IESET.
Hypotheses·distribution·labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarity

Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.

PARTIALengine/runs/labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarity

PARTIAL — coef=-7.366e+04, p=0.927 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether employment protection rules overall index is actually linked to better or worse inequality disposable income from 1998 to 2015.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-7.366e+04, p=0.927 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Distributional claims often sound morally clear but are empirically complex. This test asks whether the proposed channel explains real differences across places.

how the test works

It compares 15 country or place units from 1998 to 2015, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Employment protection rules overall index
  • Collective bargaining coverage
What we checked
  • Inequality disposable income
  • Top 10 share
  • Long term unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarity
1007550250199820072015DEUGBRFRAITAESPNLDSWE
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show gini_disposable_income across 15 sampled countries over 1998–2015.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarity. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarity/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

1 school list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Ordoliberalism (Freiburg School)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:49:14Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

The hypothesis is considered falsified if the pre-registered empirical test shows the opposite direction of the claim at conventional significance (p > 0.10), or if the primary outcome measure moves less than 10% in the claimed direction across the sample. Exact thresholds will be pinned in the variables and estimator blocks when this stub is promoted from draft.

formal test & threshold
test:      Panel FE on DEU+GBR (1998-2015) regressing Gini on labour-reform intensity interacted with collective-bargaining-coverage; country+year FE, country-clustered SEs. Refute if interaction term sign-flipped at p<0.10 or |effect|<10% of pre-period Gini.

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
15 countries · 1998 – 2015
Evidence type
associational

Cross-country OECD panel testing interaction between labour-market reform intensity and pre-existing collective-bargaining / vocational-training institutions on inequality outcomes. Country and year FE; clustering by country.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
gini_disposable_income
outcome
oecd:OECD.WISE.INEtier 2
level
top_10_share
outcome
wid:wid_alltier 3
level
long_term_unemployment_rate
outcome
oecd:OECD.ELS.EMPtier 2
level
epl_overall_index
treatment
oecd:OECD.ELS.EMPtier 2
level
collective_bargaining_coverage
treatment
oecd:OECD.ELS.SAEtier 2
level
union_density
treatment
oecd:OECD.ELS.SAEtier 2
level
gdp_per_capita_ppp
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
labour_share
control
pwt:labshtier 3
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — labour_market_reform_institutional_complementarity

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-7.366e+04, p=0.927 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Germany's Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms worked within the Ordoliberal framework precisely because they preserved collective-bargaining institutions and vocational-training architecture; the same reforms imposed on UK-style labour markets produced larger inequality increases.
  • Falsification rule: The hypothesis is considered falsified if the pre-registered empirical test shows the opposite direction of the claim at conventional significance (p > 0.10), or if the primary outcome measure moves less than 10% in the claimed direction across the sample. Exact thresholds will be pinned in the variables and estimator blocks when this stub is promoted from draft.
  • Falsification test: Panel FE on DEU+GBR (1998-2015) regressing Gini on labour-reform intensity interacted with collective-bargaining-coverage; country+year FE, country-clustered SEs. Refute if interaction term sign-flipped at p<0.10 or |effect|<10% of pre-period Gini.

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -7.366e+04
  • Std error: 8.048e+05
  • p-value: 0.927
  • Observations: 215, countries: 15
  • Within R²: 0.027
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • oecd:OECD.WISE.INE,DSD_IDD@DF_IDD,1.0 → gini_disposable_income (outcome, publisher=oecd, n=902)
  • wid:wid_all → top_10_share (outcome, publisher=wid, n=9000)
  • oecd:OECD.ELS.EMP,DSD_EPL_OV@DF_EPL_OV,1.0 → epl_overall_index (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1123)
  • oecd:OECD.ELS.SAE,DSD_TU@DF_CBC,1.0 → collective_bargaining_coverage (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1076)
  • oecd:OECD.ELS.SAE,DSD_TU@DF_TUD,1.0 → union_density (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1825)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → gdp_per_capita_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • pwt:labsh → labour_share (controls, publisher=pwt, n=7970)

Variables missing data

  • oecd:OECD.ELS.EMP,DSD_LMS@DF_LMS_DURATION,1.0 (outcome, name=long_term_unemployment_rate) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:49:14+00:00

Notes

Maps the ordoliberal school's institutional-complementarity claim (Hartz reforms preserved bargaining + training, UK-style deregulation did not) to a DEU vs GBR panel. Estimator and prior set; full pre-registration awaits steelman + human sign-off.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.