Pre-registration
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution). Below this threshold, market reforms show insignificant or negative associations with growth. The pre- registered claim is that the interaction term between market- reform intensity and rule-of-law score is positive and significant at p<0.05, while the marginal effect of market reform at rule-of-law below -0.5 is not significantly positive.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Not supported if (a) the interaction coefficient is not positive and significant at p<0.05, OR (b) the marginal effect of market reform is positive and significant even when rule-of- law is below -0.5 (no threshold effect), OR (c) the interaction becomes insignificant when post-Soviet transition countries are dropped (indicating the result is driven by one historical episode). A "market reform works everywhere" reading wins if (b) holds; a "institutions don't matter" reading wins if both main effect and interaction are insignificant.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_market_reform_rule_of_law_interaction threshold: panel_FE_beta(market_reform × rule_of_law) > 0 at p<0.05 AND marginal_effect_reform_at_RL_minus_0.5 NOT > 0 at p<0.10 AND result robust to excluding POST_SOVIET at p<0.10
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 55 countries · 1980 – 2020
- Evidence type
- associational
Panel FE with interaction term: market_reform × rule_of_law. Primary test: significance and sign of interaction coefficient. Secondary: sub-sample analysis (rule-of-law above vs below threshold). Robustness: use Fraser EFW composite instead of constructed reform index; use V-Dem polyarchy instead of WGI RL as threshold measure; event-study around large reform episodes (post-Soviet transition, China's 1978, India's 1991) with rule-of-law pre-condition as moderator.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
real_gdp_per_capita_growth outcome | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2 | level |
tfp_growth_5yr outcome | pwt:rtfpnatier 3 | log_diff_5yr |
market_reform_intensity_index treatment | constructed:0.4×fraser_efw:privatisation + 0.3×fraser_efw:trade_openness + 0.3×fraser_efw:price_controlstier 5 | level |
rule_of_law_wgi treatment | wgi:RL.ESTtier 4 | level |
rule_of_law_above_threshold treatment | constructed:indicator = 1 if wgi:RL.EST > -0.5tier 5 | indicator |
log_initial_gdp_pc control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2 | log |
human_capital_index control | pwt:hctier 3 | level |
trade_openness control | world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
government_consumption_share control | world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZStier 2 | level |
inflation_rate control | world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarity
Verdict: REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
Pre-registration
- Claim: Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution). Below this threshold, market reforms show insignificant or negative associations with growth. The pre- registered claim is that the interaction term between market- reform intensity and rule-of-law score is positive and significant at p<0.05, while the marginal effect of market reform at rule-of-law below -0.5 is not significantly positive.
- Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) the interaction coefficient is not positive and significant at p<0.05, OR (b) the marginal effect of market reform is positive and significant even when rule-of- law is below -0.5 (no threshold effect), OR (c) the interaction becomes insignificant when post-Soviet transition countries are dropped (indicating the result is driven by one historical episode). A "market reform works everywhere" reading wins if (b) holds; a "institutions don't matter" reading wins if both main effect and interaction are insignificant.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_market_reform_rule_of_law_interaction
Estimate
- Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
- Coefficient (treatment): -0.1483
- Std error: 0.05246
- p-value: 0.00481
- Observations: 905, countries: 44
- Within R²: 0.0449
- Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
- Clustering: country
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG→ real_gdp_per_capita_growth (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)pwt:rtfpna→ tfp_growth_5yr (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)constructed: 0.4×fraser_efw:privatisation + 0.3×fraser_efw:trade_openness + 0.3×fraser_efw:price_controls→ market_reform_intensity_index (treatment, publisher=market_reform_intensity_index, n=2255)wgi:RL.EST→ rule_of_law_wgi (treatment, publisher=wgi, n=5296)constructed: indicator = 1 if wgi:RL.EST > -0.5→ rule_of_law_above_threshold (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=2255)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD→ log_initial_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)pwt:hc→ human_capital_index (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS→ trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZS→ government_consumption_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9133)world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG→ inflation_rate (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7550)
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:25+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Fraser EFW sub-components provide the longest-run market-reform series. WGI Rule of Law begins in 1996; earlier years use backfilled Polity5 and V-Dem proxies with flagged uncertainty. The post-Soviet transition episode (1990-2000) provides the cleanest natural experiment but also the strongest leverage; robustness to its exclusion is essential.