Pre-registration
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, stronger judicial independence — measured by V-Dem judicial-constraints-on-the- executive index, Fraser EFW integrity of the legal system, and the Cingranelli-Richards physical-integrity-rights index — predicts lower investment volatility and stronger long-run GDP per capita growth following major reform episodes. The pre- registered claim is that countries in the top tercile of judicial independence show at least 1.0 percentage point lower standard deviation of investment/GDP and at least 0.4 percentage points higher annual growth in the 10 years post-reform than countries in the bottom tercile, after controlling for reform type and initial income.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Not supported if (a) the interaction coefficient is not positive and significant at p<0.05 on post-reform growth, OR (b) the top-tercile vs bottom-tercile investment-volatility gap is below 0.5 pp of GDP standard deviation, OR (c) the marginal effect of reform is positive and significant even at low judicial independence (no complementarity). An "institutions don't matter for reform success" reading wins if (c) holds.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_reform_judicial_independence_interaction threshold: panel_FE_beta(reform × judicial_independence) > 0 at p<0.05 AND top_tercile_investment_volatility_gap >= 0.50 pp_of_gdp_sd AND marginal_effect_reform_at_low_judicial_independence NOT > 0 at p<0.10
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 55 countries · 1980 – 2020
- Evidence type
- associational
Panel FE on reform-episode sub-sample with interaction: reform_episode × judicial_independence. Tercile comparison as robustness. Event-study around identified reform episodes with judicial independence as moderator. Robustness: exclude post-Soviet transitions; exclude China; use only Fraser EFW legal-integrity measure.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
investment_gdp_volatility outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZStier 2 | rolling_sd_10yr |
real_gdp_per_capita_growth_post_reform outcome | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2 | mean_post_reform_10yr |
tfp_growth_post_reform outcome | pwt:rtfpnatier 3 | log_diff_post_reform_10yr |
judicial_independence_index treatment | constructed:0.5×vdem:v2x_jucon + 0.3×fraser_efw:legal_integrity + 0.2×vdem:v2xcl_roltier 5 | level |
vdem_judicial_constraints treatment | vdem:v2x_jucontier 4 | level |
major_reform_episode treatment | constructed:reform_episodes_from_fraser_efw_changestier 5 | indicator |
log_initial_gdp_pc control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2 | log |
human_capital_index control | pwt:hctier 3 | level |
trade_openness control | world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
government_consumption_share control | world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZStier 2 | level |
political_stability control | wgi:PV.ESTtier 4 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — judicial_independence_growth_persistence
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'major_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
Pre-registration
- Claim: Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, stronger judicial independence — measured by V-Dem judicial-constraints-on-the- executive index, Fraser EFW integrity of the legal system, and the Cingranelli-Richards physical-integrity-rights index — predicts lower investment volatility and stronger long-run GDP per capita growth following major reform episodes. The pre- registered claim is that countries in the top tercile of judicial independence show at least 1.0 percentage point lower standard deviation of investment/GDP and at least 0.4 percentage points higher annual growth in the 10 years post-reform than countries in the bottom tercile, after controlling for reform type and initial income.
- Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) the interaction coefficient is not positive and significant at p<0.05 on post-reform growth, OR (b) the top-tercile vs bottom-tercile investment-volatility gap is below 0.5 pp of GDP standard deviation, OR (c) the marginal effect of reform is positive and significant even at low judicial independence (no complementarity). An "institutions don't matter for reform success" reading wins if (c) holds.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_reform_judicial_independence_interaction
Estimate
- Error: treatment 'major_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS→ investment_gdp_volatility (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9870)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG→ real_gdp_per_capita_growth_post_reform (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)pwt:rtfpna→ tfp_growth_post_reform (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)constructed: reform_episodes_from_fraser_efw_changes→ major_reform_episode (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=2255)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD→ log_initial_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)pwt:hc→ human_capital_index (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS→ trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZS→ government_consumption_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9133)wgi:PV.EST→ political_stability (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5255)
Variables missing data
constructed: 0.5×vdem:v2x_jucon + 0.3×fraser_efw:legal_integrity + 0.2×vdem:v2xcl_rol(treatment, name=judicial_independence_index) — vintage not on diskvdem:v2x_jucon(treatment, name=vdem_judicial_constraints) — vintage not on disk
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:19+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
V-Dem judicial-constraints data begins in 1900 but coverage is sparse pre-1980. Fraser EFW legal-integrity begins in 1970. Reform episodes are identified from large Fraser EFW changes and verified against known historical episodes.