Derived from the steelman + listed predictions. These are the framework axes this school makes empirical claims about. Any hypothesis testing one of these axes is relevant evidence, whether or not the school explicitly cited that hypothesis ID.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
Late-developing economies face structural constraints — commodity-export dependence, terms-of-trade deterioration, unequal technological starting points — that full market liberalisation cannot address on a policy-relevant timeline. Industrial policy (selective tariffs, export discipline, strategic credit allocation, subsidised R&D) has been the common factor across successful catch-up cases: Japan MITI 1950s-80s, South Korea Park Chung-hee HCI 1970s, Taiwan semiconductor ITRI, China post-1978. The Washington Consensus's prescriptions produced underperformance in Latin America 1980s-90s where applied strictly; Asian developmentalists outperformed the same period. The framework should recognise that market mechanisms require complementary developmental institutions during catch-up phases and distinguish these from steady-state developed-economy contexts.
Historical movements (parties, governments, doctrinal coalitions) whose programmes the framework codes as aligned with, opposed to, or partially aligned with this school's predictions. Alignment is scored by what the movement enacted on each axis, not by the labels it used.
Resource-extractor nationalisation with autonomy loss reduces output.
Park Chung-hee's 1961–1979 heavy-and-chemical-industry drive in Korea produced durable industrial capability (shipbuilding, steel, petrochemicals) that generated export competitiveness by 1985, outperforming Latin American comparators on the same period.
Taiwan's ITRI-led semiconductor strategy (1973 founding, TSMC 1987 spinoff) produced a frontier-capability industry that market-led alternatives did not generate in comparable economies.
China's post-WTO 2001 accession produced export-sector productivity gains that spilled over to domestic value chains, vindicating export-oriented industrial policy combined with selective liberalisation.
Pinochet-era Chile's rapid liberalisation produced an initial growth collapse (1975, 1982) and only recovered after selective state re-engagement; the pure-Chicago prescription underperformed its East Asian contemporaries.
Argentine Menem-era rapid privatisation and opening 1991–2001 produced a decade of growth followed by collapse — underperforming the comparable-size Korean developmental-state path.
India's post-1991 liberalisation accelerated growth but services-heavy rather than manufacturing-led, leaving labour-intensive employment gains smaller than in East Asian industrial-policy peers.
Pre-2010 Ethiopian developmental-state strategy (state-led infrastructure, industrial parks, export-credit allocation) produced the fastest sustained African growth rates, consistent with late-developer industrial-policy theory.
Vietnam's Doi Moi 1986 reforms and subsequent export-oriented strategy replicated the East Asian developmental-state pattern and produced three decades of above-peer-region growth.
Tariff protection for infant industries under export-discipline conditionality (Korea steel, Brazil Embraer) produces capability build-up that free-trade-from-start counterfactuals would not have generated in the same timeframe.
Lula third-term's Marco Fiscal (Lei Complementar 200/2023) demonstrates that structuralist / developmentalist fiscal space — room to expand transfers and industrial policy within a statutory discipline frame — is institutionally compatible with inflation-targeting monetary policy, contrary to the Washington-Consensus view that developmentalist fiscal commitments require abandonment of nominal-anchor discipline.
The v1 decomposition (three channels: WGI gov effectiveness, WGI rule of law, IMF debt/GDP) left 98% of the Nordic-vs-Southern-Europe log GDP/capita gap unexplained
El Salvador's ~98% homicide-rate decline from 103/100k (2015) to 2.4/100k (2023) — with the sharpest decline occurring after the Mar 2022 régimen de excepción and the Jan 2023 CECOT opening — is causally attributable ...
El Salvador's fiscal trajectory under Bukele (2019-2024) shows improvement in the primary balance and stabilisation (or modest decline) in debt-to-GDP after the 2020 COVID spike, achieved via a combination of: (a) the...
Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain
Across the OECD 38, over 2000-latest, larger general government final consumption as a share of GDP is associated with slower growth in real household disposable income per capita, controlling for demographics, initia...
The natural-gas price shock that began in late 2021 and intensified after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 produced a measurable differential contraction of EU industrial output relative to US, UK, and...
Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain
German industrial gross value added, manufacturing output, and real household income diverged materially from a synthetic-Germany donor- pool counterfactual over 2018-2025, and a variance decomposition across candidat...
Precautionary-principle-based regulation in the EU produces a three-order causal chain relative to the US regulatory baseline
The EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals regulation (REACH, entered into force 2007 with phased registration deadlines 2010, 2013, 2018) imposed substantial fixed-cost registration r...
