IESET.
Hypotheses·fiscal·capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity

Social spending reduces poverty more strongly when tax administration and corruption control are high; in weak-capacity states, spending growth has lower poverty elasticity and higher fiscal slippage.

SUPPORTEDengine/runs/capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity

SUPPORTED — coef=-1.106e-06 (sign matches claim -), p=0.0263

confidence cueThis is a clear pass for the claim as written. It still applies only to this sample, period, and method.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether social spending share is actually linked to better or worse poverty headcount from 1980 to 2024.

plain answer

The data clearly moved in the predicted direction. coef=-1.106e-06 (sign matches claim -), p=0.0263

why it matters

This matters because fiscal claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 1980 to 2024, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Social spending share
What we checked
  • Poverty headcount
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity
1007550250198020022024GLOBAL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show poverty_headcount across 1 sampled countries over 1980–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

17 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callChicago School Monetarismwins if MIXEDpartial/no-callClassical Liberalwins if MIXEDpartial/no-callDegrowth / Ecological Macroeconomicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callDemocratic Socialism (Bernsteinian revisionism + modern)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedStructuralist / Developmentalistwins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedEco-Socialism / Red-Greenwins if MIXEDpartial/no-callEmpirical Pragmatist (the framework's house position)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedNew Institutional Economicswins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedMarket Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedMarxian Political Economywins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarxism-Leninism (central-planning implementation)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callModern Monetary Theorywins if MIXEDpartial/no-callNew Keynesian (mainstream synthesis)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedOrdoliberalism (Freiburg School)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedPost-Keynesianwins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedSocial Democraticwins if SUPPORTEDschool supported

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:18Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Social spending reduces poverty more strongly when tax administration and corruption control are high; in weak-capacity states, spending growth has lower poverty elasticity and higher fiscal slippage.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if the primary treatment coefficient has the pre-registered - sign at p<=0.10 with minimum sample gates. REFUTED if the coefficient has the opposite sign at p<=0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL; missing data or failed sample gates are INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
1 countries · 1980 – 2024
Evidence type
associational

First-pass panel fixed effects screen. Multi-outcome or threshold language from the source backlog should be upgraded to a bespoke replication before scoreboard conversion.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
poverty_headcount
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.DDAYtier 2
level
social_spending_share
treatment
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_lagged_one_year
log_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
government_effectiveness
control
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity

Verdict: SUPPORTED — coef=-1.106e-06 (sign matches claim -), p=0.0263

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Social spending reduces poverty more strongly when tax administration and corruption control are high; in weak-capacity states, spending growth has lower poverty elasticity and higher fiscal slippage.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if the primary treatment coefficient has the pre-registered - sign at p<=0.10 with minimum sample gates. REFUTED if the coefficient has the opposite sign at p<=0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL; missing data or failed sample gates are INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_capacity_tax_administration_social_spending_poverty_elasticity

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -1.106e-06
  • Std error: 4.969e-07
  • p-value: 0.0263
  • Observations: 706, countries: 35
  • Within R²: 0.195
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.DDAY → poverty_headcount (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=2862)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → social_spending_share (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1649)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • wgi:GE.EST → government_effectiveness (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:18+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Source shard: engine/audits/swarm_2026-05-22_200_hypotheses_worker_C_state_capacity_mixed.md. Backlog source families: not specified. Initial promotion pass left scoreboard mapping empty; mapped by the 2026-05-22 swarm scoreboard conversion v1.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.