces output gains with minimal inflation cost.
supported
+8
2000-2012
Spikes in the US Baa-Aaa corporate bond spread are followed by deteriorating real activity, visible as rising unemployment and falling industrial production within twelve months.
supported
1919-2026
Bangladesh's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis was a systemic banking-and-credit rupture in the advanced-economy core (USA, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, the Eurozone periphery) with the canonical multi-metric pattern of large credit-to-GDP run-up followed by sharp output contraction, persistent unemployment, large fiscal-deficit blowout, and long real-house-price retracement.
supported
+3
2000-2018
Argentina's 2001-2002 crisis — convertibility regime collapse, December 2001 corralito freeze on bank deposits, January 2002 currency-board abandonment, sovereign default, pesification of bank balance sheets, and real-GDP contraction of >= 10% peak-to-trough — is the canonical case of a hard-peg / currency-board collapse compounded by banking-system suspension.
supported
1998-2006
The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis affected a tightly-clustered group of east-Asian economies (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines) through a common pattern of currency-peg collapse, foreign-currency-denominated bank-and-corporate balance-sheet distress, large IMF programmes, and sharp output contractions.
supported
1995-2002
Brazil's January 1999 abandonment of the crawling peg and devaluation of the real by >= 35% against USD, combined with the IMF programme negotiated in late 1998 and the legacy of the PROER bank-restructuring programme of 1995-1997, constitutes a canonical EM exchange-rate-anchor-failure case in which banking-system stress was managed without a Laeven-Valencia-coded systemic banking crisis.
supported
1995-2003
Brazil's PROER (Programme to Stimulate the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System) of 1995-1997 — interventions in Banco Nacional, Banco Económico, Banco Bamerindus, central-bank liquidity facilities, and pre-emptive bank cleanup — is a canonical case of pre-emptive bank-balance-sheet cleanup in the wake of macro stabilisation (Plano Real 1994).
supported
1992-2000
The March 2013 Cyprus banking crisis, in which uninsured depositors at Bank of Cyprus and Laiki Bank were converted to equity / written down ("bail-in"), produced a real GDP peak-to-trough decline of >= 8%, a bank-credit-to-GDP decline of >= 100 pp, an unemployment-rate rise of >= 10 pp, and required an EUR 10bn ESM programme.
supported
2007-2018
Greece 2010-2018 exhibits the canonical sovereign-banking doom-loop: sovereign-debt distress propagated through bank holdings of Greek government bonds, requiring three successive IMF/EU programmes (2010, 2012, 2015), a sovereign restructuring in 2012 (PSI), and bank recapitalisations that depressed real GDP cumulatively by >= 25% peak-to-trough.
supported
2007-2019
The 2008-2013 Irish banking crisis was a property-credit-bust event in which the Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks, and Bank of Ireland balance-sheet expansion during 2003-2007 produced a real-house-price peak-to-trough decline of >= 50%, a bank-rescue fiscal cost of >= 25% of GDP, an unemployment rate rise of >= 9 pp, and a Troika programme entry.
supported
2002-2016
Italy's 2016-2017 banking-distress episode — Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena precautionary recapitalisation in July 2017, Veneto-banks resolution in June 2017, and a peak system-wide non-performing-loan ratio above 17% — represents a protracted-NPL-overhang post-GFC banking distress case that did NOT meet the canonical full-systemic-banking-crisis threshold but DID require multiple state-aid resolution events.
supported
2010-2020
Japan's 1990-2003 banking-and-asset-bubble bust — Nikkei index decline of >= 60% peak-to-trough, real residential property price decline of >= 40%, persistent bank-NPL accumulation that required government recapitalisation in 1998 and 2003, and a "lost decade" of GDP growth averaging <= 1% — is a canonical case of a delayed-resolution banking crisis.
supported
1985-2005
In the Laeven-Valencia systemic-banking-crisis panel covering 1980-2020, four ex-ante observables jointly predict crisis onset: (i) high private-credit-to-GDP, (ii) negative current-account balance, (iii) real-effective-exchange-rate appreciation versus a 3-year trailing average, and (iv) low foreign-exchange reserve coverage of short-term external liabilities.
supported
+28
1980-2020
Latvia's 2008-2010 banking crisis — Parex Banka nationalisation in November 2008, EUR-peg defence, EUR 7.5bn IMF / EU programme, real-GDP cumulative decline of >= 20% peak-to-trough, and unemployment-rate rise of >= 13 pp — is a canonical small-open-economy hard-peg-defence + banking-rescue case from the GFC era.
supported
2003-2014
The 1988-1993 Nordic banking crises (Norway 1988-1991, Sweden 1991-1992, Finland 1991-1993) are a canonical post-deregulation credit-boom-bust panel.
supported
1985-1998
The August 1998 Russian crisis — domestic-currency sovereign default, ruble devaluation of >= 60% against USD, real-GDP contraction of >= 5%, banking-system collapse with widespread bank failures, and IMF programme entry — is the canonical EM sovereign-and-banking-twin-default case of the late 1990s.
supported
1994-2003
In the Schularick-Taylor cross-country macrohistory panel restricted to the post-1980 era, sustained acceleration of bank credit to the private non-financial sector relative to GDP raises the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis within a five-year forward window.
supported
+13
1980-2020
South Africa's August 2014 African Bank Limited curatorship — SARB-led resolution of an unsecured-consumer-credit lender, retail-deposit guarantee, good-bank / bad-bank split, no propagation to systemic banks (Standard Bank, FirstRand, Absa, Nedbank) — is a canonical case of a contained-resolution single-institution failure in an emerging market with an effective supervisory framework.
supported
2010-2018
Spain's 2012 banking-sector restructuring of the cajas (regional savings banks), including the FROB recapitalisation, the creation of SAREB (the bad-bank vehicle), and the EUR 100bn ESM bank-recapitalisation programme, occurred in response to a multi-year buildup of property-credit exposure that produced a peak-to-trough real house-price decline of >= 35%, an unemployment rate rise to >= 25%, and a government-debt run-up of >= 50 pp of GDP.
supported
2002-2016
Turkey's February 2001 banking crisis — exchange-rate-based stabilisation collapse, TRL devaluation of >= 50% against USD, real-GDP contraction of >= 5%, large IMF programme, and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency takeover of failed banks — is a canonical case of an EM exchange-rate-anchor disinflation programme failing through the banking-system channel.
supported
1998-2005
The March 2023 US regional-banking distress — Silicon Valley Bank failure 10-Mar-2023, Signature Bank failure 12-Mar-2023, First Republic Bank failure 1-May-2023, plus the Bank Term Funding Program created 12-Mar-2023 — was a duration-mismatch / uninsured-deposit-flight event triggered by the 2022-2023 Fed-tightening cycle marking long-duration AFS securities below-water.
supported
2021-2024
The US Savings & Loan crisis of 1986-1995 — closure or assistance of >= 1,000 thrifts, Resolution Trust Corporation creation in 1989, FDIC bank failures peaking in 1988-1992, estimated taxpayer cost in the USD 100-200bn range, and a Laeven-Valencia coded systemic banking crisis 1988 — was a US-domestic banking crisis with limited GDP impact.
supported
1980-1998
Vietnam's 2012-2015 banking-sector restructuring — Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) created July 2013, NPL ratio peak above 4%, mandatory mergers of weak banks, and forced central-bank acquisition of three commercial banks at zero VND in 2015 — represents a controlled-resolution emerging-market banking distress event without a full systemic crisis.
supported
2008-2018
Bhutan's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
US Biden IRA + CHIPS 2022 fiscal expansion produced measurable industrial investment gains without triggering persistent wage-price spiral once supply-side pandemic disruptions resolved.
supported
2018-2025
Periods of policy rates below inflation/GDP-growth fundamentals predict later credit-gap and house-price expansions.
supported
1980-2024
Botswana's divergence from Sub-Saharan African averages post-1966 is attributable primarily to retained pre-colonial Tswana chieftaincy institutions plus post-independence resource-rent management, rather than resource endowment alone.
supported
+5
1966-2023
Cambodia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker productivity growth through favoritism and subsidy allocation.
supported
+34
1996-2023
Higher pre-crisis bank capital buffers reduce crisis output losses without permanently lowering credit growth in high-supervision states; in weak-supervision states, nominal capital ratios do not prevent credit busts.
supported
1990-2024
Public electrification complements private-sector growth when regulatory quality is high; in low-regulatory-quality states, electricity access expansions show weaker links to manufacturing value added and business entry.
supported
1980-2024
Credit booms turn into damaging house-price cycles primarily where housing supply and permitting capacity are constrained; elastic-supply markets show smaller price booms and smaller post-boom employment losses.
supported
1990-2024
Public investment complements private investment and productivity only in high-execution states; in low government-effectiveness states, higher public capital formation predicts weaker private investment shares and no TFP improvement.
supported
1990-2024
Social spending reduces poverty more strongly when tax administration and corruption control are high; in weak-capacity states, spending growth has lower poverty elasticity and higher fiscal slippage.
supported
1980-2024
Higher tax revenue supports growth and poverty reduction when tax collection capacity and rule of law are high; above similar revenue shares in low-capacity states, marginal revenue predicts lower private investment and no poverty improvement.
supported
1980-2024
More generous unemployment benefits do not lower employment when activation spending and case-management capacity are high; without activation, generosity predicts longer unemployment duration and lower employment rates.
supported
1990-2024
Urban infrastructure investment lowers mortality and supports urban productivity only when municipal/state capacity is high; rapid urbanization without service delivery predicts worse health and weaker productivity.
supported
1990-2024
In an OECD-country panel 2014-2024, reductions in the top statutory capital- gains tax rate predict higher subsequent gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP and higher business-startup rates, controlling for corporate-tax rates, interest rates, and institutional quality.
supported
+84
2014-2024
Developmentalist catch-up growth premiums are strongest before countries reach roughly 40 percent of US GDP per capita, but the premium fades or reverses after that middle-income threshold unless market competition and rule-bound institutions strengthen.
supported
+17
1960-2024
Large central-bank government-bond purchases lower long yields without producing proportional CPI inflation when unemployment is above pre-crisis levels.
supported
1990-2024
Universal child-benefit / expanded child tax credit expansions (US ARP 2021, UK pre-2013 child benefit) reduced child poverty rates by measurable magnitudes in real time.
supported
2000-2022
Chile's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Chile and Venezuela began the 1999-2023 window at broadly comparable GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars).
supported
1999-2023
China's 1978 Deng-era reforms — Household Responsibility System in agriculture, Special Economic Zones, dual-track price liberalisation, Township and Village Enterprise reform, gradual opening to FDI and trade — produced a structural break in per-capita GDP growth rates.
supported
1965-2019
China's local-government-financing-vehicle (LGFV) debt expansion 2015-2024 — driven by post-2015 credit easing, infrastructure stimulus to offset property weakness, and 2020-2022 COVID fiscal response — produced a structural rise in non-financial-corporate debt-to-GDP and a generalised public-sector debt-to-GDP increase that is observable in BIS credit aggregates and IMF general-government debt series.
supported
2010-2024
China's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
China's strongest total factor productivity acceleration occurred during the WTO-accession period (2001-2008) linked to tariff reduction, foreign competition, and regulatory harmonisation, while the subsequent subsidy-heavy state-direction phase (post-2008, intensifying post-2015) is associated with weaker TFP growth and rising capital misallocation.
supported
1990-2020
China's post-WTO 2001 accession produced export-sector productivity gains that spilled over to domestic value chains, vindicating export-oriented industrial policy combined with selective liberalisation.
supported
1990-2019
Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether foreign-direct-investment inflows produce productivity spillovers to domestic firms rather than enclave effects.
supported
+31
1990-2020
Corbyn 2017-2019 Labour programme (rail/utility renationalisation, expanded NHS) did not produce the capital-flight or fiscal-collapse outcomes predicted by market-liberal critics in the 2017 and 2019 manifestos' IFS-modelled scenarios.
supported
2015-2020
Abolition of state cotton marketing boards predicts higher output and yield growth relative to state monopsony regimes.
supported
+24
1970-2023
Higher broad economic freedom predicts faster real GDP per-capita growth.
supported
+158
1990-2023
Higher broad economic freedom predicts higher private-investment shares.
supported
+81
1990-2023
Higher fossil-electricity shares predict lower life expectancy after controls.
supported
+200
1990-2023
Higher government consumption predicts lower unemployment.
supported
+167
1990-2023
Private-credit depth predicts higher income inequality.
supported
+158
1990-2023
Regulatory quality predicts higher private-investment shares.
supported
+91
1996-2023
Higher renewable-electricity shares predict lower child mortality.
supported
+186
1990-2023
Higher renewable-electricity shares predict faster GDP per-capita growth.
supported
+200
1990-2023
Rule of law predicts deeper private credit intermediation.
supported
+180
1996-2023
Trade openness predicts faster real GDP per-capita growth.
supported
+185
1990-2023
Cuban life expectancy and infant mortality outcomes 1960-2000 outperformed Latin American middle-income peers despite sanctions, demonstrating socialist health-system superiority.
supported
+6
1960-2000
Currency monetisation does not mechanically produce proportional consumer-price inflation in high-slack regimes; the US 2008-2019 and Japan 1995-2020 experience demonstrates the decoupling.
supported
1995-2020
Germany's Schuldenbremse (constitutional debt brake, 2009) produced lower debt-to-GDP trajectories than comparable-economy fiscal-rule-absent peers over 2009–2019, without output loss relative to the Eurozone mean.
supported
+5
2000-2019
High public-debt overhang — defined as general government gross debt exceeding 90% of GDP for at least 5 consecutive years — predicts lower private gross fixed capital formation and slower real GDP per capita growth over subsequent 30-year windows, in a broad-country panel 1970-2020.
supported
+60
1970-2020
Government deficits are associated with higher private-sector net saving, especially when current-account balances are stable; the claim is refuted if private saving does not co-move after accounting identities and valuation changes are handled.
supported
1990-2024
India's demographic transition 1990-2050 was projected (UN-DESA 1990s/2000s) to deliver a large dividend to per-capita growth.
supported
+2
1990-2023
Mexico's fertility decline (TFR 6.7 in 1970 to ~1.8 in 2023) is associated with a working- age share rise that should have translated into rising real wages 1995-2023, partially offset by US migration outflows.
supported
1990-2023
Economic-freedom indices (Fraser, Heritage) correlate positively with per-capita income levels across countries, with the strongest sub-indices being legal-system and sound-money.
supported
+38
1980-2022
Public education spending reduces inequality or improves intergenerational mobility only when housing-cost burden is low.
supported
1990-2024
ESOP (employee-stock-ownership) firms in the US post-1974 ERISA show higher survival rates and comparable productivity to matched conventional firms.
supported
1974-2023
Estonia’s radical market reforms after independence in 1991 — including a currency board, flat tax, rapid privatisation, and full trade liberalisation — generated a cumulative GDP-per-capita convergence gain of at least 15 log-points by 2024 relative to a synthetic counterfactual constructed from gradual post-Soviet reform comparators (Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan).
supported
+9
1991-2024
Ethiopia's pre-war 2000-2019 development episode combined fast real GDP per-capita growth, large child-mortality reduction, rising life expectancy, and a shift toward services employment.
supported
2000-2019
The EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals regulation (REACH, entered into force 2007 with phased registration deadlines 2010, 2013, 2018) imposed substantial fixed-cost registration requirements on chemical substances manufactured or imported above threshold tonnages.
supported
+6
2000-2023
EU Green Deal 2020-present emissions reductions have outpaced aggregate GDP growth, showing partial decoupling, but at rates still below 1.5C-consistent pathways.
supported
+10
2010-2023
EU single market 1993 produced measurable intra-EU trade, productivity, and consumer-price convergence gains consistent with the Ordoliberal view that rules-based market integration requires supranational competition enforcement.
supported
+12
1980-2010
Higher interest expenditure shares predict lower public investment or education/health spending in EU country-years outside monetary-sovereign conditions.
supported
1990-2024
Hard ceilings on farm size predict lower agricultural labour productivity after 20 years than market-determined scale.
supported
+24
1970-2023
Market opportunity and service-sector expansion predict higher female labour-force participation.
supported
+34
1990-2023
Over 50+ year horizons since the 1971 collapse of Bretton Woods, major fiat currencies (USD, GBP, EUR legacy components, JPY, AUD) have lost substantial purchasing power against hard assets (gold, broad commodity baskets, residential real estate).
supported
+1
1971-2025
The Bank of England's operational independence (May 1997, instrument-independence on monetary policy) and its post-GFC macroprudential remit (Financial Policy Committee created April 2013 under the Bank of England Act 2013) are associated with (a) lower realised UK CPI-inflation volatility 1997-2008 vs 1985-1997, (b) flatter UK credit-cycle amplitude 2014-2022 vs 2000-2007, and (c) lower exchange- rate-passthrough volatility post-1997 vs pre-1997.
supported
1985-2024
Major episodes of financial deregulation — the 1999 US Gramm-Leach- Bliley repeal of Glass-Steagall, the 1986 UK Financial Services Act ("Big Bang"), Chile's 1974-1981 banking liberalisation, Sweden's late-1980s credit-market liberalisation, and Japan's 1996-2001 Big Bang — are followed within 10 years by higher-than-baseline incidence of banking crises, measured by the Laeven-Valencia Systemic Banking Crisis Database, and by elevated credit-to-GDP gaps per BIS.
supported
+16
1970-2023
Comparing the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) median federal-funds-rate forecast from 2012 onwards (the "dot plot") against the realised effective-fed-funds path, the median dot at horizons of 2-3 years systematically over-predicted the realised rate during the 2012-2019 window (median dot consistently above the path ultimately realised) and under-predicted it during the 2021-2023 inflation surge.
supported
2012-2024
The Federal Reserve's overnight reverse-repurchase-agreement facility (ON RRP) saw usage rise from sub-USD 100bn in early 2021 to a peak above USD 2.4 trillion in December 2022, then decline to below USD 500bn by mid-2024 as Treasury bill issuance absorbed money-market-fund cash.
supported
2020-2024
Financial liberalisation (capital-account opening, domestic interest-rate deregulation, removal of credit controls) without prudential regulation (strong supervision, capital adequacy, macro-prudential buffers) raises the probability and severity of banking and currency crises, which can erase long-run market-reform gains in GDP per capita.
supported
+28
1975-2020
Deeper private financial markets predict stronger productivity and income growth by reallocating capital.
supported
+34
1980-2023
Across an unbalanced panel of OECD and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, higher firm-entry rates (new business registrations per 1000 working-age population) predict stronger subsequent 20-year total-factor-productivity growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita, human capital, and capital-deepening rates.
supported
+34
1980-2020
Credible fiscal consolidation episodes — defined as sustained primary balance improvement of at least 2% of GDP over 3 years, not reversed within 5 years, and accompanied by declining debt-to-GDP trajectories — predict stronger subsequent 10-year real GDP per capita growth and private investment than repeated discretionary fiscal stimulus in mature economies, in an OECD panel 1980-2020.
supported
+29
1980-2020
Post-2010 Southern-European departures from euro fiscal rules (Greece 2001–2009) produced the specific pattern Ordoliberal theory predicts: credibility loss, borrowing-cost spikes, and forced stabilisation on worse terms than voluntary rule-compliance would have produced.
supported
+5
2001-2019
Countries that adopted a flat personal-income-tax regime between 1994 and 2012 experienced faster real GDP per capita growth in the decade following reform than matched non-reforming peers, controlling for initial income, institutional quality, and trade openness.
supported
+12
1990-2023
Post-2008 mainstream-central-bank forward guidance affected the term structure of interest rates beyond what pure-signal rational-expectations models would predict, consistent with NK sticky-information models.
supported
2008-2017
US M2 or central-bank balance-sheet expansions predict asset-price inflation more strongly than CPI inflation over post-1990 windows.
supported
1980-2024
Since 1973, US nonfarm-business labour productivity has cumulatively outpaced real hourly compensation by a large margin, indicating a persistent productivity-compensation divergence.
supported
1973-2025
Across a global cross-country panel 1960-2023, the 10-year average rate of broad-money (M2 or equivalent national broad-money aggregate) growth is positively and strongly associated with the contemporaneous 10-year average rate of CPI inflation, with a slope close to unity net of trend real-output growth.
supported
+29
1960-2023
The Fed's 1929–1933 contraction of M2 by approximately one-third was the proximate cause of the Great Depression's severity, not a Keynesian demand-collapse failure.
supported
1925-1939
Market-compatible institutional quality predicts higher frontier quality-of-life levels.
supported
+34
1996-2023
The 2007-2009 financial crisis originated in endogenous leverage build-up (Minsky hedge→speculative→Ponzi financing transition) within financial sector balance sheets, not in exogenous shocks.
supported
+3
2000-2009
Ghana's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
R&D spending has larger high-tech export returns in countries with higher government effectiveness and rule of law.
supported
1980-2024
The 1929-1933 US Great Depression contraction would have been substantially shallower with active fiscal expansion rather than the actual deflationary fiscal stance through 1932.
supported
+12
1925-1939
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
supported
+177
2024-2024
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher household private consumption per capita after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+47
1996-2023
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
supported
+177
2024-2024
Under Financial Secretary John Cowperthwaite (1961–1971) and successors, Hong Kong pursued near-laissez-faire economic policy — no capital controls, no industrial policy, minimal tariffs, low flat taxes, and light labour regulation; between 1960 and 1997 Hong Kong's GDP per capita rose from approximately $4,000 to $26,000 (2011 PPP), converging almost fully to UK levels and surpassing most continental European economies.
supported
1960-1997
The net fiscal contribution of immigrants (taxes paid minus public services + transfers received, measured in lifetime NPV terms) varies systematically by (a) origin-country institutional quality, (b) skill level at arrival, (c) age at arrival, (d) duration of residence, and (e) legal status (working-age visa / family reunification / asylum).
supported
+3
2000-2023
India's 1991 balance-of-payments-crisis-driven liberalisation programme (Manmohan Singh's package: rupee devaluation, industrial delicensing, trade liberalisation, FDI opening, partial financial- sector reform) produced a sustained acceleration in per-capita GDP growth.
supported
1965-2019
India's Modi-era growth 2014-2024 — covering GST implementation 2017, IBC bankruptcy reform 2016, infrastructure capex push, PLI manufacturing schemes 2020-2024 — produced a per-capita GDP growth rate that is comparable to but not materially above the 2004-2013 UPA-era pre-COVID trend.
supported
+1
2004-2024
India's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Indonesia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved higher long-run real per-capita GDP growth over 1960-2019 than otherwise-comparable countries starting at similar income levels in 1960.
supported
+13
1960-2019
Mission-oriented industrial policy raises high-tech export shares and resident patenting after five to ten years, with support only if gains exceed general R&D and education trends.
supported
1990-2024
Higher discretionary intervention burden proxies predict weaker long-run prosperity growth over broad windows.
supported
+34
1980-2023
Rising state-intervention burden proxies predict lower long-run quality-of-life and income growth.
supported
+34
1980-2023
Ireland’s long-run convergence from a middle-income to a high-income economy during 1987–2024 is better predicted by trade openness, tax competitiveness, and FDI entry than by classic industrial planning.
supported
+9
1987-2024
Pre-1945 Keynes-era claims that growth would ease 'economic problem' within a century (Keynes 1930 'Possibilities for Our Grandchildren') are, by 2030, technically met in OECD per-capita output terms, inviting the degrowth reframing question.
supported
+12
1930-2023
Park Chung-hee's 1961-1979 heavy-and-chemical-industry drive in Korea (shipbuilding, steel, petrochemicals, chemicals) produced durable industrial capability that generated export competitiveness by 1985, outperforming import-substitution-industrialisation counterfactuals in Latin America across comparable decades.
supported
+3
1961-1990
Korean division 1945-present delivers a natural experiment: matched populations, geography, pre-war institutions; post-war institutional divergence explains the roughly 20x GDP-per-capita gap.
supported
1953-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger long-run real wage and income proxies.
supported
+34
1996-2023
The observed decline in the labour share of gross value added across OECD economies over 1980-2020 (typically 4-8 percentage points) is explained by a decomposable set of channels rather than a single cause: (a) capital-intensity technological change with capital and labour complementarity below unity (Karabarbounis-Neiman), (b) globalisation and import competition lowering tradable-sector wage bargaining power (Elsby-Hobijn-Sahin), (c) rising market concentration enabling markup expansion (De Loecker-Eeckhout-Unger), and (d) measurement artefacts from owner-occupier imputed-rent accounting and self-employment income allocation (Rognlie, Gollin).
supported
+14
1980-2020
Labour-market flexibilisation reforms improve unemployment outcomes in countries with strong active-labour-market-policy (ALMP) complementarities (Denmark flexicurity post-1994, Germany Agenda 2010 / Hartz I-IV 2003-2005) but produce inequality increases without commensurate employment gains in countries lacking institutional ALMP infrastructure.
supported
+9
1994-2015
The estimated reduced-form parameters of the US Phillips curve (slope on unemployment-NAIRU gap; coefficient on lagged inflation) shifted significantly between the pre-Volcker (1960Q1-1979Q3) and post-Volcker (1985Q1-2019Q4) regimes.
supported
1960-2024
Maastricht convergence criteria 1992 imposed fiscal discipline that produced lower inflation and interest-rate convergence in pre-accession EU members, consistent with the Ordoliberal principle of rules-binding monetary constitutions.
supported
+7
1985-2002
Malaysia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Maldives's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts higher real household consumption per person.
supported
+34
1996-2023
Market-led income growth predicts higher school completion over 20-year windows.
supported
+34
1990-2023
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more open capital accounts predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, stronger fiscal balances predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, stronger fiscal balances predict higher domestic savings shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, stronger fiscal balances predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger government-consumption shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger government-consumption shares predict lower domestic savings shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger government expenditure shares predict lower employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger government expenditure shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger government expenditure shares predict lower investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger public-debt shares predict lower private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
supported
+47
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible income levels predict stronger medical-capacity retention and availability.
supported
+34
1990-2023
Swedish Meidner plan / wage-earner funds 1984-1991 did not produce measurable capital flight during their brief implementation, falsifying claims that citizen ownership funds trigger disinvestment.
supported
1980-1995
higher central-bank independence predicts lower inflation volatility and stronger real wage growth over 15- to 30-year windows after controlling for fiscal dominance.
supported
1980-2024
revenue-neutral tax shifts from income taxation toward broad consumption taxation predict higher household saving and private investment, without systematically weaker lower-decile consumption growth when transfers are controlled.
supported
1990-2024
faster and more predictable contract enforcement predicts larger average firm scale, lower working-capital constraints, and higher labor productivity.
supported
1990-2024
directed-credit intensity predicts lower marginal product of capital and slower total factor productivity growth than market-priced credit allocation.
supported
1990-2024
negative real deposit rates created by interest-rate caps or high inflation reduce private saving and lower long-run domestic investment quality.
supported
1980-2024
binding fiscal rules with transparent escape clauses predict lower debt-service burdens and faster post-shock recovery than discretionary fiscal regimes at similar initial debt levels.
supported
1980-2024
fuel-subsidy reforms paired with targeted transfers produce stronger 5- to 15-year fiscal balances and social spending durability than unreformed universal subsidies.
supported
1990-2024
Mongolia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Nepal's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
The post-Fukushima nuclear phase-outs in Germany (2011-2023), Belgium (legislated 2003, accelerated 2025) and Switzerland (Energy Strategy 2050, 2017) produced an expected-loss reduction -- probability of severe accident multiplied by actuarial cost per accident (NEA 2018; Sovacool et al.
supported
+2
2011-2024
In countries where nuclear power's share of electricity generation rose materially after 1985, fossil-fuel electricity share usually fell.
supported
+3
1985-2024
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger income mobility proxies than discretionary licensing-heavy systems.
supported
+34
1996-2023
In OECD annual data from 1990 to 2022, broader collective-bargaining coverage is not associated with a material penalty to real GDP-volume growth.
supported
+32
1990-2022
Across OECD country-years, disposable-income Gini is materially lower than market-income Gini after taxes and transfers.
supported
+31
1975-2024
Across OECD country-years, disposable-income poverty rates are materially lower than market-income poverty rates at the 50 percent median-income line.
supported
+31
1975-2024
Social spending reduces poverty more effectively when active labour programmes and family benefits make up a larger spending share.
supported
1980-2024
Post-war West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder (1948-1965) reflects the combined effect of (a) Erhard's June-1948 currency reform plus immediate price-control liberalisation and (b) the 1957 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) anti-cartel law.
supported
1949-1965
Countries with very large renewable-electricity gains should also show visible economy-wide energy transition: among countries where renewable electricity share rose by at least 20 percentage points from 2000 to 2023, at least 80% should increase renewables' share of total energy by at least 5 percentage points, and the median total-energy renewable-share gain should be at least 8 percentage points.
supported
+12
2000-2023
Most large economies should show substantial carbon-intensity improvement since 1990: among the 19 country-level G20 economies with local OWID coverage, at least 75% should reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by at least 25% by 2022, and the median decline should be at least 35%.
supported
+13
1990-2022
Among a fixed panel of 20 high-income economies, per-capita CO2 emissions should mostly fall after the mid-2000s energy-transition inflection: at least 75% should reduce per-capita CO2 by at least 15% from 2005 to 2023, and the median reduction should be at least 25%.
supported
+14
2005-2023
Countries with very large internet-use diffusion after 2000 should usually also show gains in average years of schooling, consistent with broader public-goods and capability expansion.
supported
+83
2000-2022
Among countries where renewable electricity share rose by at least 15 percentage points between 2000 and 2024, fossil-fuel electricity share usually fell materially: at least 70% should show a fossil-share decline of at least 10 percentage points, and the median fossil-share change should be at most -15 percentage points.
supported
+52
2000-2024
Countries that materially raise tax revenues as a share of GDP from 2000 to 2022 should usually also achieve large child-mortality reductions, consistent with state-capacity public-goods follow-through.
supported
+65
2000-2022
State-capped medical-school or residency places predict slower physician-supply growth and weaker mortality improvement in ageing populations.
supported
+24
1990-2023
Poland's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Durable exit from extreme poverty (sustained above-poverty-line household consumption for at least 5 consecutive years) is more strongly associated with private formal-sector job creation than with the expansion of cash transfers or social-assistance programmes alone, over 15-25 year windows in low- and middle-income countries 1995-2020.
supported
+20
1995-2020
Countries maintaining long-lived food price controls or state procurement show slower agricultural value-added growth than market-priced peers.
supported
+24
1970-2023
Statutory price ceilings set below plausible market-clearing prices produce measurable shortage indicators — stockouts, queue formation, black-market emergence, quality degradation, and in monetary- expansion contexts, large divergences between official and parallel- market prices.
supported
1970-2023
In post-communist transition-economy panels 1990-2015, countries that implemented rapid mass-privatisation programmes (voucher privatisation, direct sales to insiders, and rapid SOE liquidation) experienced faster TFP growth recovery in the decade following reform than countries that pursued gradual or partial state-retention strategies, controlling for initial income, EU accession candidacy, and institutional quality.
supported
+23
1990-2015
Across a broad panel of economies 1960-2020, property-rights protection — measured by WGI Rule of Law, Fraser EFW legal-system and property-rights sub-index, and Heritage property-rights scores — predicts 40-year real income per capita growth more strongly than state investment share of GDP.
supported
+45
1960-2020
Stronger property rights and deeper credit markets predict broader long-run home access proxies.
supported
+34
1996-2024
Stronger rule-of-law and property-rights proxies predict higher control-of-corruption and social-trust governance outcomes.
supported
+34
1996-2023
Publicly owned electricity generators (EDF in France pre-privatisation, Vattenfall Sweden) achieved lower-carbon generation mixes than otherwise-matched privatised counterparts in the 1970s-1990s.
supported
+3
1970-1999
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger investment and innovation diffusion where procurement is more rule-bound.
supported
+34
1996-2023
US Federal Reserve post-2008 QE expanded base money roughly 4x without triggering broad-money expansion or consumer-price inflation until 2021, contradicting the quantity-theory mechanical transmission.
supported
2005-2021
Fed QE programmes 2008–2014 lowered long-end yields and corporate spreads, raising asset prices and stimulating investment through portfolio-rebalancing and signalling channels even at the zero lower bound.
supported
2008-2014
Broad-scope market-institution proxies predict higher long-run quality-of-life levels, reducing isolated anomaly weight.
supported
+34
1996-2023
Reduced working-time experiments (French 35-hour week 2000, Icelandic four-day-week trial 2015-2019) did not produce the catastrophic output or employment consequences predicted by standard models.
supported
+7
1995-2022
Rapid renewable electricity-share growth raises electricity prices in the short run unless fossil or nuclear backup volatility falls.
supported
1990-2024
Rwanda's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
The Philippines' business-process-outsourcing (BPO) sector — built through PEZA tax incentives, English-language workforce, and a 2005- onwards explicit industrial-policy push — produced a measurable services-led structural shift, with services value-added share of GDP rising by at least +5 percentage points 2005-2019 and per-capita GDP growth differential vs the ASEAN-5 peer mean (IDN, MYS, THA, VNM) averaging at least +0.3pp/yr over 2005-2019.
supported
2000-2024
Rogernomics (NZ) and Pinochet-era Chile produced positive macro outcomes because reforms were combined with strengthened institutions; same reforms without institutional strengthening (Russia 1990s) produced catastrophic outcomes.
supported
1973-1999
Singapore's Changi airport, SIA, port-state, and open-city strategy produced a durable air-services and visitor hub: by the pre-COVID endpoint, tourist arrivals were multiple times resident population, receipts were material, and the same economy remained extremely trade-open.
supported
+1
1981-2019
Singapore's LKY-era industrial strategy worked through disciplined openness to foreign capital and manufacturing upgrading: FDI inflows were persistently high, FDI intensity exceeded regional peers, manufacturing value added rose sharply, and manufactured exports dominated by 1990.
supported
+1
1970-1990
Singapore's LKY-era market-rule and financial-hub trajectory produced deep private credit, large FDI intensity, and high market-rule scores by the modern endpoint, consistent with an open financial-services hub rather than a closed developmental state.
supported
+1
1970-2020
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew era growth takeoff from 1965 to 1990 was not a small city-state accounting artifact: real GDP per capita grew rapidly, the level multiplied several-fold, investment rates stayed high, and the 1990 income level exceeded regional market-economy peers by a large margin.