Binding statutory price controls produce a three-order causal chain
The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — reporting phase from October 2023, certificate-purchase phase from 2026 — raises the effective landed cost of EU-manufactured CBAM-covered products (steel, aluminium,...
Binding rent control initiates a three-order causal chain
Argentina has experienced 12 distinct episodes of annual inflation exceeding 50% since 1945, each preceded by a fiscal deficit exceeding 4% of GDP financed via central bank money creation
Monetary finance of fiscal deficits (central-bank balance-sheet expansion directed at sovereign obligations in the absence of independent policy rate adjustment) produces a three-order causal chain
Italy's real GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) was approximately unchanged between 1999 (euro launch) and 2023 — a quarter-century of near-zero cumulative growth, with modest levels of variation aro...
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicara...
India's 1991 balance-of-payments-crisis-driven liberalisation programme (Manmohan Singh's package: rupee devaluation, industrial delicensing, trade liberalisation, FDI opening, partial financial- sector reform) produc...
Chile and Venezuela began the 1999-2023 window at broadly comparable GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars)
Canadian GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) diverged negatively from a donor pool of resource-plus-advanced-anglophone-plus- small-open-developed economies (USA, AUS, NZL, GBR, NOR, CHE) starting aro...
Sectoral nationalisation produces a three-order causal chain
Spain's headline macroeconomic trajectory under the 2018-present PSOE-led governments is NOT uniformly worse than a peer euro-area donor pool, once euro-area-common shocks (COVID 2020-2021, 2022 energy shock, ECB rate...
China's 1978 Deng-era reforms — Household Responsibility System in agriculture, Special Economic Zones, dual-track price liberalisation, Township and Village Enterprise reform, gradual opening to FDI and trade — produ...
Under Financial Secretary John Cowperthwaite (1961–1971) and successors, Hong Kong pursued near-laissez-faire economic policy — no capital controls, no industrial policy, minimal tariffs, low flat taxes, and light lab...
From 2000 to 2023, Asian economies that continued market-oriented institutional reform from a low starting GDP-per-capita base — China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka...
Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved hi...
El Salvador's homicide rate fell from 52 per 100,000 (2019) to 2.4 per 100,000 (2023) — a 95% reduction — under Bukele's Estado de Excepción security crackdown beginning March 2022
Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free t...
Canadian real household disposable income per capita has stagnated or grown more slowly than in comparable resource-plus-anglophone-plus-small- open-developed economies (USA, AUS, NZL, GBR, NOR, CHE) over 2015-2023, o...
Strong employment-protection legislation (EPL) with high union wage-setting coverage and limited at-will dismissal produces a three-order causal chain in Southern European labour markets
Albania's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Albania clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Armenia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Armenia clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Bhutan's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Bhutan clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Cambodia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Cambodia clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Chile's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Chile clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
China's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether China clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Ethiopia's pre-war 2000-2019 development episode combined fast real GDP per-capita growth, large child-mortality reduction, rising life expectancy, and a shift toward services employment. The narrow test is whether at least three of four WDI-based outcome metrics meet their thresholds before the 2020 conflict shock.
Ghana's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Ghana clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
India's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether India clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Indonesia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Indonesia clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Malaysia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Malaysia clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Maldives's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Maldives clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Mongolia's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Mongolia clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Nepal's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Nepal clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Poland's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Poland clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Rwanda's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Rwanda clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
South Korea's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether South Korea clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Spain's 2020 COVID lockdown generated a severe GDP shock and a meaningful unemployment rise, but the unemployment-rate increase was much smaller than the output collapse implied.
Sri Lanka's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Sri Lanka clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Thailand's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Thailand clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Turkey's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Turkey clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
The UK's September 1992 ERM exit was followed by a rapid real-output rebound and disinflation, while unemployment lagged the recovery rather than improving immediately.
Uzbekistan's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Uzbekistan clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
Vietnam's post-Doi Moi development path from 1990 to 2023 combined rapid real income growth, human-development gains, trade integration, and a labour-market shift toward services. The narrow test is whether Vietnam clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds: average real GDP per-capita growth of at least 4% per year, at least a 60% decline in under-5 mortality, trade openness above 150% of GDP, and services employment reaching at least 35% of total employment.
Large electricity-access expansion from 1990 to 2023 should generally coincide with positive average real GDP-per-capita growth rather than being bought at the price of stagnation.
Countries with large electricity-access gains from 1990 to 2023 should usually record substantial gains in life expectancy over the same period.
