IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·post_soviet_transition_institutional_variation

Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.

PARTIALengine/runs/post_soviet_transition_institutional_variation

PARTIAL — coef=-3.693e-10, p=0.719 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-3.693e-10, p=0.719 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 20 country or place units from 1991 to 2019, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Rule of law
  • Control of corruption
What we checked
  • Log income pc cost-of-living adjusted
  • Maddison real income pc
  • Productivity index
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

9 input datasets, 1 unresolved missing series, provenance status: incomplete.

Results

engine/runs/post_soviet_transition_institutional_variation
1007550250199120052019ESTLVALTUPOLCZESVKHUN
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show log_gdp_pc_ppp across 20 sampled countries over 1991–2019.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for post_soviet_transition_institutional_variation. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/post_soviet_transition_institutional_variation/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

1 school list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

New Institutional Economicswins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:59Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

PRIMARY: SUPPORTED if the coefficient on WGI rule_of_law in the country-year panel FE is positive at p < 0.10. REFUTED if the coefficient is negative at p < 0.10. PARTIAL if the coefficient is directionally positive but not statistically distinguishable from zero at p < 0.10, or if the sign is negative but imprecise. METHOD_VALID: at least 30 country-year observations after overlap filtering and at least 8 countries with usable outcome and rule-of-law data.

formal test & threshold
test:      Panel FE of transition-cohort log GDP per capita PPP on WGI rule_of_law, country and year FE, 1996-2019; primary threshold is coefficient > 0 at p<0.10.
threshold: PRIMARY: beta(rule_of_law) > 0 and p < 0.10; REFUTE: beta(rule_of_law) < 0 and p < 0.10.

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
20 countries · 1991 – 2019
Evidence type
associational

Post-Soviet country panel 1991-2023 of real GDP per capita on transition-era institutional-quality scores (EBRD transition indicators, World Governance Indicators rule-of-law, Polity IV democracy). Tests whether institutional-quality differences explain the cross-country spread in transition-cohort outcomes.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_gdp_pc_ppp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
maddison_real_gdp_pc
outcome
maddison:gdppc_ppptier 3
log
tfp_index
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
level
rule_of_law
treatment
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level
control_of_corruption
treatment
wgi:CC.ESTtier 4
level
polity_score
treatment
polity5:polity2tier 4
level
vdem_liberal_democracy
treatment
vdem:v2x_libdemtier 4
level
log_initial_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
log_population
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTLtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — post_soviet_transition_institutional_variation

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-3.693e-10, p=0.719 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Higher transition-era rule-of-law scores are positively associated with higher log GDP per capita within the post-Soviet and Eastern European transition cohort after country and year fixed effects; Estonia/Poland-style inclusive-institution build-out should outperform partial extraction persistence cases such as Russia and Ukraine.
  • Falsification rule: PRIMARY: SUPPORTED if the coefficient on WGI rule_of_law in the country-year panel FE is positive at p < 0.10. REFUTED if the coefficient is negative at p < 0.10. PARTIAL if the coefficient is directionally positive but not statistically distinguishable from zero at p < 0.10, or if the sign is negative but imprecise. METHOD_VALID: at least 30 country-year observations after overlap filtering and at least 8 countries with usable outcome and rule-of-law data.
  • Falsification test: Panel FE of transition-cohort log GDP per capita PPP on WGI rule_of_law, country and year FE, 1996-2019; primary threshold is coefficient > 0 at p<0.10.

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -3.693e-10
  • Std error: 1.025e-09
  • p-value: 0.719
  • Observations: 357, countries: 17
  • Within R²: 1
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_gdp_pc_ppp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • maddison:gdppc_ppp → maddison_real_gdp_pc (outcome, publisher=maddison, n=19706)
  • pwt:rtfpna → tfp_index (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • wgi:RL.EST → rule_of_law (treatment, publisher=wgi, n=5296)
  • wgi:CC.EST → control_of_corruption (treatment, publisher=wgi, n=5201)
  • polity5:polity2 → polity_score (treatment, publisher=polity5, n=17307)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_initial_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTL → log_population (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=14447)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)

Variables missing data

  • vdem:v2x_libdem (treatment, name=vdem_liberal_democracy) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:59+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Seeded from an institutionalist claim that post-1991 transition outcomes vary sharply with pre-1991 and transition-era institutional quality, with Estonia/Poland (high inclusive-institution build-out) outperforming Russia/Ukraine. Cross-country panel of post-Soviet transition cohort; human review needed for the institutional-quality scoring choice.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.