MEX·2018 – 2024·Morena-led Juntos Haremos Historia (Morena + PT + PES, later Morena + PT + PVEM) with a supermajority built over the term
Leaders: Andrés Manuel López Obrador (President 2018-2024) · Carlos Urzúa (Finance Minister Dec 2018 - Jul 2019, resigned) · Arturo Herrera (Finance Minister 2019-2021) · Rogelio Ramírez de la O (Finance Minister 2021-2024) · Rocío Nahle (Energy Minister 2018-2023, Dos Bocas) · Manuel Bartlett (CFE Director 2018-2024) · Octavio Romero Oropeza (Pemex Director 2018-2024) · Alejandro Díaz de León / Victoria Rodríguez (Banxico Governors)
Heterodox-populist Morena government implementing AMLO's "Cuarta Transformación" (Fourth Transformation) framing: rhetorical rupture with the 1982-2018 neoliberal period combined with in-practice fiscal austerity (the "republican austerity" decree of Dec 2018) that held primary balances broadly stable until late-term. Economic school: state-nationalist on energy and strategic sectors, Cárdenas-style in symbolism, with a strong social-transfer pillar; not Keynesian in the demand-management sense because discretionary fiscal stimulus was refused even during COVID-19. Four pillars: (i) fiscal austerity — Ley Federal de Austeridad Republicana (DOF 19-nov-2019), salary caps, elimination of ~100 fideicomisos, no COVID-era fiscal package; (ii) direct cash transfers scaled up — universal non-contributory pension for over-65s (constitutional right 2020, amount doubled across the term to ~MXN 6,000/bimester by 2024), Becas Benito Juárez (students), Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro (apprenticeships), Sembrando Vida (agro-forestry payments to 450k+ smallholders); (iii) state reassertion in energy — reversal of energy-reform secondary rulings, CFE-first dispatch rule, Ley de la Industria Eléctrica reform March 2021, cancellation of Ronda auctions, construction of the Dos Bocas / Olmeca refinery in Tabasco, nationalisation of Iberdrola plants 2023; (iv) signature infrastructure by the armed forces — Tren Maya (opened segments 2023-2024, ~MXN 500bn+), Felipe Ángeles Airport (AIFA, replacing cancelled Texcoco NAIM after Oct 2018 consulta), Interoceánico corridor. Labour content: minimum wage approximately doubled in real terms (from MXN 88/day 2018 to MXN 249/day 2024, with a higher frontier-zone rate), USMCA labour chapter ratified and enforcement expanded, outsourcing reform 2021 banned most subcontracting. Popularity: won 2018 with 53.2% (first-round majority since 1988), Morena-led bloc took ~308 Cámara seats (from 500) in 2018, ~278 in 2021 mid-terms, ~364 supermajority in 2024 alongside successor Sheinbaum; AMLO's personal approval rarely dipped below 58% across the sexenio, ending around 65-75% per most trackers. Coherence line: the movement's rhetoric was anti-neoliberal but its macro management was orthodox on fiscal/monetary (Banxico autonomy unchallenged, debt-to-GDP held below ~50%); the structural turn was institutional — energy re-statification, crowding-out of private infrastructure, military-led execution of flagship projects, concentration of discretionary transfers — and set up the constitutional-reform push that Sheinbaum executed in Sep 2024.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · strong
larger transfer footprint
Universal non-contributory pension doubled + Sembrando Vida + Becas Benito Juárez; constitutionalised in 2020.
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
decreased · weak
weaker judicial independence
Public confrontation with SCJN + INE; judicial-reform constitutional push prepared in final months, enacted under Sheinbaum.
Policies enacted
· mx_austerity_decree_2019
· mx_texcoco_airport_cancellation_2018
· mx_universal_pension_2019_2024
· mx_minimum_wage_doubling_2018_2024
· mx_dos_bocas_refinery_2019
· mx_tren_maya_2020_2024
· mx_electricity_industry_law_reform_2021
· mx_outsourcing_reform_2021
· mx_sembrando_vida_2019
What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses
The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.
refuted — GBR TFP growth FELL post-1984 (-0.51pp/yr, pre +0.97% → post +0.46%) AND underperformed the comparator-OECD mean (-0.55pp/yr; comparator post +1.01%). The productivity-from-privatisation premise does not show in PWT country-level TFP.
Reforma a la Ley de la Industria Eléctrica (DOF 9-mar-2021)
Reforma en materia de subcontratación (DOF 23-abr-2021)
USMCA / T-MEC (vigente 1-jul-2020)
Consulta sobre el NAIM (28-29 oct 2018)
Banxico Informes Trimestrales 2018-2024
IMF Article IV Mexico 2019, 2021, 2023
Notes
Analytically important that AMLO's macro conservatism and his micro- interventionism point opposite directions on IESET axes. Invariant 3 (content over label) is why fiscal.spending_level gets a 0 while regulatory.product_market_competition gets a strong negative.