IESET.
Hypotheses·institutional quality·judicial_independence_growth_persistence

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, stronger judicial independence — measured by V-Dem judicial-constraints-on-the- executive index, Fraser EFW integrity of the legal system, and the Cingranelli-Richards physical-integrity-rights index — predicts lower investment volatility and stronger long-run GDP per capita growth following major reform episodes.

The pre- registered claim is that countries in the top tercile of judicial independence show at least 1.0 percentage point lower standard deviation of investment/GDP and at least 0.4 percentage points higher annual growth in the 10 years post-reform than countries in the bottom tercile, after controlling for reform type and initial income.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/judicial_independence_growth_persistence

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'major_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. treatment 'major_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

why it matters

This matters because institutional quality claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 55 country or place units from 1980 to 2020, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Judicial independence index
  • Vdem judicial constraints
What we checked
  • Investment income volatility
  • Real income per capita growth post reform
  • Productivity growth post reform
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/judicial_independence_growth_persistence
1007550250198020002020USAGBRDEUFRAITAESPNLD
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show investment_gdp_volatility across 55 sampled countries over 19802020.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for judicial_independence_growth_persistence. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/judicial_independence_growth_persistence/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

9 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:19Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, stronger judicial independence — measured by V-Dem judicial-constraints-on-the- executive index, Fraser EFW integrity of the legal system, and the Cingranelli-Richards physical-integrity-rights index — predicts lower investment volatility and stronger long-run GDP per capita growth following major reform episodes. The pre- registered claim is that countries in the top tercile of judicial independence show at least 1.0 percentage point lower standard deviation of investment/GDP and at least 0.4 percentage points higher annual growth in the 10 years post-reform than countries in the bottom tercile, after controlling for reform type and initial income.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if (a) the interaction coefficient is not positive and significant at p<0.05 on post-reform growth, OR (b) the top-tercile vs bottom-tercile investment-volatility gap is below 0.5 pp of GDP standard deviation, OR (c) the marginal effect of reform is positive and significant even at low judicial independence (no complementarity). An "institutions don't matter for reform success" reading wins if (c) holds.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_reform_judicial_independence_interaction
threshold: panel_FE_beta(reform × judicial_independence) > 0 at p<0.05 AND top_tercile_investment_volatility_gap >= 0.50 pp_of_gdp_sd AND marginal_effect_reform_at_low_judicial_independence NOT > 0 at p<0.10

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
55 countries · 19802020
Evidence type
associational

Panel FE on reform-episode sub-sample with interaction: reform_episode × judicial_independence. Tercile comparison as robustness. Event-study around identified reform episodes with judicial independence as moderator. Robustness: exclude post-Soviet transitions; exclude China; use only Fraser EFW legal-integrity measure.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
investment_gdp_volatility
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZStier 2
rolling_sd_10yr
real_gdp_per_capita_growth_post_reform
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2
mean_post_reform_10yr
tfp_growth_post_reform
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
log_diff_post_reform_10yr
judicial_independence_index
treatment
constructed:0.5×vdem:v2x_jucon + 0.3×fraser_efw:legal_integrity + 0.2×vdem:v2xcl_roltier 5
level
vdem_judicial_constraints
treatment
vdem:v2x_jucontier 4
level
major_reform_episode
treatment
constructed:reform_episodes_from_fraser_efw_changestier 5
indicator
log_initial_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
human_capital_index
control
pwt:hctier 3
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
government_consumption_share
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZStier 2
level
political_stability
control
wgi:PV.ESTtier 4
level

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — judicial_independence_growth_persistence

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'major_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, stronger judicial independence — measured by V-Dem judicial-constraints-on-the- executive index, Fraser EFW integrity of the legal system, and the Cingranelli-Richards physical-integrity-rights index — predicts lower investment volatility and stronger long-run GDP per capita growth following major reform episodes. The pre- registered claim is that countries in the top tercile of judicial independence show at least 1.0 percentage point lower standard deviation of investment/GDP and at least 0.4 percentage points higher annual growth in the 10 years post-reform than countries in the bottom tercile, after controlling for reform type and initial income.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) the interaction coefficient is not positive and significant at p<0.05 on post-reform growth, OR (b) the top-tercile vs bottom-tercile investment-volatility gap is below 0.5 pp of GDP standard deviation, OR (c) the marginal effect of reform is positive and significant even at low judicial independence (no complementarity). An "institutions don't matter for reform success" reading wins if (c) holds.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_reform_judicial_independence_interaction

Estimate

  • Error: treatment 'major_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS → investment_gdp_volatility (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9870)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_per_capita_growth_post_reform (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • pwt:rtfpna → tfp_growth_post_reform (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • constructed: reform_episodes_from_fraser_efw_changes → major_reform_episode (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=2255)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_initial_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • pwt:hc → human_capital_index (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZS → government_consumption_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9133)
  • wgi:PV.EST → political_stability (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5255)

Variables missing data

  • constructed: 0.5×vdem:v2x_jucon + 0.3×fraser_efw:legal_integrity + 0.2×vdem:v2xcl_rol (treatment, name=judicial_independence_index) — vintage not on disk
  • vdem:v2x_jucon (treatment, name=vdem_judicial_constraints) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:19+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

V-Dem judicial-constraints data begins in 1900 but coverage is sparse pre-1980. Fraser EFW legal-integrity begins in 1970. Reform episodes are identified from large Fraser EFW changes and verified against known historical episodes.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.