Countries with large electricity-access gains from 1990 to 2023 should usually show large under-5 mortality reductions over the same development window.
High-remittance economies should often show non-negative average private-consumption growth across the global shock years 2009, 2020, and 2021.
High-remittance economies should more often than not avoid negative average real GDP-per-capita growth across the global shock years 2009, 2020, and 2021.
Large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should generally be compatible with positive average real GDP-per-capita growth.
Countries with large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should usually register sizable growth in output per worker.
Countries with large tertiary-attainment gains from 2000 to 2023 should usually show a visible shift of employment toward services.
Bangladesh's 1990-2023 development trajectory combined sustained real income growth, large child-mortality reductions, rising life expectancy, and a services-employment shift. The narrow test is whether Bangladesh clears at least three of four independent outcome thresholds over the period, using WDI vintages already present in the pipeline.
High-remittance economies should usually avoid extreme average current-account deficits over 2000-2023 because worker transfers directly finance external balances.
Developmentalist catch-up growth premiums are strongest before the middle-income threshold and fade above it.
State capacity is a prerequisite for successful market reform; naive laissez-faire without capable institutions underperforms.
Developmentalist catch-up works, but the claim that transition to markets is necessary for the strongest performers is more contested.
Industrial policy (sectoral targeting, export subsidies, conditional credit, technology push) succeeds in raising long-run manufacturing productivity and export sophistication when implemented in high-governance state...
Sweden’s post-1992 crisis market reforms — fiscal consolidation, inflation- targeting adoption, tax and pension overhauls, and product-market deregulation — predict stronger real GDP-per-capita growth during 1995–2024...
Countries that undertake unilateral tariff liberalisation — defined as an autonomous, non-FTA-driven reduction in the applied weighted-mean tariff of at least 5 percentage points sustained for at least 5 consecutive y...
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum ...
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, state allocation of resources — measured by government consumption share, state- enterprise share of output, and public-investment share — has negative long-run effects on ...
Higher government-consumption shares predict weaker TFP growth after controlling for public investment, education, and health spending, across a broad panel of advanced and emerging economies from 1970 to 2020.
Chile’s long-run income convergence is stronger after the combination of market reforms (1975–1990) and democratic institutional repair (1990 onward) than under the earlier state-led import-substitution regime (1950–1...
New Zealand’s 1984–1993 liberalisation (deregulation, tariff cuts, privatisation, inflation targeting, and fiscal consolidation) improved long-run macroeconomic stability and tradables-sector productivity over 1984–20...
Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberal...
Across countries 1990-2020, faster insolvency and bankruptcy resolution — measured by years to resolve, recovery rate, and strength of insolvency framework index — predicts stronger post- shock productivity recovery t...
Across emerging-market and developing economies 1990-2020, stronger contract enforcement — measured by years to resolve a commercial dispute, contract-enforcement index, and legal-origin dummies — predicts whether for...
Across an unbalanced panel of OECD and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, higher firm-entry rates (new business registrations per 1000 working-age population) predict stronger subsequent 20-year total-factor-product...
Across middle-income and catch-up economies 1980-2020, high state-directed allocation — measured by state-enterprise share of output, directed-credit intensity, and public-investment-driven growth — is associated with...
In Maddison long-run country panels, catch-up growth is materially faster below roughly 40 percent of US GDP per capita than above that threshold, but the post-threshold premium is small enough that the developmentali...
In a 1996-2018 Maddison/WGI cross-section, countries with stronger rule of law should show higher mean annual GDP-per-capita growth after controlling for initial income if the property-rights growth channel is strong ...
State capacity (proxied by government effectiveness, rule of law, and fiscal extraction) is a prerequisite for effective liberal market policy
Developmentalism treats this institutional.rule_of_law hypothesis as a conditional benchmark rather than a directional win condition: Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls. This tests the property-rights, contract-enforcement, and economic-calculation channe...
Developmentalism treats this regulatory.trade_openness hypothesis as a conditional benchmark rather than a directional win condition: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), with trading formally commencing 2021-01-01, has not yet produced a measurable acceleration in aggregate African trade-openness ratios over the 2021-2024 window relative to a synthetic-control donor pool of non-AfCFTA emerging-market regions, because of slow tariff- ...
Developmentalism treats this regulatory.product_market_competition hypothesis as a conditional benchmark rather than a directional win condition: Across a broad panel of developing and emerging-market economies 1980-2020, price controls and directed input subsidies predict higher capital misallocation — measured by the dispersion of the marginal product of capital across firms or sectors — and lower long-run total-factor-productivity growth. The pre-registere...