supported
+1
1965-1990
Singapore's LKY-era human-capital and investment-promotion base was followed by a high-tech export and digital adoption profile: internet diffusion became near-universal and high-tech manufactures remained a majority of manufactured exports by the 2020s.
supported
+1
1990-2024
Singapore's LKY-era and immediate post-LKY human-capital trajectory shows a large education upgrade: PWT human-capital index roughly doubled, upper-secondary attainment rose sharply, tertiary enrolment became mass-participation, and the 2010 human-capital level reached advanced-economy territory.
supported
+2
1965-2010
The LKY-era Singapore fiscal-market model combined high national savings, relatively low tax take, fiscal surpluses, and high economic/trade-freedom scores rather than relying on a large transfer state.
supported
+1
1970-1990
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew era public-health and disciplined social-policy bundle coincided with first-world health outcome convergence by 1990: life expectancy rose strongly, infant mortality collapsed, and Singapore beat regional market-economy peers on both endpoints.
supported
+1
1965-1990
Singapore's post-LKY institutional legacy is visible in WGI data: control of corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law remain near the top of the regional peer set from 1996 to 2024.
supported
+1
1996-2024
The LKY-era Singapore model was extraordinarily trade-open rather than autarkic: trade and exports were far above GDP, trade openness beat regional peers, and manufactured exports became a dominant share by 1990.
supported
+1
1965-1990
Smallholder-dominant systems converge to higher long-run agricultural productivity than plantation-dominant systems after controlling for crop mix and land quality.
supported
+24
1970-2023
South Korea's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
For monetary sovereigns with floating exchange rates and debt in domestic currency, high public-debt ratios do not predict inflation or default absent real-resource or external-balance stress.
supported
1990-2024
Spain absorbed the 2021-2023 inflation shock with improving unemployment and GDP above its pre-COVID level by late 2023.
supported
2021-2023
Spain's 2020 COVID lockdown generated a severe GDP shock and a meaningful unemployment rise, but the unemployment-rate increase was much smaller than the output collapse implied.
supported
2019-2020
The Spanish police-recorded sexual-offence rate per 100,000 population cannot be interpreted directly across the 7 October 2022 entry into force of Ley Orgánica 10/2022 ("Ley de garantía integral de la libertad sexual", colloquially "solo sí es sí"), because that statute redefined the boundaries of the sexual-offence category: it replaced the prior distinction between "abuso sexual" (without violence/intimidation) and "agresión sexual" (with violence/intimidation) with a single consent-based "agresión sexual" offence category, broadened what conduct is prosecutable, and reorganised statistical reporting categories used by INE and the Sistema Estadístico de Criminalidad of the Ministerio del Interior.
supported
+2
2010-2023
Sri Lanka's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Higher broad tax-burden proxies predict lower control-of-corruption and trust-related governance outcomes.
supported
+34
1996-2023
The 2021 expansion of the US Child Tax Credit under the American Rescue Plan (full refundability + monthly payments + raised maximum) reduced the official + Supplemental Poverty Measure child poverty rate by at least 3 percentage points within the six-month payment window (July- December 2021), with a sharp reversion after expiration in 2022Q1.
supported
2018-2023
Higher tax revenue predicts faster growth only when it is associated with higher public investment or government effectiveness.
supported
1980-2024
Higher broad tax burden proxies predict slower disposable-income and consumption growth.
supported
+34
1990-2023
Thailand's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
In the cross-country panel of advanced economies post-1980, the top-1 percent share of total pre-tax national income exhibits a structural break upward in countries that adopted the Anglo-American liberalisation package (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and a flat-or-mildly- rising trajectory in coordinated-market economies (Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands), even though both groups experienced comparable real GDP per capita growth.
supported
+14
1980-2020
Argentina's manufacturing sector did not benefit durably from Mercosur (1991 onward) — manufacturing share of GDP fell over 1995-2019 from approximately 18% to 14%, a trajectory broadly consistent with non-Mercosur Latin American comparators (suggesting global deindustrialisation, not Mercosur-induced gain).
supported
+2
1990-2019
Bangladesh's preferential duty-free, quota-free access to EU markets under the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) scheme — strengthened by Multi-Fibre Arrangement phase-out completion in 2005 and EBA-rules-of-origin simplification effective 2011 — produced a structural acceleration in Bangladesh apparel exports and manufacturing-share-of-GDP over the 2005-2019 window.
supported
1995-2019
The Colombia-United States Trade Promotion Agreement, effective 2012-05-15, did not produce a measurable trade-openness or manufacturing-export acceleration for Colombia over the 2012-2019 pre-COVID window.
supported
2002-2019
Egypt's FTA cascade (EU Association Agreement 2004, Agadir Agreement 2007, COMESA Free Trade Area 1998 with full implementation 2009, US Qualifying Industrial Zones 2004 enabling duty-free apparel exports to the US under Israeli content rules) raised Egyptian trade-openness modestly over 2000-2010 before the 2011 revolution and subsequent macroeconomic instability eroded the gains.
supported
1995-2019
India's 1991 tariff-liberalisation component (mean weighted applied tariff fell from ~80% in 1990 to ~30% by 1997 and ~13% by 2007) raised Indian merchandise-exports-to-GDP and trade- openness over the 1992-2007 window in a structural-break pattern.
supported
1980-2019
NAFTA (effective 1994-01-01) raised Mexican manufacturing value-added and merchandise-export intensity over the 1994-2007 pre-China-shock window relative to a synthetic-control pool of Latin American non-NAFTA economies.
supported
+7
1985-2007
South Africa's SADC trade-protocol implementation (effective 2000, asymmetric tariff phase-down completed 2008 for the SADC developing-country members and 2012 for South Africa) raised bilateral intra-SADC trade for ZAF but did not produce a measurable acceleration in aggregate ZAF trade-openness over 2000-2019.
supported
+4
1990-2019
The Trump administration's Section-301 China tariffs (2018-2019, cumulating to >USD 350bn of imports under tariff by end 2019), largely retained by the Biden administration through 2024, reduced US-China bilateral trade-openness while raising US trade with bilateral substitutes (Vietnam, Mexico, Taiwan).
supported
2010-2024
Higher trade openness raises short-run unemployment volatility but lowers average unemployment in flexible or high-capacity labour markets.
supported
1980-2024
Turkey's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Dubai Internet City and the UAE digital-state strategy were followed by near-universal internet adoption and a measurable high-tech export presence, even if the high-tech export share remains far below Singapore-style electronics hubs.
supported
2000-2024
Dubai/UAE aviation, airport, and tourism policy achieved exceptional pre-COVID visitor-hub scale by Gulf standards, visible in absolute arrivals, arrivals per resident, and arrivals relative to GCC peers.
supported
2015-2019
The UAE's education, migration, and labour-market reforms were followed by a large rise in female labour-force participation, placing the UAE above the GCC peer median by the 2020s.
supported
1990-2024
The UAE's free-zone, commercial-court, and state-capacity model is visible in relatively high government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule-of-law, and market-rule scores compared with many resource-rent peers.
supported
1996-2024
The UAE's Jebel Ali and free-zone strategy produced a highly open trade and investment platform by Gulf standards: trade intensity is high, exceeds the GCC peer median, FDI intensity has become material, and trade-freedom scores remain high.
supported
1985-2024
The UAE diversification model reduced direct oil-rent dependence and expanded services, while still retaining hydrocarbon-export exposure.
supported
1990-2024
The 2016 Brexit referendum shock produced a clear near-term UK inflation pass-through and a squeeze in CPI-deflated weekly earnings over the 2016Q2-2017Q4 event window.
supported
2016-2017
The 2022 UK energy-price shock produced high CPIH inflation and a material CPI-deflated weekly-earnings squeeze.
supported
2021-2023
The UK's September 1992 ERM exit was followed by a rapid real-output rebound and disinflation, while unemployment lagged the recovery rather than improving immediately.
supported
1992-1993
The UK furlough-era labour-market intervention coincided with a huge 2020 output collapse but contained unemployment and allowed output to return near its pre-pandemic level by late 2021.
supported
2019-2021
Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.
supported
2022-2023
Post-1980 OECD countries with higher union density and collective-bargaining coverage maintained lower inequality growth without measurable cumulative growth penalty.
supported
+16
1980-2023
Universal healthcare systems across OECD produce lower per-capita health spending than the US multi-payer system at equal or better outcome measures.
supported
+17
2010-2023
US GDP growth 1980-2020 did not absolutely decouple from territorial CO2 emissions once offshored manufacturing emissions are attributed; 'decoupling' claim dissolves under consumption-based accounting.
supported
1980-2020
US WWII fiscal expansion 1941-1945 (debt reaching 106% of GDP) did not produce sustained inflation once price controls were lifted and real capacity returned, consistent with MMT's real-constraint view.
supported
1939-1955
Uzbekistan's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift.
supported
1990-2023
Vietnam's Doi Moi 1986 reforms and subsequent export-oriented strategy replicated the East Asian developmental-state pattern and produced three decades of above-peer-region growth.
supported
+3
1986-2019
Vietnam's post-Doi Moi development path from 1990 to 2023 combined rapid real income growth, human-development gains, trade integration, and a labour-market shift toward services.
supported
1990-2023
Vietnam's post-Doi Moi economic growth (1986-2020) is more strongly associated with private-sector enterprise entry, trade openness, and market-oriented reforms than with state-owned-enterprise (SOE) expansion or continued state direction.
supported
+2
1986-2020
Volcker disinflation 1979-1982 produced output costs (unemployment rising to 10.8%) that mainstream models systematically underestimated, consistent with post-Keynesian insistence that disinflation costs are real and persistent.
supported
1976-1985
Volcker's 1979–1982 disinflation produced output recovery by 1984 once inflation expectations re-anchored, vindicating the monetarist claim that credible rule-based tightening imposes finite transition costs.
supported
1979-1987
Argentine Menem-era rapid privatisation and opening 1991–2001 produced a decade of growth followed by collapse — underperforming the comparable-size Korean developmental-state path.
supported
1991-2001
Large electricity-access expansion from 1990 to 2023 should generally coincide with positive average real GDP-per-capita growth rather than being bought at the price of stagnation.
supported
+48
1990-2023
Countries with large electricity-access gains from 1990 to 2023 should usually record substantial gains in life expectancy over the same period.
supported
+50
1990-2023
Countries with large electricity-access gains from 1990 to 2023 should usually show large under-5 mortality reductions over the same development window.
supported
+50
1990-2023
High-remittance economies should often show non-negative average private-consumption growth across the global shock years 2009, 2020, and 2021.
supported
+25
2000-2023
High-remittance economies should usually avoid extreme average current-account deficits over 2000-2023 because worker transfers directly finance external balances.
supported
+32
2000-2023
High-remittance economies should more often than not avoid negative average real GDP-per-capita growth across the global shock years 2009, 2020, and 2021.
supported
+31
2000-2023
Large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should generally be compatible with positive average real GDP-per-capita growth.
supported
+16
2000-2023
Countries with large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should usually register sizable growth in output per worker.
supported
+15
2000-2023
Countries with large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should usually show a visible shift of employment toward services.
supported
+16
2000-2023
US 10-year minus 2-year Treasury yield-curve inversions are followed by meaningful labour-market weakening in most completed post-1976 episodes.
supported
1976-2026
Yugoslav worker-self-managed firms 1965-1980 achieved productivity growth comparable to southern European market peers at similar development stages, demonstrating that self-management can coexist with market allocation.
supported
1965-1980
Active labour-market policies with strong conditionality predict faster return to employment than passive benefit systems.
partial
1990-2023
Botswana's celebrated 1966-2010 institutional-exceptionalism case showed signs of diminishing returns post-2014 as natural-diamond demand softened (lab-grown competition, shifting consumer preferences, Indian polishing-industry restructuring) and economic diversification efforts produced limited results.
partial
2000-2024
Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (construction 2011-2024, partial commissioning from 2022) was projected to raise generation capacity by ~5 GW and shift the country's electricity-supply frontier outward.
partial
+1
2005-2024
The November 2020 - November 2022 Ethiopia-Tigray war produced a sharp economic contraction in Ethiopia visible in real GDP growth deceleration, FX-reserve depletion, birr depreciation, sovereign-spread widening, and humanitarian-aid-distortion of the external accounts.
partial
2010-2024
Ghana's December 2022 IMF Extended Credit Facility programme, paired with the December 2022 domestic-debt-exchange (DDEP) and 2023 external-debt restructuring, produced a measurable but partial macro-stabilisation: cedi depreciation slowed, inflation decelerated from a peak above 50% YoY, and primary fiscal balance moved toward surplus.
partial
2014-2026
Kenya's 2007 launch of M-Pesa and subsequent build-out of mobile-money rails (2007-2024) produced a measurable acceleration in financial inclusion, household consumption smoothing, and informal-to-formal transition relative to Sub-Saharan African peers without comparable mobile-money penetration.
partial
+2
2000-2024
Mauritius's 1970-launched Export Processing Zone, sequenced upper-middle-income transition through textiles → tourism → financial services, and post-2000 services-export diversification produced a sustained convergence pattern that distinguishes it from SSA peers.
partial
1975-2024
Nigeria's May 2023 elimination of the petrol subsidy under President Tinubu produced a fiscally favourable but socially costly trajectory: federally-retained revenue rose, the primary fiscal balance improved relative to the 2018-2022 baseline, but headline CPI inflation accelerated and household real-consumption proxies weakened in the 12-24 months post-removal.
partial
2010-2025
The CBN's October 2022 - February 2023 naira-redesign demonetisation programme (recall of 200/500/1000 notes, replacement with new design, partial deadline rollback by Supreme Court) caused a measurable but transitory contraction in cash-intensive informal-sector activity, a temporary spike in payment-system volume on NIBSS rails, and a documented shock to first-quarter 2023 retail and consumption indicators.
partial
2018-2024
Rwanda's post-1995 reconstruction trajectory under the RPF/Kagame government produced a multi-decade growth premium versus Sub-Saharan African peers, accompanied by sharp improvements in life expectancy, child mortality, and electrification, and a comparatively idiosyncratic civil-liberties regression captured in V-Dem and Freedom House.
partial
+1
1990-2024
South Africa's persistent electricity-supply crisis (Eskom load-shedding episodes 2007, 2014-2015, 2018-2024) caused a measurable and cumulative manufacturing-sector contraction and total-factor-productivity drag, with effects intensifying in the post-2018 phase as load-shedding hours per year escalated to record levels.
partial
+1
2000-2024
Sub-Saharan African economies' post-2020 COVID recovery trajectories diverged systematically along three dimensions: oil/commodity exporters (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon) underperformed on inflation; fiscally-constrained economies in debt distress (Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya) underperformed on growth; and tourism-dependent or fiscally- cushioned economies (Mauritius, Botswana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire) recovered faster.
partial
+24
2015-2024
Countries that impose agricultural export bans during price spikes show larger domestic price volatility and lower long-run farm investment.
partial
1990-2023
Agricultural trade openness predicts more stable domestic food availability (lower variance) than autarkic food self-sufficiency targets.
partial
1990-2023
Declines in agricultural employment share predict faster GDP-per-capita growth only when manufacturing or services productivity rises at the same time.
partial
1980-2024
Apprenticeship systems with strong employer-chamber governance predict lower youth unemployment and better wage-employment matching.
partial
1990-2023
Argentine convertibility and subsequent collapse (Menem 1991–2001) reflects rule-based money's appeal combined with fixed-regime rigidity risk that Austrian theory predicts.
partial
1991-2005
Argentina has experienced 12 distinct episodes of annual inflation exceeding 50% since 1945, each preceded by a fiscal deficit exceeding 4% of GDP financed via central bank money creation.
partial
1950-2024
South Korea's chaebol-reform attempts under Moon Jae-in (2017-2022, fair-trade enforcement, 2018 commercial-act amendments, minimum wage hikes) and Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-present, partial rollback) did NOT produce a measurable de-concentration of the Korean economy.
partial
2010-2024
Sri Lanka's April 2022 sovereign default — preceded by FX-reserve depletion, Rajapaksa-era tax cuts (2019), unfunded fertilizer-import ban (2021), and tourism collapse (2020-2021) — produced a measurable growth contraction with real GDP falling at least 7% in 2022, 33%+ CPI inflation peak in 2022, and the March 2023 IMF EFF arrangement produced a partial 2023 stabilisation visible in inflation deceleration to under 10% by year-end and FX-reserve recovery to at least 3 months of imports by end-2023.
partial
2015-2024
From 2000 to 2023, Asian economies that continued market-oriented institutional reform from a low starting GDP-per-capita base — China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Cambodia — converged rapidly on Western income levels, with cumulative log GDP-per-capita-PPP growth materially greater than incumbent Western economies.
partial
+18
2000-2023
Fiscal consolidation within three years after recessions lowers employment and potential-output paths relative to countries that delay consolidation until recovery.
partial
1980-2024
Post-2010 European fiscal consolidation intensity negatively predicts subsequent output-gap closure speed and cumulative output over the 2010-2019 window, with the effect concentrated in the Eurozone periphery where the combination of sovereign spreads, no monetary- policy-at-country-level, and high initial output gaps produced a multiplier larger than the pre-crisis consensus assumed.
partial
+15
2008-2019
Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.
partial
+8
1970-2024
Australian superannuation guarantee 1992 produced broad-based retirement-savings expansion without the crowd-out or private-saving collapse predicted by some critics.
partial
+14
1980-2023
Monetary expansion episodes predict rising wealth shares for asset holders before wage earners, with the lag proportional to financial-market depth.
partial
1990-2023
Large-scale central-bank sovereign-debt purchases predict negative real returns for new savers while protecting incumbent bondholders and leveraged asset owners.
partial
1990-2023
Monetary expansion transmitted through financial centres predicts widening urban-rural income gaps before wage catch-up in peripheral regions.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with less independent central banks show higher average inflation and larger post-crisis inflation overshoots than independent-central-bank peers.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with higher realised inflation and stricter capital controls show higher cryptocurrency adoption as a share of remittances and savings.
partial
1990-2023
Sharp currency devaluations raise imported-goods prices for consumers before raising export-sector wages, widening the consumption-wage gap temporarily.
partial
1990-2023
Dollarised or currency-board economies show lower inflation persistence and smaller post-shock inflation variance than independent-float peers with weak central-bank credibility.
partial
1990-2023
Post-1971 fiat-standard recessions show larger amplitude and more frequent financial crises than Bretton Woods or pre-1914 recessions, controlling for structural change.
partial
1990-2023
Countries on classical gold-standard or currency-board arrangements before 1914 or 1990s show lower inflation variance and smaller wealth-share volatility than fiat-standard peers.
partial
1990-2023
Direct-to-household monetary transfers predict consumption surges but not sustained investment or productivity improvements.
partial
1990-2023
Once inflation expectations de-anchor, the output cost of re-anchoring exceeds the cost of maintaining a credible low-inflation regime from the start.
partial
1990-2023
Higher inflation predicts larger welfare losses for households with consumption baskets skewed toward food, transport, and housing (non-durables) than for asset-heavy households.
partial
1990-2023
Higher inflation volatility predicts larger declines in real bank-deposit balances for low-wealth households relative to high-wealth households with diversified assets.
partial
1990-2023
Rapid monetary expansion predicts larger increases in house-price-to-income ratios and rent burdens for young cohorts than for incumbent homeowners.
partial
1990-2023
Money is long-run neutral in price level but not in capital structure; countries with stop-go monetary policy show permanently lower capital-per-worker than stable-money peers.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with longer uninterrupted low-inflation regimes show lower inflation-risk premia in long bond yields and lower nominal interest rates at given real rates.
partial
1990-2023
Money creation dominated by bank credit flows predicts asset-price inflation; money creation dominated by fiscal transfer flows predicts goods inflation.
partial
1990-2023
In a long-run cross-country panel 1960-2019, economies with persistently high gross domestic savings rates (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) generate more TFP growth per unit of investment than economies whose investment is predominantly financed by foreign credit inflows or domestic credit expansion.
partial
+18
1960-2019
High seigniorage financing of government spending predicts lower private financial-deepening ratios and weaker long-run investment.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with lower and more stable inflation over 30-year windows show smaller increases in disposable-income Gini than countries with high and volatile inflation.
partial
1990-2023
Prolonged zero-lower-bound policy predicts rising pension-fund underfunding and higher contribution demands on younger workers relative to retired beneficiaries.
partial
1990-2023
Post-2008 countries with larger automatic stabilisers (Nordics, Germany short-time work) experienced milder output and employment contractions than countries with weaker welfare-state cushions (UK, southern Eurozone).
partial
+12
2005-2017
Across countries 1990-2020, faster insolvency and bankruptcy resolution — measured by years to resolve, recovery rate, and strength of insolvency framework index — predicts stronger post- shock productivity recovery than discretionary rescue policy (bailouts, forbearance, and evergreening).
partial
+34
1990-2020
Higher collective-bargaining coverage lowers in-work poverty and low-wage incidence with no youth-employment penalty in coordinated systems, but is refuted if coverage mainly prices out young or low-skill workers.
partial
1990-2024
Bilateral investment treaties predict higher FDI inflows, especially in countries with weaker domestic rule of law.
partial
1990-2023
In BIS country-quarter panels, an elevated credit-to-GDP gap predicts a subsequent real residential property-price reversal.
partial
+14
1970-2025
Credit-gap booms combined with house-price booms predict higher unemployment 2-4 years later.
partial
1980-2024
Household debt-service stress predicts subsequent private-credit slowdown.
partial
+11
1999-2025
Household debt-service stress predicts slower real house-price appreciation.
partial
+11
1999-2025
Real effective exchange-rate appreciation predicts lower export product variety and weaker goods-export growth over the next 2 years.
partial
1980-2024
Large real effective exchange-rate appreciations mean-revert.
partial
+15
1994-2026
The Sep 2021 introduction of Bitcoin as legal tender plus the Chivo state-wallet launch and $30 per-adult BTC buy-in failed to produce a statistically significant change in El Salvador's total remittance volume or in the aggregate price of remittance services (World Bank remittance-cost series) relative to Central American and Caribbean peer countries.
partial
+3
2010-2025
Bolivia's 2020-2024 Arce administration inherited a depleted-FX-reserve, declining-gas-export economy and attempted to defend the boliviano-USD peg through capital controls, fuel subsidies, and quasi-fiscal central- bank intervention.
partial
2014-2024
Bolivia's 2006-2019 Morales-MAS era (May 2006 hydrocarbons nationalisation, renegotiated gas-export contracts with Brazil and Argentina, expansion of cash-transfer programmes Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad, fixed-currency-peg-style stabilisation, large social investment) produced a measurable poverty-reduction and growth record relative to a Latin American resource-dependent peer pool.
partial
+2
1995-2024
Chile rejected two proposed constitutions during the Boric administration: the 2022 left-leaning convencion text (rejected 62% in September 2022) and the 2023 right-leaning consejo text (rejected 55% in December 2023).
partial
2014-2026
Strict building-height restrictions near transit nodes predict lower agglomeration productivity and higher office or housing costs.
partial
+24
1970-2023
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).
partial
+1
2010-2025
El Salvador's fiscal trajectory under Bukele (2019-2024) shows improvement in the primary balance and stabilisation (or modest decline) in debt-to-GDP after the 2020 COVID spike, achieved via a combination of: (a) the 2022-2023 bond buyback / liability-management operations, (b) the 2023 tax reform (lower rates with base-broadening and improved compliance), and (c) IMF-signalled fiscal consolidation culminating in the Dec 2024 $1.4bn Extended Fund Facility.
partial
+1
2010-2025
El Salvador's ~98% homicide-rate decline from 103/100k (2015) to 2.4/100k (2023) — with the sharpest decline occurring after the Mar 2022 régimen de excepción and the Jan 2023 CECOT opening — is causally attributable in material part to the Bukele-era mass-incarceration regime (régimen de excepción + Plan Control Territorial + CECOT).
partial
+5
2005-2025
El Salvador's second Bukele term (post-2024 inauguration, with continued régimen-de-excepción and worsening institutional-quality scores) maintains FDI inflows, GDP growth, and tourism arrivals trajectories established in 2019-2024 despite mounting authoritarianism critique (V-Dem electoral-democracy decline, WGI rule-of-law score continuing to fall, Freedom House "partly free" downgrade).
partial
+1
2019-2026
Among high-income frontier economies 1980-2020, countries with higher business dynamism — measured by firm-entry rates, job- reallocation rates, and low incumbent-employment share — maintain stronger real income growth per capita than countries with low churn and high incumbent protection.
partial
+18
1980-2020
Canadian GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) diverged negatively from a donor pool of resource-plus-advanced-anglophone-plus- small-open-developed economies (USA, AUS, NZL, GBR, NOR, CHE) starting around 2015, such that the Canadian per-capita trajectory 2015-2023 is materially below a country-and-year-fixed-effect counterfactual matched on pre-2015 level and covariates.
partial
+1
2000-2023
Canadian real household disposable income per capita has stagnated or grown more slowly than in comparable resource-plus-anglophone-plus-small- open-developed economies (USA, AUS, NZL, GBR, NOR, CHE) over 2015-2023, once adjusted for CPI and household size.
partial
+1
2000-2023
Capital-market depth raises patenting and high-growth entry when rule of law and disclosure quality are high; in weak-institution settings, market depth predicts volatility and crisis exposure more than innovation.
partial
1980-2024
Public childcare and family benefits raise female labour-force participation and fertility only when housing costs and childcare supply constraints are not binding; high transfers without supply expansion have weaker fertility/LFP effects.
partial
1990-2024
Public investment raises infrastructure and growth outcomes only where corruption control is high; where corruption control is low, higher public investment predicts debt accumulation without road, electricity, or growth gains.
partial
1980-2024
Education spending raises human capital and later productivity only where governance quality and teacher/system capacity are high; spending alone is weakly related to outcomes in low-capacity systems.
partial
1980-2024
Energy-shock relief works better as targeted transfers or temporary tax smoothing in high-capacity states; administered price controls/subsidies predict shortages, fiscal slippage, or lower investment where pass-through is suppressed for long periods.
partial
1990-2024
Government size only drags growth when the marginal increase is government consumption or wage-bill heavy; public investment-heavy expansions in high-capacity states have neutral or positive five-year productivity effects.
partial
1990-2024
Government spending has a nonmonotonic relationship with growth: moderate-to-large spending is compatible with growth in high-effectiveness states, while similarly large spending in low-effectiveness states predicts lower private investment and slower GDP per capita growth.
partial
1980-2024
Green industrial policy complements markets when it lowers renewable costs or deployment without raising industrial electricity prices; where grid integration capacity is weak, higher renewable shares predict manufacturing-share losses through energy-price channels.
partial
1990-2024
Universal or broad health coverage improves health outcomes without reducing employment when financed through broad-based taxes or social insurance and managed by high-capacity institutions; payroll-heavy financing with weak administration predicts employment drag.
partial
1990-2024
Public health spending reduces mortality and raises life expectancy when corruption control is high; low corruption-control states show weaker health outcome gains per spending point.
partial
1980-2024
Industrial-policy intensity proxies such as R&D spending or high-tech export targeting predict durable high-tech export shares only above a government-effectiveness threshold; below it, the same policy intensity predicts concentration without upgrading.
partial
1980-2024
Regulation complements markets when regulatory quality is high: higher regulatory quality predicts more business entry and less informality; high procedural burden with low regulatory quality predicts lower entry and weaker employment growth.
partial
1990-2024
R&D spending converts into patenting and productivity only when private finance and regulatory quality are adequate; otherwise R&D intensity is weakly associated with innovation outcomes.
partial
1980-2024
Infant-industry protection works when tariffs are temporary and followed by export-share gains; persistent tariffs without export discipline predict lower consumption growth and no high-tech export upgrading.
partial
1980-2024
Tariff reductions increase consumption and export variety in high-rule-of-law and high-human-capital countries, but generate weak or negative medium-run growth in low-capacity countries with shallow finance.
partial
1980-2024
Transport infrastructure raises regional productivity and employment where procurement quality and maintenance capacity are high; low-capacity buildouts show weaker productivity gains and higher debt per road-km improvement.
partial
1990-2024
Capital-account liberalisation predicts faster growth only above rule-of-law and regulatory-quality thresholds; below them it raises crisis frequency.
partial
1990-2023
Capital account openness supports long-run real GDP per capita growth only above institutional-quality thresholds; below them it raises the frequency and severity of financial crises without delivering offsetting growth gains, in a broad-country panel 1970-2020.
partial
+60
1970-2020
More restrictive capital-account regimes reduce crisis incidence and exchange-rate volatility without lowering long-run investment or GDP growth in emerging markets.
partial
1980-2024
Higher capital-gains tax rates predict lower firm-entry rates, fewer IPOs, and slower venture-capital formation.
partial
1990-2023
Increased capital mobility after 1980 (capital account liberalisation across OECD) is correlated with declining worker bargaining power, measured via union density and strike frequency.
partial
+14
1980-2020
Revenue-neutral carbon taxes (with offsetting payroll or income tax cuts) predict lower emissions without net employment loss compared to cap-and-trade with grandfathering.
partial
1990-2023
Taxes on cash transactions or restrictions on cash use predict higher shadow-economy shares and lower financial inclusion for the unbanked.
partial
1990-2023
In Maddison long-run country panels, catch-up growth is materially faster below roughly 40 percent of US GDP per capita than above that threshold, but the post-threshold premium is small enough that the developmentalist catch-up advantage fades over longer 10-year windows.
partial
+16
1960-2018
Central-bank digital currencies with high surveillance design predict lower adoption relative to private digital payment methods.
partial
1990-2023
Larger central-bank balance sheets relative to GDP predict higher bond-market volatility during normalisation attempts and weaker transmission.
partial
1990-2023
Across countries 1990-2023, higher de jure and de facto central-bank independence predicts lower mean CPI inflation and lower inflation volatility, conditional on a basic set of controls (exchange-rate regime, trade openness, fiscal balance, initial inflation level).
partial
+23
1990-2023
Childcare and family-benefit expansions raise female labor-force participation and fertility without lowering maternal employment; refuted if cash-only benefits reduce employment or fail to move fertility.
partial
1990-2024
Pinochet-era Chile's monetary stabilisation (post-1975, advised by Chicago Boys) produced lower inflation and higher growth than contemporaneous Latin American countries using heterodox stabilisation.
partial
+2
1970-1990
Chile’s long-run income convergence is stronger after the combination of market reforms (1975–1990) and democratic institutional repair (1990 onward) than under the earlier state-led import-substitution regime (1950–1973).
partial
+6
1950-2024
China's demographic transition — driven by the legacy of the one-child policy (1980-2015), low post-relaxation fertility despite three-child policy (2021), and the realisation of the working-age-population peak around 2014-2015 — is now empirically visible in macro outcomes 2020-2024.
partial
2000-2024
China's "Made in China 2025" industrial-policy programme (announced May 2015, targeting 10 priority sectors with subsidies, state-directed investment, and indigenous-innovation procurement) produced measurable capability gains in manufacturing value-added share, high-tech export share, and R&D intensity from 2015 to 2024 — but did not break the global manufacturing-value-added share growth trend already in place pre-2015.
partial
+1
2005-2024
China's December-2022 abrupt reopening from dynamic-zero-COVID produced a partial-and-fading recovery in 2023 rather than a sharp pent-up-demand rebound.
partial
2017-2024
Pre-1914 classical-gold-standard episodes (excluding wartime suspensions) show lower long-run average inflation than comparable-length fiat-regime samples (post-1971) in the same or equivalent economies, even if short-run price-level volatility is higher under gold.
partial
1870-2020
Across countries 2000-2022, higher WGI Political Stability (PV.EST) and Rule of Law (RL.EST) jointly predict higher subsequent FDI inflows as a share of GDP, conditional on initial income, market size, openness, and natural-resource rents.
partial
+54
2000-2022
Clinton welfare reform 1996 (TANF) reduced the income floor for single-parent households in recessions and raised deep-poverty rates among children, consistent with democratic-socialist critique of means-tested conditionality.
partial
1990-2012
Sectoral collective-bargaining extension to non-signatory firms predicts higher unemployment in small firms and reduced entry.
partial
1990-2023
Commodity exporters that opened manufacturing and services trade diversified faster and showed lower output volatility than those that maintained resource nationalism.
partial
1990-2023
US dollar commodity invoicing predicts lower exchange-rate risk for non-US producers than invoicing in volatile local currencies.
partial
1990-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger productivity growth through faster technology adoption.
partial
+34
1996-2023
More competitive telecom markets predict lower internet prices, faster broadband penetration, and smaller urban-rural digital gaps.
partial
1990-2023
Higher market openness and regulatory quality predict broader telecom and internet diffusion.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts lower broad house-price pressure through construction competition.
partial
+34
1996-2024
Lower statutory corporate tax rates predict higher business investment and faster capital deepening, with larger effects in open economies.
partial
1990-2023
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, state allocation of resources — measured by government consumption share, state- enterprise share of output, and public-investment share — has negative long-run effects on total-factor-productivity growth when corruption is high (WGI Control of Corruption below median), but neutral or positive effects when corruption is low (above median).
partial
+49
1980-2020
State ownership has negative growth effects where corruption is high and neutral or mixed effects where governance is strong.
partial
1990-2023
Costa Rica's 1950-2023 development trajectory reaches US-comparable life expectancy at birth (within 1.5 years of US LE in 2010-2020) at roughly one-fifth the per-capita CO2 emissions and a UNDP HDI score within 0.05 of the US level by 2020.
partial
1950-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger control-of-corruption scores than discretionary crony-capitalist allocation.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Restrictions on cross-border data flows predict lower digital-service exports, higher cloud-computing costs, and reduced foreign SaaS adoption.
partial
1990-2023
Capital-account openness predicts higher FDI inflows.
partial
+173
1990-2023
Electricity access predicts lower child mortality.
partial
+187
1990-2023
Electricity access predicts faster GDP per-capita growth.
partial
+205
1990-2023
Higher energy use per capita predicts higher life expectancy.
partial
+170
1990-2023
FDI inflows predict higher high-tech export intensity.
partial
+174
1990-2023
Stronger fiscal balances predict slower GDP growth if consolidation is contractionary.
partial
+151
1990-2023
Stronger fiscal balances predict higher private investment if confidence effects dominate.
partial
+65
1990-2023
Higher inequality predicts weaker employment outcomes.
partial
+157
1990-2023
Higher inequality predicts slower GDP per-capita growth.
partial
+165
1990-2023
Higher government-consumption shares predict lower child mortality.
partial
+167
1990-2023
Higher government-consumption shares predict higher life expectancy.
