IESET.
Movements·philippines_marcos_jr_2022_present

Philippines Marcos Jr restoration (Bongbong)

PHL·2022 – present·Uniteam / Partido Federal ng Pilipinas + Lakas-CMD + allied blocs (with Sara Duterte-Carpio VP until mid-2024 rift)
Leaders: Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos Jr. (President, 2022-) · Sara Duterte-Carpio (VP, 2022-; impeached Feb 2025) · Benjamin Diokno / Ralph Recto (Finance) · Enrique Manalo / Theresa Lazaro (Foreign Affairs)
positionsclassical_liberaldevelopmentalisminstitutionalism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Pragmatic centre-right Marcos restoration presenting itself as a continuity-plus-competence project. Economic programme is broadly market-oriented macro-orthodoxy — inflation targeting under BSP Governor Remolona, fiscal consolidation via a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework, and continued Duterte-era CREATE corporate tax schedule — paired with an activist state in infrastructure and industrial policy through the Maharlika Investment Fund (sovereign wealth vehicle enacted July 2023, capitalised ₱500bn / ~$9bn from Landbank, DBP and BSP dividends) and a "Build Better More" infra pipeline largely continuing Duterte's "Build Build Build". On foreign policy the administration has sharply re-anchored to the US alliance — expanded Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement sites from 5 to 9 (Apr 2023), trilateral Japan-US-Philippines summit (Apr 2024), and a harder public line on the West Philippine Sea against PRC grey-zone operations — while preserving trade ties (RCEP ratification Feb 2023, Luzon Economic Corridor announced Apr 2024). Domestically the restoration is contested: ICC probe into the Duterte drug war proceeded (Duterte Sr. arrested Mar 2025 and transferred to The Hague), the Marcos-Duterte alliance fractured, and the May 2025 midterms produced a split Senate.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · moderate
expanded sectoral subsidies
Maharlika vehicle channels public capital into infrastructure and strategic sectors; continuation of Build Better More pipeline.
↑
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · moderate
more open trade
RCEP ratification Feb 2023 after long Senate hold; continued tariff schedules under CREATE; Luzon Economic Corridor as G7-backed investment channel.
—
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
unchanged · weak
No major liberalisation beyond inherited Public Services Act amendments; sectoral FDI caps further eased only at margins.
↑
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
increased · weak
stronger rule of law
Cooperation with ICC probe (transfer of Duterte Sr. Mar 2025) and restored posture of prosecutorial independence, though selective; Quiboloy prosecution pursued.
↑
energy supply security
regulatory.energy_supply_security
Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.
increased · weak
higher supply-security posture (diversified, strategic reserves)
Nuclear revival studies (Bataan NPP recommissioning review), LNG import terminals, renewable-energy FDI cap lift carried forward from 2022.

Policies enacted

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
classical_liberal
Macro orthodoxy and trade openness yes; Maharlika fund and dynastic governance no.
partial
developmentalism
Maharlika + Build Better More echo a directed-investment template, without the East Asian performance-discipline apparatus.
partial
institutionalism
Restored formal cooperation with the ICC and the bureaucracy, but dynastic capture and 1986-era unresolved plunder cases constrain the claim.

References

Notes

Voter mandate: 31.6 million votes (58.8%) in the May 2022 election, the largest plurality since the 1986 restoration of democracy — with running mate Sara Duterte-Carpio winning the vice presidency on 61.5%. Uniteam commanded both chambers of the 19th Congress (House supermajority ~85%+ via PFP/Lakas/NPC/NUP bloc; Senate ~17 of 24 aligned). Approval tracked by Pulse Asia ran 65-80% through 2023-24, softening to high-50s by early 2025 amid Duterte rift and impeachment of VP Sara. May 2025 midterms returned a more divided Senate (Marcos-bloc ~6 new, Duterte-bloc ~5, opposition ~1).