Developmentalism predicts this state-capacity or industrial-policy claim should fail: Deeper private-credit market proxies predict stronger productivity growth than state-owned banking allocation.
Developmentalism predicts this state-capacity or industrial-policy claim should fail: Deeper private financial-market proxies predict stronger high-technology and innovation diffusion outcomes.
Developmentalism predicts this state-capacity or industrial-policy claim should hold: China's 2010-2023 state-directed solar-PV and onshore-wind manufacturing scale-up (Renewable Energy Law 2005, 12th and 13th Five-Year Plan industrial-policy targets) is the dominant source of the ~85% global decline in solar-PV module costs and the ~55% decline in onshore-wind LCOE over the same window. The cost-decline spillover to the rest of the world is a positive industrial-policy externality, not an anti-competitive distortion -- the global LCOE trajectory in a counterfactual without Chinese scale-up sits materially above the observed trajectory.
Developmentalism predicts this energy-development tradeoff claim should hold: Higher fossil-electricity shares predict faster GDP growth in development panels.
supported·Hypothesis:cross_school_fossil_electricity_growth_development_tradeoff_1990_2023Developmentalism predicts this trade-and-catch-up claim should hold: Across a broad 1990-2023 country panel, higher trade openness is associated with faster real GDP per-capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls. The mechanism is selective global-market integration: access to export demand and imported inputs should support catch-up growth when domestic capacity is binding.
Developmentalism predicts this infrastructure-and-human-development claim should hold: Across a broad 1990-2023 country panel, higher electricity access is associated with lower under-5 mortality after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls. The mechanism is basic infrastructure capacity improving household welfare, health-service reliability, refrigeration, sanitation, and information access.
Developmentalism predicts this state-capacity design claim should hold: stronger rule-bound procurement and regulatory quality should coincide with higher investment diffusion and productivity-supporting capital formation.
Developmentalism predicts this strategic-services claim should hold: the Philippines' BPO-focused industrial-policy bundle should raise services share and sustain growth outperformance relative to regional peers.
Developmentalism predicts this human-capital deepening claim should hold: sustained income growth should be associated with higher secondary-school completion over long horizons.
Developmentalism predicts this trade-platform claim should hold: Singapore's post-2014 FTA cascade should preserve frontier trade openness and maintain growth outperformance against high-income East Asian peers.
Developmentalism predicts this infrastructure-state-capacity claim should hold: Indonesia's Jokowi-era infrastructure push should raise investment intensity and deliver pre-COVID growth outperformance versus ASEAN peers.
Developmentalism predicts this calibrated-growth claim should hold: India's 2014-2024 reform mix should deliver only modest aggregate acceleration versus 2004-2013 unless paired with deeper manufacturing capability upgrading.
Developmentalism predicts this structural-divergence claim should hold: pre-COVID debt and commodity dependence should explain a large share of SSA recovery divergence in 2020-2024.
Developmentalism predicts this resource-dependence claim should hold: Botswana's post-2014 diamond-demand shock should expose diversification limits and produce weaker growth and industrial deepening than a mineral-exporting synthetic counterfactual.
Developmentalism predicts this state-led infrastructure claim should hold: Ethiopia's GERD buildout should lift electricity consumption and access faster than comparable SSA peers despite wartime disruption and commissioning delays.
Developmentalism predicts this export-led catch-up claim should hold: Bangladesh's apparel export model should raise manufacturing share and outperform Pakistan on GDP-per-capita growth.
Developmentalism predicts this Pakistan state-capacity claim should hold: repeated IMF stabilisation without durable domestic reform should not generate a growth premium over SAARC peers.
Developmentalism predicts this demographic-dividend claim should hold: Mexico's fertility decline and working-age-share expansion should be associated with stronger real wage outcomes.
Developmentalism predicts this India trade-reform claim should hold: the 1991 tariff-cut component should produce a visible structural increase in trade openness.
Developmentalism predicts this agricultural upgrading claim should hold: export openness should help agricultural economies diversify into higher-value crops over time.
Developmentalism predicts this Bangladesh apparel-upgrading claim should hold: external market access, sectoral specialisation, and integration into global apparel demand should raise manufacturing share relative to close comparators.
Developmentalism predicts this free-zone institutions claim should hold: strategically built legal and administrative enclaves can raise regulatory quality and commercial capacity even in a resource-rent state.
Public electrification complements private-sector growth when regulatory quality is high; in low-regulatory-quality states, electricity access expansions show weaker links to manufacturing value added and business entry.
