IESET.
Hypotheses·institutional quality·privatisation_transition_tfp_panel

In post-communist transition-economy panels 1990-2015, countries that implemented rapid mass-privatisation programmes (voucher privatisation, direct sales to insiders, and rapid SOE liquidation) experienced faster TFP growth recovery in the decade following reform than countries that pursued gradual or partial state-retention strategies, controlling for initial income, EU accession candidacy, and institutional quality.

The directional claim is that mass-privatisation adoption is associated with at least 0.5 percentage points higher annual TFP growth over the post- reform decade.

SUPPORTEDengine/runs/privatisation_transition_tfp_panel

SUPPORTED — coef=+0.1772 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0582

confidence cueThis is a clear pass for the claim as written. It still applies only to this sample, period, and method.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The data clearly moved in the predicted direction. coef=+0.1772 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0582

why it matters

This matters because institutional quality claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 29 country or place units from 1990 to 2015, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Mass privatisation indicator
  • Eu accession candidate
What we checked
  • Productivity growth annual
  • Labour productivity growth
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/privatisation_transition_tfp_panel
1007550250199020032015ESTLVALTUPOLCZESVKHUN
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show tfp_growth_annual across 29 sampled countries over 1990–2015.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for privatisation_transition_tfp_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/privatisation_transition_tfp_panel/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

5 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Degrowth / Ecological Macroeconomicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarket Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarxian Political Economywins if MIXEDpartial/no-callModern Monetary Theorywins if MIXEDpartial/no-callNew Keynesian (mainstream synthesis)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:24Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

In post-communist transition-economy panels 1990-2015, countries that implemented rapid mass-privatisation programmes (voucher privatisation, direct sales to insiders, and rapid SOE liquidation) experienced faster TFP growth recovery in the decade following reform than countries that pursued gradual or partial state-retention strategies, controlling for initial income, EU accession candidacy, and institutional quality. The directional claim is that mass-privatisation adoption is associated with at least 0.5 percentage points higher annual TFP growth over the post- reform decade.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if β1 (mass privatisation) is positive and significant at p<0.10 for TFP growth and larger than the EU-candidacy coefficient. PARTIAL if positive and significant but smaller than EU candidacy (institutional anchor dominates ownership reform). REFUTED if β1 is negative and significant at p<0.10. INFORMATIVE: excluding Russia should not eliminate the positive sign; if it does, the result is driven by one dominant case.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_mass_privatisation_tfp_transition
threshold: β_mass_priv (TFP growth) > 0 at p<=0.10  AND β_mass_priv > β_EU_candidate  AND Ex-Russia robustness retains positive sign.

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
29 countries · 1990 – 2015
Evidence type
associational

Two-way FE panel with staggered adoption: TFP_growth = β0 + β1*mass_priv + β2*EU_candidate + controls + FE. Robustness: (1) exclude Russia (dominant mass-privatisation case); (2) use synthetic control for each privatiser vs matched gradualist; (3) control for war/conflict exposure; (4) separate voucher privatisation from direct sales; (5) use 5-year non-overlapping averages to reduce noise.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
tfp_growth_annual
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
log_diff_annual
labour_productivity_growth
outcome
pwt:rgdpo_per_emptier 3
log_diff_annual
mass_privatisation_indicator
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for EST from 1993; LVA from 1994; LTU from 1995; CZE from 1992; SVK from 1992; POL from 1994; HUN from 199tier 5
indicator
eu_accession_candidate
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for POL from 1994; CZE from 1996; SVK from 1995; HUN from 1994; SVN from 1996; EST from 1995; LVA from 199tier 5
indicator
log_initial_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
institutional_quality
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
inflation_rate
control
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level
investment_share_gdp
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZStier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — privatisation_transition_tfp_panel

Verdict: SUPPORTED — coef=+0.1772 (sign matches claim +), p=0.0582

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In post-communist transition-economy panels 1990-2015, countries that implemented rapid mass-privatisation programmes (voucher privatisation, direct sales to insiders, and rapid SOE liquidation) experienced faster TFP growth recovery in the decade following reform than countries that pursued gradual or partial state-retention strategies, controlling for initial income, EU accession candidacy, and institutional quality. The directional claim is that mass-privatisation adoption is associated with at least 0.5 percentage points higher annual TFP growth over the post- reform decade.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if β1 (mass privatisation) is positive and significant at p<0.10 for TFP growth and larger than the EU-candidacy coefficient. PARTIAL if positive and significant but smaller than EU candidacy (institutional anchor dominates ownership reform). REFUTED if β1 is negative and significant at p<0.10. INFORMATIVE: excluding Russia should not eliminate the positive sign; if it does, the result is driven by one dominant case.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_mass_privatisation_tfp_transition

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +0.1772
  • Std error: 0.09324
  • p-value: 0.0582
  • Observations: 399, countries: 18
  • Within R²: 0.669
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • pwt:rtfpna → tfp_growth_annual (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • pwt:rgdpo_per_emp → labour_productivity_growth (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=9529)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for EST from 1993; LVA from 1994; LTU from 1995; CZE from 1992; SVK from 1992; POL from 1994; HUN from 1995; RUS from 1992; UKR from 1994; KAZ from 1993; GEO from 1994; ARM from 1994; ALB from 1995 → mass_privatisation_indicator (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=754)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for POL from 1994; CZE from 1996; SVK from 1995; HUN from 1994; SVN from 1996; EST from 1995; LVA from 1995; LTU from 1995; BGR from 1995; ROU from 1995; HRV from 1996 → eu_accession_candidate (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=754)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_initial_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • wgi:RL.EST → institutional_quality (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → inflation_rate (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7550)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS → investment_share_gdp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9870)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:24+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.