partial
+179
1990-2023
Higher government consumption predicts lower private investment if crowding out dominates.
partial
+93
1990-2023
Government effectiveness predicts higher FDI inflows.
partial
+191
1996-2023
Government effectiveness predicts faster GDP per-capita growth.
partial
+198
1996-2023
Government effectiveness predicts higher high-tech export intensity.
partial
+176
1996-2023
Government effectiveness predicts higher manufacturing value-added share.
partial
+187
1996-2023
Private credit depth predicts higher high-tech export intensity.
partial
+169
1990-2023
Public debt does not mechanically predict higher inflation.
partial
+99
1990-2023
Higher public debt is associated with lower unemployment if deficits accommodate demand.
partial
+95
1990-2023
More flexible regulation predicts higher employment-to-population ratios.
partial
+157
1990-2023
Regulatory quality predicts higher employment.
partial
+177
1996-2023
Rule of law predicts higher high-tech export intensity.
partial
+177
1996-2023
Smaller-government EFW scores predict faster GDP per-capita growth.
partial
+158
1990-2023
Sound-money institutions predict lower inflation.
partial
+157
1990-2023
Higher tax revenue shares predict lower child mortality.
partial
+152
1990-2023
Higher tax revenue shares predict lower inequality.
partial
+133
1990-2023
Higher tax revenue shares predict higher life expectancy through public capacity.
partial
+153
1990-2023
Tertiary enrollment predicts higher high-tech export intensity.
partial
+159
1990-2023
Freedom to trade predicts higher high-tech export intensity.
partial
+153
1990-2023
Trade openness predicts higher manufacturing value-added share.
partial
+176
1990-2023
Cryptocurrency adoption is highest in countries with capital controls, high inflation, and weak property-rights protection, serving as a market-discovered money substitute.
partial
1990-2023
Cuba's life expectancy and infant mortality outcomes by 2000 were strong enough to rank competitively not just against Latin American peers, but against a broad ex-ante fixed pool of non-Latin-American market economies; if Cuba fails that harder comparison, the "socialist health-system superiority" story is more regional than universal.
partial
+15
1960-2000
Cuban post-1991 Special Period shows that socialist planning can maintain health and education outputs under severe external shock better than market economies of similar GDP per capita.
partial
+3
1991-2000
Unofficial dollarisation or currency-board arrangements predict lower inflation and smaller devaluation risk than independent floats with weak institutions.
partial
1990-2023
Currency-union members with asymmetric business cycles show higher unemployment persistence than members with synchronised cycles.
partial
1990-2023
Currency-union membership predicts higher bilateral trade volumes than flexible-exchange-rate pairs with similar income and distance.
partial
1990-2023
The long-run prosperity gap between the Czech Republic and Slovakia since their 1993 dissolution is better explained by divergence in market institutions and FDI openness than by state-led industrial strategy.
partial
+5
1993-2024
Removal of dairy production quotas predicts output expansion and price normalisation without persistent farm-income collapse.
partial
+24
1980-2023
Lower out-of-pocket health-spending shares predict lower avoidable mortality and less medical impoverishment after total health spending is controlled; refuted if decommodification has no independent outcome gain.
partial
1980-2024
Output or energy-use contractions do not have to reduce basic-needs outcomes when health, education, and food-security institutions are protected; refuted if contractions reliably worsen mortality, schooling, or poverty even under high public provision.
partial
1980-2024
Across OECD countries 1990-2023, the rise in the old-age dependency ratio is associated with a proportional increase in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP and crowding-out of productive public investment, particularly where pay-as-you-go pension architecture predominates.
partial
+24
1990-2023
Brazil's demographic transition 1980-2023 (TFR fall from ~4.0 to ~1.6) coincides with inequality decline post-2000 (Gini from ~0.60 to ~0.53).
partial
1980-2023
The Chinese one-child policy (1980-2015) produced a measurable long-run drag on per-capita growth in the post-2010 period via accelerated working-age decline and a higher dependency ratio than counterfactual fertility paths would predict.
partial
+4
1970-2023
Post-1990 (and especially post-EU-accession 2004/2007) outmigration from Eastern Europe (POL, ROU, BGR, LTU, LVA, EST, HUN, SVK) has produced upward pressure on real wages at origin via labour-supply contraction.
partial
+5
1990-2023
Across countries 1980-2023, increases in female labour-force participation are positively associated with per-capita output growth, with substantial heterogeneity by income level and institutional context.
partial
+32
1980-2023
Across countries 1980-2023, sustained declines in the total fertility rate below 2.1 are followed within 20-30 years by significant slowdowns in real GDP per capita growth, mediated by working-age population share.
partial
+35
1980-2023
France absorbed approximately 800,000-1,000,000 pied-noir repatriates from Algeria in 1962-1963, equivalent to roughly 2% of the French population.
partial
1955-1980
Korea, Taiwan, and Ireland's rapid higher-education expansion (tertiary attainment rising from <15% to >50% of working-age cohorts within roughly 30 years) is associated with measurable acceleration in per-capita output growth in these countries, particularly pronounced in the high-tech-export-share component.
partial
+4
1980-2023
Israel absorbed approximately 900,000 Soviet Jewish immigrants 1989-1994 (~20% of the pre-immigration population).
partial
1985-2010
Italy and Spain 1995-2023 exhibit a coupled demographic-growth stagnation: sustained sub-replacement fertility (TFR ~1.2-1.4) since the 1980s feeds into post-2008 working-age contraction, which decomposes as a substantial share of the post-2008 per-capita growth shortfall vs the EU-15 median.
partial
+7
1995-2023
Japan's prolonged deflationary period 1995-2015 is causally linked to its rapid demographic ageing through reduced aggregate demand from older cohorts and depressed wage growth.
partial
+6
1990-2023
Japan's de facto policy of refusing large-scale immigration through the 1990s-2010s, in combination with its rapid ageing, produced a working-age population contraction larger than any major OECD comparator.
partial
+4
1990-2023
South Korea experienced a "fertility cliff" 2015-2024 (TFR falling from ~1.24 to <0.8), globally unprecedented in peacetime.
partial
+4
2000-2024
Cross-country panel evidence 1990-2023: gains in life expectancy at age 60 are associated with rising labour force participation rates among the 55-64 and 65+ age brackets, controlling for statutory pension age.
partial
+24
1990-2023
In countries with major migrant-corridor remittance dependency (Philippines, Bangladesh, Honduras, Nepal, where remittances exceed 6% of GDP for sustained periods), remittances smooth household consumption but are associated with reduced domestic labour-force participation (Dutch-disease-via-labour) and elevated reservation wages.
partial
+7
2000-2023
Sub-Saharan Africa's demographic-dividend window (defined as the period of rising working- age share following fertility transition) opened for most countries 2000-2020 and is projected to extend through 2050.
partial
+14
1990-2023
Sweden absorbed approximately 163,000 asylum applicants in 2015 (~1.6% of population in one year).
partial
+2
2010-2023
The UK's decision not to apply transitional restrictions on A8 (2004) accession-state migration produced a large inflow (~1.5 million by 2014), particularly Polish-origin.
partial
1995-2020
The 1965 US Hart-Celler immigration reform replaced national-origin quotas with a family-reunification + skill-based system, producing a multi-decade shift in the composition and scale of US migrant inflows.
partial
1950-2023
The "demographic dividend" hypothesis: across countries 1960-2023, increases in the working-age population share (15-64) are associated with elevated real GDP per capita growth, with a 1-percentage-point rise in working-age share predicting roughly 0.3-0.5 percentage-point higher annualised per-capita growth, after controlling for capital deepening, education, and institutions.
partial
+30
1960-2023
Deregulation episodes (US transportation 1978–1980, UK telecoms 1984, NZ Rogernomics 1984–1993) show measurable TFP gains in the deregulated sectors within a decade.
partial
+6
1970-2010
Developmentalist policy packages show positive growth effects mainly in low-income catch-up windows, while the same packages show weaker or null effects in upper-middle-income and high-income windows unless market competition improves.
partial
+17
1960-2024
Higher regulatory quality predicts faster internet diffusion for digital education access.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger digital and high-technology startup proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Disability-benefit reforms tightening eligibility but expanding rehabilitation predict higher employment among formerly disabled cohorts.
partial
1990-2023
Higher discretionary state-allocation burden proxies predict lower control-of-corruption scores.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger personal-freedom and voice-and-accountability proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Ecuador's December 2008 strategic default on $3.2bn of Global 2012 and Global 2030 bonds (declared "illegitimate" by the Correa-appointed audit commission) produced a measurable medium-run sovereign-borrowing- cost penalty without delivering a fiscal-space dividend large enough to offset that penalty.
partial
2003-2024
Ecuador's January 2000 unilateral dollarisation (in the wake of the 1998-1999 banking and currency crisis) produced a permanent break in the inflation series and a measurable stabilisation of macro outcomes relative to a Latin American non-dollarised peer pool over the subsequent two decades.
partial
+1
1995-2024
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger secondary-school enrollment outcomes over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-compatible institutional quality predicts education-related quality-of-life gains across broad samples.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Greater trade openness predicts higher education participation and quality proxies over long windows.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Higher public education spending predicts higher secondary and tertiary attainment among lower-income cohorts and lower intergenerational earnings persistence; a null or regressive attainment effect would refute the equal-opportunity claim.
partial
1990-2024
School-autonomy and governance-quality proxies predict education gains beyond income levels alone.
partial
+34
1996-2023
El Salvador's homicide rate fell from 52 per 100,000 (2019) to 2.4 per 100,000 (2023) — a 95% reduction — under Bukele's Estado de Excepción security crackdown beginning March 2022.
partial
2010-2024
Germany's 2010-2024 Energiewende-driven reduction in territorial CO2 emissions, valued at a central social-cost-of-carbon (SCC) of USD 185/tCO2 (Rennert et al.
partial
+2
2010-2024
The 2022 European gas-price shock plus heterogeneous national policy responses (German Doppelwumms ~€200bn relief package, Spanish-Portuguese Iberian gas-price-cap mechanism, Italian energy-aid bridges, French EDF nationalisation + nuclear price cap) produced a divergent industrial- relocation pattern within Europe and across the Atlantic over 2022-2025.
partial
+8
2018-2025
Stronger regulatory quality in energy markets predicts better household energy access and affordability proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger electricity access and reliability proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger broad energy-access quality-of-life outcomes.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Removal of fossil-fuel and electricity subsidies predicts more efficient energy use and faster renewable adoption than continued subsidy.
partial
1990-2023
Strong equal-pay legislation enforcement predicts faster gender wage-gap closure, especially when combined with parental-leave flexibility.
partial
1990-2023
Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
partial
1991-2007
Pre-2010 Ethiopian developmental-state strategy (state-led infrastructure, industrial parks, export-credit allocation) produced the fastest sustained African growth rates, consistent with late-developer industrial-policy theory.
partial
+6
1991-2019
The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — reporting phase from October 2023, certificate-purchase phase from 2026 — raises the effective landed cost of EU-manufactured CBAM-covered products (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, electricity) in extra-EU markets because (a) EU producers face the full EU ETS carbon price without free-allocation offsets during the phase-out and (b) EU exports to non-CBAM jurisdictions face cost disadvantages from embedded-carbon-cost pass-through.
weakly supported
+11
2018-2024
Across the EU-27 panel 2005-2023, territorial CO2 emissions declined in absolute terms while real GDP rose -- a pattern-consistent absolute-decoupling regime.
partial
+21
2005-2023
The natural-gas price shock that began in late 2021 and intensified after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 produced a measurable differential contraction of EU industrial output relative to US, UK, and non-EU Asian comparators over 2021-2024.
partial
+8
2018-2024
Energy-price spikes increase household distributional stress.
partial
+25
2019-2025
Higher industrial electricity prices predict lower manufacturing value-added share and weaker industrial production growth.
partial
1980-2024
Flexible exchange rates predict smaller output losses during terms-of-trade shocks than fixed exchange rates with limited reserves.
partial
1990-2023
Higher real exchange-rate volatility predicts shorter investment horizons and lower capital intensity in tradable sectors.
partial
1990-2023
In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.
partial
+39
1990-2020
Agricultural export liberalisation predicts faster diversification into higher-value crops than import-substitution agricultural policy.
partial
+24
1970-2023
Export-processing zones with competitive labour markets show positive wage spillovers to non-zone firms; zones with suppressed wages do not.
partial
1990-2023
Export promotion combined with domestic competition outperforms export promotion combined with domestic protection over 25-year windows.
partial
1990-2023
Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, higher expropriation risk — measured by ICRG expropriation risk index, Heritage investment-freedom score, and political-risk ratings — predicts shorter investment horizons (higher share of short-term investment, lower share of structures and machinery) and lower capital intensity in tradable sectors.
partial
+31
1990-2020
FDI openness predicts domestic supplier productivity growth when paired with competition, but not when paired with protected national champions.
partial
1990-2023
The 2022-2024 US disinflation episode is partially but not predominantly attributable to the Fed's 525bp rate-hike cycle 2022-03 to 2023-07; supply-chain normalisation, energy-price reversion, and fiscal-impulse fade explain at least as much of CPI's decline from 9.1% (2022-06) to ~3% (2024-12).
partial
2019-2025
US Sanders 2016/2020 $15 federal minimum wage proposal, in meta-analyses of state-level evidence, would not produce the 1.3m-job loss CBO low-end estimate; effect is closer to zero.
partial
1990-2022
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger long-run growth consistent with decentralized market-policy experimentation.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Financial deepening predicts growth up to a threshold; beyond it, credit booms predict crisis risk that offsets deepening gains.
partial
1990-2023
The ECB's June-2014 introduction of a negative deposit-facility rate (initially -0.10%, cut to -0.50% by September-2019) and the parallel Swiss / Danish / Swedish / Japanese negative-rate experiments lowered short-end money-market rates and core sovereign-bond yields below zero, but did NOT cause an aggregate decline in eurozone bank deposits or measurable deposit-flight from the banking sector.
partial
+9
2010-2022
Financial-transaction taxes predict lower market liquidity, higher volatility, and reduced price-discovery efficiency.
partial
1990-2023
Fiscal tightening predicts weaker next-year GDP growth when real interest rates are low or output gaps are negative, but not when inflation is high.
partial
1980-2024
Fiscal expansions during high-slack years reduce unemployment and accelerate GDP recovery more than expansions near capacity, with no persistent inflation overshoot unless supply constraints bind.
partial
1980-2024
Liberal democracies with binding numerical fiscal rules in place for at least 10 years over the 1976–2025 window show systematically lower (less positive, or more negative) statist-drift slopes than peers without such rules.
partial
+20
1976-2025
Higher fiscal-transparency indices predict lower sovereign bond-yield spreads and smaller default-risk premia at given debt levels.
partial
1990-2023
Greater trade openness predicts lower child-mortality nutrition-risk proxies over long windows.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Countries with both higher domestic food-production growth and higher food-trade openness have smaller food-price and poverty spikes after global commodity-price shocks.
partial
1990-2024
Historical free-banking episodes show lower frequency of systemic crises per bank than central-bank-managed systems with deposit insurance.
partial
1990-2023
Rapid market liberalisation (price decontrol, mass privatisation, trade opening) under weak institutions produces large short-run welfare losses—rising mortality, falling life expectancy, rising inequality, and collapsing output—that may persist for at least a decade, compared to gradual reformers or non-reformers at similar initial income levels.
partial
+24
1989-2010
Germany's Schuldenbremse (constitutional debt brake adopted 2009 and binding on the federation from 2016) did not produce a sustained growth or investment collapse over 2010-2019 (pre-COVID) at the single-country time-series level.
partial
2000-2019
Across countries 1996-2022, the joint condition of high rule-of-law (WGI RL) and high de-jure central-bank independence (proxied by Fraser-EFW area-3 sound-money sub-component plus institutional rules) predicts simultaneously lower mean inflation AND lower output volatility than either single condition alone.
partial
+42
1996-2022
In US time-series 1948-2024, the long-run Phillips curve is vertical in the Friedman-Phelps (1968) sense: the slope of the long-run unemployment-inflation relationship — measured by the long-horizon cumulative response of inflation to a sustained change in the unemployment-NAIRU gap — is statistically indistinguishable from zero, while the short-run slope is statistically negative.
partial
1948-2024
The labour-supply dis-employment elasticity of negative-income-tax (NIT) and earned-income-tax-credit (EITC) -style cash-transfer programmes is materially smaller than the canonical mid-1970s NIT- experiment headline estimates suggested.
partial
1968-2020
Countries with stronger market-institution scores around 1960 were more likely to remain in, or converge into, the high-income frontier by 2024 than countries with weaker property rights and heavier state-directed allocation, after controlling for initial GDP per capita.
partial
+29
1960-2024
Fuel-subsidy removal with targeted cash transfers predicts more efficient energy use and better redistribution than universal subsidy.
partial
1990-2023
Lower broad subsidy and state-consumption burden proxies predict stronger electricity-access and quality-of-life gains.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Wellbeing-indicator measures (life satisfaction, ISEW/GPI, HDI) diverge from GDP per capita above roughly $25-35k per capita, indicating that further growth delivers diminishing welfare returns in rich economies.
partial
+26
1990-2022
German industrial gross value added, manufacturing output, and real household income diverged materially from a synthetic-Germany donor- pool counterfactual over 2018-2025, and a variance decomposition across candidate channels attributes the majority of the divergence to regulatory-channel factors (Environmental Policy Stringency index increase post-2017, nuclear-phase-out schedule, single-supplier Russian gas dependency lock-in, industrial emission and reporting rules) rather than to fiscal-channel factors (general government consumption and tax burden were broadly stable across the Merkel late-term and Scholz years, with the debt brake in effect until 2023).
partial
+6
2005-2025
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis originated in household-debt-financed consumption sustaining aggregate demand despite stagnant real wages, a Minsky-plus-Marx pattern.
partial
+14
1995-2010
Strict gig-economy reclassification rules predict lower platform-worker entry and reduced service availability without clear income gains.
partial
1990-2023
Gold-standard periods show lower consumer-price variance and fewer currency crises than fiat-standard periods, controlling for financial development.
partial
1990-2023
Higher government-consumption shares predict weaker TFP growth after controlling for public investment, education, and health spending, across a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies from 1970 to 2020.
partial
+26
1970-2020
In a broad-country panel 1980-2019, a larger government expenditure share of GDP predicts lower subsequent total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth, controlling for initial income, trade openness, and human capital.
partial
+100
1980-2019
The 1929-1933 Great Depression contraction in US output was precipitated by an endogenous over-accumulation crisis in the 1920s (rising capital-to-output ratio, falling profitability) rather than by Federal Reserve policy errors alone.
partial
1920-1939
Greek fiscal crisis 2010-2015 was fundamentally a currency-user crisis (Greece issued no sovereign euro), not evidence of fiscal limits on sovereign currency-issuers.
partial
+1
2007-2018
Guyana's 2015 Liza-1 discovery (and subsequent Stabroek-block developments through 2024) and Suriname's 2020 Block-58 discoveries produced one of the most extreme oil-and-gas-windfall growth events on record.
partial
+2
2010-2024
Haiti's 2010-2024 governance trajectory — the failed post-earthquake reconstruction (2010-2015), Martelly-era PetroCaribe-fund mismanagement (2011-2016), Moïse assassination (July 2021), gang takeover of Port- au-Prince (2022-2024), and effective state collapse — produced a catastrophic economic collapse measurable in real-GDP-per-capita decline, life-expectancy stagnation, and emigration acceleration.
partial
2005-2024
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts better broad health quality-of-life outcomes.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher health-spending shares improve mortality outcomes without reducing medium-run GDP-per-capita growth unless financed through high debt-service burdens.
partial
1980-2024
Higher regulatory quality predicts greater health-system capacity and lower entry-barrier drag.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger regulatory quality predicts higher life expectancy after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger regulatory quality predicts deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage business freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage overall economic freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger control of corruption predicts higher life expectancy after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger control of corruption predicts higher household private consumption per capita after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger control of corruption predicts deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage investment freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage labour-market freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage monetary freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
In a 1996-2023 country panel, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available employment rate than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available gross-capital-formation share.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
partial
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage trade freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
partial
+177
2024-2024
High-income-country per-capita material footprint (UNEP International Resource Panel "raw material equivalents" consumption-based metric) has not declined materially over 2000-2022 -- mean change across the high-income panel is within +/-10% of 2000 levels -- despite a documented decline in territorial CO2 emissions over the same window.
partial
+14
2000-2022
High-tech export shares generate stronger GDP and TFP growth when export concentration is low.
partial
1980-2024
China's agricultural output growth accelerated after the household responsibility system replaced collective farming, relative to comparable middle-income reform peers.
partial
+24
1970-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts lower house-price pressure in broad housing panels.
partial
+34
1996-2024
More permissive housing supply regulation proxies predict lower house-price pressure over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2024
Higher broad tax-burden proxies predict weaker population-mobility and housing-opportunity matching.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger human-capital accumulation with long lags.
partial
+34
1996-2023
High-skill emigration from low-income countries shows brain-drain costs, but diaspora-return and knowledge-network effects can turn it into brain gain with strong institutions.
partial
1990-2023
Countries that implemented decisive currency reform with independent central banks after hyperinflation achieved lower relapse rates than countries with gradual stabilisation.
partial
1990-2023
Faster services-sector expansion predicts higher female labour-force participation, net of education and income.
partial
1980-2024
Higher import penetration predicts faster domestic productivity growth through reallocation and innovation responses.
partial
1990-2023
Import-substitution industrialisation episodes underperform export-oriented openness episodes in 25-year GDP-per-capita and labour-productivity windows across a broad panel of developing economies during 1960-2020.
partial
+56
1960-2020
Higher broad state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker high-technology innovation diffusion.
partial
+34
1996-2023
India's November 2016 demonetisation (sudden withdrawal of 86% of currency in circulation by value, INR500 and INR1000 notes) produced a measurable short-run output contraction visible in quarterly real GDP growth and a persistent negative effect on the cash-intensive informal-sector through 2017-2018, with no offsetting medium-run benefit on tax-revenue / GDP or formalisation indicators by 2019.
partial
2010-2019
India's post-1991 liberalisation accelerated growth but services-heavy rather than manufacturing-led, leaving labour-intensive employment gains smaller than in East Asian industrial-policy peers.
partial
+3
1991-2023
Indigenous-managed territories (documented across Amazon basin, Canadian First Nations, Australian Indigenous Protected Areas) retain higher biodiversity and lower deforestation than state-protected or privately-held land of matched biome.
partial
+1
2000-2023
Industrial policy outcomes are bimodal by governance capacity: high-capacity states (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) produce positive returns; low-capacity states produce rent-capture and white-elephants.
partial
+18
1971-2019
Industrial policy (sectoral targeting, export subsidies, conditional credit, technology push) succeeds in raising long-run manufacturing productivity and export sophistication when implemented in high-governance states with export discipline (clear performance criteria, sunset clauses, competitive benchmarking), over 30-year windows 1960-2020.
partial
+16
1960-2020
Tariff protection for infant industries under export-discipline conditionality (Korea steel, Brazil Embraer) produces capability build-up that free-trade-from-start counterfactuals would not have generated in the same timeframe.
partial
+5
1960-2023
Inflation expectations remained anchored through the 2008–2020 period in economies with credible inflation-targeting central banks, producing a flatter short-run Phillips curve than the 1970s relationship.
partial
+5
1970-2020
The output cost of disinflation is higher when inflation expectations are de-anchored than when credibility is maintained.
partial
1990-2023
Inflation-targeting adoption predicts lower inflation persistence and faster convergence to target than previous monetary regimes.
partial
1990-2023
Higher inflation volatility predicts shorter corporate investment horizons and higher hurdle rates.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger employment-rate proxies where entry barriers and informality are lower.
partial
+34
1996-2023
State-led infrastructure investment (transport, energy, water, telecommunications) has high economic returns in countries below basic access thresholds (paved-road density <20 km per 100 km2, electricity access <80%, clean water access <90%), confirming developmentalist catch-up logic.
partial
+24
1990-2020
Privatised infrastructure with regulated third-party access shows lower operating costs and higher investment than state operation.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger infrastructure-maintenance and access proxies than universal underpricing.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher inheritance taxes predict more frequent sale or liquidation of family businesses at founder death and lower long-run business survival.
partial
1990-2023
Across liberal democracies, the country's general-government spending share at the start of the corpus window negatively predicts subsequent statist drift.
partial
+20
1976-2025
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger innovation-cluster proxies through firm entry and labor mobility.
partial
+34
1996-2023
High-technology diffusion predicts stronger income and quality-of-life spillovers over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Where corruption control is weak, heavier state intervention predicts weaker quality-of-life gains.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Stronger rule-of-law and IP-protection proxies predict stronger high-technology diffusion and innovation outputs.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Italy's real GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) was approximately unchanged between 1999 (euro launch) and 2023 — a quarter-century of near-zero cumulative growth, with modest levels of variation around a flat trend.
partial
1995-2023
Jamaica's 2010-2024 fiscal-consolidation programme (under successive IMF SBA, EFF, and PLL programmes; combined with two domestic-debt restructurings — JDX 2010 and NDX 2013) succeeded in reducing public debt as a share of GDP from above 140% (2012) to below 75% (2024) while sustaining positive cumulative real-GDP growth and avoiding hyperinflation.
partial
2005-2024
Japanese stagnation 1990-2020 (mean GDP growth under 1%) coincided with stable or improving wellbeing indicators (life expectancy, life satisfaction), refuting the claim that zero-growth necessarily degrades human outcomes.
supported subset
1990-2020
Judicial independence predicts stronger investment growth, especially in contract-intensive sectors (finance, business services, complex manufacturing).
partial
1990-2023
Stronger rule-of-law proxies strengthen quality-of-life and income outcomes under market institutions.
partial
+34
1996-2023
More flexible market-compatible institutions predict higher employment and quality-of-life opportunity.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-friendly labor institutions predict stronger broad opportunity measures across long samples.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Labour-market flexibility (ease of hiring and firing, low EPL, decentralised wage bargaining) improves long-run employment rates, productivity growth, and GDP per capita only when paired with complementary adjustment institutions: active labour-market policy (retraining, job search assistance), relocation support, or income-smoothing mechanisms (unemployment insurance, portable benefits).
partial
+27
1980-2020
In a broad-country panel 1990-2019, greater labour-market flexibility — measured by lower OECD EPL overall strictness, higher ease-of-hiring scores, and absence of centralized wage bargaining — predicts higher employment-to- population ratios and faster real GDP per capita growth, controlling for institutional quality, education, and trade openness.
partial
+32
1990-2019
Countries with more flexible labour markets show faster employment recovery after recessions than countries with strict employment protection.
partial
1990-2023
Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.
partial
+9
1998-2015
Restrictions on interregional labour mobility predict larger regional wage and unemployment divergences.
partial
1990-2023
Argentina's 2017 Macri-government labour-reform package (Vaca Muerta sector-specific reform, broader labour-cost reduction proposal partially blocked) failed to deliver a measurable formal-employment gain by 2019: synthetic-DiD gap on formal-employment share is statistically indistinguishable from zero against a Latin-American donor pool, falsifying the strong-pro-employment claim.
partial
+1
2010-2019
Australia's 1996 Workplace Relations Act and subsequent 2005 WorkChoices amendments (enterprise-bargaining shift, AWA individual contracts, Fair Pay Commission replacing arbitrated awards) accelerated Australian employment-rate growth between 1996 and 2007 by at least 1.5 pp relative to a synthetic control of OECD peers, with the largest gains in private- sector employment.
partial
+2
1985-2010
Brazil's November 2017 Reforma Trabalhista (Law 13,467/2017: intermittent-contract creation, collective-bargaining prevalence over statute, judicial-fee imposition on labour claims) raised the Brazilian formal-employment rate by at least 1 pp by 2019 relative to a synthetic control of Latin- American peers, but did not reduce informal-sector share.
partial
+1
2010-2019
Chile's 2001 Lagos-government labour reform (Law 19,759: collective-bargaining strengthening, dismissal-cost recalibration, working-time provisions) raised the share of workers under collective-bargaining coverage by at least 3 pp by 2006 relative to a synthetic control of Latin- American peers, without producing a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline.
partial
+1
1995-2010
Colombia's 2002 Uribe-government labour reform (Law 789: working-day extension, overtime/holiday-premium reduction, dismissal-cost cuts) reduced the Colombian unemployment rate by at least 2 pp by 2007 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with formal-sector employment gaining and informality not worsening.
partial
+1
1995-2010
The Czech Republic's 2017-2019 staged minimum-wage rises (CZK 11,000/month 2017, 12,200 in 2018, 13,350 in 2019: approximately +21% nominal cumulative) did not produce a measurable employment-rate decline relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad peers, while raising bottom-decile real wages by at least 12% by 2020.
partial
+1
2010-2021
France's 1998-2002 35-hour week law (Aubry I 1998, Aubry II 2000) did not produce the predicted +700,000 net jobs claimed by proponents; the synthetic-DiD gap on French employment rate 2000-2005 vs euro-area peers is below +1.0 pp and statistically indistinguishable from zero, while real wage growth slowed measurably.
partial
+2
1990-2007
Greece's 2010-2014 troika-program labour reforms (minimum-wage cut 22% / 32% youth, collective-bargaining decentralisation, dismissal-cost reduction) effected a permanent real-wage decline of at least 15% relative to a synthetic control of euro-area peers, but produced no statistically distinguishable improvement in unit-labour-cost-adjusted employment by 2017.
partial
+1
2005-2018
The 2003-2005 Hartz I-IV reforms in Germany lowered the German unemployment rate by at least 2 percentage points relative to a synthetic control of non-reforming euro-area peers over the five-year post-period (2005-2010), with the effect concentrated in long-term unemployment exit rates rather than short-duration flows.
partial
+4
1995-2012
Hungary's 2018 "slave law" overtime amendment (Act CXVI/2018: raising annual overtime cap from 250 to 400 hours, allowing 3-year reference periods) effective 2019-Q1 raised the Hungarian average annual hours worked by at least 1.5% relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad peers, but did not produce a measurable expansion in employment-rate or output growth.
partial
+1
2010-2021
Indonesia's 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation (UU Cipta Kerja: fixed-term-contract liberalisation, severance reduction, outsourcing expansion, minimum-wage formula recalibration) raised the Indonesian formal-employment share by at least 2 pp by 2024 relative to a synthetic control of ASEAN peers, partially offsetting the COVID labour-market shock.
partial
+1
2010-2024
Israel's 2008-2011 staged minimum-wage increase (from NIS 3,710 to NIS 4,100 monthly, with subsequent 2011 increase to NIS 4,300) did not produce a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline relative to a synthetic control of high-income OECD peers, while raising the bottom-quintile real wage by at least 5%.
partial
+2
2000-2015
Italy's 2014-2015 Jobs Act (Article 18 dismissal-cost reform, contratto a tutele crescenti, NASpI unemployment insurance rationalisation) raised the Italian employment rate by at least 0.8 pp by end-2018 relative to a synthetic control of southern-European peers, with the largest gains on permanent rather than fixed-term contracts.
partial
+1
2008-2019
Japan's 2004 Worker Dispatch Law amendment (manufacturing- sector liberalisation effective 2004-Q1, period extension to 3 years) raised the Japanese non-regular-worker share by at least 4 pp by 2008 relative to a synthetic control of high-income peers, but did not raise aggregate employment rate above donor pool baseline.
partial
+2
1995-2010
South Korea's 1998 IMF-program labour reforms (lifetime- employment relaxation, dispatch-worker law, layoff-rule liberalisation) restructured the Korean labour market: by 2003 non-regular-worker share rose by at least 8 pp relative to a synthetic control of East-Asian peers, and aggregate employment-rate recovered to pre-crisis level, but the regular-worker share fell durably.
partial
+1
1990-2008
The 2017 Macron ordonnances (CDI flexibilisation, dismissal-cost ceilings, branch-vs-firm bargaining inversion) raised the French private-sector employment-to-population ratio by at least 1.0 pp over the 2017-2019 pre-COVID window relative to a synthetic control of non-reforming euro-area peers, with no offsetting rise in headline poverty rate at 60% of median income.
partial
+2
2010-2019
Mexico's 2019 labour reform (recognition of authentic collective-bargaining, pre-USMCA labour-side-letter compliance) and the 2021 outsourcing prohibition increased the formal-employment share by at least 2 pp by 2023 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with the largest gains concentrated in manufacturing-export states.
partial
+1
2010-2023
Peru's 2008 MYPE (micro/small-enterprise) special labour regime extension (Legislative Decree 1086: reduced labour obligations, simplified social-security access for small firms) raised the formal-employment share among MYPE workers by at least 4 pp by 2013 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, without producing a measurable wage decline at the median.
partial
+1
2000-2015
Poland's 2017 retirement-age reversal (PiS-government rollback of the 2012 Tusk-government age increase: women's age 60 from 67, men's age 65 from 67) reduced the 55-64 employment-rate by at least 3 pp by 2020 relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad-Central-European peers, and increased the early pension take-up rate substantially.
partial
+2
2010-2022
Portugal's 2011-2014 troika-era labour reforms (Memorandum of Understanding measures: severance reduction, working-time flexibility, collective-bargaining suspension) lowered the Portuguese unemployment rate by at least 1.5 pp by 2017 relative to a synthetic control of euro-area peripheral peers, but did not durably raise the labour-share of national income.
partial
+1
2005-2018
Russia's 2002 Labour Code (replacing the 1971 KZoT: fixed-term contract liberalisation, severance recalibration, collective-bargaining recodification) did not produce a measurable formal-employment-share gain by 2007 relative to a synthetic control of post-Soviet peers; the headline Russian labour-market improvement 2002-2007 is dominated by the oil-price-driven domestic-demand expansion.
partial
+2
1995-2010
South Africa's 2018 National Minimum Wage Act (R20/hour effective 2019-Q1) did not produce a measurable employment- rate decline relative to a synthetic control of upper-middle- income peers despite its high minimum-wage-to-median ratio (~62%), but raised real wages at the bottom decile by at least 8% by 2022.
partial
+2
2010-2023
Spain's February 2012 labour reform (Real Decreto-Ley 3/2012: dismissal-cost reduction from 45 to 33 days/year, decentralised collective bargaining, "objective causes" expansion) shortened the duration of the post-2011 unemployment surge by accelerating hiring rates 2014-2017 by at least 1.5 pp relative to a synthetic control of euro-area peripheral peers, without producing a permanent reduction in real wages relative to donors.
