IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel

Active labour-market spending is less effective at reducing low-education unemployment when employment protection legislation is stricter.

The discriminating claim is an ALMP x EPL interaction, not a simple claim that either policy is always good or always bad.

PARTIALengine/runs/oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel

PARTIAL — coef=+1.789, p=0.458 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether almp spending income is actually linked to better or worse low education unemployment from 1996 to 2019.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=+1.789, p=0.458 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 42 country or place units from 1996 to 2019, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Almp spending income
  • Employment protection rules
What we checked
  • Low education unemployment
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel
1007550250199620082019AUSAUTBELBGRCANCHECHL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show low_education_unemployment across 42 sampled countries over 1996–2019.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:47Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Active labour-market spending is less effective at reducing low-education unemployment when employment protection legislation is stricter. The discriminating claim is an ALMP x EPL interaction, not a simple claim that either policy is always good or always bad.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED only if the ALMP x EPL interaction is positive at p<=0.10, with a negative ALMP main effect in the low-EPL part of the distribution. REFUTED if the interaction is negative at p<=0.10.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
42 countries · 1996 – 2019
Evidence type
associational

Primary estimand is almp_spending_gdp x epl. A positive coefficient means stricter EPL weakens the unemployment-reducing association of ALMP spending.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
low_education_unemployment
outcome
oecd:DSD_LMS_low_education_unemployment_ratetier 2
level
almp_spending_gdp
treatment
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level
epl
treatment
oecd:EPL_OVtier 2
level
gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level
log_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
government_effectiveness
control
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=+1.789, p=0.458 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Active labour-market spending is less effective at reducing low-education unemployment when employment protection legislation is stricter. The discriminating claim is an ALMP x EPL interaction, not a simple claim that either policy is always good or always bad.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED only if the ALMP x EPL interaction is positive at p<=0.10, with a negative ALMP main effect in the low-EPL part of the distribution. REFUTED if the interaction is negative at p<=0.10.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_oecd_almp_epl_low_education_unemployment_interaction_panel

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +1.789
  • Std error: 2.404
  • p-value: 0.458
  • Observations: 345, countries: 19
  • Within R²: 0.215
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • oecd:DSD_LMS_low_education_unemployment_rate → low_education_unemployment (outcome, publisher=oecd, n=1215)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → almp_spending_gdp (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1404)
  • oecd:EPL_OV → epl (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1123)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • wgi:GE.EST → government_effectiveness (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:47+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

This extends the earlier separate OECD ALMP and EPL low-education unemployment screens into a single complementarity test.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.