IESET.
Hypotheses·welfare architecture·unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response_panel

In OECD and high-income country panels from 1990 to 2023, larger unconditional cash-transfer intensity for working-age households predicts lower average hours worked and lower labour-force participation than equally costly work-conditioned or in-kind support.

The directional claim is that a 1 percentage-point-of-GDP increase in unconditional working-age cash-transfer intensity is associated with a negative hours-worked coefficient and at least a 0.4 percentage-point lower labour-force-participation rate, after controlling for unemployment, income, age structure, and total social spending.

PARTIALengine/runs/unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response_panel

PARTIAL — coef=-2.071e-07, p=0.15 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-2.071e-07, p=0.15 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

This matters because welfare architecture claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 1990 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Unconditional working age cash transfers income
  • Work conditioned transfer intensity
What we checked
  • Average annual hours worked
  • Labour force participation rate
  • Employment to population ratio
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response_panel
1007550250199020072023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show average_annual_hours_worked across 38 sampled countries over 1990–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:55:01Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

In OECD and high-income country panels from 1990 to 2023, larger unconditional cash-transfer intensity for working-age households predicts lower average hours worked and lower labour-force participation than equally costly work-conditioned or in-kind support. The directional claim is that a 1 percentage-point-of-GDP increase in unconditional working-age cash-transfer intensity is associated with a negative hours-worked coefficient and at least a 0.4 percentage-point lower labour-force-participation rate, after controlling for unemployment, income, age structure, and total social spending.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Refuted if unconditional working-age cash-transfer intensity has a non-negative coefficient on hours and labour-force participation, or if work-conditioned transfers show equal or larger negative labour-supply coefficients at the same spending level. Poverty-reduction gains are reported separately and do not by themselves support or refute the labour-supply claim.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response
threshold: beta_unconditional_cash_lfp_1pp_gdp <= -0.4pp and beta_unconditional_cash_hours < 0

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 1990 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Estimate two-way FE with unconditional cash intensity and work-conditioned transfer intensity jointly, holding total social spending constant. Robustness checks exclude disability-related cash transfers, use five-year averages, and separate extensive-margin LFP from intensive-margin hours.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
average_annual_hours_worked
outcome
oecd:DSD_LFS_BStier 2
level
labour_force_participation_rate
outcome
ilostat:EAP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
employment_to_population_ratio
outcome
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
unconditional_working_age_cash_transfers_gdp
treatment
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
work_conditioned_transfer_intensity
treatment
oecd:TaxBEN_in_work_benefit_67awtier 2
level_pct_of_gross_wage
total_social_spending_gdp
control
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
unemployment_rate
control
ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
log_real_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
working_age_population_share
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZStier 2
level_pct

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response_panel

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-2.071e-07, p=0.15 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In OECD and high-income country panels from 1990 to 2023, larger unconditional cash-transfer intensity for working-age households predicts lower average hours worked and lower labour-force participation than equally costly work-conditioned or in-kind support. The directional claim is that a 1 percentage-point-of-GDP increase in unconditional working-age cash-transfer intensity is associated with a negative hours-worked coefficient and at least a 0.4 percentage-point lower labour-force-participation rate, after controlling for unemployment, income, age structure, and total social spending.
  • Falsification rule: Refuted if unconditional working-age cash-transfer intensity has a non-negative coefficient on hours and labour-force participation, or if work-conditioned transfers show equal or larger negative labour-supply coefficients at the same spending level. Poverty-reduction gains are reported separately and do not by themselves support or refute the labour-supply claim.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_unconditional_transfer_work_hours_response

Estimate

  • Method: statsmodels OLS FE fallback (linearmodels failed: exog does not have full column rank. If you wish to proceed with model estimation irrespective of the numerical accuracy of coefficient estimates, you can set check_rank=False.)
  • Coefficient (treatment): -2.071e-07
  • Std error: 1.439e-07
  • p-value: 0.15
  • Observations: 1020, countries: 32
  • Within R²: 0.942
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • ilostat:EAP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → labour_force_participation_rate (outcome, publisher=ilostat, n=10464)
  • ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → employment_to_population_ratio (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → unconditional_working_age_cash_transfers_gdp (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → total_social_spending_gdp (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → unemployment_rate (controls, publisher=ilostat, n=10188)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_real_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS → working_age_population_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16965)

Variables missing data

  • oecd:DSD_LFS_BS@DF_HRS (outcome, name=average_annual_hours_worked) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:TaxBEN_in_work_benefit_67aw (treatment, name=work_conditioned_transfer_intensity) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:55:01+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Candidate Worker C spec. The hypothesis challenges claims that unconditional redistribution is labour-supply neutral, but it is designed so null or positive labour-supply findings overturn the claim.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.