Energy-shock relief works better as targeted transfers or temporary tax smoothing in high-capacity states; administered price controls/subsidies predict shortages, fiscal slippage, or lower investment where pass-throu...
Green industrial policy complements markets when it lowers renewable costs or deployment without raising industrial electricity prices; where grid integration capacity is weak, higher renewable shares predict manufact...
Higher industrial electricity prices predict lower manufacturing value-added share and weaker industrial production growth.
Agricultural output growth achieved through forest-cover loss has weaker poverty-reduction returns and worse emissions outcomes than output growth without forest loss.
Fossil-fuel subsidy reductions lower emissions intensity only when paired with household compensation; otherwise they raise poverty or energy stress enough to weaken the just-transition claim.
In high-income countries, material footprint per capita can fall while life expectancy and life satisfaction are maintained or improved; refuted if footprint reductions systematically require welfare losses outside re...
carbon pricing achieves emissions reductions at lower output and household-cost penalties per ton abated than technology-specific mandates of similar ambition.
sustained household fuel or electricity price controls predict higher shortage frequency, larger fiscal subsidy burdens, and lower energy-sector investment.
fuel-subsidy reforms paired with targeted transfers produce stronger 5- to 15-year fiscal balances and social spending durability than unreformed universal subsidies.
network-sector unbundling combined with independent regulation predicts lower prices and better service quality than vertically integrated state or protected monopoly models.
Higher nuclear electricity share predicts lower industrial power-price volatility and lower fossil electricity share.
Higher fossil-fuel consumption subsidies predict higher energy intensity and slower renewable-share growth.
Expanding protected land lowers land-use emissions or forest loss without reducing food production per capita in countries with adequate yield growth.
Public investment crowds in renewable capacity and private investment during slack periods, but is refuted if higher public investment systematically displaces private capital without capacity gains.
Renewable-capacity growth increases net employment or prevents industrial-employment loss in regions with transition policy, while the claim is refuted if capacity growth coincides with persistent employment losses.
Rapid renewable electricity-share growth raises electricity prices in the short run unless fossil or nuclear backup volatility falls.
Lower annual hours worked reduce energy use and emissions per capita without proportionate reductions in life satisfaction or employment.
Fiscal consolidation within three years after recessions lowers employment and potential-output paths relative to countries that delay consolidation until recovery.
Larger automatic stabilizers reduce peak-to-trough GDP losses and poverty spikes during recessions, but may trade off against recovery speed if labor-market reentry is weak.
Public investment raises infrastructure and growth outcomes only where corruption control is high; where corruption control is low, higher public investment predicts debt accumulation without road, electricity, or gro...
Education spending raises human capital and later productivity only where governance quality and teacher/system capacity are high; spending alone is weakly related to outcomes in low-capacity systems.
Discretionary fiscal expansion raises real output with limited inflation when unemployment is above its country-specific 10-year mean, but the output gain shrinks and inflation pass-through rises when unemployment is ...
During the 2008-2012 crisis, faster fiscal stimulus in high-capacity states predicted smaller employment losses and faster GDP recovery; in low-capacity/high-debt states, stimulus size had weaker recovery payoff and w...
Government size only drags growth when the marginal increase is government consumption or wage-bill heavy; public investment-heavy expansions in high-capacity states have neutral or positive five-year productivity eff...
Government spending has a nonmonotonic relationship with growth: moderate-to-large spending is compatible with growth in high-effectiveness states, while similarly large spending in low-effectiveness states predicts l...
Public health spending reduces mortality and raises life expectancy when corruption control is high; low corruption-control states show weaker health outcome gains per spending point.
Industrial-policy intensity proxies such as R&D spending or high-tech export targeting predict durable high-tech export shares only above a government-effectiveness threshold; below it, the same policy intensity predi...
Public investment complements private investment and productivity only in high-execution states; in low government-effectiveness states, higher public capital formation predicts weaker private investment shares and no...
supported·Hypothesis:capacity_public_investment_execution_private_capital_complementR&D spending converts into patenting and productivity only when private finance and regulatory quality are adequate; otherwise R&D intensity is weakly associated with innovation outcomes.
In OECD recessions from 1980-2024, larger automatic stabilizers cushion two-year GDP and employment losses only where government effectiveness is above the sample median; where effectiveness is low, the same spending ...
Social spending reduces poverty more strongly when tax administration and corruption control are high; in weak-capacity states, spending growth has lower poverty elasticity and higher fiscal slippage.
Higher tax revenue supports growth and poverty reduction when tax collection capacity and rule of law are high; above similar revenue shares in low-capacity states, marginal revenue predicts lower private investment a...