partial
+1
2005-2018
Sweden's 1990s labour-market reforms (1991 unemployment-insurance partial reform, 1994 Lindbeck-Commission-driven activation changes, 1995 EU accession liberalisation) accelerated post- crisis employment-rate recovery between 1995 and 2002 by at least 2 pp relative to a synthetic control of Nordic and northern-European peers, conditional on the 1992 currency-peg collapse and SEK depreciation channel.
partial
+1
1985-2005
The UK 1980-1988 Thatcher Employment Acts (1980, 1982, 1984, 1988 — picketing restrictions, secondary-action ban, ballot requirements, closed-shop restrictions) reduced UK strike days lost per 1000 employees by at least 80% between 1980 and 1990 relative to a synthetic control of European peers, and lowered the union-wage premium without producing a measurable employment-rate gain.
partial
+2
1975-1995
Vietnam's 2019 Labour Code revision (Law 45/2019/QH14: retirement-age increase, multiple-trade-union recognition, working-time provisions, dispute-resolution reform) effective 2021-Q1 raised the Vietnamese formal-employment share by at least 1.5 pp by 2024 relative to a synthetic control of ASEAN peers, with the largest gains in foreign- invested manufacturing.
partial
2010-2024
Across an OECD post-1980 panel, the rise in cross-border capital-account openness is the dominant treatment channel reducing the labour share of gross value added, with a magnitude that exceeds the contributions of technology, trade, or measurement adjustments.
partial
+16
1980-2020
Higher labour-tax wedges on second earners predict lower female labour-force participation and lower fertility.
partial
1990-2023
Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.
partial
+24
1970-2023
Stronger rule-of-law and property-rights proxies predict higher investment rates and neighborhood-upgrading capacity.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Stricter land-use regulation proxies predict weaker real disposable wage and income gains via housing costs.
partial
+34
1996-2024
Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).
partial
+5
2015-2026
Across Latin American economies 1990-2024, the cross-country gradient of capital-account openness (Chinn-Ito-style index proxied by Foreign-direct-investment-share-of-GDP plus external-debt-stock-share-of-GNI as available signals) correlates positively with cumulative real-GDP-per-capita growth and negatively with macro volatility, but conditionally on institutional quality (WGI).
partial
+14
1990-2024
Across Latin American economies 1990-2024, the cross-country variation in real-GDP growth is materially driven by the global commodity-price cycle, with a measurable "China-supercycle" dividend 2003-2014 and a "post-supercycle penalty" 2014-2019.
partial
+13
1990-2024
Across Latin American economies 1999-2024, countries that adopted numerical fiscal rules (Chile 2001, Brazil LRF 1999, Colombia 2011, Mexico Pemex-and-budget 2006, Peru 1999, Uruguay 2006) showed measurably better fiscal-balance dispersion and lower public-debt growth than non-adopters, conditional on commodity-cycle exposure.
partial
+12
1995-2024
Across Latin American economies 1999-2024, the staggered adoption of formal inflation-targeting central-bank regimes (Brazil 1999, Chile 1999, Colombia 1999, Mexico 2001, Peru 2002, Guatemala 2005, Uruguay 2007, Paraguay 2011, Dominican Republic 2012, Costa Rica 2018) reduced average inflation and inflation volatility relative to a non-adopting comparison group, without an associated growth penalty.
partial
+14
1995-2024
Across six Latin American economies with high US-source remittance dependency (MEX, GTM, HND, SLV, NIC, DOM), the post-COVID expansion of US-to-LatAm remittance flows (2020-2024) combined with the 2022-2023 Federal-Reserve hiking cycle produced measurable dollarisation pressure: rising USD share of resident deposits, rising USD-denominated household savings, and (where measurable) rising USD-denominated retail circulation.
partial
2017-2025
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador resource-nationalisation programmes 2000-2015 financed measurable social-outcome gains (poverty reduction, literacy) despite extractive-output costs, a Pareto-dominance structure depending on normative weighting.
partial
+3
2000-2015
Across countries 1990-2020, higher capital-account openness (proxied by EFW area-4 freedom-to-trade-internationally sub- components covering capital controls, plus IMF AREAER-derived binary capital-control intensity where available) predicts higher subsequent 10-year real per-capita GDP growth, conditional on initial income, rule-of-law level, trade openness, and financial- development depth.
partial
+53
1990-2020
Across countries 1990-2020, accession to a substantive free-trade agreement (FTA) — defined as a WTO-notified preferential-trade agreement going beyond MFN with measurable bilateral tariff reductions — is followed by higher trade openness and higher per-capita real GDP growth in the post-accession 5-year window than in the matched pre-accession 5-year window.
partial
+55
1990-2020
Higher regulatory quality predicts higher control-of-corruption scores, consistent with lower licensing discretion and bribery.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Countries with higher sustained market-institution scores from 1970 to 2024 experienced stronger convergence in real household consumption per capita toward the US frontier than countries with weaker market scores.
partial
+29
1970-2024
Monetary base expansion (M2 growth) correlates with asset price inflation in equities and real estate with a lag, measurable via cointegration and lead-lag analysis across major developed economies 2008-2025.
partial
+4
2008-2025
Macron 2017-2019 labour-tax reforms produced measurable employment gains but had distributional costs; welfare-state-adjustment outcome is mixed and depends on transfer-side offsets.
partial
2014-2022
Exxon, Shell, BP, Chevron 1980-2020 disclosed knowledge of climate impacts while investing in reserves whose combustion would exceed the remaining 1.5C carbon budget, consistent with accumulation-ecological-limit contradiction.
partial
1980-2020
Higher share of mandatory vs discretionary spending predicts stronger automatic stabilisers and less pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
partial
1990-2023
Maoist China's 1949-1976 infrastructure and literacy expansion produced the human-capital base that enabled post-1978 reform growth; pre-1978 development was a precondition, not a failure.
partial
1949-1990
Countries with market-driven land conversion and migration show faster urban productivity growth and less informal slum expansion.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality and competition proxies predict stronger high-technology export and innovation-quality proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Countries with flexible exchange rates recover faster from external shocks than countries with fixed but unsustainable pegs.
partial
1990-2023
Deregulation of entry permits and licensing predicts higher firm-entry rates and lower informal-sector share.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality and market-entry openness predict higher employment rates.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Countries with market-determined exchange rates closer to purchasing-power parity show stronger trade-volume growth than countries with sustained overvaluation.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger political-stability and democratic-resilience proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-compatible institutions predict higher life expectancy after controlling for income.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-compatible institutions predict governance quality and quality-of-life outcomes jointly across broad samples.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger migration opportunity and population-mobility proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-enabled income predicts better health outcomes over long windows.
partial
+34
1970-2023
Market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger broad innovation outcomes than direct planning intensity.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Stronger regulatory quality predicts more health output per unit of health spending.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Stronger market-compatible institutions predict stronger material-wellbeing resilience and income growth.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Countries with stronger market-compatible institutions recover prosperity losses faster after shocks.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market opening predicts faster diffusion of consumer durable and communications technologies.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more open capital accounts predict higher FDI inflows as a share of GDP after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more open capital accounts predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger control of corruption predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger control of corruption predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger control of corruption predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger control of corruption predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict higher employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher broad economic-freedom scores predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger government-consumption shares predict lower manufacturing value-added shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger government-consumption shares predict lower private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher domestic savings shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher manufacturing value-added shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger public-debt shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger public-debt shares predict lower domestic savings shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, larger public-debt shares predict shallower private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict higher employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, more predictable and market-compatible regulation predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher inflation predict lower employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher inflation predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher inflation predict shallower private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict lower employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict slower real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict lower investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger tax-revenue shares predict shallower private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict higher employment rates after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher trade openness predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
partial
+47
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger voice-and-accountability proxies in democracies and open institutions.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-oriented reform episodes that persist for at least twenty years produce more durable GDP-per-capita and productivity gains than short reform bursts or state-led industrial-policy episodes without sustained market competition.
partial
+18
1980-2024
Market-oriented reform episodes lasting 15+ years predict stronger GDP-per-capita persistence into subsequent decades than interrupted or reversed reforms.
partial
1990-2023
Market-led income growth predicts female education gains in low- and middle-income countries.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger job-quality proxies measured by employment and income levels.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts lower extreme-poverty rates over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher regulatory-quality reform proxies predict stronger long-run quality-of-life and income growth.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-oriented reforms (trade liberalisation, privatisation, price decontrol) implemented in countries with weak state capacity (low WGI government effectiveness, low tax revenue as % of GDP, weak contract enforcement) fail to produce sustained long-run prosperity compared to similar reforms in high-capacity settings.
partial
+32
1980-2020
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts more productive urbanization and higher income levels.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Material-footprint caps (Switzerland's 1-tonne society target, Welsh Wellbeing of Future Generations Act 2015) are technically implementable without triggering the collapse predicted by critics.
partial
2010-2023
In high-income countries, material footprint per capita can fall while life expectancy and life satisfaction are maintained or improved; refuted if footprint reductions systematically require welfare losses outside recession years.
partial
1980-2024
Medical-device import openness proxies predict faster diffusion of medical capacity.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Egypt's three sequential currency-regime devaluations (November 2016, March 2022, March 2024) each followed a recurring pattern: an FX-shortage crisis, an IMF-anchored devaluation step, a brief inflation surge, and a partial reserve rebuild.
partial
2014-2025
Egypt's 2014-onwards Sisi-era macro stabilisation (2016-2019 IMF EFF programme, energy- subsidy reform 2014-2019, mega-project investment programme, sequential currency devaluations) delivered headline-fiscal-deficit reduction and per-capita-GDP-growth acceleration over 2014-2019, but the post-2020 trajectory shows reversal: external- debt accumulation, recurring FX crises, military-economic-footprint expansion, and a growth model heavily dependent on Gulf bailouts.
partial
2008-2024
The May 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent maximum-pressure sanctions regime (re-imposition 2018-2019, oil-buyer-waiver elimination 2019, expanded financial sanctions 2020-2024) caused a measurable Iranian economic contraction visible in real GDP, oil exports, FX market dislocation, and household real-consumption proxies.
partial
+1
2010-2024
Israel's 2000-2024 transformation into a high-tech-export-led economy ("Start-Up Nation") produced a sustained labour-productivity acceleration, services-export composition shift, and high-skilled-employment expansion exceeding OECD peers without comparable defence-tech / venture-capital ecosystems.
partial
1995-2024
Saudi Arabia's 2016-launched Vision 2030 strategy under MBS targeted non-oil GDP share growth, female labour-force participation, tourism inflows, and PIF-led mega-project investment.
partial
2008-2024
The UAE's 1990-2024 diversification trajectory — Dubai's services / logistics / finance / tourism build-out, Abu Dhabi's hydrocarbon-anchored sovereign-wealth model, free-zone proliferation (DIFC, ADGM, JAFZA) — produced the most successful Gulf transition from hydrocarbon-rent dependency, visible in non-oil-GDP share, services-export composition, and tourism / aviation hub metrics.
partial
1985-2024
Middle-income countries that liberalize product and trade markets show stronger long-run income gains.
partial
+34
1980-2023
High-skill immigration predicts higher native wages and employment in complementary occupations, not displacement.
partial
1990-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger migration-opportunity and labor-market openness proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Milei's "motosierra" (chainsaw) programme combines public-sector employment cuts, ministry consolidation (from 18 to 9 ministries), and elimination of energy/transport subsidies.
partial
2008-2026
Argentine quarterly real GDP, having contracted in 2024H1 under the Milei stabilisation shock, recovers along a trajectory that by Q4 2025 closes at least 50% of the peak-to-trough output gap observed during the shock's worst quarter, and by Q4 2026 returns to or exceeds the pre-Milei (Q4 2023) real-GDP level.
partial
+1
2015-2027
Moderate minimum-wage bite increases low-end wages and reduces working poverty with employment effects near zero; refuted if high-bite settings show significant low-skill job losses.
partial
1980-2024
Automatic minimum-wage indexation to inflation or median wages predicts larger employment volatility than discretionary adjustments.
partial
1990-2023
Higher minimum wages relative to median predict larger increases in youth unemployment and slower job-entry rates.
partial
1990-2023
In a broad-country panel 1990-2019, higher statutory minimum wages (relative to median earnings) predict higher youth (ages 15-24) unemployment rates, controlling for aggregate demand conditions, education attainment, and labour- market institutions.
partial
+64
1990-2019
Mitterrand 1981-1983 nationalisations of banking and industry did not produce the predicted efficiency collapse in the nationalised firms relative to private peers during their nationalised years, though macro outcomes were affected by FX pressure.
partial
1978-1986
lower effective marginal tax rates on new investment predict faster capital deepening and manufacturing productivity growth than sector-specific investment credits.
partial
1990-2024
credit booms occurring under subsidized or politically directed credit regimes produce deeper post-boom output losses than credit booms under market-priced credit.
partial
1990-2024
stricter employment protection legislation predicts higher youth unemployment and longer unemployment duration after demand shocks, with smaller effects where apprenticeships and temporary contracts are flexible.
partial
1980-2024
sustained household fuel or electricity price controls predict higher shortage frequency, larger fiscal subsidy burdens, and lower energy-sector investment.
partial
1990-2024
higher formal business-entry barriers predict larger informal sectors and lower small-firm productivity growth over long windows.
partial
1990-2024
expenditure rules that cap current spending while preserving public investment predict higher private investment and lower fiscal volatility than untargeted deficit rules.
partial
1980-2024
improvements in expropriation-risk and property-rights indicators predict higher private investment and longer project maturities, especially in capital-intensive sectors.
partial
1980-2024
tighter FDI restrictions predict slower adoption of foreign technology and weaker productivity convergence in tradable sectors.
partial
1990-2024
countries implementing durable packages of trade openness, monetary stability, property-rights improvement, and entry liberalization show stronger 15- to 30-year gains in median consumption, life expectancy, and human development than synthetic controls without comparable reform packages.
partial
1980-2024
high minimum-wage bite raises wages for covered incumbents but predicts weaker youth employment and higher informal employment in low-productivity regions.
partial
1990-2024
network-sector unbundling combined with independent regulation predicts lower prices and better service quality than vertically integrated state or protected monopoly models.
partial
1990-2024
stable rule-bound regulation predicts higher private investment and lower investment volatility than discretionary licensing or case-by-case industrial policy.
partial
1980-2024
lower entry barriers in childcare, retail, transport, and personal services predict higher female labor-force participation through lower household-service prices and more flexible jobs.
partial
1990-2024
durable tariff reductions predict lower tradable-goods prices and higher real household consumption, especially for lower-income households with high tradable basket shares.
partial
1980-2024
higher labor tax wedges predict lower prime-age employment and higher informality over long windows, with larger effects in middle-income economies.
partial
1990-2024
US M2 velocity (nominal-GDP / M2) was stable in the strong Friedman-Schwartz sense (low-frequency variation only, no trend break) from 1960 through 2007.
partial
+7
1960-2024
Monetary finance of fiscal deficits (central-bank balance-sheet expansion directed at sovereign obligations in the absence of independent policy rate adjustment) produces a three-order causal chain.
partial
2000-2024
Direct central-bank financing of fiscal deficits predicts higher inflation within 2–3 years, especially when institutional independence is weak.
partial
1990-2023
Across US industries 1980-2020, rising concentration (top-4 / top-8 firm shares of industry sales) is associated with a parallel rise in aggregate non-financial corporate markups, and the cross-industry relationship is positive and material in magnitude.
partial
1980-2020
In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, mortgage-market liberalisation episodes (abolition of interest-rate caps, reduction of down-payment requirements, privatisation of state mortgage banks, and introduction of securitisation) predict higher homeownership rates, higher residential investment as a share of GDP, and lower housing-rent-to-income ratios, controlling for income growth, demographic structure, and urbanisation.
partial
+84
1990-2020
Sectoral nationalisation produces a three-order causal chain.
partial
1995-2024
Privatisation of natural monopolies (electricity transmission, water distribution, rail infrastructure, fixed-line telecommunications) without strong independent regulation fails to improve long-run consumer welfare compared to well-governed public ownership or regulated private provision.
partial
+26
1985-2020
Negative policy rates predict compressed net interest margins, weaker bank profitability, and slower credit growth to SMEs.
partial
1990-2023
US New Deal 1933-1938 (public-works employment, Social Security, Wagner Act) raised median living standards and reduced unemployment faster than the pre-1933 laissez-faire counterfactual, vindicating democratic reformist economic management.
partial
+4
1925-1942
New Zealand’s 1984–1993 liberalisation (deregulation, tariff cuts, privatisation, inflation targeting, and fiscal consolidation) improved long-run macroeconomic stability and tradables-sector productivity over 1984–2024 relative to a synthetic counterfactual of OECD small open economies, but aggregate economy-wide labour productivity and TFP did not improve enough to support strong market-optimism claims.
partial
+7
1984-2024
Nordic 1990s reforms (Swedish pension 1999, Norway handlingsregel 2001, Danish flexicurity) preserved welfare-state scope while restoring fiscal sustainability, showing that welfare-state scale is not inherently unsustainable.
partial
1985-2015
Nordic persistent outcome advantages (GDP per capita, Gini disposable income, unemployment) over comparable high-welfare Southern European economies over 1996-2023 are substantially explained by a decomposable set of institutional, market-economy, and fiscal-discipline features — specifically government effectiveness, rule of law, and debt-to-GDP ratio — rather than by welfare architecture or Nordic-specific cultural factors alone.
partial
+4
1996-2023
The v1 decomposition (three channels: WGI gov effectiveness, WGI rule of law, IMF debt/GDP) left 98% of the Nordic-vs-Southern-Europe log GDP/capita gap unexplained.
partial
+4
1996-2023
The September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines formalised a structural pivot in European gas supply: the share of EU gas imports from Russia (pipeline + LNG combined) fell from ~40% in 2021 to <15% by 2024, US LNG exports to the EU rose from ~22 bcm/yr pre-shock to ~50-70 bcm/yr 2023-2024, Norwegian pipeline gas became the largest single EU supplier (>30% of imports), and EU LNG regasification capacity expanded materially (FSRU additions in DEU Wilhelmshaven + Brunsbüttel + Stade, NLD Eemshaven, ITA Piombino, FRA Le Havre).
partial
+8
2018-2025
Norway's post-1990 GPFG resource-rent architecture outperformed a hydrocarbon-dependent donor pool on real GDP per capita, consistent with the claim that collective ownership of resource rents plus market-based management can avoid resource-curse growth outcomes.
partial
+5
1985-2023
Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain.
partial
2000-2024
The 2022-2026 window saw rhetorical and policy-stated revival of Western large-scale nuclear power: France committed to EPR2 fleet (6 + 8 reactors by 2050) under loi accélération du nucléaire 2023; UK confirmed Sizewell C investment FID 2024 + Small Modular Reactor (SMR) competitive selection 2024-2025; US Vogtle Unit 4 commercial start July 2024 + several SMR / advanced-reactor licensing applications; Japan re-pivoted to nuclear restart + lifetime extension (2023 GX framework permits >60-year operation); Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium reversed phase-out policies.
partial
+5
2018-2027
Higher nuclear electricity share predicts lower industrial power-price volatility and lower fossil electricity share.
partial
1980-2024
Occupational licensing predicts higher wages in licensed occupations but lower interstate mobility and slower wage convergence.
partial
1990-2023
In OECD country-years from 1990 to 2022, broader collective-bargaining coverage does not impose a material unemployment penalty.
partial
+32
1990-2022
Higher public education spending as a share of GDP predicts later human-capital gains only where governance quality is above the sample median.
partial
1980-2024
Higher housing-cost burdens are associated with higher after-tax inequality even after market-income inequality is controlled.
partial
1980-2024
OECD country-years with higher housing-cost overburden rates have lower real private-consumption-per-capita growth over the next 1-3 years, after income, unemployment, and country/year effects.
partial
1980-2024
Higher minimum-wage bite predicts higher low-education unemployment when productivity growth is below the OECD median.
partial
1980-2024
Higher physician density predicts lower amenable mortality, with larger effects where public coverage or public health spending is higher.
partial
1990-2024
Rising low-income rent burden predicts higher child poverty or disposable-income poverty, net of unemployment and GDP per capita.
partial
1980-2024
In OECD country-years from 1990 to 2022, higher trade-union density is associated with lower disposable-income Gini after country and year fixed effects and unemployment controls.
partial
+32
1990-2022
Higher union density lowers wage dispersion but may reduce employment only where productivity growth is weak.
partial
1980-2024
Larger vocational or work-based upper-secondary pathways predict lower youth unemployment without reducing tertiary progression.
partial
1990-2024
In OECD country-years from 1990 to 2022, a wider youth-to-prime-age wage gap is associated with lower youth employment, even after controlling for the aggregate unemployment rate.
partial
+32
1990-2022
Greater trade openness predicts stronger high-technology diffusion under open competitive standards.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher trade interdependence predicts lower bilateral military-conflict probability after controlling for alliance structures.
partial
1990-2023
Across 1948-1998, the Deutsche Bundesbank — operating under a statutorily independent, price-stability-prioritised mandate (Bundesbankgesetz 1957) — delivered lower mean and lower-variance CPI inflation than the median OECD central bank operating under more discretionary mandates.
partial
+10
1948-1998
Higher fossil-fuel consumption subsidies predict higher energy intensity and slower renewable-share growth.
partial
1980-2024
Flexible parental-leave designs predict higher female labour-force participation and smaller gender wage gaps than rigid maternal-only leave.
partial
1990-2023
Restrictive part-time and temporary-work regulations predict lower female labour-force participation and larger gender pay gaps.
partial
1990-2023
Higher rule-of-law and regulatory-quality proxies predict stronger innovation diffusion than interventionist IP bottlenecks.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher tax burden proxies predict lower labour-force participation over long windows.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Higher employer payroll taxes predict lower formal employment, especially for low-skilled and young workers.
partial
1990-2023
Forced-saving pension systems (mandatory defined-contribution or provident funds with significant asset accumulation) raise capital deepening (capital per worker) and support catch-up real GDP per worker growth in developing and emerging economies, but do not guarantee frontier total factor productivity growth, in a broad-country panel 1980-2020.
partial
+60
1980-2020
Peru's 1990-1995 Fujimori shock-therapy package (price liberalisation, fiscal stabilisation under the August 1990 "Fujishock", Brady-style external debt restructuring 1996-1997, large-scale privatisation of SOEs, central-bank independence under the 1993 constitution, and trade liberalisation) produced a structural break in inflation and real-GDP per capita relative to Peru's 1985-1990 hyperinflation trajectory and relative to a Latin American peer pool that did not adopt comparable packages on the same timeline.
partial
+4
1985-2005
Colombia's policy package under Petro (2022-2026) — tax reform raising marginal rates on high incomes and dividends, energy-transition policies signalling oil/coal sector contraction, pension reform proposal, and labour reform — produces measurable capital-flight indicators beyond the synthetic counterfactual: peso real depreciation, sovereign credit-spread widening, resident-deposit dollarisation, and net portfolio outflows.
partial
2014-2026
Colombia's real GDP, FDI inflows, and peso exchange-rate trajectory from Petro's August 2022 inauguration through 2026 diverge negatively from a comparable-institutional-quality Latin American donor pool (Peru, Chile, Mexico) weighted to match Colombia's pre-treatment macroeconomic profile (GDP per capita, oil export share, central-bank-independence index, WGI rule-of-law score, inflation-target credibility).
partial
2014-2027
Stringent pharmaceutical price controls predict fewer new drug launches and longer time-to-market for innovative therapies.
partial
1990-2023
The Phillips curve flattened post-1990 in OECD economies, reflecting endogenous expectation formation and labour-market regime change rather than pure NAIRU drift.
partial
+14
1970-2023
Pinochet-era Chile's rapid liberalisation programme (1973-1982) produced an initial growth collapse culminating in the 1975 recession and the 1982 banking-and-debt crisis, with sustained recovery only after selective state re-engagement (copper-sector re-nationalisation, Banco del Estado expansion, pension-system guarantee backstopping).
partial
+1
1965-1995
Monetary tightening reduces labor share and wage growth more than profit income during disinflation episodes, implying a distributional cost channel.
partial
1980-2024
Politicised development-bank lending that increases around election cycles predicts weaker subsequent total-factor-productivity growth and higher non-performing loan ratios in a broad panel of emerging and developing economies during 1990-2020.
partial
+84
1990-2020
Higher regulatory quality predicts higher trade openness through lower port and trade-cost frictions.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Market-compatible regulatory quality predicts higher labor-force participation where benefits can remain portable.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.
partial
+14
1991-2019
Precautionary-principle-based regulation in the EU produces a three-order causal chain relative to the US regulatory baseline.
partial
+3
1995-2024
Binding statutory price controls produce a three-order causal chain.
partial
2000-2024
Agricultural output surges most sharply in years following price liberalisation and de-collectivisation, controlling for weather.
partial
1990-2023
Across a broad panel of developing and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, price controls and directed input subsidies predict higher capital misallocation — measured by the dispersion of the marginal product of capital across firms or sectors — and lower long-run total-factor-productivity growth.
partial
+22
1980-2020
Stronger market price signals and lower sector-entry barriers predict faster labour reallocation during terms-of-trade shocks.
partial
+24
1996-2023
Following Schularick-Taylor 2012 and Jorda-Schularick-Taylor, the five-year change in private credit-to-GDP is a leading indicator of subsequent financial-sector distress in the OECD post-1980 panel.
partial
+17
1980-2020
Private and market-compatible generation entry proxies predict faster electrification.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher regulatory quality and lower entry-barrier proxies predict stronger education participation outcomes.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Private-sector and service-market expansion proxies predict higher household consumption levels.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Mass-voucher privatisation predicts weaker long-run productivity than trade sales or management buyouts, but both outperform continued state ownership.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts higher control-of-corruption scores through more competitive procurement conditions.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Countries that run procyclical fiscal policy during expansions — raising primary spending or cutting revenues when output is above potential — experience larger subsequent output volatility and deeper recessions during the following downturn, compared to countries that run countercyclical or neutral fiscal stance in the same boom.
partial
+28
1995-2023
Higher top marginal income-tax rates predict lower taxable income reporting among high earners (behavioural response) and larger tax-avoidance industries.
partial
1990-2023
Stronger property-rights protection predicts higher agricultural investment and faster yield growth, especially for tree crops and soil conservation.
partial
1990-2023
Stronger rule of law and property rights predict lower child mortality over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2023
In a 1996-2018 Maddison/WGI cross-section, countries with stronger rule of law should show higher mean annual GDP-per-capita growth after controlling for initial income if the property-rights growth channel is strong in between-country variation.
partial
+16
1996-2018
Stronger rule-of-law and property-rights proxies predict higher long-run real income levels.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher reliance on property taxes for local government predicts stronger taxpayer accountability and better public-service quality than transfer-dependent localities.
partial
1990-2023
Expanding protected land lowers land-use emissions or forest loss without reducing food production per capita in countries with adequate yield growth.
partial
1980-2024
Higher public health spending reduces amenable mortality, infant mortality, and out-of-pocket burden after income and population-age controls; the claim is refuted if spending growth does not improve outcomes or only raises total cost.
partial
1980-2024
Countries with higher pre-2020 public health spending shares had smaller 2019-2022 life-expectancy losses, conditional on age structure and income.
partial
2010-2023
Public investment crowds in renewable capacity and private investment during slack periods, but is refuted if higher public investment systematically displaces private capital without capacity gains.
partial
1990-2024
More generous public pensions lower elderly poverty and material deprivation, and the claim is weakened if gains are accompanied by persistent working-age tax wedges, debt-service stress, or lower employment.
partial
1990-2024
Larger unfunded public-pension liabilities predict lower domestic investment and higher implicit debt burdens that crowd out productive spending.
partial
1990-2023
Public R&D spending (government and higher-education R&D) complements private-market innovation at the technology frontier, raising private patenting, total factor productivity, and venture-capital activity in sectors with high spillover potential (defence, health, general-purpose technologies).
partial
+19
1990-2020
Large public-sector wage premia predict lower private-sector formal employment and higher queueing for public jobs.
partial
1990-2023
Public investment in basic infrastructure (transport, energy, water, sanitation) has strong catch-up returns to real GDP per capita growth in developing and emerging economies, while persistent public transfers and subsidies have weaker or insignificant long-run growth effects, in a broad-country panel 1980-2020.
partial
+60
1980-2020
Quality-adjusted real household consumption per capita grew faster in market-liberal economies than in state-directed peers over 30-year windows from 1960-2020, after controlling for initial income level, human capital, and demographic structure.
partial
+31
1960-2020
Reagan's 1981–1986 marginal-tax-rate reductions produced measurable labour-supply response at the top of the distribution, with output growth exceeding the pre-reform trend.
partial
+2
1970-1995
Regional trade agreements with regulatory-convergence chapters predict faster intra-bloc FDI and technology diffusion.
partial
1990-2023
Stable rules-based regulation predicts higher cross-sector private investment and faster technology adoption than discretionary intervention.
partial
+24
1996-2023
Among high-income frontier economies 1990-2020, regulatory predictability — measured by low regulatory-policy volatility, stable tax codes, and low frequency of major rule changes — predicts innovation outcomes (patent quality, R&D productivity, and frontier TFP growth) better than direct public R&D subsidies as a share of GDP.
partial
+25
1990-2020
Stronger regulatory quality predicts larger FDI productivity spillovers to domestic firms through supply-chain linkage.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger high-technology diffusion consistent with entry-permitting regulatory sandboxes.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Deregulation of remote work and cross-border service provision predicts faster geographic wage convergence within countries.
partial
1990-2023
Renewable-capacity growth increases net employment or prevents industrial-employment loss in regions with transition policy, while the claim is refuted if capacity growth coincides with persistent employment losses.
partial
1980-2024
Stringent rent control predicts slower rental-stock growth and higher uncontrolled market rents over long city or country panels.
partial
+24
1970-2024
Rent control predicts lower housing-supply elasticity, higher market rents for uncontrolled units, and longer commuting distances.
partial
1990-2023
Binding rent control initiates a three-order causal chain.
partial
1990-2024
Resource-funded developmentalist states produce early public-investment gains but weaker long-run economic diversification and lower TFP growth than market-open resource peers over 30-year windows in a broad panel of resource-rich economies during 1970-2020.
partial
+69
1970-2020
Nationalisation of producing oil, gas, and mining enterprises without preservation of operational autonomy reduces extractor output within 3–5 years of nationalisation and underperforms the counterfactual trajectory for at least a decade.
partial
+3
1950-2024
R&D spending intensity predicts higher patent intensity only where government effectiveness or rule of law is high.
partial
1980-2024
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger transport and logistics access proxies over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Rule-bound regulatory quality predicts higher control-of-corruption and business-trust governance proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Across countries 1996-2023, higher WGI Rule of Law (RL) scores predict higher subsequent real per-capita GDP growth, conditional on standard controls (initial income, investment share, trade openness, demographic composition).
partial
+54
1996-2023
Post-1991 Russian mass privatisation produced worse output and distributional outcomes than the Chinese gradualist-with-retained-public-ownership path, controlling for initial conditions.
partial
1991-2010
Schroder Agenda 2010 reforms reduced German unemployment but widened inequality and produced slower median-wage growth, demonstrating that not all labour-market flexibilisation is welfare-improving.
partial
+5
1995-2015
Malaysia's 1MDB scandal — public-fund misappropriation 2009-2015, international scandal exposure 2015-2018, Najib conviction 2020 — produced measurable institutional-quality damage observable in Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness scores, and an associated under-performance in real GDP-pc growth vs ASEAN-5 peer mean over 2015-2019.
partial
2008-2024
Vietnam's post-1995 trajectory — building on the 1986 Doi Moi reforms through US trade-normalisation 1995, ASEAN accession 1995, BTA with the US 2001, WTO accession 2007, EVFTA 2020, and a deliberate FDI manufacturing-attraction strategy — produced sustained convergence to middle-income levels, with real GDP-per-capita (PPP) growth averaging at least 4.5 percentage points per year above the SE-Asian peer panel mean (PHL, IDN, KHM, LAO, BGD, MMR) over 1995-2019.
partial
+1
1995-2024
Low-rate broad-base tax systems predict stronger long-run investment and employment than high-rate systems with sector exemptions.
partial
+24
1990-2023
Among high-income economies 1990-2020, services-sector competition — measured by low barriers to entry, low incumbent-protection scores, and high churn in retail, transport, communications, and professional services — predicts long-run prosperity (real GDP per capita growth and labour-productivity growth) better than manufacturing-specific industrial policy spending.
partial
+27
1990-2020
Seigniorage revenue follows a Laffer curve; beyond moderate inflation, higher inflation reduces real seigniorage by shrinking money demand.
partial
1990-2023
Higher mandated severance pay predicts slower job creation and more temporary-contract substitution.
partial
1990-2023
Reductions in annual hours worked raise hourly productivity and wellbeing without lowering employment rates when implemented in high-productivity economies.
partial
1980-2024
Tobacco and alcohol taxes with elastic demand generate health gains but unstable revenue; inelastic-demand sin taxes generate stable revenue but smaller behavioural change.
partial
1990-2023
Singapore's long-run prosperity and frontier convergence are better predicted by extreme trade openness, strong rule of law, competitive product and services markets, and high economic freedom than by state ownership or industrial targeting alone.
partial
+5
1965-2020
Singaporean state-holding-company model (Temasek, GIC) combines public ownership of commanding heights with competitive enterprise discipline, achieving sustained growth that falsifies the claim that all public ownership degrades efficiency.
partial
1974-2023
Universal single-payer healthcare systems (NHS, Canadian Medicare) produce lower per-capita healthcare expenditure with equal or better life-expectancy outcomes than the US multi-payer system.
supported subset
1971-2023
Right-to-buy and social-housing privatisation transfers predict higher household wealth accumulation than continued state ownership.
partial
+24
1970-2023
Higher social spending reduces market-income poverty more strongly where benefits are more cash-and-service universal, and the claim is weakened if poverty falls only through accounting transfers with no improvement in employment or material deprivation.
partial
1990-2024
Countries that constitutionally entrench price stability or central-bank independence show lower inflation variance across political cycles.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with lower average inflation and smaller inflation variance over 30-year windows show stronger long-run real GDP-per-capita growth and lower crisis frequency.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with lower long-run inflation show smaller erosion of defined-benefit pension real values and lower elderly poverty.
