IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost

Sectoral collective-bargaining extension to non-signatory firms predicts higher unemployment in small firms and reduced entry.

PARTIALengine/runs/collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost

PARTIAL — coef=-5.758e-16, p=7.77e-06; effect magnitude effectively zero

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether treatment var is actually linked to better or worse outcome var from 1990 to 2023.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-5.758e-16, p=7.77e-06; effect magnitude effectively zero

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 1990 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Treatment var
What we checked
  • Outcome var
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost
1007550250199020072023GLOBAL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show outcome_var across 1 sampled countries over 1990–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 056ee96 · 2026-05-04T10:44:59Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:33Z

Sectoral collective-bargaining extension to non-signatory firms predicts higher unemployment in small firms and reduced entry.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if coefficient > 0 and p < 0.10

formal test & threshold
test:      collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost_placeholder_test

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
1 countries · 1990 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
outcome_var
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
treatment_var
treatment
fraser_efw:summary_indextier 4
level
log_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-5.758e-16, p=7.77e-06; effect magnitude effectively zero

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Sectoral collective-bargaining extension to non-signatory firms predicts higher unemployment in small firms and reduced entry.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if coefficient > 0 and p < 0.10
  • Falsification test: collective_bargaining_extension_non_signatory_cost_placeholder_test

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -5.758e-16
  • Std error: 1.286e-16
  • p-value: 7.77e-06
  • Observations: 3446, countries: 138
  • Within R²: 1
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → outcome_var (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • fraser_efw:summary_index → treatment_var (treatment, publisher=fraser_efw, n=4557)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:33+00:00

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.