Pre-registration
In country-year panels since 1996, higher tax revenue as a share of GDP predicts lower private investment as a share of GDP after country and year fixed effects, income-level controls, demographics, trade openness, and rule-of-law controls. The mechanism tested is not that every tax-funded public good is harmful, but that redistribution financed by broad tax extraction reduces retained earnings, expected after-tax returns, and investable cash flow relative to a market-led growth path.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Supported if the coefficient on tax_revenue_share is negative at p <= 0.10 in the baseline and remains negative in the three-year lag specification. Refuted if the baseline coefficient is positive at p <= 0.10, or if the lag specification is positive at p <= 0.10. Otherwise the result is partial or inconclusive.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_tax_revenue_private_investment_drag threshold: [object Object]
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 53 countries · 1996 – 2023
- Evidence type
- associational
Two-way fixed-effects panel. Report the contemporaneous coefficient and a three-year lag specification to reduce reverse-causality from recessions raising tax ratios mechanically. The result is associational unless a later tax reform event-study is registered.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
private_investment_share outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FPRV.ZStier 2 | level |
tax_revenue_share treatment | world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2 | level |
log_gdp_per_capita_ppp control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2 | log |
population_growth control | world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.GROWtier 2 | level |
trade_openness control | world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
rule_of_law control | wgi:RL.ESTtier 4 | level |
inflation control | world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — redistribution_tax_private_investment_drag_panel
Verdict: REFUTED — coef=+0.5889 (sign opposite claim -), p=0.00012
Pre-registration
- Claim: In country-year panels since 1996, higher tax revenue as a share of GDP predicts lower private investment as a share of GDP after country and year fixed effects, income-level controls, demographics, trade openness, and rule-of-law controls. The mechanism tested is not that every tax-funded public good is harmful, but that redistribution financed by broad tax extraction reduces retained earnings, expected after-tax returns, and investable cash flow relative to a market-led growth path.
- Falsification rule: Supported if the coefficient on tax_revenue_share is negative at p <= 0.10 in the baseline and remains negative in the three-year lag specification. Refuted if the baseline coefficient is positive at p <= 0.10, or if the lag specification is positive at p <= 0.10. Otherwise the result is partial or inconclusive.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_tax_revenue_private_investment_drag
Estimate
- Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
- Coefficient (treatment): +0.5889
- Std error: 0.15
- p-value: 0.00012
- Observations: 241, countries: 12
- Within R²: 0.0337
- Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
- Clustering: country
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FPRV.ZS→ private_investment_share (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=3304)world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS→ tax_revenue_share (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4787)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD→ log_gdp_per_capita_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.GROW→ population_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16672)world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS→ trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)wgi:RL.EST→ rule_of_law (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG→ inflation (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7550)
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:33+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Mechanism-targeted test for redistribution-heavy claims: it asks whether the financing side of redistribution reduces private investment before making any welfare claim about the spending side.