partial
1990-2023
Soviet industrial output grew faster than Western European averages during 1928-1940 under the first two Five-Year Plans, demonstrating primitive socialist accumulation's catch-up capacity.
partial
1928-1940
Spain's headline macroeconomic trajectory under the 2018-present PSOE-led governments is NOT uniformly worse than a peer euro-area donor pool, once euro-area-common shocks (COVID 2020-2021, 2022 energy shock, ECB rate cycle) are absorbed by year fixed effects.
partial
+3
2005-2023
Countries moving from administrative spectrum allocation to market auctions show faster mobile and internet diffusion.
partial
+24
1990-2023
Among high-income economies 2000-2020, startup density (new high- growth firms per 1000 working-age population) predicts frontier prosperity — measured by real GDP per capita growth and productivity growth — more strongly than industrial-policy spending as a share of GDP.
partial
+18
2000-2020
Higher broad state-consumption burden proxies predict worse child-mortality nutrition-risk outcomes.
partial
+34
1980-2023
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict lower long-run living-standard levels.
partial
+34
1980-2023
Higher state-bank credit share predicts lower loan quality and weaker long-run TFP growth than private-bank-dominated systems.
partial
1990-2023
Infrastructure quality improves most where state capacity enables market-compatible regulation.
partial
+34
1996-2023
State capacity (proxied by government effectiveness, rule of law, and fiscal extraction) is a prerequisite for effective liberal market policy.
partial
+16
1996-2019
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker high-technology diffusion than competitive financing.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher broad state-consumption burden proxies predict weaker productivity and income levels.
partial
+34
1980-2023
Higher state-consumption burden proxies predict weaker electricity-access outcomes over long windows.
partial
+34
1990-2023
State-led five-year planning economies show faster initial growth but sharper fade after 25 years than market economies with similar initial human capital.
partial
1990-2023
State commodity-marketing boards capture lower farm-gate prices and show more rent-seeking than private auction markets.
partial
1990-2023
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker infrastructure access outcomes than competitive procurement.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker voice-and-accountability and information-quality proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker quality-of-life and income gains after controlling for initial income.
partial
+34
1980-2023
Transition from pay-as-you-go to funded pensions predicts higher national savings and capital deepening, but transition costs matter for fiscal sustainability.
partial
1990-2023
Higher state-allocation burden proxies predict weaker voice-and-accountability information-quality outcomes.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Lower price-signal and regulatory-quality proxies predict higher inflationary shortage pressure.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Across the OECD 38, over 2000-latest, larger general government final consumption as a share of GDP is associated with slower growth in real household disposable income per capita, controlling for demographics, initial-income level, energy-price exposure, and trade openness.
partial
+34
2000-2023
Restrictive strike legislation predicts fewer days lost but may also reduce wage flexibility and sectoral adjustment speed.
partial
1990-2023
Strong employment-protection legislation (EPL) with high union wage-setting coverage and limited at-will dismissal produces a three-order causal chain in Southern European labour markets.
partial
1995-2024
Export-processing zones with market-compatible rules show stronger export and employment growth than zones with heavy state direction and local-content requirements.
partial
1990-2023
Taiwan's ITRI-led semiconductor strategy (ITRI founding 1973, UMC spinoff 1980, TSMC spinoff 1987, continued state-industry co-investment through the 1990s-2000s) produced a frontier-capability industry that market-led alternatives in comparable-income economies did not generate over the same 40-year window.
partial
+3
1970-2019
Taiwan's long-run total factor productivity performance is better predicted by small-and-medium-enterprise (SME) density, export-market discipline, and product-market competition intensity than by direct state planning or state-owned-enterprise (SOE) share.
partial
1960-2020
Automatic indexation of tax brackets to inflation prevents real tax burden increases and supports labour-supply growth.
partial
1990-2023
Countries with broader tax bases and lower marginal rates show stronger long-run investment and GDP growth than countries with narrow bases and high rates.
partial
1990-2023
At high-income levels (GDP per capita above OECD median), very high tax burdens — defined as total tax revenue above 40% of GDP — predict weaker long-run total factor productivity growth unless paired with unusually high state capacity (top tercile WGI Government Effectiveness) and high labour- market flexibility (top tercile OECD EPL), in an OECD and high-income panel 1980-2020.
partial
+29
1980-2020
International tax competition for mobile capital predicts lower corporate rates but does not reduce total corporate revenue when bases are broad.
partial
1990-2023
Higher tax complexity predicts larger tax-advisory and avoidance industries and lower productive investment share.
partial
1990-2023
More tax exemptions and special regimes predict higher compliance costs, larger avoidance sectors, and lower effective progressivity.
partial
1990-2023
Argentine tax-cut episodes — Macri 2017 simplification (export-tax cuts, income-tax floor adjustments, asset-revaluation amnesty) and Milei 2024 cuts (PAIS-tax simplification, top-rate adjustments, dollarisation- preparation framework) — produced upward shifts in the Argentine top-1 pretax income share over their respective post-treatment windows vs LATAM synthetic control, but with the headline-rate effect attenuated by 100+ percent inflation regimes that mechanically inflate measured capital-income realisations.
partial
+1
2010-2025
The Australian Rudd-Swan 2008-2010 top-rate adjustments (Medicare-levy surcharge changes + temporary flood levy 2011 + ongoing top-bracket threshold movements) plus the 2014-2017 Abbott temporary deficit-levy produced top-1 pretax income share dynamics with an absolute elasticity to the headline top rate below 0.5, consistent with the Australian imputation-credit franking system reducing the income-shifting margin for high-earner business owners.
partial
+2
1995-2020
Brazilian tax-base evolution 1995-2024 — Real Plan stabilisation 1994 + CPMF transactions tax 1997-2007 + Lula CCT funding 2003-2010 + Dilma fiscal expansion + Bolsonaro tax simplification proposals + Lula 2024 consumption-tax reform — produced disposable-income Gini reduction of at least 3 Gini-points over 1995-2024 driven primarily by transfer-side expansion rather than tax-progressivity.
partial
1995-2024
The 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA), which cut US qualified-dividend and long-term-capital-gains rates to 15 percent, shifted the composition of top-1 pre-tax income toward dividend and capital-gains realisations between 2003 and 2007, raising the top-1 share by 1.5 to 3 percentage points relative to the pre-2003 trend.
partial
1995-2010
The 2016 Trudeau federal top marginal income tax bracket (33 percent on income above CAD 200,000, raising combined federal-provincial top rate to 53.5 percent in Ontario) produced a measurable but transitory forestalling spike in reported top-1 pretax income share in 2015 with partial reversion by 2018, consistent with a Canadian ETI estimate in the 0.4-0.7 range as documented by Milligan-Smart.
partial
2005-2020
The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA-1993), which raised the US top marginal income tax rate from 31 to 39.6 percent and added the 36 percent bracket, produced a transitory dip in the reported top-1 pre-tax income share via timing-shifted realisations into 1992, but no persistent level reduction in the top share by 1996 once the realisation pull-forward unwinds.
partial
1985-2000
Macron's 2017 reform replacing the French ISF (Impot de Solidarite sur la Fortune) with the IFI (real-estate-only wealth tax) and the introduction of the 30 percent flat tax (PFU) on capital income produced a measurable rise in the French top-1 pre-tax income share over 2018-2022 relative to Eurozone synthetic control, but a smaller-than-projected fall in HNW emigration once concurrent CRS enforcement is accounted for.
partial
+3
2010-2023
The 2000 Schroder corporate + personal tax reform package (top personal rate cut from 53 to 42 percent staged 2000-2005, corporate rate cut from 40 to 25 percent, capital-gains exemption on inter-corporate shareholdings) is associated with a 1.0 to 1.5 percentage point rise in the German top-1 pre-tax income share over 2000-2008 vs Eurozone synthetic control, but no measurable rise in aggregate output growth beyond Eurozone trend.
partial
+3
1990-2010
Greek Memorandum-era tax hikes 2010-2018 (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent, VAT hikes to 24 percent standard, ENFIA recurring property tax 2014, solidarity surcharge 2011-2019) raised the disposable-income Gini coefficient by at least 1.5 Gini-points relative to Eurozone- comparator synthetic control over the period, with the regressivity driven by VAT and property-tax incidence rather than income-tax progressivity.
partial
+3
2000-2020
The Pena Nieto 2014 Mexican tax reform (top marginal income tax rate raised from 30 to 35 percent, capital-gains taxation introduced at 10 percent, dividend tax 10 percent) produced a measurable but small reduction in the Mexican top-1 pretax income share over 2014-2018 vs LATAM synthetic control, with the effect attenuated by Mexico's high informal-sector share which limits the formal-tax-base distributional margin.
partial
+1
2005-2020
Norway's continued retention of an annual wealth tax (formuesskatt) through 2024 — at rates of 0.85-1.1 percent on net wealth above NOK 1.7M — is associated with a top-1 wealth share trajectory that lies below the Nordic-ex-Norway synthetic counterfactual by at least 1 percentage point over 2010-2024, without a large register-based HNW emigration response prior to the 2022 rate increase.
partial
2000-2024
New Zealand's 2010 tax swap (GST rate raised from 12.5 to 15 percent, paired with personal income tax rate cuts including the top rate from 38 to 33 percent) produced a measurable rise in the New Zealand top-1 pretax income share over 2010-2014 vs Anglo-comparator synthetic control, with smaller but detectable rise in the disposable-income Gini coefficient driven by the GST regressivity.
partial
2000-2018
The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) cutting the US top marginal income tax rate from 70 to 50 percent produced a measurable rise in the top-1 percent pre-tax national income share within five years, consistent with the Saez-Slemrod-Giertz elasticity-of-taxable-income literature where most of the apparent response is income-shifting and reporting-form changes rather than real labour-supply expansion.
partial
+7
1975-1990
Spanish top marginal income tax rate dynamics — Zapatero 2007 cut to 43 percent, Rajoy 2012 hike to 52 percent, Sanchez 2021 hike to 47 percent + IGF (solidarity wealth tax) 2022 — produce top-1 pre-tax income share responses that are smaller in absolute magnitude than the OECD median, consistent with a labour-market with relatively compressed top-decile wage structure (high public-sector and family-firm capture of top income).
partial
+8
1995-2024
The Swedish 1991 "tax reform of the century" — flat 30 percent rate on capital income, top labour-income marginal rate cut from 80 to 50 percent, + base broadening — produced a sharp rise in measured top-1 pre-tax income share between 1991 and 1995 driven primarily by the dual-rate income- shifting incentive (capital-income reclassification of high-earner business income), with smaller persistent labour-supply response.
partial
1985-2000
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017 produced after-tax income gains that were monotonically increasing in pre-tax income decile through 2019, with the top decile capturing more than 35 percent of cumulative after-tax income gain over 2018-2019 — orthogonal to the existing TCJA growth-effect spec which targets aggregate output.
partial
2015-2020
Nigel Lawson's 1988 budget cut the UK top marginal income tax rate from 60 to 40 percent, producing a discrete jump in the UK top-1 pre-tax national income share within three years that exceeds the contemporaneous G7-ex-UK trajectory.
partial
+1
1980-1995
The UK's temporary 50 percent additional rate on income above GBP 150,000 (introduced April 2010, reduced to 45 percent April 2013) produced a large transitory dip in reported top-1 pretax income share via 2009-2010 realisation forestalling, with limited persistent effect once the realisation pull-back unwinds.
partial
2000-2018
Tax simplification (fewer filings, flat rates, presumptive thresholds) predicts faster small-firm employment growth and higher formalisation.
partial
1990-2023
Broader tax-treaty networks predict higher bilateral FDI flows and stronger productivity spillovers to domestic suppliers.
partial
1990-2023
Greater trade openness predicts stronger productivity and income growth through technology import channels.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Mandatory technology-transfer requirements on foreign investors predict lower subsequent domestic R&D and fewer high-quality patents.
partial
1990-2023
Temporary safeguard tariffs do not produce measurable learning-curve productivity gains in protected sectors relative to unprotected comparators.
partial
1990-2023
Higher institutional and regulatory quality predicts stronger tertiary education participation and research-capacity proxies.
partial
+34
1996-2023
The growth of the top-1% pre-tax national income share across OECD economies over 1980-2020 is primarily driven by two channels that are consistent with marginal-product returns in skill-biased and capital- deep economies — (a) specialist-wage growth concentrated in superstar- firm and specialist-services sectors, and (b) capital-income growth driven by asset-price appreciation relative to wage income — with material but smaller contributions from (c) rent-extraction indicators (finance-sector share, executive-compensation-to-worker-pay ratio) and (d) sector concentration effects.
partial
+14
1980-2020
Progressive income-tax marginal rates (up to roughly 70% top rate) have been compatible with strong growth in post-war US 1945-1980 and Nordics, falsifying extreme-Laffer-curve positions.
partial
+10
1945-1980
Deep trade agreements (with regulatory cooperation, investment provisions) predict stronger institutional-quality spillovers than shallow tariff-only agreements.
partial
1990-2023
Lower trade costs (tariffs, logistics, border delays) predict declining informal-sector shares through formal-firm expansion.
partial
1990-2023
Access to trade credit predicts higher SME exporter entry and survival, especially in countries with weak domestic financial development.
partial
1990-2023
Trade embargoes imposed on smaller economies predict larger relative welfare losses for the target than for the imposing country.
partial
1990-2023
Customs modernisation and trade-facilitation reforms predict larger reductions in import lead times and inventory costs than tariff cuts alone.
partial
1990-2023
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), with the goods agreement effective 2010-01-01 for the original ASEAN-6, raised ASEAN-6 merchandise-export intensity over the 2010-2019 window relative to non-ASEAN comparator economies.
partial
+9
2000-2019
The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), effective 2015-12-20, raised Australian merchandise-exports-to-GDP and resource-export intensity over the 2016-2019 pre-COVID window relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of resource-exporting economies.
partial
+4
2005-2019
China's WTO accession (2001-12-11) triggered a structural acceleration in Chinese merchandise-export intensity and manufacturing value-added relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of large emerging economies that did not accede to the WTO on the same date.
partial
+6
1990-2019
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), effective 2018-12-30 for the first six ratifying members (AUS, CAN, JPN, MEX, NZL, SGP), produced modest measurable trade-creation effects among CPTPP members in the 2019-2024 window.
partial
+11
2010-2024
The EU's 2007 (BGR, ROU) and 2013 (HRV) enlargements produced a smaller per-capita-income convergence acceleration than the 2004 enlargement, because (a) accession occurred into the financial- crisis and post-crisis austerity environment rather than the pre-crisis growth boom, and (b) baseline institutional quality was lower at the accession date.
partial
+3
1995-2019
Eurozone formation (1999 currency conversion, 2002 banknotes) raised intra-eurozone trade-openness ratios for the 11/12 founding members relative to non-eurozone EU comparators (GBR, DNK, SWE) over the 1995-2008 pre-GFC window.
partial
+11
1995-2008
The EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), effective 2020-08-01, raised Vietnamese merchandise-exports-to-GDP and manufacturing value-added relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of South-East Asian comparator economies in the 2020-2024 window.
partial
+2
2010-2024
India under the Modi government (2014-) has reversed elements of the 1991-2007 tariff-liberalisation trajectory: weighted applied tariffs rose from ~13% in 2014 to ~18% by 2022 (according to WTO and WDI tariff measures), with Production-Linked Incentive schemes adding non-tariff protection.
partial
+4
2005-2023
Japan's CPTPP entry (2018-12-30) plus the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (effective 2019-02-01) jointly produced a modest measurable trade-openness expansion for Japan over the 2019-2024 window relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of large advanced economies.
partial
+3
2010-2024
The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), effective 2012-03-15, raised bilateral US-Korea merchandise trade volumes and Korean manufacturing-export share to GDP relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of comparable East Asian and OECD economies over the 2012-2019 pre-COVID window.
partial
+4
2002-2019
Morocco's FTA cascade (EU Association Agreement 2000, Agadir Agreement 2007, US FTA 2006, Turkey 2006) raised Moroccan trade- openness and manufacturing-export share over the 2000-2019 window relative to North African comparators.
partial
1990-2019
The Singapore-China FTA, effective 2009-01-01, produced negligible measurable trade-creation effects on Singapore aggregate trade ratios because Singapore's trade was already extremely liberalised under unilateral free-port policy and pre-existing ASEAN-China integration.
partial
1995-2019
The UK's exit from the EU single market (effective 2021-01-01 end of transition) reduced UK trade-openness and merchandise exports relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of European comparator economies.
partial
+6
2010-2024
The US-China Phase One Trade Agreement (signed 2020-01-15) committed China to USD 200bn of additional US imports over 2020- 2021.
partial
2015-2024
Major trade-liberalisation events — defined as sharp, policy-driven increases in trade-to-GDP openness sustained over at least 5 years — are associated with positive subsequent per-capita GDP growth over 10-year horizons, relative to matched non-liberalising controls.
partial
+24
1980-2023
Trade openness predicts higher real household consumption over long windows.
partial
+34
1980-2023
Greater trade openness predicts stronger control-of-corruption scores through governance discipline.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Trade openness predicts faster GDP-per-capita convergence to the frontier over 30-year panels after controlling for geography and institutions.
partial
1990-2023
Market openness without adjustment institutions raises inequality or regional divergence enough to trigger policy reversal.
partial
1990-2023
Across a broad panel of countries 1960-2019, higher trade openness predicts faster long-run convergence of real GDP per capita toward the global frontier (the United States) than industrial-policy intensity does.
partial
+56
1960-2019
Unilateral trade liberalisation predicts faster manufacturing productivity growth through import competition and export discipline.
partial
1990-2023
Trade openness predicts better access to medical capacity and health inputs.
partial
+34
1990-2023
Mandatory training levies with firm-specific training predict stronger productivity effects than levies funding general state training.
partial
1990-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts better transport-access proxies and commute-related quality of life.
partial
+34
1996-2023
UK post-1979 institutional reform (Bank of England independence 1997, competition-authority strengthening, privatisation regulatory frameworks) contributed to 1992-2007 macro stability more than the policy content alone.
partial
+1
1979-2007
UK Cameron-Osborne austerity 2010-2016 reduced output below the counterfactual path and failed to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio on the government's own timeline.
partial
2010-2016
UK Truss mini-budget 2022 gilt crisis reflected market confidence and institutional-framework rupture rather than an MMT-predicted hard fiscal limit, because the BoE restored order by intervening as issuer.
partial
2022-2023
Longer unemployment-benefit duration predicts higher long-term unemployment and slower re-employment wage growth.
partial
1990-2023
In a broad-country panel 1990-2019, higher unemployment-benefit generosity (proxied by public social expenditure on unemployment programmes as a share of GDP and by the OECD net replacement rate where available) predicts lower employment-to-population ratios and higher structural unemployment, controlling for cyclical conditions, institutional quality, and demographic structure.
partial
+32
1990-2019
Countries that cut tariffs unilaterally show larger consumption welfare gains than countries that maintained protection, even without reciprocity.
partial
1990-2023
Countries that undertake unilateral tariff liberalisation — defined as an autonomous, non-FTA-driven reduction in the applied weighted-mean tariff of at least 5 percentage points sustained for at least 5 consecutive years — experience stronger subsequent 20-year growth in real GDP per worker and real private consumption per capita than matched protectionist peers, in a global panel 1970-2020.
partial
+60
1970-2020
Higher union density raises labor share and lowers disposable-income inequality without reducing medium-run GDP per hour growth once sector composition is controlled.
partial
1990-2024
Higher union density predicts wage compression and higher unemployment among the young and low-skilled.
partial
1990-2023
Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain.
partial
1995-2024
Child-poverty rates in EU countries with universal child-benefit systems are substantially lower than in means-tested systems at similar tax-and-transfer cost.
partial
+12
1995-2023
Higher market-compatible regulatory quality predicts stronger high-technology output from university spinout ecosystems.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Higher regulatory quality predicts better urban-service availability proxies over long windows.
partial
+34
1996-2023
US 1945-1973 coordinated labour-management-state compact produced broad-based real-wage growth tracking productivity, demonstrating that strong labour institutions + progressive taxation are growth-compatible.
partial
1945-1973
US GDP per capita (PPP, constant $) exceeds the EU15 weighted average by approximately 50% as of 2023, with the gap widening from ~20% in 2000 after converging during 1980-1995.
partial
+9
1970-2023
Higher VAT efficiency (revenue/product of standard rate and consumption base) predicts stronger public-finance sustainability and lower debt drift.
partial
1990-2023
Deeper private financial-market proxies predict stronger high-technology and innovation diffusion outcomes.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Vienna's sustained social-housing programme has delivered lower rent burdens and housing-cost inflation than comparable European capitals without supply collapse, a counter-example to the rent-control-supply-destruction narrative.
partial
+6
1971-2023
In the 2021-2024 OECD inflation episode, wage growth lagged price inflation rather than led it — average across OECD economies, real wages fell 2-4% cumulative 2021-2023 before recovering — refuting the wage-price-spiral framing and supporting the "profit-led-then-supply-shock-driven" decomposition (Bivens, Weber, Stiglitz) for the early phase, with wage catch-up only emerging 2023-2024 once inflation peaked.
partial
+12
2018-2024
Following Bhaduri-Marglin (1990) and the Stockhammer-Onaran post-Keynesian empirical tradition, advanced economies are heterogeneously classified as "wage-led" or "profit-led" depending on whether a rise in the wage share raises or lowers aggregate demand.
partial
+11
1980-2020
Higher regulatory quality predicts stronger network-utility access proxies where private or corporatized participation is credible.
partial
+34
1996-2023
Across country-years with local WDI and WGI coverage, new business registrations predict stronger three-year forward GDP-per-capita growth mainly where rule of law is higher; in weak-rule-of-law settings, the same business-entry count is a noisier proxy for productive market-process entrepreneurship.
partial
+54
2006-2019
Health expenditure per capita increases life expectancy strongly at low and middle spending levels but has sharply diminishing returns above the OECD median.
partial
1980-2024
Higher out-of-pocket health spending shares predict higher infant, under-5, or amenable mortality at a given income level.
partial
1980-2024
Tertiary attainment growth predicts higher high-tech export shares after 3-5 years, conditional on income and trade openness.
partial
1980-2024
Wealth taxes predict capital flight, lower reported domestic wealth, and reduced investment, especially when valuation is subjective and enforcement uneven.
partial
1990-2023
Nordic prosperity relative to peer high-income economies is better explained by the combination of generous welfare states with high trade openness, flexible labour markets, and strong competition policy than by welfare-state size alone, over the 1990-2023 period.
partial
+10
1990-2023
Japan's 2004 basic-pension reform (introducing macroeconomic-slide indexation, raising employee contributions in stages to 18.3% by 2017, raising age of full-eligibility to 65) materially extended fiscal sustainability of the pension system through the 2010s without producing the projected step-down in elderly-poverty rate, illustrating a sustainability-versus-adequacy tradeoff that motivated subsequent 2012 and 2020 supplementary-benefit additions.
partial
1995-2022
Singapore's CPF reform sequence 2013-2024 — MediShield Life 2015, CPF Life 2013-2024 evolution, Silver Support Scheme 2016, Workfare Income Supplement increases, Lease Buyback Scheme expansion, Retirement Sum increases — preserved the CPF forced-saving architecture's macro-savings rate while materially reducing elderly-poverty rate from 41% (2014 OECD harmonised) to under 20% by 2024 through targeted top-up mechanisms, demonstrating that CPF-style architecture is upgradeable on adequacy without abandoning the forced-saving foundation.
partial
2010-2024
The Hartz IV reform (Jan 2005, consolidating Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilfe into a single means-tested benefit with stricter activation rules) cut Germany's long-term-unemployment rate by at least 30% within seven years (2005-2012) relative to a synthetic-control of EU peers (FRA, BEL, NLD, AUT, ITA), with the activation channel decomposed from the wage-floor channel by tracking the simultaneous Hartz I-III placement-service reforms.
partial
1995-2015
The UK Universal Credit rollout (2013-2017, replacing six legacy means-tested benefits with a single taper) raised employment-rate among legacy-benefit claimants by 3 to 5 percentage points within 24 months of area rollout, identified off geographic-staggered Pathfinder/full-service rollout timing 2013-2018, controlling for area unemployment and the post-Brexit-vote labour-market shock.
partial
2010-2022
Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.
partial
+29
1980-2020
Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD, established 1982 paying annual dividends to all Alaska residents from oil-revenue-funded sovereign wealth) — averaging USD 1100-2000 per resident-year over 1982-2024 — has produced a measurable and persistent reduction in extreme-poverty rate of at least 3 percentage points relative to a synthetic-control of comparable resource-rich US states (Wyoming, North Dakota, Texas, Louisiana) without affecting state-level employment-rate, providing the longest- running natural-experiment evidence for non-trivial unconditional-cash-floor effects in a US-state high-income institutional environment.
partial
1980-2023
Brazil's Bolsa Família phase-2 (post-2010 expansion under Dilma 2011-2015 with Brasil Sem Miséria add-on, then Bolsonaro-era restructuring 2019-2021, then Lula-era Auxílio Brasil to BFP rebrand 2023) produced diminishing marginal poverty-reduction returns relative to the 2003-2010 phase, with the post-2014 commodity-bust eroding the wage-floor channel that complemented BFP transfers in phase-1, illustrating cash-transfer-program-decoupling from labour-market complement.
partial
2010-2023
China's combined social-protection expansion — urban dibao (1999, expanded 2003) plus rural dibao (2007 universalisation) plus rural-pension scheme NRPS (2009 launch reaching 459M+ enrollees by 2013) — reduced rural extreme-poverty headcount by at least 5 percentage points within five years (2009-2014) net of growth-channel effects, identified off province-staggered NRPS rollout 2009-2012 and province-level dibao-spending intensity in panel-FE design.
partial
2000-2018
France's RSA (Revenu de Solidarité Active 2009, replacing RMI + API) and Prime d'Activité (2016, replacing RSA-activité + PPE) lowered the participation tax rate on low-wage work and raised employment among low-education beneficiaries by 2 to 4 percentage points relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of EU peers without comparable reforms (BEL, ITA, ESP, PRT) over five-year post-reform windows.
partial
+1
2000-2022
Indonesia's PKH (Program Keluarga Harapan, conditional cash transfer launched 2007 with phased expansion to 10M+ households by 2018) and BLT/BLSM unconditional energy-subsidy compensation transfers (2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2022) produced complementary poverty effects, with PKH delivering long-horizon human-capital channel and BLT delivering short-horizon consumption-smoothing channel, identified off staggered PKH rollout cohorts and BLT one-shot event-windows in the panel of Indonesian provinces 2005-2022.
partial
2003-2022
Italy's Reddito di Cittadinanza (RdC, March 2019) reduced absolute-poverty headcount among low-income Italian households by at least 15% within three years (2019-2022) but produced no measurable improvement in employment-rate among working-age beneficiaries, identified off the synthetic-control gap with EU peers (ESP, GRC, PRT) lacking comparable means-tested guaranteed-minimum-income programmes pre-2020.
partial
2010-2023
South Korea's Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC, introduced 2009 with subsequent expansions 2012, 2015, 2019) raised labour-force-participation among low-income married women by 2 to 4 percentage points within five years of each expansion threshold change, identified off discontinuity in eligibility-cliff income brackets across years using a regression-discontinuity-in-time framework consistent with US EITC literature (Eissa-Liebman 1996; Hoynes-Patel 2018).
partial
2005-2022
Portugal's 2010-2012 austerity-era rollback of the Rendimento Social de Inserção (RSI) — eligibility restrictions, value freezes, and stricter conditionality under the Troika programme — raised severe material deprivation among working-age households by at least 3 percentage points within 4 years, identified off the synthetic-control gap with Greece-excluded southern-EU donor pool, demonstrating that residualisation of guaranteed-minimum-income programmes during fiscal consolidation has measurable poverty cost.
partial
2005-2018
South Africa's social-grants system (Old Age Pension extension 1998, Child Support Grant 1998-2012 expansion to age 18, Disability and Foster Care Grants, Social Relief of Distress 2020-2024) reaching 18+ million recipients — roughly 30% of population — has produced sustained reductions in extreme- poverty headcount of 6 to 10 percentage points relative to a synthetic-control of upper-middle-income Sub-Saharan and LatAm peers without comparable grant-coverage scale, while exerting fiscal-pressure costs visible in National Treasury MTBPS structural-balance projections.
partial
1998-2024
Universal-childcare expansions in three jurisdictions — Quebec 1997 (CAD 5/day universal subsidised childcare), Germany 2013 (legal-entitlement to under-3 childcare via U3 Ausbau), Korea 2013 (universal free childcare for ages 0-5) — produced cross-jurisdiction-replicable maternal-LFP increases of at least 4 percentage points within five years of universal-rollout, identified off rest-of-Canada, rest-of-Germany (eastern-states pre-treatment baseline), and synthetic-control donor pools, providing triangulation evidence for a generalisable maternal-LFP effect of universal childcare.
partial
1990-2022
Higher trade openness predicts higher top-income concentration in a country-year panel: after country and year fixed effects, log GDP per capita, population, and regulatory-quality controls, WDI trade as a share of GDP should be positively associated with the WID top 0.1 percent pre-tax income share.
partial
+33
1996-2023
More diversified export baskets predict smaller export and GDP contractions during global downturns.
partial
1980-2024
Higher food import tariffs predict higher food-price inflation and worse poverty outcomes, especially in food-import-dependent countries.
partial
1990-2024
Tariff reductions predict greater import product variety and higher private consumption per capita over 3-year windows.
partial
1980-2024
Worker cooperative conversions (US Main Street Employee Ownership Act 2018, Italian Marcora Law 1985) preserve employment in firms that would otherwise close.
partial
1985-2023
In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, the introduction of workfare or activity- conditional welfare programmes (requiring job search, training, or community work in exchange for benefits) predicts higher employment-to-population ratios and lower long-run unemployment relative to unconditional transfer regimes, controlling for cyclical conditions and institutional quality.
partial
+32
1990-2020
Lower annual hours worked reduce energy use and emissions per capita without proportionate reductions in life satisfaction or employment.
partial
1980-2024
Stricter working-time limits predict higher hourly productivity but lower total output per worker, with ambiguous welfare effects.
partial
1990-2023
WTO accession predicts productivity spillovers through import competition and technology transfer, especially when domestic entry barriers also fall.
partial
1990-2023
WTO accession predicts total factor productivity (TFP) growth spillovers through increased import competition and expanded export market access, especially in episodes where domestic entry barriers also fall, in a panel of accession and non-accession countries 1995-2020.
partial
+35
1995-2020
Honduras under Xiomara Castro repealed the ZEDE (Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico — charter-city / special-economic-zone) framework in April 2022, immediately after taking office.
partial
2015-2026
Upzoning and deregulation of single-family-only zoning predict faster permit growth and lower real rent growth than restrictive zoning.
partial
+24
1990-2024
Abenomics 2012-2020 produced weaker inflation response than orthodox monetary-policy models predicted, vindicating post-Keynesian view that monetary policy alone cannot lift effective demand at zero lower bound.
refuted
2008-2020
Growth in food or crop production per rural worker predicts lower poverty rates and child mortality in low- and middle-income countries.
refuted
1980-2024
Australia's punitive tobacco excise escalation (four 12.5% increases 2013-2020, plus plain packaging 2012) reduced adult smoking prevalence more than comparator countries that adopted less punitive, harm-reduction-friendly approaches: New Zealand (legalised vaping 2020), the United Kingdom (NHS promotes vaping as quit aid), and Sweden (snus as dominant harm-reduction product).
refuted
2000-2022
Larger automatic stabilizers reduce peak-to-trough GDP losses and poverty spikes during recessions, but may trade off against recovery speed if labor-market reentry is weak.
refuted
1990-2024
Deeper private-credit market proxies predict stronger productivity growth than state-owned banking allocation.
refuted
+34
1996-2023
The 2008 Icelandic banking collapse (failure of Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing in October 2008) is a canonical case of a small-open-economy systemic banking crisis driven by external-funded balance-sheet expansion exceeding any plausible lender-of- last-resort capacity.
refuted
2003-2015
Mexico's December-1994 Tequila Crisis — peso devaluation against the USD by >= 50%, IMF / US Treasury rescue package, real-GDP contraction of >= 6% in 1995, and a Laeven-Valencia-coded systemic banking crisis 1994-1996 — is the canonical EM-currency-and-banking-twin-crisis case of the early 1990s.
refuted
1990-2000
Real residential property-price growth above income growth predicts weaker private consumption growth over the next 2 years.
refuted
1980-2024
Higher household debt-service ratios predict slower real private-consumption growth especially after policy-rate increases.
refuted
1980-2024
The 1945-1973 Bretton Woods era sustained higher trend growth and lower unemployment across OECD than the post-1973 floating-rate era because capital-account controls preserved fiscal space for demand management.
refuted
+10
1945-1990
Active labour-market spending reduces long-term unemployment only where case-management capacity and benefit conditionality are strong; passive benefit generosity without activation predicts longer unemployment duration.
refuted
1990-2024
Broadband infrastructure improves business entry, productivity, and export services when telecom competition and regulatory quality are high; monopoly rollout without competition shows weaker diffusion benefits.
refuted
1990-2024
Discretionary fiscal expansion raises real output with limited inflation when unemployment is above its country-specific 10-year mean, but the output gain shrinks and inflation pass-through rises when unemployment is below that slack threshold.
refuted
1990-2024
During the 2008-2012 crisis, faster fiscal stimulus in high-capacity states predicted smaller employment losses and faster GDP recovery; in low-capacity/high-debt states, stimulus size had weaker recovery payoff and worse sovereign-risk outcomes.
refuted
1990-2024
In-work benefits increase low-income employment when phaseout cliffs are smooth and administration is simple; sharp cliffs or complex means tests predict lower hours growth and weaker reemployment.
refuted
1990-2024
Financial depth supports productivity and innovation only under strong rule of law; in weak-rule-of-law settings, private credit growth predicts credit booms and asset prices more than TFP or patenting.
refuted
1980-2024
In OECD recessions from 1980-2024, larger automatic stabilizers cushion two-year GDP and employment losses only where government effectiveness is above the sample median; where effectiveness is low, the same spending share predicts slower debt repair without a measurable unemployment cushion.