Lower out-of-pocket health-spending shares predict lower avoidable mortality and less medical impoverishment after total health spending is controlled; refuted if decommodification has no independent outcome gain.
Government deficits are associated with higher private-sector net saving, especially when current-account balances are stable; the claim is refuted if private saving does not co-move after accounting identities and va...
Public education spending reduces inequality or improves intergenerational mobility only when housing-cost burden is low.
Higher public education spending predicts higher secondary and tertiary attainment among lower-income cohorts and lower intergenerational earnings persistence; a null or regressive attainment effect would refute the e...
Higher interest expenditure shares predict lower public investment or education/health spending in EU country-years outside monetary-sovereign conditions.
Fiscal tightening predicts weaker next-year GDP growth when real interest rates are low or output gaps are negative, but not when inflation is high.
Fiscal expansions during high-slack years reduce unemployment and accelerate GDP recovery more than expansions near capacity, with no persistent inflation overshoot unless supply constraints bind.
R&D spending has larger high-tech export returns in countries with higher government effectiveness and rule of law.
Higher government consumption share predicts lower private investment share, especially when debt-service burden is high.
Higher health-spending shares improve mortality outcomes without reducing medium-run GDP-per-capita growth unless financed through high debt-service burdens.
higher central-bank independence predicts lower inflation volatility and stronger real wage growth over 15- to 30-year windows after controlling for fiscal dominance.
revenue-neutral tax shifts from income taxation toward broad consumption taxation predict higher household saving and private investment, without systematically weaker lower-decile consumption growth when transfers ar...
lower effective marginal tax rates on new investment predict faster capital deepening and manufacturing productivity growth than sector-specific investment credits.
expenditure rules that cap current spending while preserving public investment predict higher private investment and lower fiscal volatility than untargeted deficit rules.
binding fiscal rules with transparent escape clauses predict lower debt-service burdens and faster post-shock recovery than discretionary fiscal regimes at similar initial debt levels.
countries that shift toward broader tax bases and lower statutory marginal rates achieve higher 10- to 25-year private investment growth without lower total revenue ratios than comparable countries relying on narrow b...
Higher public education spending as a share of GDP predicts later human-capital gains only where governance quality is above the sample median.
Higher housing-cost burdens are associated with higher after-tax inequality even after market-income inequality is controlled.
Social spending reduces poverty more effectively when active labour programmes and family benefits make up a larger spending share.
Increases in top marginal income-tax rates lower top-income concentration without reducing medium-run GDP per capita growth or private investment more than matched lower-tax countries.
Higher public health spending reduces amenable mortality, infant mortality, and out-of-pocket burden after income and population-age controls; the claim is refuted if spending growth does not improve outcomes or only ...
Countries with higher pre-2020 public health spending shares had smaller 2019-2022 life-expectancy losses, conditional on age structure and income.
More generous public pensions lower elderly poverty and material deprivation, and the claim is weakened if gains are accompanied by persistent working-age tax wedges, debt-service stress, or lower employment.
Larger tax-and-transfer redistribution gaps predict faster bottom-40 real disposable-income growth over the next three years without a GDP-per-capita growth penalty larger than 0.3 percentage points per year.
R&D spending intensity predicts higher patent intensity only where government effectiveness or rule of law is high.
Higher social spending reduces market-income poverty more strongly where benefits are more cash-and-service universal, and the claim is weakened if poverty falls only through accounting transfers with no improvement i...
Higher tax revenue predicts faster growth only when it is associated with higher public investment or government effectiveness.
Health expenditure per capita increases life expectancy strongly at low and middle spending levels but has sharply diminishing returns above the OECD median.
Higher out-of-pocket health spending shares predict higher infant, under-5, or amenable mortality at a given income level.
Growth in food or crop production per rural worker predicts lower poverty rates and child mortality in low- and middle-income countries.
Declines in agricultural employment share predict faster GDP-per-capita growth only when manufacturing or services productivity rises at the same time.
Broadband infrastructure improves business entry, productivity, and export services when telecom competition and regulatory quality are high; monopoly rollout without competition shows weaker diffusion benefits.
Transport infrastructure raises regional productivity and employment where procurement quality and maintenance capacity are high; low-capacity buildouts show weaker productivity gains and higher debt per road-km impro...
