IESET.
Movements·pakistan_shehbaz_pmln_coalition_2024_present

Shehbaz Sharif PML-N+PPP coalition — IMF stabilisation and SIFC (Pakistan)

PAK·2024 – present·PML-N + PPP + MQM-P + PML-Q + IPP + BAP post-election coalition (Feb 2024); same broad PDM composition (minus PTI-dissidents) that held the first Shehbaz premiership Apr 2022 - Aug 2023
Leaders: Shehbaz Sharif (Prime Minister 4 Mar 2024-present; first term 11 Apr 2022 - 14 Aug 2023) · Muhammad Aurangzeb (Finance Minister Mar 2024-, ex-HBL CEO) · Ishaq Dar (Deputy PM and Foreign Minister; Finance Minister 2022-2023 in first Shehbaz term) · Asif Ali Zardari (President, PPP co-chair, Mar 2024-) · Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (PPP chair, foreign-affairs role) · Jameel Ahmad (Governor State Bank of Pakistan, Aug 2022-) · Gen Syed Asim Munir (COAS Nov 2022-, SIFC apex-committee member)
positionsclassical_liberalnew_keynesiandevelopmentalismsocial_democratic

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Centre-right business-establishment-orthodoxy return under a PML-N + PPP coalition, explicitly continuation-and-deepening of the first Shehbaz premiership (Apr 2022 - Aug 2023) that had negotiated a $3bn IMF Stand-By Arrangement in July 2023 under near-default conditions (FX reserves below 2 weeks import cover). After the Feb 2024 general election — contested as the least legitimate in Pakistan's polling history, with PTI barred from its electoral symbol and ballot-rigging allegations from losing camps — the new government pursued (i) $7bn IMF Extended Fund Facility 37-month (Sep 2024), the 24th IMF programme in Pakistan's history, with fifth tranche-linked structural conditionality on tax-base expansion, agriculture-income-tax provincial harmonisation, SOE divestment, and FX-regime credibility; (ii) the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC, operationalised June 2023, civil-military joint apex body) to fast-track GCC (Saudi, UAE, Qatari, Kuwaiti) investment in agriculture, minerals (Reko Diq), IT, and energy, positioned as sovereign-wealth-style FDI facilitation; (iii) power-tariff hikes 2023-2024 resolving capacity-payment circular-debt arrears (base tariff up ~26% Jul 2023 then incremental adjustments, passthrough of capacity charges to consumers); (iv) PIA privatisation first attempt Oct 2024 (single bid of PKR 10bn against PKR 85bn floor, failed) with a second attempt structured FY25-26; (v) GIDC gas-cess restructuring and captive-power-plant gas disconnections to push industrial demand onto the national grid; (vi) BISP continuation and modest expansion back from Ehsaas branding; (vii) institutional tightening — Peca e-crimes amendment Jan 2025 (criminalising 'false information'), social-media bans (X/Twitter from Feb 2024), 26th Constitutional Amendment Oct 2024 restructuring Supreme Court appointments and creating a Constitutional Bench, the most significant court-related change since 2010. Coherence line: IMF-led stabilisation + power-sector cost-recovery + SIFC-channelled FDI + CPEC revival under overt military-establishment partnership, operating under contested electoral legitimacy and intense PTI- street opposition. Popularity: Feb 2024 NA seat composition — PTI-backed independents (registered as SIC bloc) 93 / 265 directly-contested seats, PML-N 75, PPP 54, MQM-P 17; reserved- seats dispute escalated to Supreme Court. Approval of the coalition is contested, PTI claims majoritarian mandate denied; government frames itself as the constitutional winner.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↓
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
decreased · moderate
lower spending share
Primary-balance surplus targets under IMF EFF 2024; FY24 primary surplus ~0.9% GDP, first in nearly two decades.
↑
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
increased · weak
more progressive (higher top rates, wider spread, larger targeted credits)
Agriculture-income-tax provincial harmonisation (IMF benchmark); retailer documentation restarted; direct-tax share rising modestly from a narrow base.
↓
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
decreased · moderate
reduced sectoral subsidies
Power-sector cross-subsidy rationalisation via tariff hikes; captive-power gas pricing removed; fertiliser/wheat support schemes trimmed.
↑
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · weak
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
PIA privatisation attempts and SOE divestment framework under Sovereign Wealth Fund Act 2023; execution partial.
~
energy supply security
regulatory.energy_supply_security
Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.
mixed · weak
Capacity-payment renegotiation with IPPs ongoing; cost-recovery improved; end-user affordability strained.
—
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
unchanged · weak
SBP Amendment Act 2022 framework preserved; policy rate cut sequence 2024 tracking disinflation from ~38% peak to ~5% yoy by early 2025.
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · moderate
weaker rule of law
26th Amendment restructured Supreme Court appointments + Constitutional Bench creation; Peca amendment criminalised speech categories; X/Twitter ban; election-legitimacy contestation.
↓
judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
decreased · moderate
weaker judicial independence
26th Amendment (Oct 2024) moved chief-justice selection from seniority to parliamentary special committee; Constitutional Bench composition executive-influenced.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
imf_stabilisation_program_effects
not yet written
central_bank_independence_inflation_effects
not yet written
judicial_independence_growth_effects

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
classical_liberal
IMF-programme orthodoxy + privatisation + subsidy rationalisation; opposed on speech/judicial-appointment dimensions.
aligned
new_keynesian
Orthodox stabilisation with SBP inflation-targeting framework preserved.
partial
developmentalism
SIFC is explicitly state-coordinated FDI facilitation; CPEC Phase 2 continuation.
opposed
social_democratic
Power-tariff cost-recovery passes regressively; Peca speech restrictions oppose liberal-left position.

References

Notes

Movement entry covers both the first Shehbaz premiership (Apr 2022 - Aug 2023, post-PTI ouster) and the second / current term (Mar 2024 - present) as continuous doctrinal programme under the same coalition composition and same military-establishment posture. The caretaker Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar government (Aug 2023 - Mar 2024) conducted the election and SIFC operationalisation; its content is substantively continuous with this movement and coded here. Election-legitimacy dispute and 26th Amendment judicial restructuring are flagged on institutional axes.