Self-described "socialism of the 21st century" combining nationalisation of strategic industries (oil via PDVSA 2002 politicisation, steel, cement, telecoms, agriculture), price controls on food and consumer goods, foreign exchange controls (CADIVI 2003+), expropriation of private firms and farms, dismantling of judicial and central bank independence, and monetisation of fiscal deficits once oil revenues declined. Policy content spans nearly every framework axis in the direction of state control and market replacement. Outcome: the sharpest peacetime economic collapse of a non-warring oil-exporter in the modern record — GDP per capita down more than 70% from 2013 peak, hyperinflation 2017–2019, ~7 million emigrants (>20% of population).
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
Statutory or administrative ceilings, freezes, margin caps, or mandated below-cost pass-through rules for goods and services outside housing. This axis separates direct price ceilings from general product-market entry regulation.
increased · strong
more binding or broader price controls
Food and consumer-goods price controls expanded from 2003 onward with INDEPABIS/SUNDDE enforcement, parallel markets, and chronic shortages.
derived: score=-0.92, overlap=6 axes vs ordoliberal profile (mechanical backfill v1)
References
Kronick (2019), 'The Collapse of Venezuela's Economy'
Rodriguez-Pardo IMF WP 2018 on Venezuela hyperinflation
WGI Venezuela series, 1996-2022
IMF Article IV Venezuela (final 2004 before lapse)
Notes
Treatment date 1999 is Chávez's inauguration. Institutional-quality decline is gradual 1999-2004, steepens after PDVSA strike 2002-2003, and accelerates sharply after oil-price collapse 2014-2016.
Framework-validation case: if v1 can't detect this negative effect, the framework is broken. Expected result: enormous negative treatment effect (multiple log-points of GDP per capita) with clean pre-trends.