IESET.
Hypotheses·energy·china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth

Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefNot enough data

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether china state-owned firms strategic sector indicator is actually linked to better or worse log manufacturing value added real from 1990 to 2019.

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. treatment 'china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

why it matters

This matters because energy claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 9 country or place units from 1990 to 2019, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • China state-owned firms strategic sector indicator
  • Privatisation intensity
What we checked
  • Log manufacturing value added real
  • Industrial value added share income
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

3 input datasets, 2 unresolved missing series, provenance status: incomplete.

Results

engine/runs/china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth
1007550250199020052019CHNPOLCZEHUNSVKRUSUKR
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show log_manufacturing_value_added_real across 9 sampled countries over 1990–2019.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

8 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Degrowth / Ecological Macroeconomicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callDemocratic Socialism (Bernsteinian revisionism + modern)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callEco-Socialism / Red-Greenwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callNew Institutional Economicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarket Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callMarxism-Leninism (central-planning implementation)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callPost-Keynesianwins if MIXEDpartial/no-callSocial Democraticwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit bae09ab · 2026-04-29T22:09:42Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:03Z

Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

The hypothesis is falsified if the estimated coefficient on the treatment variable is not negative at conventional significance (p < 0.05) in the preregistered panel specification with country and year fixed effects.

formal test & threshold
test:      china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth_placeholder_test

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
9 countries · 1990 – 2019
Evidence type
associational

Cross-country panel-FE on log manufacturing VA (and industrial share) over 1990-2019, with CHN-strategic-sector indicator as treatment and EBRD transition / privatisation intensity as competing channel. Country and year FE absorb level differences and global cycle. Caveat: CHN single treated unit limits identification — output growth differential may reflect WTO accession + rural-urban migration rather than ownership form.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_manufacturing_value_added_real
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.KDtier 2
log
industrial_value_added_share_gdp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for CHN; 0 for CEE/post-Soviet privatised peers (POL, CZE, HUN, SVK, RUS, UKR, ROU, BGR). Strategic-sectortier 5
indicator
privatisation_intensity
treatment
ebrd:transition_indicatorstier 2
level
log_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
log_population
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTLtier 2
log

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.
  • Falsification rule: The hypothesis is falsified if the estimated coefficient on the treatment variable is not negative at conventional significance (p < 0.05) in the preregistered panel specification with country and year fixed effects.
  • Falsification test: china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growth_placeholder_test

Estimate

  • Error: treatment 'china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.KD → log_manufacturing_value_added_real (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8624)
  • world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.TOTL.ZS → industrial_value_added_share_gdp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10903)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for CHN; 0 for CEE/post-Soviet privatised peers (POL, CZE, HUN, SVK, RUS, UKR, ROU, BGR). Strategic-sector subset = ISIC C24 (basic metals) + D35 (electricity, gas) + J61 (telecoms) where disaggregated data permit. → china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=270)
  • ebrd:transition_indicators → privatisation_intensity (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=270)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTL → log_population (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=14447)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:03+00:00

Notes

Maps the marxist-leninist + market-socialist schools' SOE-strategic-sector outperformance claim to a CHN vs CEE/post-Soviet cross-country comparison. Estimator and prior set; full pre-registration awaits steelman + human sign-off.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.