refuted
1980-2024
China's property-sector deleveraging shock 2020-2024 — triggered by the August 2020 "three red lines" policy on developer leverage, escalating through Evergrande's September 2021 default, Country Garden's 2023 liquidity crisis, and the persistent ghost-cities inventory overhang — produced a structural break in residential investment and a sustained drag on aggregate growth that is identifiable in real GDP, gross capital formation, and the household-consumption share of GDP.
refuted
2008-2024
China's 2010-2023 state-directed solar-PV and onshore-wind manufacturing scale-up (Renewable Energy Law 2005, 12th and 13th Five-Year Plan industrial-policy targets) is the dominant source of the ~85% global decline in solar-PV module costs and the ~55% decline in onshore-wind LCOE over the same window.
refuted
+3
2010-2023
Clinton's 1996 welfare reform (TANF, work requirements) increased low-skill labour-force participation and reduced caseloads without the catastrophic child-poverty outcomes critics predicted.
refuted
1990-2010
Costa Rican post-1950 development path achieves life expectancy comparable to the US at roughly one-fifth the per-capita material throughput, demonstrating the feasibility of high-wellbeing low-throughput trajectories.
refuted
1950-2023
Higher energy use per capita predicts faster GDP growth.
refuted
+170
1990-2023
Stronger fiscal balances predict higher unemployment if austerity is contractionary.
refuted
+141
1990-2023
Higher fossil-electricity shares predict worse child-mortality outcomes.
refuted
+186
1990-2023
Higher fossil-electricity shares predict faster GDP growth in development panels.
refuted
+200
1990-2023
Higher government consumption predicts faster GDP per-capita growth.
refuted
+179
1990-2023
Private-credit depth does not reliably translate into faster GDP per-capita growth.
refuted
+180
1990-2023
Private-credit depth predicts manufacturing-share erosion, consistent with financialisation crowding out production.
refuted
+175
1990-2023
Public debt is not necessarily growth-damaging in broad panels.
refuted
+103
1990-2023
Higher renewable-electricity shares predict higher life expectancy.
refuted
+200
1990-2023
Higher tax revenue shares predict lower extreme poverty.
refuted
+133
1990-2023
If Cuba's socialist health-system superiority story really travels beyond a friendly regional pool, Cuba should remain at least mid-pack against a small advanced-market subgroup of non-socialist health performers by 2000; if it ranks near the bottom even after adjusting expectations for lower income, the universal version of the Marxist-Leninist claim is overstated.
refuted
+1
1960-2000
Across countries 1980-2023, rising age at first marriage is associated with declining total fertility rate, and through that channel, with shifts in working-age trajectories that propagate to per-capita growth 25-30 years later.
refuted
+24
1980-2023
The strongest long-run economic performers among countries that achieved middle-income status are those that used developmentalist tools (state-directed credit, sectoral targeting, export subsidies, infrastructure investment) for catch-up growth, then transitioned toward market competition, fiscal discipline, and rule-bound institutions before reaching frontier convergence.
refuted
+21
1960-2020
Kidney-dialysis markets with competing providers and outcome-based reimbursement show lower mortality and hospitalisation than single-provider models.
refuted
+24
1980-2023
Energy use per capita has a strong positive association with life expectancy below a threshold but little additional association above high-income levels.
refuted
1980-2024
Employment protection improves job security and tenure without creating youth/temporary-contract dualism only when active labor policy and growth are strong.
refuted
1980-2024
Erhard's 1948 currency reform and price-control removal produced the fastest recovery in post-war Europe, demonstrating that rules-based market restoration outperforms Bretton-Woods-era rationed economies.
refuted
1946-1958
Private-sector carbon-pricing schemes (EU ETS 2005-present) have failed to reduce EU territorial emissions at the pace implied by 1.5C pathways, demonstrating market-mechanism inadequacy.
refuted
+21
2005-2023
EU countries with faster construction value-added or construction employment growth experience lower subsequent housing-cost overburden.
refuted
1990-2024
Fed quantitative tightening (QT) 2022-06 to 2025 — running off Treasury and MBS holdings at peak ~$95B/month (slowed to ~$60B in 2024-Q2) — produced small but detectable upward pressure on term premia and mortgage spreads, consistent with the QE channel operating in reverse but at materially weaker magnitude per dollar of balance-sheet change.
refuted
2020-2025
Across countries that introduced loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) macroprudential limits on residential mortgage lending in 2010-2022, the growth rate of household credit and the change in real residential property prices decelerate over the 3-year window following limit introduction relative to matched control country-years.
refuted
+20
2010-2022
Share of value added going to financial-sector profits in the US rose from under 15% in 1970 to over 30% by 2007, consistent with Hilferding-style financialisation hypothesis.
refuted
1970-2007
Higher private-credit depth and financial-sector value-added shares predict lower labor shares and weaker real investment after credit booms, supporting financialization critiques if robust.
refuted
1980-2024
Fiscal multipliers are state-dependent: large at ZLB, small near full employment; no single-number answer is policy-relevant.
refuted
+14
1971-2023
Agricultural output growth achieved through forest-cover loss has weaker poverty-reduction returns and worse emissions outcomes than output growth without forest loss.
refuted
1980-2024
Fossil-fuel subsidy reductions lower emissions intensity only when paired with household compensation; otherwise they raise poverty or energy stress enough to weaken the just-transition claim.
refuted
1980-2024
Across middle-income and catch-up economies 1980-2020, high state-directed allocation — measured by state-enterprise share of output, directed-credit intensity, and public-investment-driven growth — is associated with larger boom-bust cycles after middle-income status is reached, even when early catch-up growth is strong.
refuted
+55
1980-2020
Among high-income and near-frontier economies from 1970 to 2024, lower product-market regulation, stronger competition, and stronger property rights predict higher long-run TFP growth than state ownership or targeted industrial-policy intensity.
refuted
+18
1970-2024
Mandatory pharmacy-level generic substitution predicts pharmaceutical-spending reductions without worse mortality outcomes.
refuted
+24
1980-2023
Germany's industrial electricity prices diverged upward from a basket of comparable industrial peers (United States, France, Sweden, Norway, Finland) after the 2011 Energiewende pivot and the gap widened further through the 2014 nuclear-phase-out milestones and the 2022 gas crisis.
refuted
+4
2005-2024
Countries permitting GM crop cultivation without prolonged moratoria experienced faster agricultural yield convergence than ban or delay countries.
refuted
+24
1990-2023
Higher government consumption share predicts lower private investment share, especially when debt-service burden is high.
refuted
1980-2024
Urban growth boundaries or greenbelts predict steeper house-price-to-income ratios and lower construction-employment growth.
refuted
+24
1970-2024
In an OECD panel 2000-2023, increases in OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) stringency and increases in regulatory uncertainty (proxied by year-to-year changes in the OECD PMR sub-indices) are negatively associated with private non-residential investment as a share of GDP, with effects concentrated in capital-intensive long-duration sectors.
refuted
+16
2000-2023
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage financial freedom in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage government integrity in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available electricity access than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available real GDP per capita PPP than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have lower latest-available consumer-price inflation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have higher latest-available trade openness than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-government-spending score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage judicial effectiveness in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage property-rights protection in 2024 have lower latest-available extreme-poverty headcount.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available account ownership.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available female labour-force participation than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available high-technology export share.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available real private consumption per capita.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available private-credit depth.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available tertiary enrollment.
refuted
+177
2024-2024
Hong Kong's long-run income convergence to the productivity frontier without classic industrial policy (sectoral targeting, directed credit, national champions, or SOE promotion) matches or exceeds that of developmentalist East Asian comparators after controlling for initial income, human capital, and trade openness.
refuted
+1
1960-2020
Post-Keynesian / Minsky reading: across advanced economies in the decade preceding the 2008 GFC, the rise in household credit-to-GDP was the leading indicator of subsequent banking-sector distress.
refuted
+15
1995-2010
Countries liberalising medical-imaging equipment licensing and private-clinic entry show larger reductions in diagnostic wait times.
refuted
+24
1990-2023
Indigenous-managed parcels in the Amazon basin (BRA, PER, COL, ECU, BOL), Canadian First-Nations comanagement areas, and Australian Indigenous Protected Areas retain at least 20% more above-ground biomass per hectare than biome-matched state- protected and private parcels over 2003-2023, after controlling for slope, accessibility, and pre-treatment biome composition.
refuted
+1
2003-2023
Persistent broad subsidy and government-consumption burdens predict weaker long-run household consumption growth.
refuted
+34
1980-2023
Japanese public debt crossing 150%, then 200%, then 250% of GDP 1990-2020 did not trigger a solvency or inflation crisis, contradicting household-debt-analogue framings.
weakened
1990-2020
Japan crossed every debt-to-GDP threshold predicted by Sargent-Wallace (1981) "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" framing — 100% (1996), 150% (2002), 200% (2010), 250% (2020) — without producing the predicted outcomes: 10y JGB yields fell rather than rose across the full 1990-2024 window, CPI inflation averaged below 1% over 1995-2020 and did not breach 4% even at the 2022-2024 global price shock peak, and no sovereign-debt distress event occurred.
weakened
1990-2024
Japan's 1990-2020 near-zero per-capita GDP growth regime (mean GDP/capita growth < 1%) coincided with a meaningful improvement in life expectancy at birth (+5 years), a sharp decline in average annual hours worked per employed person (~-15%), and a stable Cantril life-satisfaction trajectory at OECD-median levels.
refuted
1990-2020
Public employment or activation-heavy labor-market programs lower long-term unemployment and poverty more than passive transfers at similar fiscal cost.
refuted
1990-2024
Elevated US JOLTS job openings are a leading indicator of broad private-sector wage growth; when job openings accelerate, average hourly earnings growth follows within six months.
refuted
2007-2026
In demand-constrained high-income economies, rising labor share predicts stronger consumption and GDP growth, while profit-share gains predict weaker domestic demand.
refuted
1980-2024
Blanchard-Summers hysteresis: prolonged high unemployment (European NAIRU rise post-1980s, post-2008 Southern Europe) produces persistent labour-force detachment and skill decay that raises the natural rate.
refuted
+9
1980-2017
Canada's 1990-1996 unemployment-insurance reforms (1990 Bill C-21 entrance-requirement tightening, 1996 EI Act with hours-based eligibility and intensity rule) lowered the Canadian NAIRU by at least 1.5 pp by 2000 relative to a synthetic control of OECD peers, with the largest gains in high-frequent-claimant regions (Atlantic provinces).
refuted
+1
1985-2002
Germany's Schröder Agenda 2010 reforms (2003-2005, complementary to Hartz IV) durably widened the German bottom-quintile-to- median wage ratio: by 2015 the ratio gap relative to a synthetic control of euro-area peers was at least -3 pp below the donor pool, with the gap not reverting after partial 2015 minimum-wage introduction.
refuted
+2
1995-2018
Land-value or split-rate property taxation predicts lower vacancy and faster redevelopment than pure improvement taxation.
refuted
+24
1970-2023
Liberal democracies experience monotonic positional drift toward larger, more redistributive states across multi-decade horizons.
refuted
+20
1976-2025
Across cross-country liberalisation episodes since 1971 (trade opening, product-market deregulation, state-owned-enterprise divestiture, financial account liberalisation), output growth follows the reform rather than preceding it — i.e.
refuted
+35
1971-2019
US CPI inflation was highly persistent (first-order autocorrelation at quarterly frequency above 0.85, sum of AR coefficients above 0.95) during 1960-1979, and substantially less persistent (first-order autocorrelation below 0.6, sum of AR coefficients below 0.8) during 1985-2019.
refuted
1960-2024
Brazil's Novo Arcabouço Fiscal (Lei Complementar 200 of 2023) holds the federal primary-balance path and the real-spending growth rate within its statutory band (real primary spending growth 0.6-2.5% per year, conditional on primary-balance target attainment) through 2026, and the cumulative 2023-2026 primary- balance outcome does not diverge from target by more than one standard deviation of the historical primary-balance forecast error.
refuted
2015-2027
Unified national building, sanitary, and product standards predict faster cross-regional firm entry and higher productivity than fragmented subnational regulation.
refuted
+24
1996-2023
Countries with more market-responsive hospital and physician supply show larger declines in amenable mortality over 20-year panels.
refuted
+24
1996-2023
Longer continuous duration of market-compatible institutions predicts higher quality-of-life levels.
refuted
+34
1996-2023
Higher trade and investment openness predicts stronger long-run prosperity gains.
refuted
+34
1995-2023
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more open capital accounts predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
refuted
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, stronger fiscal balances predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
refuted
+27
1996-2021
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, larger government expenditure shares predict shallower private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
refuted
+47
1996-2023
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, higher inflation predict lower investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
refuted
+47
1996-2023
Market reforms predict stronger long-run real wage proxies through productivity and income growth.
refuted
+34
1996-2023
Lebanon's October-2019-onwards economic collapse (banking-sector freeze, BdL multi-rate regime, lira hyperinflation, GDP contraction, dollarisation reversal) produced one of the largest real-economy contractions of the 21st century, with World Bank estimating GDP shrinking ~58% peak-to-trough.
refuted
2010-2024
Mitterrand's 1981–1983 French nationalisations reduced productivity and required the 1983 'tournant de la rigueur' reversal, vindicating the classical-liberal diagnosis that political ownership distorts resource allocation.
refuted
+1
1975-1995
deeper private capital markets predict faster reallocation of capital toward high-productivity firms and stronger aggregate TFP growth than bank-dominated systems with politically concentrated credit.
refuted
1990-2024
carbon pricing achieves emissions reductions at lower output and household-cost penalties per ton abated than technology-specific mandates of similar ambition.
refuted
1980-2024
customs simplification and shorter border delays predict lower trade costs and faster small-exporter growth than tariff cuts alone.
refuted
1990-2024
moderate-to-strong IP protection predicts higher quality-adjusted innovation and technology diffusion, but extremely restrictive follow-on rules reduce downstream innovation.
refuted
1990-2024
sustained excess broad-money growth over real output growth predicts higher medium-run inflation across regimes, with weaker coefficients only where credible nominal anchors are present.
refuted
1960-2024
countries that shift toward broader tax bases and lower statutory marginal rates achieve higher 10- to 25-year private investment growth without lower total revenue ratios than comparable countries relying on narrow bases and high rates.
refuted
1980-2024
Across the 2008-2014 ZLB era and the 2020-2021 pandemic-response window, large-scale de-facto monetary finance of fiscal expansion in the US, Japan, and the Eurozone did not produce headline-CPI inflation consistent with naive quantity-theoretic monetisation predictions: cumulative central-bank balance-sheet expansion exceeded 15% of GDP while CPI YoY remained below 3% in each economy across both windows.
refuted
+1
2008-2021
Large mortgage-interest deductions do not raise long-run homeownership rates but do raise house-price-to-income ratios.
refuted
+24
1980-2024
Large US mortgage-rate increases are followed by materially weaker housing starts within one year, consistent with interest-rate-sensitive residential construction labour demand.
refuted
1971-2026
Cross-country Phillips-curve data post-1970 shows no stable unemployment-inflation tradeoff in the long run, consistent with Friedman's natural-rate hypothesis.
refuted
+14
1970-2023
Net migration flows per 1,000 population across countries 1990-2020 are positively associated with stronger market institutions (higher Economic Freedom of the World composite, lower OECD PMR product-market regulation, and stronger rule of law), after controlling for per-capita income level, common language networks, and proximity to armed conflict.
refuted
+39
1990-2020
New Zealand post-1984 Rogernomics reforms delivered growth improvement only in conjunction with later institutional reforms (Reserve Bank Act 1989, Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994), not from deregulation alone.
refuted
1980-2000
NZ Rogernomics 1984–1993 liberalisation (tariff removal, SOE corporatisation, financial-market liberalisation) produced productivity acceleration and real-income gains over 1990s–2000s relative to pre-reform trend.
refuted
+3
1970-2005
Active labour-market spending predicts faster unemployment declines after unemployment shocks than passive cash-support spending.
refuted
1990-2024
OECD economies 2010-2023 have absolutely decoupled territorial CO2 emissions from real GDP -- emissions fell while GDP rose -- AND the pace of that decoupling falls short of the rate consistent with a 1.5C-aligned linear pathway (50% reduction 2019-2030, ~7%/year).
refuted
+29
2010-2023
Stricter employment protection legislation predicts higher youth unemployment, especially when GDP growth is weak.
refuted
1980-2024
Higher ICT-sector value-added or productivity growth predicts faster aggregate GDP-per-hour growth.
refuted
1990-2024
Among countries where wind plus solar electricity share rose by at least 10 percentage points from 2000 to 2024, coal's electricity share should usually fall: at least 60% of selected countries should show a coal-share decline of at least 5 percentage points, with median coal-share change at most -10 percentage points.
refuted
+63
2000-2024
Technology markets with sustained multi-platform competition show faster quality-adjusted improvement than markets protected by interoperability barriers.
refuted
+24
1995-2023
Lower price-distortion intensity predicts stronger long-run goods availability and living-standard gains.
refuted
+34
1996-2023
Thatcher-era UK privatisations (BT, British Gas, BA, water utilities) produced measurable productivity gains and price reductions in the privatised sectors, net of cost-shifting concerns.
refuted
+3
1975-2000
In the US 1948-2023, the Marxian-defined real profit rate (corporate net operating surplus divided by the replacement-cost net stock of fixed capital, deflated) exhibits a secular declining trend with a structural break post-1973, consistent with the Dumenil-Levy and Shaikh long-wave readings.
refuted
1948-2023
Increases in top marginal income-tax rates lower top-income concentration without reducing medium-run GDP per capita growth or private investment more than matched lower-tax countries.
refuted
1980-2024
Human-capital growth predicts TFP growth more strongly than capital-deepening alone over 5-year windows.
refuted
1980-2024
Post-2008 large-scale asset purchase programmes by the Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan produced a measurable divergence between asset-price inflation (equities and residential real estate) and headline consumer-price inflation until roughly 2021.
refuted
+2
2008-2023
Larger tax-and-transfer redistribution gaps predict faster bottom-40 real disposable-income growth over the next three years without a GDP-per-capita growth penalty larger than 0.3 percentage points per year.
refuted
1980-2024
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
refuted
+49
1980-2020
Indonesia's Jokowi-era infrastructure push 2014-2024 — covering the toll-road expansion, MRT/LRT urban transit, port and airport upgrades, electrification programme, and 2024 Nusantara new-capital build — produced a measurable rise in gross fixed capital formation share of GDP and a logistics-cost reduction visible in the World Bank Logistics Performance Index.
refuted
2008-2024
Singapore's post-2014 FTA expansion — covering CECA upgrade with India (in-force 2005, modernised post-2014), CPTPP 2018, RCEP 2022 — sustained the export-share-of-GDP and trade-openness ratios at the world's highest levels, with exports of goods and services / GDP averaging at least 170% over 2015-2019 (vs 100-130% for global peers like NLD, BEL, IRL), and Singapore's real GDP-pc growth maintaining at least +0.3pp/yr differential vs the high-income East Asian peer panel (KOR, JPN, HKG) over 2014-2019.
refuted
2010-2024
Thailand's 2014 military coup and ensuing junta + 2017 constitutional reset under-performed peer ASEAN economies on per-capita GDP growth through 2019, and Thailand's heavy tourism-dependence (international tourism receipts ~12-18% of GDP pre-COVID) produced a sharper-than-peer contraction in 2020 and slower recovery through 2023.
refuted
2008-2023
Deeper private financial-market proxies predict stronger productivity growth than state-directed allocation alone.
refuted
+34
1996-2023
Sweden’s post-1992 crisis market reforms — fiscal consolidation, inflation- targeting adoption, tax and pension overhauls, and product-market deregulation — predict stronger real GDP-per-capita growth during 1995–2024 than its pre-crisis state-expansion model (1975–1990).
refuted
+5
1975-2024
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86) — which paired a top-rate cut from 50 to 28 percent with substantial base-broadening (passive-loss limits, AMT expansion, capital-gains rate harmonisation) — produced a smaller persistent top-1 income share response than ERTA 1981 once the one-off 1986-1988 realisation spike from capital-gains reclassification is removed.
refuted
1975-1995
The 2001 Russian Putin-Kasyanov 13 percent flat income tax (replacing a three-bracket schedule with top rate 30 percent) produced a measurable rise in reported tax compliance and a discrete jump in the Russian top-1 pretax income share over 2001-2005, with most of the apparent share rise attributable to compliance/reporting gain rather than real redistribution.
refuted
1995-2010
Trump's 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act produced smaller investment and output responses than Laffer-curve advocates projected, consistent with New Keynesian estimates of corporate-tax-cut passthrough in a near-full-employment economy with inelastic long-run investment supply.
weakened
2010-2019
Thailand's middle-income plateau (post-1997 and especially post-2005) is associated with weaker product-market competition, lower institutional quality, and fragmented state coordination capacity relative to East Asian peers that sustained convergence.
refuted
+4
1980-2020
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), with trading formally commencing 2021-01-01, has not yet produced a measurable acceleration in aggregate African trade-openness ratios over the 2021-2024 window relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of non-AfCFTA emerging-market regions, because of slow tariff- schedule ratification, COVID-19 trade disruption, and weak cross-border infrastructure.
refuted
+44
2010-2024
Brazil's tariff schedule under Mercosur Common External Tariff (CET) commitments has been historically high relative to other middle-income economies and has not declined materially over 1995-2020 — Brazil weighted applied tariffs hovered around 10-12% throughout the period vs OECD median ~3% and emerging Asia median ~6-7%.
refuted
+4
1995-2020
Chile's bilateral-FTA cascade (Canada 1997, Mexico 1999, EU 2003, Korea 2004, US 2004, China 2006, Japan 2007) is associated with Chile's trade-openness-to-GDP rising from approximately 50% in 1990 to over 70% by 2019 — among the largest sustained increases in Latin America.
refuted
1985-2019
The 2004 EU eastern enlargement (CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN; plus CYP, MLT) produced an income-convergence acceleration relative to non-acceding Eastern European and CIS comparators.
refuted
+13
1995-2019
Indonesia's 1985-1995 unilateral trade-liberalisation reforms (tariff reductions, customs reform under the Inpres 4 1985 package, removal of import licensing) raised manufacturing exports and trade-openness ratios over the 1985-1996 window before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis interrupted the trajectory.
refuted
1975-2000
Mercosur (Treaty of Asunción 1991, customs union effective 1995) raised intra-bloc trade-openness for ARG, BRA, PRY, URY through the 1990s but produced minimal additional trade-creation effects after Argentina's 2001 crisis and the gradual erosion of the common external tariff.
refuted
+3
1985-2019
The Mexico-EU Free Trade Agreement, effective 2000-07-01, raised Mexican bilateral exports to the EU and broader trade-openness modestly over the 2000-2007 pre-China-shock window.
refuted
1990-2007
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (signed 1930-06-17, raising US weighted average tariffs on dutiable imports from approximately 40% to approximately 47-50%) coincided with a collapse in global merchandise trade that exceeded the contemporaneous fall in global GDP.
refuted
+8
1925-1939
UK post-1945 Attlee reforms (NHS, nationalisation of coal/rail/steel, expanded public housing) delivered measurable improvements in life expectancy and child mortality without undermining subsequent 1950s-1960s growth.
refuted
+4
1945-1969
More generous unemployment benefits reduce household-income losses and recession depth, but the strongest claim is refuted if they materially lengthen unemployment duration after controlling for labor-demand shocks and activation spending.
refuted
1990-2024
The 2020-2021 US fiscal response (CARES + ARP, roughly $5tn) produced a transient inflation episode that receded by 2023-2024 as supply-side capacity normalised, consistent with MMT's real-constraint view.
refuted
2018-2024
Post-Bretton Woods US (1971-present) has never faced a solvency crisis in dollar-denominated debt, consistent with currency-issuer operational-solvency claim.
weakened
1971-2023
US post-2008 recovery shows rising GDP per capita alongside stagnant or declining median-household ISEW/GPI indicators, consistent with Daly's diminishing-returns-to-growth.
refuted
2008-2023
The United States has not experienced a default, missed coupon, missed principal, or IMF-program distress event on dollar-denominated federal obligations across the entire post-Bretton-Woods fiat era 1971-2024, including periods when gross federal debt exceeded 100% of GDP (2013-2024) and when net interest crossed pre-1990 thresholds (2022-2024).
weakened
1971-2024
Chile's 1981 pension privatisation (replacing PAYG with mandatory individual AFP accounts under Decreto Ley 3500) delivered domestic-savings-rate persistence near 20% of GDP through 1985-2010 and capital-deepening above LatAm peers, but produced median replacement rates below 40% by 2010-2020 due to coverage gaps among informal workers, motivating the 2008 solidarity-pillar addition (Pilar Solidario) and the ongoing 2019-2024 reform debate.
refuted
+1
1970-2022
New Zealand's 1991 'Mother of All Budgets' benefit cuts (8-25% reductions to unemployment, sickness, domestic-purposes, and youth benefits, with stricter eligibility) produced a step-change rise in child poverty (under-65%-median) of at least 6 percentage points within 5 years, identified off the synthetic-control gap with Australia and other small Anglo economies, providing empirical weight to the democratic-socialist critique of front-loaded welfare retrenchment in commodity-exposed economies.
refuted
1985-2000
Sweden's 1990s welfare-state consolidation (replacement-rate cuts to sickness/unemployment insurance 1991-1996, 1998 pension reform to NDC, child-allowance flatten 1996-2006) preserved poverty/inequality outcomes (Gini and bottom-40 income share) within plus-or-minus 5% of pre-crisis levels while restoring fiscal sustainability (debt/GDP back below 50% by 2008), supporting the scale-preserving consolidation interpretation rather than retreat from the universal-transfer model.
refuted
1985-2015
Argentina's Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH, October 2009 by decreto) reduced child-poverty headcount by at least 8 percentage points within four years (2009-2013), separating the cash-transfer channel from the contemporaneous commodity-boom channel via a synthetic-control of LatAm peers (BRA, COL, PER, URY) with comparable boom exposure but no AUH-scale CCT expansion in the same window.
refuted
2000-2015
Mexico's 2019 phase-out of Prospera (formerly Oportunidades / Progresa, the canonical CCT programme studied since 1997) and replacement with un-conditional cash-transfer schemes under AMLO produced a measurable rise in extreme-poverty headcount and a deterioration in school-attendance among poor children of at least 3 percentage points within three years (2019-2022), identified off the synthetic-control gap with LatAm peers (BRA, COL, PER) maintaining CCT continuity.
refuted
2010-2023
Spain's Ingreso Mínimo Vital (IMV, June 2020 emergency-launched during COVID) reached fewer than half of intended-eligible households within 24 months due to take-up frictions, producing a measured reduction in extreme-poverty headcount of less than 3 percentage points by 2022 — well below the pre-launch government estimate of 7-10pp — and providing a natural test of unconditional-floor design in a high-frictions administrative environment.
refuted
2015-2023
The American Rescue Plan Act (March 2021) expansion of the Child Tax Credit to USD 3000-3600 per child with full refundability and monthly disbursement (July-December 2021) produced a measurable and immediate decline in monthly child-poverty rate of at least 4 percentage points (Center on Poverty and Social Policy at Columbia time-series), with the credit's December 2021 expiration producing a corresponding immediate reversal — providing high-frequency event-window evidence on near-instantaneous cash-transfer-to-poverty mechanics.
weakened
2019-2023
Growth in resident patent applications predicts TFP growth over the next 3-5 years more strongly than non-resident patenting.
refuted
1980-2024
Higher tariff protection does not predict later high-tech export upgrading unless governance quality is high.
refuted
1980-2024
Across OECD economies 1980-2022, country-year reductions in average annual hours worked per employed person are NOT proportionally associated with declines in the employment-to-population ratio.
refuted
+17
1980-2022
Between 2002 and 2007 the US effective Federal Funds Rate ran on average more than 200 basis points below the rate prescribed by a standard Taylor rule (1.5 inflation-gap, 0.5 output-gap weights, 2% natural rate).
not public yet
run pending
1990-2012
Absolute decoupling of GDP growth from material throughput has not been sustained at global scale 1970-2020; reported decoupling in advanced economies reflects offshored manufacturing and is reversed under consumption-based accounting.
not public yet
run pending
+20
1970-2020
In OECD unemployment-insurance panels from 1995 to 2023, stronger job-search conditionality and enforceable sanction regimes predict shorter unemployment duration and higher reemployment among benefit recipients at a given replacement rate.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1995-2023
Generative-AI tool adoption following ChatGPT's November 2022 release will produce a measurable but modest sector-level labour-productivity divergence by 2026 — high-AI-exposure white-collar sectors (information, professional services, finance) running 1-3pp/year above low-exposure sectors (construction, accommodation, transportation), consistent with Brynjolfsson's productivity-J-curve at an early-diffusion stage.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2026
Argentina's post-1945 economic decline from high-income status is attributable to institutional instability (Peronist-military cycles, property-rights uncertainty, central-bank subordination) more than to specific policy choices.
not public yet
run pending
1945-2023
Taiwan's semiconductor industrial policy — anchored by ITRI's 1980s technology incubation, the 1987 spin-off of TSMC under government ownership, the Hsinchu Science Park ecosystem, and sustained R&D-intensity targeting through 2024 — produced one of the largest industrial-policy successes in modern economic history.
not public yet
run pending
1985-2024
US business-dynamism measures — the firm-formation rate (new establishments per 1000 working-age population), the job- reallocation rate, and the share of employment in firms aged 0-5 — declined materially over 1980-2020.
not public yet
run pending
1980-2020
In a panel of advanced economies 1987-2007, base-money expansion and broad money growth correlate positively with asset-price indices (equity, real estate) but only weakly with headline CPI inflation.
not public yet
run pending
+6
1987-2007
In a cross-country panel of OECD and middle-income democracies 1960-2019, the age of stable democratic institutions (years since last constitutional rupture) is positively associated with the density of distributional coalitions (proxied by union density, professional-licensing prevalence, and OECD PMR entry-barrier scores) and negatively associated with TFP growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita and human-capital level.
not public yet
run pending
+30
1960-2019
The 1920-1921 US depression — a sharp post-WW1 contraction featuring industrial production collapse on the order of 30% and unemployment rising above 10% — was followed by a rapid V-shaped recovery within approximately 18 months, despite the Harding administration cutting federal spending by roughly half over 1920-1922 and the Federal Reserve raising rather than lowering policy rates through much of 1920.
not public yet
run pending
1918-1925
China's 2015 stock-market crash and the 2020-2024 property-sector deleveraging episode (Evergrande default August 2021, Country Garden distress August 2023, the "three red lines" macroprudential framework introduced 2020) constitute a sustained financial-stress episode characterised by extreme equity volatility 2015-2016, real residential property price decline >= 10% in tier-2/3 cities 2021-2024, and developer-bond defaults exceeding RMB 1 trillion cumulative.
not public yet
run pending
2013-2024
Lebanon's 2019-2024 banking collapse — informal capital controls, multi-tier exchange rates, sovereign default on Eurobonds in March 2020, and a real-GDP cumulative decline of >= 35% — constitutes a canonical case of a peg-plus-Ponzi- banking-system unwind in a small, dollarised, post-civil-war economy.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2024
In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, the cumulative stock of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed predicts higher subsequent net FDI inflows as a share of GDP and higher real GDP per capita growth, controlling for institutional quality, market size, and trade openness.
not public yet
run pending
+95
1990-2020
Rapid private credit expansion predicts weaker private-investment share over the following five years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
High non-financial corporate debt-service burdens predict later private-investment-share declines.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
High non-financial corporate debt-service burdens predict lower manufacturing value-added shares, consistent with balance-sheet pressure crowding out tradable-sector reinvestment and slowing industrial upgrading.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1999-2025
High BIS credit-gap episodes predict weaker private-consumption growth over the following two years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Credit gaps are followed by larger unemployment increases when the current account is also in deficit.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Credit-gap stress predicts larger unemployment increases when current accounts are in deficit.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
Country-years with both a high BIS credit gap and high household debt-service burden are followed by larger unemployment increases.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Credit-gap stress is more damaging when household debt-service burdens are also high.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
High credit-gap episodes predict weaker export growth as domestic credit booms unwind.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
BIS credit-gap booms are followed by higher unemployment, and the association is larger where regulatory quality is weaker.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1996-2025
Elevated BIS credit gaps predict weaker three-year real house-price growth.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
Credit-gap stress is more dangerous when real interest rates are unusually low.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
High credit-gap episodes predict later manufacturing-share erosion.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
High BIS credit-gap episodes predict weaker private-investment share over the following three years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
High BIS credit-gap episodes predict weaker private-investment share over the following three years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Credit gaps are more damaging when they coincide with real house-price booms.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Credit booms are more damaging for export performance when paired with real exchange-rate appreciation.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
High BIS credit-gap episodes predict unemployment increases over the following two years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Household debt-service stress predicts larger unemployment increases when the current account is also in deficit.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
House-price booms reverse more sharply when household debt-service burdens are high.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
House-price booms reverse more sharply when paired with high BIS credit gaps.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
In BIS/WDI country panels, high household debt-service stress is followed by weaker private-consumption growth over the next two years.
not public yet
run pending
+11
1999-2022
High household debt-service burdens predict weaker private-consumption growth over the next two years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
In BIS/WDI country panels, high household debt-service stress is followed by larger unemployment increases over the next two years.
not public yet
run pending
+11
1999-2023
Credit booms predict weaker five-year real GDP-per-capita growth, consistent with later market discipline.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
In BIS panels, policy-rate tightening episodes are followed by compression in the BIS credit-to-GDP gap over the next eight quarters.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1958-2023
In BIS panels, policy-rate tightening episodes are followed by materially weaker real house-price growth over the next eight quarters.
not public yet
run pending
+31
1948-2025
Large real exchange-rate appreciations predict weaker export growth over the following two years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Large real exchange-rate appreciations predict later erosion in manufacturing value-added share.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Large real exchange-rate appreciations predict lower inflation over the following two years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Real effective exchange-rate appreciations predict lower inflation, and the disinflationary association is stronger in more trade-open economies where import-price pass-through is more exposed to currency movements.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1970-2025
Large real exchange-rate depreciations predict current-account improvement over the following three years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Large real exchange-rate depreciations are followed by higher inflation over the next two years.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Large real exchange-rate appreciations are followed by current-account repair through later adjustment.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
High real exchange-rate volatility predicts weaker export growth.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Higher real exchange-rate volatility predicts lower private-investment share.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1964-2026
Bismarckian contributory welfare architectures (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) are more fiscally sustainable than tax-financed universal architectures when demographic ageing is severe, because contribution-benefit linkage constrains expansion.