More restrictive capital-account regimes reduce crisis incidence and exchange-rate volatility without lowering long-run investment or GDP growth in emerging markets.
deeper private capital markets predict faster reallocation of capital toward high-productivity firms and stronger aggregate TFP growth than bank-dominated systems with politically concentrated credit.
directed-credit intensity predicts lower marginal product of capital and slower total factor productivity growth than market-priced credit allocation.
moderate-to-strong IP protection predicts higher quality-adjusted innovation and technology diffusion, but extremely restrictive follow-on rules reduce downstream innovation.
stable rule-bound regulation predicts higher private investment and lower investment volatility than discretionary licensing or case-by-case industrial policy.
Higher ICT-sector value-added or productivity growth predicts faster aggregate GDP-per-hour growth.
Human-capital growth predicts TFP growth more strongly than capital-deepening alone over 5-year windows.
Growth in resident patent applications predicts TFP growth over the next 3-5 years more strongly than non-resident patenting.
Universal or broad health coverage improves health outcomes without reducing employment when financed through broad-based taxes or social insurance and managed by high-capacity institutions; payroll-heavy financing wi...
Urban infrastructure investment lowers mortality and supports urban productivity only when municipal/state capacity is high; rapid urbanization without service delivery predicts worse health and weaker productivity.
Energy use per capita has a strong positive association with life expectancy below a threshold but little additional association above high-income levels.
countries implementing durable packages of trade openness, monetary stability, property-rights improvement, and entry liberalization show stronger 15- to 30-year gains in median consumption, life expectancy, and human...
Higher physician density predicts lower amenable mortality, with larger effects where public coverage or public health spending is higher.
Credit-gap booms combined with house-price booms predict higher unemployment 2-4 years later.
Real residential property-price growth above income growth predicts weaker private consumption growth over the next 2 years.
Credit booms turn into damaging house-price cycles primarily where housing supply and permitting capacity are constrained; elastic-supply markets show smaller price booms and smaller post-boom employment losses.
EU countries with faster construction value-added or construction employment growth experience lower subsequent housing-cost overburden.
OECD country-years with higher housing-cost overburden rates have lower real private-consumption-per-capita growth over the next 1-3 years, after income, unemployment, and country/year effects.
Rising low-income rent burden predicts higher child poverty or disposable-income poverty, net of unemployment and GDP per capita.
Capital-market depth raises patenting and high-growth entry when rule of law and disclosure quality are high; in weak-institution settings, market depth predicts volatility and crisis exposure more than innovation.
Regulation complements markets when regulatory quality is high: higher regulatory quality predicts more business entry and less informality; high procedural burden with low regulatory quality predicts lower entry and ...
faster and more predictable contract enforcement predicts larger average firm scale, lower working-capital constraints, and higher labor productivity.
higher formal business-entry barriers predict larger informal sectors and lower small-firm productivity growth over long windows.
improvements in expropriation-risk and property-rights indicators predict higher private investment and longer project maturities, especially in capital-intensive sectors.
Higher collective-bargaining coverage lowers in-work poverty and low-wage incidence with no youth-employment penalty in coordinated systems, but is refuted if coverage mainly prices out young or low-skill workers.
Active labour-market spending reduces long-term unemployment only where case-management capacity and benefit conditionality are strong; passive benefit generosity without activation predicts longer unemployment duration.
Public childcare and family benefits raise female labour-force participation and fertility only when housing costs and childcare supply constraints are not binding; high transfers without supply expansion have weaker ...
In-work benefits increase low-income employment when phaseout cliffs are smooth and administration is simple; sharp cliffs or complex means tests predict lower hours growth and weaker reemployment.
More generous unemployment benefits do not lower employment when activation spending and case-management capacity are high; without activation, generosity predicts longer unemployment duration and lower employment rates.
Childcare and family-benefit expansions raise female labor-force participation and fertility without lowering maternal employment; refuted if cash-only benefits reduce employment or fail to move fertility.
Employment protection improves job security and tenure without creating youth/temporary-contract dualism only when active labor policy and growth are strong.
Higher private-credit depth and financial-sector value-added shares predict lower labor shares and weaker real investment after credit booms, supporting financialization critiques if robust.
Faster services-sector expansion predicts higher female labour-force participation, net of education and income.
Public employment or activation-heavy labor-market programs lower long-term unemployment and poverty more than passive transfers at similar fiscal cost.
In demand-constrained high-income economies, rising labor share predicts stronger consumption and GDP growth, while profit-share gains predict weaker domestic demand.
Moderate minimum-wage bite increases low-end wages and reduces working poverty with employment effects near zero; refuted if high-bite settings show significant low-skill job losses.
stricter employment protection legislation predicts higher youth unemployment and longer unemployment duration after demand shocks, with smaller effects where apprenticeships and temporary contracts are flexible.
high minimum-wage bite raises wages for covered incumbents but predicts weaker youth employment and higher informal employment in low-productivity regions.
lower entry barriers in childcare, retail, transport, and personal services predict higher female labor-force participation through lower household-service prices and more flexible jobs.
higher labor tax wedges predict lower prime-age employment and higher informality over long windows, with larger effects in middle-income economies.