not public yet
run pending
+12
1980-2023
Very high minimum-wage bite ratios relative to the state low-wage tail predict weaker total employment growth.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2024
Higher state minimum-wage bite ratios relative to median wages are associated with weaker food-service employment growth.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2024
County food-service employment grows more slowly when the state minimum wage rises faster.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2024
State food-service employment grows more slowly when the state minimum wage rises faster.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2024
Skilled emigration rates (tertiary-educated migrants as a share of the tertiary-educated domestic population) are higher from countries with weaker market opportunity (lower EFW business freedom, higher entry barriers, weaker property rights) than from peers at similar income levels with stronger market institutions, even when public investment in education and research is high.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1990-2020
Across broad country panels from 1995 to 2024, higher business freedom and lower business-regulation burdens predict higher employer entry, higher new-business density, and higher working-age employment rates.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1995-2024
Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.
not public yet
run pending
+11
1988-2024
Across Caribbean small-island economies 1990-2024, climate-related shocks (named hurricanes, tropical-storm landfalls, sea-level encroachment events) imposed measurable cumulative real-GDP-per- capita losses correlated with storm frequency and intensity, and insurance-market and disaster-financing arrangements (CCRIF SPC, contingent-credit lines) reduced — but did not eliminate — the growth penalty.
not public yet
run pending
+6
1990-2024
Developmentalist catch-up episodes generate more of their early growth through capital deepening and labor reallocation than through sustained TFP growth, which helps explain why the growth premium fades near the frontier.
not public yet
run pending
+14
1960-2024
The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase on 1 January 2026 (after a 2023-2025 transitional reporting-only phase), imposing financial liability on EU importers of cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity, and hydrogen embedding non-EU carbon costs.
not public yet
run pending
+11
2018-2027
Across the Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, ECB, and Bank of England, the cumulative central-bank-balance-sheet expansion 2008-2020 exceeded 30% of GDP at each institution while cumulative core-CPI divergence from each institution's pre-2008 trend remained within ±2 percentage points and inflation-expectations 5y5y forwards remained within their pre-2008 anchored ranges.
not public yet
run pending
+2
2008-2020
US-style Certificate-of-Need restrictions predict slower capacity growth and weaker health-access improvement than non-CON regimes.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1975-2023
Across US household-panel microdata 1980-2019, the marginal propensity to consume out of income shocks identified as permanent (lasting >5 years; e.g.
not public yet
run pending
1980-2019
Across the empirical universe of school-voucher and means-tested school-choice programmes that have been evaluated with random-assignment or quasi-random-assignment designs (USA Milwaukee, Cleveland, DC OSP, New York School Choice Scholarships, Louisiana, Indiana; Chile post-1980 voucher; Sweden post-1992 friskolor; Colombia PACES), the population- weighted mean effect on standardised reading and mathematics test scores is positive at +0.05 to +0.15 standard deviations after 2-4 years of programme exposure, with effects largest for low-income participants drawn from the worst-performing public schools.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2024
Across an OECD panel 1980-2023, the deadweight loss (excess burden) of marginal income taxation rises convexly in the top statutory marginal rate, with the slope accelerating sharply once top rates exceed roughly 50%.
not public yet
run pending
+15
1980-2023
Chilean post-1990 growth outpaces earlier Pinochet-era growth despite similar market orientation, reflecting democratic-institutional upgrades more than policy continuity.
not public yet
run pending
1973-2023
Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms, by introducing price signals and household responsibility in agriculture and Township-Village-Enterprise market exchange, account for the majority of Chinese poverty reduction 1978–2000 — not state investment.
not public yet
run pending
1978-2000
China's state-directed solar and wind manufacturing scale-up 2005-2020 delivered cost reductions on learning curves faster than any market-led OECD programme, demonstrating planning-led industrial policy's ecological potential.
not public yet
run pending
+4
2005-2020
Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.
not public yet
run pending
+3
1990-2019
China's dynamic-zero-COVID policy 2020-2022, peaking with the Shanghai April-2022 lockdown and Beijing/Wuhan late-2022 closures, produced sharper-than-counterfactual demand contraction — retail-sales YoY turning negative, manufacturing PMI sub-50, and youth unemployment spiking — and the December-2022 abrupt reopening produced an incomplete and short-lived recovery rather than the V-shaped rebound expected from pent-up demand and excess household savings.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2024
The 2022 US CHIPS and Science Act (~$52bn manufacturing subsidy + 25% ITC) produced a measurable acceleration in announced and realised US semiconductor fab construction starts and capacity additions over 2023- 2027, narrowing the US share-of-global advanced-logic capacity gap relative to Taiwan + South Korea, but the realised capacity addition by 2027 falls materially short of both the headline announcements (Intel Ohio, TSMC Arizona, Samsung Texas, Micron New York) and the pre-CHIPS US share-recovery rhetoric.
not public yet
run pending
+2
2018-2027
Across US states 2000-2022, higher occupational-licensing intensity in licensed service sectors (proxied by share of state workforce requiring a state-issued license, derived from BLS Current Population Survey supplements) is associated with higher consumer prices in the affected service sectors and lower employment in those sectors, conditional on state per-capita income, demographic composition, and rural/urban share.
not public yet
run pending
2000-2022
Across a small set of identifiable zoning-reform events (Minneapolis 2040 plan effective 2020 abolishing single-family zoning city-wide; Houston's persistent absence of formal zoning; Tokyo's national land-use system; Auckland Unitary Plan 2016 upzoning), the post-reform housing-completion rate and rental- price growth rate diverge from comparator metros without equivalent reform: completions accelerate and rental-price growth decelerates relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of comparable metros.
not public yet
run pending
2010-2024
Pre-1945 colonial institutions explain a significant share of post-independence per-capita GDP variation; former colonies with settler/inclusive institutions outperform extractive-institution former colonies.
not public yet
run pending
+23
1960-2019
Strict competition-policy enforcement (EU DG-Comp, Bundeskartellamt) produces higher consumer welfare than laissez-faire antitrust (US post-Bork consumer-welfare-standard narrowing) in sectors prone to concentration.
not public yet
run pending
+5
1980-2023
Across advanced and middle-income economies 1990-2020, stronger antitrust and competition-policy enforcement — measured by merger- control intensity, cartel fines per GDP, and competition-authority staffing — predicts higher subsequent patent quality (forward citations per patent) and total-factor-productivity growth over 20-year windows.
not public yet
run pending
+30
1990-2020
Across advanced and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, constitutional or statutory fiscal rules — debt brakes, deficit ceilings, and expenditure-growth limits — predict more durable prosperity (lower growth volatility and stronger long- run income growth) than discretionary state-investment surges.
not public yet
run pending
+49
1980-2020
Longer and more burdensome construction-permit processes predict lower housing-output growth after controlling for income, population growth, and interest rates.
not public yet
run pending
+35
2005-2020
Longer construction-permit approval times predict higher construction costs and lower housing-output elasticity.
not public yet
run pending
+24
2005-2023
Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1980-2020
Higher levels of corruption control are associated with greater efficiency in converting R&D spending into patent applications.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2023
Costa Rica's 1980-2024 development path — universal-health system (CCSS, established 1941, expanded), abolition of military 1948, large public-education investment, FDI promotion via free-zone regime (CINDE 1982, Intel 1996, medical-devices cluster 2000+), and central-bank-led inflation targeting since 2018 — produced a measurable life-expectancy and human-development premium relative to Central American peers while sustaining mid-quartile cumulative growth.
not public yet
run pending
+1
1980-2024
A widening credit gap is associated with a decline in labor share, as financial expansion may lead to capital substitution over labor.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2023
A widening credit gap is associated with subsequent increases in unemployment.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2023
Following the July 2021 protests (largest mass demonstrations in Cuba since 1959), the Cuban government enacted incremental economic reforms: legalisation of small/medium private enterprises (MIPYME, August 2021), partial dual-currency unification (Tarea Ordenamiento followed through), expansion of MLC (USD-denominated) retail circuits, and adjustment of official FX rates.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2025
Cuba's post-1959 socialist policy regime (Castro 1959-2008 + Raúl 2008-2018 + Díaz-Canel 2018-present, characterised by single-party rule, state ownership of most productive assets, ration-card consumption, FX duality, and chronic suppression of private enterprise) produced a canonical 60-year material stagnation that manifests as ≥7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer.
not public yet
run pending
1960-2023
Cuban post-1991 Special Period forced degrowth (real GDP per capita contracted ~35% over 1989-1993 after the Soviet bloc collapse cut off concessional sugar/oil terms) demonstrated that basic-needs provision (life expectancy, infant mortality, primary-school enrolment) can be maintained — or improved — during rapid material-throughput reduction when institutions are aligned around free universal health and education.
not public yet
run pending
1989-2000
Every documented modern hyperinflation episode (Cagan ≥50% monthly inflation, Hanke-Krus catalogue) since 1900 falls into one of two categories: (a) the issuing state had material foreign-currency or gold-clause obligations, hard-currency-pegged debt, or external market dependency that left it operating effectively as a currency-user (Weimar reparations, Hungary 1945-46 occupation obligations, Yugoslavia FX debt, Zimbabwe USD obligations 2007+, Venezuela USD oil revenue dependency, Argentina USD debt, Lebanon USD-pegged banking system, Turkey 2021-2024 FX-denominated debt), or (b) the issuing state experienced a documented physical supply collapse independent of the monetary regime (Weimar Ruhr occupation, Hungary post-WW2 occupation/reparation, Zimbabwe land-reform output collapse, Venezuela oil-sector collapse).
not public yet
run pending
+11
1900-2025
Rising debt service ratios are associated with a decline in high-tech exports, reflecting a crowding-out of innovation-driven trade.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2023
Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.
not public yet
run pending
+45
1980-2020
Australia's skill-stream-dominant immigration policy (skill stream ~60-70% of permanent migration since 1996) is associated with above-comparator gains in foreign-born tertiary share and labour-force-participation contribution.
not public yet
run pending
+9
1996-2023
Canada's points-based immigration system (introduced 1967, enhanced 2002 IRPA) selects on human capital and produces a foreign-born workforce with above-average tertiary attainment.
not public yet
run pending
+7
1990-2023
Across OECD countries 1995-2023, the tertiary-education wage premium (median wage of tertiary-attainment workers / median wage of upper-secondary workers) varies substantially cross-country, and is positively associated with rate of skill-biased technical change proxies (ICT capital share).
not public yet
run pending
+19
1995-2023
Across OECD countries 1990-2023, the median gender pay gap has narrowed but the rate of narrowing has slowed since 2010, with the residual gap concentrated in (a) parenthood penalties, (b) occupational segregation, and (c) hours-of-work differences.
not public yet
run pending
+19
1990-2023
Germany's Gastarbeiter programme (1955-1973) and subsequent family-reunification waves produced a long-run Turkish-origin and Southern-European-origin foreign-born population that, despite official rhetoric of temporary stay, became permanent.
not public yet
run pending
1955-2023
Across high-income destination countries 1995-2023, migration inflows have heterogeneous wage effects by skill: high-skill (tertiary-educated) inflows are associated with neutral or positive wage effects on natives, while low-skill inflows produce small negative wage effects on the bottom decile of native earners but no aggregate native-wage decline.
not public yet
run pending
+11
1995-2023
Singapore's tiered Employment Pass / S Pass / Work Permit migration regime selects strongly on skill and produces one of the world's highest foreign-born population shares (~38% by 2020) without comparable native employment displacement.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2023
Diaspora return rates (returning emigrants as a share of the stock of emigrants abroad) rise after credible market and property-rights reforms in origin countries, controlling for income growth and political stability.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1990-2020
The Dominican Republic's 1980-2024 development path combined an early free-zone regime (Law 4315 of 1955; expanded under Balaguer and especially under the 1990s textile boom), a sustained tourism- buildout (Punta Cana, Bávaro, Puerto Plata), and a Mirex-led remittance-receiving migrant infrastructure to deliver cumulative log GDP-per-capita growth in the top quartile of the Caribbean and top half of Latin America.
not public yet
run pending
+3
1980-2024
East Asian high-performing economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong) achieved superior long-run total factor productivity and manufacturing productivity growth because export-market discipline forced competitive efficiency and technology upgrading, whereas economies that relied on protected domestic industrial policy without rigorous export exposure (Malaysia, Thailand in select sectors) experienced weaker long-run productivity.
not public yet
run pending
+5
1960-2020
Rule-bound market-compatible institutions predict lower political corruption where legal constraints reduce discretionary exchange.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1996-2023
Higher education spending as a share of GDP is associated with lower Gini inequality, especially in developing economies.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2023
Consumer subsidies and charging-network markets predict more durable EV adoption than production quotas or manufacturer mandates after subsidy withdrawal.
not public yet
run pending
+24
2010-2024
In a broad-country panel 1990-2020, electricity-market liberalisation episodes (vertical unbundling of generation/transmission/distribution, introduction of wholesale markets, and retail competition) predict lower industrial electricity prices and equal or improved system reliability (lower outage frequency/duration), controlling for fuel mix, generation capacity, and income level.
not public yet
run pending
+77
1990-2020
Cooperative-sector firms in northern Italy (Emilia-Romagna) sustained employment through the 2008-2012 recession at rates higher than matched private-sector firms of similar size.
not public yet
run pending
2005-2014
Stronger regulatory quality and labour-market openness predict lower youth unemployment over long windows.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1996-2023
More competitive electricity-market institutions predict faster renewable capacity additions after controlling for income, demand growth, and fossil fuel rents.
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run pending
+35
2000-2024
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) allowance prices traded in a sustained €70-100/tCO2 range from late 2021 through 2024 (with a peak at €105 in February 2023), a step-change above the €5-30 range that prevailed through Phase I-III (2005-2020).
not public yet
run pending
+6
2010-2026
The EU's headline ~15% reduction in natural-gas demand over the August 2022 - March 2023 emergency window (vs the 2017-2021 average) was achieved through a measurable mix of (a) industrial demand destruction (rationing, plant mothballing, output cuts), (b) household + commercial conservation (thermostat reductions, voluntary cuts), (c) electricity- sector fuel-switching (coal restart, nuclear extension where available), and (d) unusually warm winter weather.
not public yet
run pending
+7
2017-2024
EU Green Deal 2020-present production-side regulation produced faster sectoral emissions reductions than previous EU-ETS price-mechanism-only approaches.
not public yet
run pending
+21
2005-2023
The cumulative EU regulatory stack (GDPR 2018, MiFID II 2018, DMA 2022, DSA 2022, AI Act 2024, Taxonomy Regulation 2020, CSRD 2023, MiCA 2023, CBAM 2023, plus sector-specific accretion) has imposed measurable productivity drag on EU firms relative to US counterparts in the same sectors.
not public yet
run pending
+5
2015-2023
Euro-area Southern members (Greece, Italy, Spain) post-2010 suffered larger output contractions than fiscal-space-preserving peers because Maastricht-constrained fiscal policy combined with ECB pre-2015 tightness produced contractionary conditions New Keynesian models predict at the currency-union ZLB.
not public yet
run pending
+5
2000-2019
Industrial electricity-price inflation passes through to headline CPI inflation.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Industrial electricity-price volatility predicts industrial employment-share decline.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Higher industrial electricity prices reduce export competitiveness.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Higher industrial electricity prices accelerate reallocation from industry toward services.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Higher industrial electricity prices predict higher unemployment in European labour-market panels.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Higher household electricity prices reduce real household consumption growth.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Higher industrial electricity prices predict lower manufacturing value-added shares in European panels.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Countries retaining higher nuclear-electricity shares have lower industrial electricity prices.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Higher industrial electricity-price growth predicts weaker manufacturing real gross-value-added growth in European country panels, after controlling for aggregate real GDP growth and common year shocks.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2008-2025
Higher industrial electricity-price growth predicts higher unemployment in European country panels, especially during the post-2021 energy-cost shock window when power-intensive producers faced larger input-cost pressure.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2008-2025
Higher renewable-electricity shares are associated with higher industrial prices during the transition window.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2019-2025
Unemployment shocks raise disposable-income Gini even in European welfare states.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2014-2025
Post-2008 eurozone austerity disproportionately affected households in the bottom income quintile; distributional cost was not necessary for fiscal consolidation, given alternative tax-side options.
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run pending
+5
2005-2017
Export promotion combined with domestic competition policy outperforms export promotion combined with domestic protection (entry barriers, state aid to incumbents, preferential procurement) in raising real export growth and manufacturing TFP, in a broad-country panel 1990-2020.
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run pending
+31
1990-2020
FDI openness predicts domestic supplier total factor productivity growth when paired with pro-competition domestic policy, but not when domestic markets are reserved for protected national champions, in a panel of emerging economies 1990-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+31
1990-2020
The 2013-2019 phase-in of Basel III capital, leverage, and liquidity standards produced a measurable rise in bank-equity-to-assets ratios across G-SIB and domestic-systemic banks in BIS-reporting jurisdictions, with median CET1 capital ratios rising from <= 9% pre-2013 to >= 13% by 2019.
not public yet
run pending
+7
2007-2022
Across advanced economies post-1970, the finance-and-insurance sector's share of gross value added rose materially while the manufacturing sector's share fell, and the two trajectories are not jointly accounted for by a balanced services-sector reweighting.
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run pending
+14
1970-2020
Japan post-1990 has run gross public-debt-to-GDP ratios from ~70% rising to ~250%, the highest sustained level in the OECD record, WITHOUT triggering inflation, currency collapse, sovereign-spread blowout, or fiscal-dominance-induced loss of monetary control.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2024
Fiscal multipliers are substantially larger at the zero lower bound than in normal interest-rate regimes, because crowding-out via higher rates is suppressed.
not public yet
run pending
+15
1995-2021
Fossil-fuel subsidies across OECD 1980-2020 persisted despite declared climate commitments, consistent with the eco-socialist claim that private fossil-reserve ownership structurally blocks adequate public action.
not public yet
run pending
+10
1980-2020
US free-community-college state experiments (Tennessee Promise 2015, Oregon 2016) raised enrolment and completion rates among low-income students without measurable fiscal crowd-out.
not public yet
run pending
2010-2023
Across OECD and high-income economies 1980-2024, real wage growth at the productivity frontier is stronger in countries with more competitive product markets and lower barriers to firm entry.
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run pending
+28
1980-2024
Post-1945 Western GDP growth 1945-1973 tracked closely with energy and resource use; the assumption that this coupling is severable has not been empirically demonstrated at policy-relevant scale.
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run pending
+10
1945-1973
The cumulative EU digital-sector regulatory stack — GDPR (2018), Digital Markets Act (2022), Digital Services Act (2022), AI Act (2024) — has imposed a measurable fixed-compliance-cost burden that falls disproportionately on scale of EU-headquartered digital firms relative to US counterparts.
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run pending
+9
2014-2024
German sectoral co-determination (Mitbestimmung) and workers-on-boards has coexisted with competitive export-manufacturing performance 1976-present, refuting the claim that worker voice necessarily reduces firm competitiveness.
not public yet
run pending
+5
1976-2023
Germany's manufacturing value-added share of GDP declined from approximately 22-23% in 2017 to approximately 18-19% by 2024, a historically large shift for a mature economy over seven years.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2024
Following Koo (2008, 2014), the post-2008 advanced-economy recovery exhibited the diagnostic pattern of a balance-sheet recession: the private sector (households especially, plus non-financial business in the most leveraged countries) shifted simultaneously from net borrowing to net saving in pursuit of debt reduction, even when policy interest rates were at the zero lower bound.
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run pending
+15
2005-2014
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis produced deeper and more persistent output contractions in liberalised financial systems (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland) than in more state-managed financial systems (China, Vietnam), controlling for pre-crisis openness, exchange-rate regime, and fiscal space.
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run pending
+13
2003-2012
Global value chain (GVC) participation predicts real GDP per capita income upgrading when firms can enter and exit freely, but not when rents are reserved for protected incumbents, in a panel of developing and emerging economies 1990-2020.
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run pending
+31
1990-2020
Deng's 1978 reforms succeeded not through pure market liberalisation but through dual-track pricing, TVE experimentation, and SEZ strategic openings — a gradualist-pragmatist pattern that pure shock-therapy could not reproduce in post-Soviet economies.
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run pending
+9
1989-2010
Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), characterised by forced collectivisation into People's Communes, Lysenkoist rejection of scientific agronomy, diversion of rural labour to backyard steel production, and cadre-competition-driven inflation of reported harvests, produced a canonical institutional-economic collapse that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source or methodology family and measuring a different causal layer (demographic mortality, agricultural output, macroeconomic contraction, institutional coverage, human capital).
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run pending
1958-1965
The 2022-2026 wave of major-economy industrial-policy programmes — US IRA + CHIPS, EU Critical Raw Materials Act + Net-Zero Industry Act, EU Chips Act, Japan Green Transformation (GX, ¥150tn / ~$1tn announced), Korea K-Chips + Korean New Deal 2.0, China 14th Five-Year Plan + Made-in-China-2025-2.0 with semiconductors and clean energy as national-security frontier — represents the largest coordinated wave of industrial-policy spending in the post-1970s OECD record.
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run pending
+8
2018-2027
Countries with aggressive green-transition regulatory stringency layered on top of gas-indexed wholesale electricity markets and premature phase-out of firm-dispatchable generation (Germany, UK, Belgium, Netherlands) have experienced materially higher industrial electricity prices 2015-2023 than comparable economies with more measured transition paths (France's nuclear retention, Nordic hydro, USA's shale-gas-backed grid).
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run pending
+6
2005-2023
Across advanced economies over 1985-2020, countries with forced-saving / architecture-based redistribution (Singapore CPF, Chilean AFP pre-2008, Australian Superannuation, Swiss mixed pension pillars) achieve comparable or superior long-run growth outcomes alongside comparable distributional improvements in household net wealth distribution relative to countries relying primarily on tax-and-transfer redistribution (Nordic cluster, UK, France).
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run pending
+9
1985-2020
Guatemala's 2000-2024 macro trajectory shows the migration-and- remittance development pattern: remittance inflows rose from below 3% of GDP (2000) to above 20% (2024), and the macro economy is increasingly stabilised by household-level migrant transfers rather than productive-investment-driven growth.
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run pending
+1
2000-2024
In post-1992 China, sectors and provinces with persistently high state-owned-enterprise (SOE) shares of fixed-asset investment exhibit lower TFP growth and higher incremental capital-output ratios (ICOR — capital used per unit of additional output) than sectors and provinces dominated by private firms, after controlling for sector composition, urbanisation, and human capital.
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run pending
1992-2019
Across 26 Swiss cantons 1990-2023, cantons with persistently lower effective corporate tax rates, looser regulatory burden, and higher Fraser-style sub-national economic-freedom ranks exhibit higher per-capita GDP growth, higher private business formation rates, and higher net inward migration of high-earning workers than cantons with persistently tighter regulation and higher tax rates.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2023
Health-savings-account or catastrophic-plus-savings designs contain cost growth without worse age-adjusted mortality than comprehensive public-insurance peers.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1980-2023
Countries escaping middle income into high income are more likely to combine export openness with domestic market competition than export promotion with persistent domestic protection.
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run pending
+23
1950-2024
Within Anglo-liberal economies (UK, US, Australia) over 1995-2020, housing-supply-restricted high-opportunity metro areas exhibit real-wage-net-of-housing-cost trajectories that diverge substantially from their headline real-wage trajectories, such that the standard "real wage stagnation" story for these metros is amplified (larger stagnation) when housing costs are properly netted out, while housing-supply-elastic metros show the opposite pattern — headline real-wage stagnation looks less severe after housing is netted.
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run pending
1995-2020
Real disposable wage growth for median earners is higher in metropolitan areas and countries with more flexible housing supply (lower regulatory barriers to new construction, higher land-use elasticity) than in otherwise-similar peers with restrictive zoning, even when headline GDP growth is comparable.
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run pending
+18
1990-2020
Tenant-based vouchers predict better long-run neighbourhood and earnings outcomes than project-based public housing in high-poverty tracts.
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run pending
+24
1980-2023
Higher human capital accumulation is associated with greater TFP divergence across countries, amplifying productivity gaps over time.
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run pending
1990-2023
Every documented hyperinflation episode since 1900 (Weimar Germany, post-WW2 Hungary, Yugoslavia 1990s, Zimbabwe 2000s, Venezuela 2010s-2020s, among others) was preceded by fiscal dominance — a state of affairs where monetary policy is subordinated to financing government deficits that cannot be financed by taxation or market-rate borrowing.
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run pending
+8
1900-2025
Per-capita crime rates (measured by police-recorded offences per 100k population, by offence type) among foreign-born residents in developed destination countries are NOT systematically higher than among native-born residents once age, gender, and socioeconomic status are controlled.
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run pending
+2
2000-2023
OECD countries that deliver a larger share of low-income support through in-work benefits and earnings disregards, rather than through non-work-conditioned transfers, have higher employment rates among low-education adults and single parents without mechanically higher relative poverty.
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run pending
+32
2001-2023
Across OECD and emerging-market economies 1995-2020, subsidies to incumbent firms — measured by state aid, bailouts, and directed credit guarantees as a share of GDP — predict persistent market concentration (rising top-4 firm revenue share) and weaker subsequent total-factor-productivity growth.
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run pending
+34
1995-2020
India's digital public infrastructure stack — Aadhaar (universal biometric ID, 2009-2016 build-out), UPI (Unified Payments Interface launched 2016), and the JAM trinity (Jan Dhan accounts + Aadhaar + Mobile) — produced productivity gains visible in formal-sector employment, financial-inclusion measures, and government-to-person transfer leakage reduction.
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run pending
+1
2011-2021
Industrial concentration (top-4 firm share) in US manufacturing and retail sectors rose 1997-2020 alongside declining labour share, consistent with monopolisation tendency.
not public yet
run pending
1997-2020
Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.
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run pending
+68
1990-2020
Industrial policy succeeds when subsidies and cheap credit are conditional on export-discipline performance (Korea, Taiwan, China) and fails when unconditional (Latin American ISI 1960s–1980s, India pre-1991 licence raj).
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run pending
+11
1960-2000
Biden's IRA/CHIPS industrial policy will show partial success on capacity-building metrics and mixed results on job creation, consistent with the conditional view that industrial policy works where targeting is technically competent and governance is strong.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2030
Industrial policy episodes without clear exit rules or export-discipline conditions generate weaker long-run GDP-per-capita and productivity outcomes than episodes with hard performance conditions, in a broad panel of economies during 1970-2020.
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run pending
+68
1970-2020
The 2021-2024 Eurozone inflation episode is best decomposed as a cost-push / distributional-conflict process rather than a demand-pull / monetary-overhang process: profit-margin expansion in energy, food, and tradable-goods sectors accounts for at least 40% of cumulative GDP-deflator growth 2021Q1-2023Q4 per the ECB and IMF unit-labour-cost decomposition framework, wage growth lagged price growth across the entire 2021-2023 window with real wages declining in every Eurozone economy, and the inflation moderation in 2024 is driven by terms-of-trade reversal rather than wage-side moderation.
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run pending
+2
2019-2024
Informal employment as a share of total non-agricultural employment persists at higher levels in countries with high entry barriers and burdensome product-market regulation (high OECD PMR, high Doing Business cost of starting a business), even when the state invests heavily in development projects and public infrastructure.
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run pending
+24
1990-2020
Sustained policy-rate hikes (≥300bp cumulative within 18 months) in advanced economies redistribute disposable income upward across household quintiles in the 24 months after the hike begins: net-saver households (top quintile, 60-80% of net interest-bearing assets) gain interest income while net-debtor and renter households (bottom three quintiles) face higher mortgage costs, higher rents passed through from landlord financing costs, and tightened consumer credit.
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run pending
2018-2024
Cross-country variation in intergenerational income mobility (commonly measured as the rank-rank slope or intergenerational income elasticity) across OECD countries is substantially explained by institutional determinants — education-system equality of provision, residential segregation, and housing affordability — rather than by the aggregate redistribution level.
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run pending
+14
1990-2020
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA, signed August 2022) produced a measurable step-change in US clean-energy investment, manufacturing reshoring, and fiscal cost over 2022-2026 relative to a pre-IRA trajectory and to non-US comparators (EU, China, Japan, Korea).
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run pending
+6
2015-2026
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) era (1960-1985) produced positive catch-up productivity growth through technology licensing coordination and scale economies, but Japan's post-1990 stagnation is associated with protected domestic sectors, zombie lending to inefficient incumbents, and weak product-market competition.
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run pending
1960-2020
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, stronger judicial independence — measured by V-Dem judicial-constraints-on-the- executive index, Fraser EFW integrity of the legal system, and the Cingranelli-Richards physical-integrity-rights index — predicts lower investment volatility and stronger long-run GDP per capita growth following major reform episodes.
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run pending
+49
1980-2020
South Korea's post-1997 corporate governance and financial liberalisation reforms explain a larger share of post-crisis frontier productivity convergence than the earlier heavy-and-chemical-industry (HCI) drive.
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run pending
+1
1970-2020
Countries with stricter employment protection legislation — measured by the OECD EPL indicator (or comparable alternatives where OECD EPL is missing) — experience longer average unemployment duration, holding other controls constant.
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run pending
+25
1985-2023
India's 2019-2020 consolidation of 29 labour laws into 4 Codes (Wage Code 2019, Industrial Relations Code 2020, OSH Code 2020, Social Security Code 2020) — implementation pending in many states — raised India's manufacturing formal-employment share by at least 1 pp by 2024 in early- notifying states relative to late-notifying states, exploiting the staggered state-level rollout for identification.
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run pending
2015-2024
New Zealand's 1991 Employment Contracts Act (abolition of national awards, individual contracts default, voluntary unionism) lowered the New Zealand unemployment rate by at least 2 pp by 1996 relative to a synthetic control of Anglo peer economies, with the largest gains in low-skill employment, but did not raise productivity growth above donor-pool baseline.
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run pending
1985-2000
Across US states and a cross-country panel of OECD and middle- income economies 1980-2020, higher occupational and business licensing burdens predict weaker entrepreneurship rates and lower intergenerational income mobility over long horizons.
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run pending
1980-2020
In high-income countries 1990-2020, gains in life satisfaction (subjective well-being) are more strongly associated with real income growth, employment opportunity, and institutional trust than with the intensity of state economic planning or public-sector employment share.
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run pending
+25
1990-2020
Brazil's substantial 2003-2010 poverty reduction (extreme poverty headcount fell from ~10% to ~4% and Gini coefficient from ~0.58 to ~0.53 per PNAD/IPEA series) is decomposed across three channels: (a) Bolsa Família cash-transfer expansion (Lei 10,836 of January 2004 consolidating prior CCTs, reaching ~13 million families by 2010), (b) real minimum-wage valorisation (real minimum wage rose over 50% 2003-2010, pulling up the bottom of the formal wage distribution and indexed social transfers including BPC), and (c) the 2003-2008 commodity boom (export revenue surge, formal-employment growth, wage-bargaining leverage from tight labour markets).
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run pending
1995-2012
Brazil's Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) 2024 industrial-policy plan targets six "missions" (sustainable agribusiness, health complex, infrastructure, digital transformation, defence/ bioeconomy, decarbonisation) with R$300bn of subsidised credit + procurement preferences.
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run pending
2018-2026
The cumulative Venezuelan real-GDP contraction over the 2013- 2023 Maduro era (>70% peak-to-trough from the 2013 peak) is decomposed into four channels: (a) the exogenous 2014-2016 oil price shock, (b) the 2013-2019 monetary-fiscal-fusion channel culminating in the 2017-2019 Cagan-threshold hyperinflation, (c) the post-2015 US sanctions escalation (SDN 2017, PDVSA designation January 2019, secondary sanctions on tanker operators 2019-2020), and (d) post-2017 political destabilisation (2017 constitutional crisis, 2019 Guaidó parallel-government episode, 2024 election dispute).
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run pending
+1
2005-2023
Malaysia's post-1990 growth plateau is associated with protected national-champion industrial policy (Proton, GLC preference, sectoral reservation) and ethnic-allocation constraints (Bumiputera equity requirements, preferential procurement) that reduced product-market competition and resource allocation efficiency after successful early catch-up (1970-1990).
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run pending
+2
1970-2024
Higher formal new-business entry density predicts faster subsequent real income growth.
not public yet
run pending
+34
2006-2020
Lower export-product concentration predicts faster subsequent real GDP per-capita growth and stronger high-technology export performance.
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run pending
+34
1988-2023
Higher government-consumption shares predict lower investment shares and slower subsequent real GDP per-capita growth.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1990-2023
Higher investment freedom and private-credit depth predict faster renewable-electricity capacity diffusion.
not public yet
run pending
+34
2000-2023
Deeper private credit markets predict faster subsequent total-factor-productivity and real GDP per-capita growth.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1990-2019
Higher security of property rights predicts higher investment shares and faster subsequent real GDP per-capita growth.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1990-2022
Higher market-oriented regulatory freedom predicts stronger high-technology export performance.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1990-2022
Lower applied tariff rates predict faster real private-consumption-per-capita growth.
not public yet
run pending
+34
1988-2023
Market openness (trade and capital-account liberalisation) without complementary adjustment institutions (active labour-market policy, regional transfers, wage insurance, retraining) raises inequality or regional divergence enough to trigger policy reversal (tariff increases, capital controls, populist economic platforms) within 10-15 years.
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run pending
+28
1980-2020
GCC economies' GDP growth volatility correlation with oil-price changes diminished measurably from the 2014-2016 oil-price collapse onwards, reflecting the cumulative effect of fiscal-buffer institutionalisation (sovereign-wealth funds, NDC frameworks), VAT introduction (UAE/SAU/BHR 2018, OMN/QAT 2022), and progress on non-oil-sector expansion.
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run pending
2000-2024
Turkey's AKP-era 2003-2024 trajectory shows two distinct phases: 2003-2013 orthodox-anchor convergence (post-2001-banking-crisis IMF programme, EU-accession reform momentum, CBRT inflation targeting establishment, real GDP-pc growth outperforming EM peers) followed by 2014-2024 unorthodox-economics regression (anti-interest-rate doctrine, central-bank-independence erosion, recurring lira crises, inflation re-acceleration).
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run pending
2000-2024
Middle-class wealth accumulation (median household net worth growth, homeownership rates, and financial-asset participation) is stronger in countries with deeper capital markets (stock-market capitalisation to GDP, private credit to GDP) and more secure property rights (WGI rule of law, Heritage property-rights score) than in peers at similar income levels with shallow financial systems or weak tenure security, over 1990-2020.
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run pending
+29
1990-2020
Argentina under Milei (December 2023 inauguration) executed a fiscal-surplus + monetary-contraction + de-facto-dollarisation programme that collapsed monthly CPI inflation from ~25% (Dec 2023) toward sub-3% by 2025-2026, eliminated the primary fiscal deficit within a single fiscal year, and compressed the parallel-market peso-USD gap (blue-dolar / official) from over 100% to near zero.
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run pending
2020-2026
Argentine monthly CPI inflation declines from its late-2023 peak (around 25% month-on-month in December 2023 following the 54% peso devaluation) to below 5% month-on-month within 12 months of Milei's December 2023 inauguration, and below 3% month-on- month within 18 months.
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run pending
2018-2027
Milei shock therapy in Argentina from December 2023 produces poverty-rate increase and real-wage decline in its first two years (2024-2025) of magnitude consistent with the Marxist-Leninist critique of neoliberal restoration — distinct from the inflation-stabilisation and output-recovery questions handled by separate hypotheses.
not public yet
run pending
2023-2027
High-bite minimum wages (statutory floors that approach or exceed the local 50th percentile of the age-specific wage distribution) produce a multi-stage causal chain.
not public yet
run pending
2000-2024
Minimum-wage increases above the local median-wage ratio produce disemployment effects at the low-skill margin, even if aggregate employment effects are small.
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run pending
+9
1990-2022
US state-level minimum-wage increases over 1990-2024 produce small, statistically uncertain effects on teen and low-wage employment when compared to contiguous counties or neighbouring states that did not raise their minimum.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2024
German Mittelstand-supporting institutional architecture (vocational training, Landesbanken patient capital, co-determination) correlates with higher manufacturing productivity persistence than Anglo-Saxon shareholder-primacy arrangements in capital-intensive sectors.
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run pending
+4
1970-2019
lower product-market regulation predicts higher long-run TFP growth and lower consumer price levels in network and retail sectors.
not public yet
run pending
1980-2024
Mondragón cooperative network (Spain, 1956-present) has sustained productivity and employment stability through successive recessions at levels comparable to Basque private-sector peers.
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run pending
1970-2023
In Q3 2008 through Q2 2009 the Federal Reserve allowed broad-money M2 growth to slow sharply (annualised QoQ growth fell from ~7% in early 2008 to near zero by late 2008, with M2 outright contracting for several months in late 2008).
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run pending
1985-2024
Sectors dominated by national-champion firms show lower 20-year total-factor- productivity growth than comparable competitive sectors after the initial scale-up phase, in a broad panel of OECD and emerging-market economies during 1980-2020.
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run pending
+14
1980-2020
Countries that enacted market-oriented structural reforms with credible institutional commitment (Norway handlingsregel 2001, Sweden pension- architecture reform 1999) experienced systematically better post-treatment GDP-per-capita and unemployment trajectories than their own pre-treatment trends would have predicted.
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run pending
+4
1996-2023
From a comparable (arguably DPRK-favoured) 1953 armistice starting point — same ethnicity, language, pre-colonial institutional inheritance, and a Japanese colonial industrial capital stock disproportionately located in the North — the Republic of Korea's market economy with state-directed industrial policy and export discipline, versus the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's autarkic central planning under Juche, produced by 2023 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
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run pending
1953-2023
Lula third-term's Nova Indústria Brasil 2024 industrial-policy package, conditioned on export performance and technology-diffusion metrics, produces measurable sectoral capability gains (semiconductors, green hydrogen, health-industrial complex) by 2030 — replicating the East Asian export-discipline conditionality pattern rather than the earlier Latin American import-substitution-industrialisation pattern.
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run pending
2018-2030
Countries that legislated and executed nuclear phase-outs (Germany 2011-2023, Belgium 2003 law with 2025-2035 phase-out, Switzerland 2017 vote) experienced over 2010-2024 (a) higher industrial electricity prices, (b) higher wholesale electricity price volatility, and (c) greater reliance on fossil-fired back-up capacity for grid balancing, relative to nuclear-retaining peers (France, Finland post-2023 Olkiluoto 3, Sweden, USA).
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run pending
+4
2005-2024
Excessive occupational-licensing scope (US state-level variation) reduces inter-state labour mobility and sector productivity relative to light-licensing alternatives.
not public yet
run pending
1980-2023
Active labour-market programme spending is associated with lower low-education unemployment.
not public yet
run pending
+30
1986-2019
Active labour-market spending is less effective at reducing low-education unemployment when employment protection legislation is stricter.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1996-2019
In OECD panels from 1990 to 2023, collective-bargaining systems where legal or administrative extension raises bargaining coverage far above union membership predict weaker labour-market entry for young workers and lower new-business density.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1990-2023
Negative growth shocks translate into more persistent unemployment where employment protection is stricter.
not public yet
run pending
+31
1991-2019
Stricter OECD employment protection is associated with higher unemployment among below-upper-secondary adults.
not public yet
run pending
+30
1985-2019
Higher OECD statutory minimum-wage bite ratios are associated with higher low-education unemployment.
not public yet
run pending
+22
1985-2019
Capital deepening alone is a weak predictor of labour-productivity growth once MFP contribution is included.
not public yet
run pending
+25
1971-2025
Countries farther below the annual OECD labour-productivity frontier subsequently grow faster in GDP per hour.
not public yet
run pending
+25
1971-2025
Average-hours reductions are not mechanically associated with lower real GVA growth in OECD PDB panels after fixed effects.
not public yet
run pending
+25
1971-2025
Countries with larger PMR declines from 2018 to 2023 saw faster PDB labour-productivity growth in the following window.
not public yet
run pending
+25
2018-2024
OECD labour-productivity growth was persistently lower after 2008 than before 2008.
not public yet
run pending
+25
1971-2025
A larger public-administration, education, and health GVA share predicts slower subsequent total-economy labour-productivity growth.
not public yet
run pending
+25
1971-2025
Small open OECD economies show conditional labour-productivity convergence toward the annual frontier.
not public yet
run pending
+8
1971-2025
OECD multifactor-productivity growth has country-level persistence after common year shocks.
not public yet
run pending
+25
1971-2025
In OECD and accession-country panels 1998-2019, reductions in the OECD PMR overall product-market-regulation index predict higher subsequent TFP growth.
not public yet
run pending
+29
1998-2019
Open economies are more compatible with large public welfare states: social-spending employment penalties are smaller where trade exposure is high.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1991-2024
Higher public social spending shares are associated with lower employment rates once country and year effects are absorbed.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1991-2024
Public social spending has a smaller employment penalty in OECD countries with higher government effectiveness.
not public yet
run pending
+36
1996-2023
In OECD country-year panels since 2001, higher employer-plus-employee labour tax wedges on low-wage workers predict lower employment rates for adults with below-upper-secondary education and higher inactivity among prime-age workers.
not public yet
run pending
+32
2001-2023
In OECD TaxBEN panels since 2001, higher participation tax rates and effective marginal tax rates at the transition from non-work to low-wage work predict lower labour-force participation and employment among single parents and low-education adults.
not public yet
run pending
+32
2001-2023
The onshore wind learning curve continued through the 2020-2024 supply-chain, commodity-price, and inflation shocks.
not public yet
run pending
2010-2024
Private competition in cataract and refractive surgery markets predicts long-run real-price decline and technology adoption.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1990-2023
Across OECD economies 1998-2022, jurisdictions with stricter rule-bound competition-law enforcement (proxied by OECD Product Market Regulation state-control / barriers-to-entry sub-indices and EFW area-5 regulation scores) exhibit higher subsequent multifactor and labour productivity growth than jurisdictions with weaker enforcement, conditional on initial income, openness, and rule-of-law level.
not public yet
run pending
+30
1998-2022
Larger fossil-fuel consumption subsidies predict weaker high-tech export upgrading.
not public yet
run pending
+15
2010-2023
Paraguay 2003-2024 quietly delivered cumulative log real-GDP per capita growth in the top half of Latin America, with low inflation (mean below 5% annualised), stable fiscal balance, and durable currency, despite minimal headline reform attention.
not public yet
run pending
+2
2003-2024
Abolishing parking minimums near transit predicts lower per-unit construction costs and faster multifamily permitting.
not public yet
run pending
+24
2000-2023
Peru's 2001-2019 growth window — under five different administrations (Toledo, García II, Humala, PPK, Vizcarra) that all preserved the 1993 macroeconomic constitution (inflation-targeting central bank, fiscal-responsibility framework, open trade and capital account) — delivered cumulative real-GDP-per-capita growth in the top quartile of Latin America despite high political turnover.
not public yet
run pending
+4
2001-2024
Poland’s sustained market transition — shock therapy stabilisation in 1990, competition-policy enforcement, mass privatisation, and EU regulatory adoption — generated a cumulative log GDP-per-capita growth advantage of at least 10 percentage points over 1990–2024 relative to CEE peers with weaker competition and slower privatisation (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia).
not public yet
run pending
+5
1990-2024
Across a broad panel of economies 1990-2020, higher policy uncertainty — measured by economic-policy-uncertainty (EPU) indices, election-frequency volatility, and regulatory-turnover rates — predicts lower private-investment shares of GDP and slower long-run total-factor-productivity growth in the years following state-led reform shifts.
not public yet
run pending
+49
1990-2020
Post-2008 OECD GDP growth has slowed to roughly 1-2% trend levels while per-capita emissions remain above 1.5C-consistent paths, falsifying the 'green growth will solve it' forecasts of 2005-2010 IPCC scenarios.
not public yet
run pending
+20
2008-2023
The 2021-2024 OECD inflation episode is best decomposed as ~60% supply-shock-driven (energy-price spike, supply-chain disruption, COVID labour-supply effects) and ~40% demand-driven (US fiscal stimulus, post-pandemic durable-goods boom, monetary accommodation), refuting both the pure-monetarist and pure-supply-shock framings.
not public yet
run pending
+1
2018-2024
The US COVID labour-market shock 2020-2024 produced a sharp asymmetric reallocation — leisure/hospitality and brick-and-mortar retail collapsed in 2020 then over-recovered nominal wages relative to trend, while professional/information sectors saw remote-work entrenchment with persistently elevated WFH share and lower CBD office utilisation through 2024.
not public yet
run pending
2019-2024
Following the 1989-1992 collapse of the Soviet bloc, post-communist countries that adopted market reforms rapidly (Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania — the "fast reformers") experienced faster recovery in life expectancy at birth than countries that reformed slowly or retained state-socialist economic structures (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan — the "slow reformers").
not public yet
run pending
+14
1989-2019
Countries with stronger price-signal institutions, proxied by higher Heritage monetary-freedom scores, achieve faster electricity-access gains from below-universal-access baselines.
not public yet
run pending
+20
1995-2024
Statutory price ceilings set below market-clearing prices reliably produce shortages, rationing via queue or privilege, quality degradation, and black-market arbitrage — across every documented episode where enforcement is sustained.
not public yet
run pending
+2
1930-2024
Stronger price-signal freedom predicts lower inflation volatility and higher private investment in country-year panels.
not public yet
run pending
+35
1995-2024
Across OECD countries 1975-2020, lower product-market regulation (PMR) predicts higher long-run total-factor-productivity growth, after controlling for education attainment, capital deepening, and initial income per capita.
not public yet
run pending
+29
1975-2020
US labour productivity and median compensation grew together 1945-1973 but decoupled after 1973, and the decoupling magnitude exceeds what composition-adjusted measures eliminate.
not public yet
run pending
1947-2019
Higher property prices are associated with higher GDP per capita, reflecting agglomeration and capital deepening.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2023
Property price booms are associated with reduced R&D investment, potentially due to capital misallocation into real estate over innovation.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2023
Infant-industry protection that persists longer than 15 years predicts lower export competitiveness and weaker productivity growth than time-limited protection in a broad panel of developing economies during 1960-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+56
1960-2020
Post-1945 US and Western European public investment in rail/transit produced lower per-capita emissions than the post-1980 privatised-deregulated transport regime.
not public yet
run pending
+4
1970-2020
Post-2008 quantitative easing operated principally through a Minsky-style financialisation channel — collateral-revaluation, portfolio-rebalancing into long-duration risk assets, and a yield-driven compression of risk premia — rather than through the textbook quantity-theoretic broad-money or expectations channels.
not public yet
run pending
+1
2008-2021
Piketty's r > g dynamic post-1980 produced wealth-to-income ratios reaching or exceeding pre-1914 levels in major OECD economies, consistent with social-democratic claims about structural inequality drift absent policy intervention.
not public yet
run pending
+12
1980-2020
In OECD countries from 1995 to 2023, faster compression of disposable-income inequality does not predict faster real household income growth once aggregate GDP per capita growth, employment, and productivity controls are included.
not public yet
run pending
+31
1995-2023
In low- and middle-income country panels from 1995 to 2023, sustained reductions in extreme poverty are more strongly predicted by market-income growth and employment gains than by higher tax revenue or government consumption shares alone.
not public yet
run pending
+29
1995-2023
Among OECD and high-income peer economies from 1995 to 2023, tax-heavy redistribution predicts slower real GDP per capita growth once the tax take exceeds the sample median, controlling for initial income, working-age population share, trade openness, inflation, and government effectiveness.
not public yet
run pending
+31
1995-2023
Across a broad country panel from 1990 to 2019, larger government final consumption shares predict slower total factor productivity growth after country and year fixed effects, human-capital controls, trade openness, investment share, and rule of law.
not public yet
run pending
+47
1990-2019
Across countries with repeated distribution data from 1995 to 2023, bottom-40 income-share gains are more durable when accompanied by employment and GDP per capita growth than when driven by social-spending or tax-share expansion alone.
not public yet
run pending
+47
1995-2023
In country-year panels since 1996, higher tax revenue as a share of GDP predicts lower private investment as a share of GDP after country and year fixed effects, income-level controls, demographics, trade openness, and rule-of-law controls.
not public yet
run pending
+47
1996-2023
Across OECD countries with comparable intergenerational mobility measures, higher tax-and-transfer redistribution is not sufficient to predict higher mobility after controlling for GDP per capita, education attainment, housing affordability, and rule of law.
not public yet
run pending
+14
1990-2020
In OECD countries from 1990 to 2023, transfer-heavy welfare states predict lower prime-age labour-force participation when transfer expansion is not accompanied by strong work incentives, after controlling for income level, female education, ageing, unemployment, and macro shocks.
not public yet
run pending
+31
1990-2023
A higher real effective exchange rate is associated with a decline in the share of high-tech exports.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2023
Higher regulatory quality strengthens the positive effect of trade openness on GDP growth, acting as a mediator for trade benefits.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2023
Lower administrative and regulatory burdens, stronger impact assessment, and more stakeholder engagement predict higher investment shares.
not public yet
run pending
+34
2018-2023
Binding rent control (price ceilings below market clearing with enforcement teeth) reduces aggregate housing supply in affected markets, reduces the quality of existing rent-controlled stock through reduced maintenance incentives, and produces distributional effects favouring long-tenure incumbents over mobile workers and new household formation.
not public yet
run pending
2000-2023
Stricter rent-price controls predict slower residential building-permit growth in European country panels.
not public yet
run pending
+22
2000-2024
Across resource-rich economies with meaningful extractive sectors, countries that capture a high share of resource rents through sovereign-wealth-fund mechanisms, royalties, resource-specific taxes, or state-share equity (the "rent-capture" regime, anchored by Norway and Botswana) deliver better long-run welfare outcomes — GDP per capita PPP, life expectancy, gini disposable income, public-service quality — than comparable resource-rich economies that run a laissez-faire regime where rents are predominantly retained by private extractive firms (anchored by Australia LNG, pre-SWF Alaska oil, pre-reform Chilean copper).
not public yet
run pending
+20
1996-2023
UK Town and Country Planning Act 1947 and subsequent restrictive-zoning regimes produce measurable housing supply elasticity reductions and price level increases relative to more-permissive planning systems.
not public yet
run pending
1947-2023
Western sanctions on Russia 2022-2025 produced material but bounded economic damage — GDP contraction shallower than Western forecasters predicted in March 2022 — because oil-revenue rerouting (China + India + Turkey absorption of seaborne crude under the G7 price cap) and import-substitution from EAEU partners blunted the trade-shock impact, while the ruble stabilised after initial collapse via capital controls and a current-account surplus.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2025
Second-generation immigrant children (born in destination country to foreign-born parents) show education outcomes (PISA scores, tertiary attainment, NEET rates) that converge toward native-born peers when controlled for parental socioeconomic status, parental years-since- arrival, and destination-country language of instruction.
not public yet
run pending
+7
2003-2022
Services trade liberalisation predicts stronger total factor productivity growth in high-income frontier economies after 1990 than goods-sector industrial policy does.
not public yet
run pending
+29
1990-2020
Singapore's CPF forced-saving architecture 1955-present, combined with rule-of-law and corruption-free administration, produced savings and growth outcomes not replicable by transfer-based welfare states without the institutional base.
not public yet
run pending
+4
1965-2023
Singapore's CPF forced-saving architecture produced higher national-savings rates and domestic capital accumulation than free-choice retirement-saving peers over 1965–2010.
not public yet
run pending
+3
1965-2010
Singapore's HDB public-housing and CPF housing-finance system increased mass homeownership and reduced overcrowding between 1960 and 1990 without relying on a general tax-financed public-housing entitlement model.
not public yet
run pending
1960-1990
The photovoltaic (PV) learning curve — log cost of utility-scale solar modules and levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) declining linearly in log cumulative installed capacity at a learning rate of approximately 20-25% per doubling — continued through the 2020-2024 period despite (a) the COVID supply-chain shock 2020-2022, (b) the 2022 polysilicon + freight-rate spike, (c) the 2022-2023 inflation shock that reversed cost declines in many other capital-equipment classes, (d) US + EU trade defences against Chinese modules.
not public yet
run pending
+6
2010-2024
Collectivised agriculture in the USSR 1930-1940 raised grain marketings sufficiently to finance industrial investment, delivering Preobrazhensky's scissors-crisis resolution despite high rural transition costs.
not public yet
run pending
1928-1940
The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
not public yet
run pending
1989-1998
Larger state-allocation footprints predict weaker private-credit depth and slower innovation diffusion after country and year fixed effects.
not public yet
run pending
+35
1996-2023
Persistent state-directed credit allocation predicts higher zombie-firm shares and lower total-factor-productivity growth over 15-30 year windows in a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies.
not public yet
run pending
+68
1990-2020
Higher state-owned enterprise shares predict slower long-run labour-productivity growth once basic infrastructure, literacy, and initial income gaps are controlled in a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies during 1980-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+68
1980-2020
Higher state-imposed trade barriers predict weaker household consumption growth and narrower imported product variety in country-year panels.
not public yet
run pending
+35
1988-2023
Industrial subsidies have positive early output effects but declining or negative productivity effects when maintained beyond 10 years in a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies during 1970-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+29
1970-2020
Longer durations of sustained tariff protection predict weaker subsequent export competitiveness (lower real export growth and slower export- complexity upgrading) and lower real household consumption per capita growth, in a broad-country panel 1970-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+60
1970-2020
Chilean post-Pinochet tax progressivity reforms — Concertación-era Aylwin-Frei marginal-rate increases 1990-1995, Bachelet 2014 reform raising corporate rate from 20 to 27 percent + DTA tightening, Boric 2022-2024 reform attempts — produced gradual reductions in the Chilean top-1 pretax income share by at least 1.5 percentage points over 1990-2024 vs Latin-American synthetic comparator pool, with most of the level shift concentrated in 1990-2000 rather than the recent reform attempts.
not public yet
run pending
+1
1985-2024
China's 2016 VAT reform (replacing the business tax on services with VAT, unifying VAT across goods and services with 17/13/11/6 percent rate slabs subsequently consolidated to 13/9/6 in 2019) produced no detectable change in the Chinese disposable-income Gini coefficient vs East-Asia synthetic control over 2016-2020, with the formalisation benefits offsetting the consumption-tax incidence regressivity.
not public yet
run pending
+1
2005-2022
Estonia's 1994 flat-tax 26 percent (subsequently reduced to 20 percent by 2015) and the unique 2000 corporate-tax reform (taxing only distributed corporate profits) produced a measurable rise in the Estonian top-1 pretax income share over 1994-2010 vs Baltic synthetic comparator (LVA, LTU), with the distributed-profit-only corporate regime channelling capital-income into top-decile reported income while reducing taxation of retained earnings.
not public yet
run pending
1994-2015
The 1981 Mitterrand wealth tax (Impot sur les Grandes Fortunes, suspended 1986, reinstated 1988 as ISF) produced a measurable but modest reduction in the French top-1 wealth share over 1981-1985 relative to the synthetic control of comparable continental European economies, with capital-flight attrition smaller than the Macron-era political narrative implied.
not public yet
run pending
+1
1975-1990
India's 2017 GST implementation (replacing fragmented state VAT/excise with unified GST with five rate slabs 0/5/12/18/28 percent) produced a short-run regressive distributional bite — measurable rise in disposable- income Gini over 2017-2019 — followed by partial reversal as input-tax- credit pass-through stabilised by 2021.
not public yet
run pending
2010-2023
Italian IRPEF flattening (Berlusconi 2003 bracket reduction from five to three brackets, Renzi 2014 EUR 80 monthly bonus, Meloni 2024 three-bracket structure) over 2002-2024 produced a measurable rise in the top-10 pretax income share but a flat-to-declining top-1 share, consistent with the view that bracket-flattening compresses upper-middle-class progressivity rather than substantially benefitting the very top in a high-evasion-rate jurisdiction.
not public yet
run pending
+4
1995-2024
Japan's three consumption-tax hikes (1997 3->5, 2014 5->8, 2019 8->10 percent) raised the disposable-income Gini coefficient by at least 0.3 Gini-points cumulatively relative to G7-ex-JPN comparator synthetic control, with the regressivity bite partially offset by simultaneous tax-rebate / cash-transfer programmes.
not public yet
run pending
+1
1990-2022
South Korea's Moon-era progressive turn 2017-2020 (top marginal rate raised from 40 to 42 then 45 percent, corporate top rate raised from 22 to 25 percent, capital-gains broadening) produced a measurable decline in the Korean top-1 pretax income share by at least 0.5 percentage points over 2017-2022 vs East-Asia synthetic control, consistent with the public-finance literature where rate increases in evasion-constrained but enforcement-intensifying environments produce real distributional effects.
not public yet
run pending
2005-2023
Post-apartheid South African tax structure (top marginal income rate raised to 45 percent in 2017, capital-gains inclusion ratio raised 2012 + 2016, recurring property-tax effective burden via municipal rates) produced a measurable reduction in the South African top-1 pretax income share over 1995-2024 vs SADC synthetic comparator pool, with the recurring property-tax channel contributing more than the marginal-income-rate channel to the distributional effect.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2024
Simpler tax systems — measured by fewer tax payments per year, lower time spent on tax compliance, and fewer separate taxes — predict higher entrepreneurship rates (new business registrations per 1,000 working-age adults) and stronger small-firm employment growth over 20-year windows, in a broad-country panel 2000-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+60
2000-2020
Strict local-content or technology-transfer requirements on FDI slow high-tech productivity convergence over long windows.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1990-2023
In OECD country panels from 1990 to 2023, stricter regulation of temporary and fixed-term contracts predicts lower youth employment rates and slower recovery of youth employment after recessions.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1990-2023
Countries with higher trade openness subsequently show faster diffusion of frontier innovation, measured by resident patent applications and high-technology export intensity.
not public yet
run pending
+35
1995-2023
Large expansions of means-tested or categorical transfers without work- incentives or activation requirements predict lower prime-age labour-force participation rates over 15-20-year windows relative to expansions that incorporate negative-income-tax or earned-income-tax-credit designs, in an OECD and rich-country panel 1980-2020.
not public yet
run pending
+29
1980-2020
Trinidad and Tobago's 2008-2024 macro trajectory shows the classic hydrocarbon-dependent small-economy pattern: real GDP, fiscal balance, and current account move with global oil and gas prices, with limited non-hydrocarbon-economy diversification despite repeated policy efforts.
not public yet
run pending
2008-2024
Trump tariff policy 2018-2019 did not reshore US manufacturing output to a meaningful degree, and tariff incidence fell on US importers and consumers, consistent with post-Keynesian emphasis on demand-side rather than price-competition factors in trade flows.
not public yet
run pending
2014-2023
The September 2022 UK gilt-market dysfunction had its operative amplification mechanism in the foreign-currency-collateral exposure of the Liability-Driven Investment (LDI) leveraged-derivative chain in the UK pension system, not in a "fiscal limit" reached by the sovereign issuer.
not public yet
run pending
2022-2023
Erdogan's "unorthodox" doctrine 2021-2023 — repeated TCMB rate cuts during accelerating inflation under his Islamist-finance theory that high rates cause inflation — produced a textbook monetary-policy failure: lira collapse, inflation-expectations de-anchoring, and CPI peaking above 85% YoY before the post-election 2023 reversal under Erkan/Karahan brought rates from 8.5% to 50% and slowly re-anchored expectations.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2024
Universal Basic Services provision (UK post-war, Nordic) delivers equivalent wellbeing outcomes to consumption-based equivalents at lower material-throughput levels.
not public yet
run pending
+11
1970-2022
UK GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) diverged negatively from a matched synthetic counterfactual of similar-income anglophone/developed economies (USA, CAN, AUS, NZL, DEU, NLD, CHE) starting around 2008 and widening post-2016 (Brexit referendum).
not public yet
run pending
+2
1996-2023
UK electricity-sector privatisation post-1989 increased per-MWh retail prices and did not accelerate decarbonisation relative to the public counterfactual until state-directed renewables mandates post-2008.
not public yet
run pending
1980-2017
UK post-war nationalised industries (coal, rail, steel, gas) through 1979 achieved capital-investment rates comparable to sectoral peers in West Germany and France, falsifying the claim that public ownership categorically starves investment.
not public yet
run pending
1950-1979
Median UK real wage growth since 2008 has been materially below the pre-2008 trend (approximately flat real median wages vs a 2% annualised pre-crisis path), producing a ~15–20 percentage-point shortfall by 2023.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2023
The UK labour share of national income fell during the Thatcher era (1979-1990) by a magnitude not explained by sectoral composition shifts alone.
not public yet
run pending
1979-1990
UK market reforms from 1979 onward — privatisation, trade liberalisation, labour-market deregulation, and competition-policy strengthening — predict stronger long-run services-sector productivity and employment performance over 1979–2024 than comparable European corporatist regimes (France, Germany, Italy).
not public yet
run pending
+6
1979-2024
In OECD and high-income country panels from 1990 to 2023, larger unconditional cash-transfer intensity for working-age households predicts lower average hours worked and lower labour-force participation than equally costly work-conditioned or in-kind support.
not public yet
run pending
+32
1990-2023
Uruguay's 2005-2020 Frente Amplio era (Vázquez I, Mujica, Vázquez II) expanded the welfare state (Plan de Equidad 2008, Asignaciones Familiares expansion, FONASA universal-health integration 2008, Sistema Nacional Integrado de Cuidados 2015), legalised cannabis 2013, and ran a centre-left fiscal-and-redistributive programme without abandoning macroeconomic orthodoxy.
not public yet
run pending
+1
1998-2024
The US-EU GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) gap has widened materially between 2000 and 2023.
not public yet
run pending
+5
2000-2023
Pre-2008 US household debt expansion sustained aggregate demand in the face of stagnant real median wages, a pattern inconsistent with representative-agent rational-expectations models.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2008
The observed gap between US median real wage growth and US real GDP per capita growth over 1973-2000 (commonly characterised as "wage stagnation during a productivity boom") is substantially explained by a decomposable set of channels rather than a single rent-extraction story: (a) growth in non-wage benefits — primarily employer-paid healthcare — substituting for cash wages; (b) compositional shifts in the labour force driven by expanded female labour force participation lowering the median worker's experience profile; (c) divergence between consumer-price and output- price deflators (Feldstein measurement critique); (d) the genuine but smaller residual of top-strata capture of marginal product growth (Bivens-Mishel reading).
not public yet
run pending
1973-2000
Venezuela's post-1999 socialist policy regime (Chávez 1999-2013 + Maduro 2013-present, characterised by FX controls, price controls, mass nationalisations, PDVSA politicisation, and 2014+ monetary financing of fiscal deficits) produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse that manifests as ≥7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer.
not public yet
run pending
1999-2024
Venezuela's post-1999 GDP per capita trajectory diverges strongly negatively from a commodity-exporter Latin American donor pool (Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Brazil) matched on pre-1999 outcome levels.
not public yet
run pending
+1
1996-2023
Post-2008 global climate finance via private carbon markets (voluntary credits, REDD+) produced marginal real emissions abatement relative to stated volumes, while public-funded mandates delivered measurable reductions.
not public yet
run pending
+4
2008-2023
Wealth taxes produce a three-order causal chain.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2024
Forced-saving welfare architectures (Singapore CPF since 1955, Chile AFP since 1981, Australia Superannuation Guarantee since 1992) and universal-transfer architectures (Nordic model, UK NHS) produce different profiles on two dimensions: (a) retirement-income adequacy for the median retiree, and (b) long-run fiscal sustainability as measured by projected net liabilities of the pension / welfare state over 30+ year horizons.
not public yet
run pending
+10
1990-2023
Mexico's 2023 Pensión Universal expansion (DOF January 2023, raising the universal-noncontributory pension to all adults 65+ at twice the previous level under AMLO's constitutional amendment) raised social-spending share of GDP by at least 1 percentage point of GDP within two fiscal years, with no offsetting domestic-revenue measure, generating a measurable structural-fiscal-balance deterioration visible in IMF Article IV monitoring and BdM stability reports.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2026
Australia's Cashless Debit Card trial (2016-2022, restricting 80% of welfare payments to non-cash spending in trial regions Ceduna, East Kimberley, Goldfields, Bundaberg/Hervey Bay) did not produce measurable reductions in alcohol-related hospitalisation, gambling spend, or domestic-violence reporting relative to a synthetic-control of comparable remote/rural regions, supporting the empirical critique that paternalistic conditionality on welfare delivery has limited demonstrable outcome effects against its stated objectives.
not public yet
run pending
2010-2022
PRWORA 1996 (TANF block-grant + work requirements) raised single-mother labour-force participation by at least 5 percentage points relative to single-childless-women within five years of state TANF adoption, holding constant EITC expansion and the late-1990s tight labour market.
not public yet
run pending
1990-2005
Finland's 2017-2018 Basic Income Experiment (2000 randomised unemployed-benefit recipients receiving EUR 560/month unconditional cash for 24 months versus matched-control unemployed-benefit recipients) produced a small positive employment effect — ATT of less than 6 days additional employment in year 2 — and a measurable improvement in self-reported wellbeing and trust-in-government, providing the cleanest RCT evidence available for unconditional-basic-income labour-supply effects in a high-welfare- state institutional context.
not public yet
run pending
2015-2020
Hong Kong's HKD 10,000 universal cash payout to permanent residents (announced February 2020, disbursed June-July 2020, total cost approximately HKD 71B) functioned as a near-universal-basic- income natural experiment with 7M+ recipients in a high-administrative-capacity environment, providing a clean test of universal-cash macro-stimulus effects on household consumption and a comparison case for less-targeted relief.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2022
India's combined rural transfer architecture — MGNREGA (2006 employment guarantee, 100 days at state-minimum-wage) and PM-KISAN (2019 unconditional cash transfer of INR 6000/year to small farmers) — produced complementary rural-poverty effects, with MGNREGA delivering wage-floor and consumption- smoothing channels and PM-KISAN delivering targeted-input-finance channel, identified off staggered rollout cohorts and combined-treatment intensity in the panel of Indian states 2006-2024.
not public yet
run pending
2002-2024
Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP, scaled-up from 2013 pilot to full-arm coverage in four northern arid-land counties 2015, with shock-responsive scale-up triggered by NDMA drought-monitor thresholds 2017 and 2022) demonstrably smoothed consumption among recipient households during drought episodes by at least 15 percentage points relative to non-recipient households in eligibility-cliff comparison areas, providing causal evidence that mobile-money-delivered shock-responsive transfers outperform conventional emergency-aid in ASAL contexts.
not public yet
run pending
2010-2024
The Stockton SEED guaranteed-income trial (Feb 2019 - Jan 2021, 125 randomised treated recipients receiving USD 500/month for 24 months in low-income Stockton CA neighbourhoods) produced a measurable full-time-employment-rate increase of approximately 12 percentage points in the treated group versus control, as reported in the West-Castro 2021 evaluation, providing US-context RCT evidence that unconditional-cash floors can complement rather than substitute for labour-market participation among working-age low-income recipients.
not public yet
run pending
2018-2022
Cumulative US EITC expansions 1975-2020 (1975 introduction, 1986 TRA expansion, 1990/1993 OBRA expansions, 2009 ARRA expansion, 2017 TCJA marginal changes) produced a long-run reduction in single-mother poverty rate of at least 6 percentage points and an increase in single-mother labour- force participation of at least 4 percentage points relative to a counterfactual without the cumulative expansions, identified off state-EITC-supplement variation in panel-FE design and the major-expansion event-windows.
not public yet
run pending
1970-2020
Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
not public yet
run pending
1950-1989
Across OECD economies 2020-2024, sector-level work-from-home adoption is uncorrelated or weakly positively correlated with sector-level labour-productivity growth — i.e.
not public yet
run pending
+12
2019-2024
Across country-years, higher WGI Regulatory Quality predicts higher average FDI net inflows as a share of GDP over the next three years after fixed effects and macro controls.
not public yet
run pending
+53
1996-2021
Resident patent applications predict stronger high-tech export performance in later country-year panels, even after accounting for non-resident patenting and export scale.
not public yet
run pending
+24
1980-2021
More concentrated export baskets predict weaker high-tech export performance.
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run pending
+33
1988-2023
Higher applied tariff rates predict lower imported product variety.
not public yet
run pending
+33
1988-2023
Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).
not public yet
run pending
1998-2009
Zimbabwean land reform 2000-2008 redistributed ownership to previously excluded populations; the inflation crisis was driven by external sanctions and fiscal-military pressures, not by the redistributive policy itself.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2009
Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.
not public yet
run pending
1995-2009
Across OECD economies 1995-2021, the cumulative fiscal multiplier on real output at the zero lower bound (defined as quarters with policy rate ≤ 0.50% AND inflation expectations anchored below 2.5%) exceeds 1.2 at horizon h=8 quarters, while the comparable normal-regime multiplier is below 0.7.
not public yet
run pending
+15
1995-2021