Active labour-market spending predicts faster unemployment declines after unemployment shocks than passive cash-support spending.
Stricter employment protection legislation predicts higher youth unemployment, especially when GDP growth is weak.
Higher minimum-wage bite predicts higher low-education unemployment when productivity growth is below the OECD median.
Higher union density lowers wage dispersion but may reduce employment only where productivity growth is weak.
Larger vocational or work-based upper-secondary pathways predict lower youth unemployment without reducing tertiary progression.
Monetary tightening reduces labor share and wage growth more than profit income during disinflation episodes, implying a distributional cost channel.
Reductions in annual hours worked raise hourly productivity and wellbeing without lowering employment rates when implemented in high-productivity economies.
More generous unemployment benefits reduce household-income losses and recession depth, but the strongest claim is refuted if they materially lengthen unemployment duration after controlling for labor-demand shocks an...
Higher union density raises labor share and lowers disposable-income inequality without reducing medium-run GDP per hour growth once sector composition is controlled.
Higher household debt-service ratios predict slower real private-consumption growth especially after policy-rate increases.
Periods of policy rates below inflation/GDP-growth fundamentals predict later credit-gap and house-price expansions.
Higher pre-crisis bank capital buffers reduce crisis output losses without permanently lowering credit growth in high-supervision states; in weak-supervision states, nominal capital ratios do not prevent credit busts.
Financial depth supports productivity and innovation only under strong rule of law; in weak-rule-of-law settings, private credit growth predicts credit booms and asset prices more than TFP or patenting.
Large central-bank government-bond purchases lower long yields without producing proportional CPI inflation when unemployment is above pre-crisis levels.
US M2 or central-bank balance-sheet expansions predict asset-price inflation more strongly than CPI inflation over post-1990 windows.
credit booms occurring under subsidized or politically directed credit regimes produce deeper post-boom output losses than credit booms under market-priced credit.
negative real deposit rates created by interest-rate caps or high inflation reduce private saving and lower long-run domestic investment quality.
sustained excess broad-money growth over real output growth predicts higher medium-run inflation across regimes, with weaker coefficients only where credible nominal anchors are present.
For monetary sovereigns with floating exchange rates and debt in domestic currency, high public-debt ratios do not predict inflation or default absent real-resource or external-balance stress.
Real effective exchange-rate appreciation predicts lower export product variety and weaker goods-export growth over the next 2 years.
Infant-industry protection works when tariffs are temporary and followed by export-share gains; persistent tariffs without export discipline predict lower consumption growth and no high-tech export upgrading.
Tariff reductions increase consumption and export variety in high-rule-of-law and high-human-capital countries, but generate weak or negative medium-run growth in low-capacity countries with shallow finance.
Countries with both higher domestic food-production growth and higher food-trade openness have smaller food-price and poverty spikes after global commodity-price shocks.
High-tech export shares generate stronger GDP and TFP growth when export concentration is low.
Mission-oriented industrial policy raises high-tech export shares and resident patenting after five to ten years, with support only if gains exceed general R&D and education trends.
customs simplification and shorter border delays predict lower trade costs and faster small-exporter growth than tariff cuts alone.
tighter FDI restrictions predict slower adoption of foreign technology and weaker productivity convergence in tradable sectors.
durable tariff reductions predict lower tradable-goods prices and higher real household consumption, especially for lower-income households with high tradable basket shares.
Higher trade openness raises short-run unemployment volatility but lowers average unemployment in flexible or high-capacity labour markets.
Tertiary attainment growth predicts higher high-tech export shares after 3-5 years, conditional on income and trade openness.
More diversified export baskets predict smaller export and GDP contractions during global downturns.
Higher food import tariffs predict higher food-price inflation and worse poverty outcomes, especially in food-import-dependent countries.
Tariff reductions predict greater import product variety and higher private consumption per capita over 3-year windows.
Higher tariff protection does not predict later high-tech export upgrading unless governance quality is high.
Output or energy-use contractions do not have to reduce basic-needs outcomes when health, education, and food-security institutions are protected; refuted if contractions reliably worsen mortality, schooling, or pover...
Ranked by axis-overlap score. These are hypotheses already in the library whose tests speak to the axes this school's predictions live on, regardless of whether the school explicitly cited them.