IESET.
Movements·mexico_sheinbaum_morena_2024_present

Sheinbaum Morena continuity + judicial-reform consolidation

MEX·2024present·Sigamos Haciendo Historia — Morena + PT + PVEM — with qualified supermajority in the Cámara de Diputados and working supermajority in the Senado
Leaders: Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo (President from 1 October 2024) · Rogelio Ramírez de la O (Finance Minister, continuing from AMLO) · Edgar Amador Zamora (Finance Minister from 2025) · Marcelo Ebrard (Economy Minister / USMCA review) · Luz Elena González (Energy Minister from 2024) · Victoria Rodríguez Ceja (Banxico Governor) · Ernestina Godoy (Fiscalía General / Consejería Jurídica)
positionsdevelopmentalismsocial_democraticinstitutionalismclassical_liberalempirical_pragmatist

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Continuity heterodox-populist Morena government following AMLO, with Sheinbaum adding a technocratic-scientific framing (she is a former energy engineer and Mexico City head of government). Economic school: AMLO-continuation — fiscal austerity rhetoric, social-transfer programmes preserved and expanded, state primacy in energy, but with more orthodox communication to markets and a personal willingness to speak to private investors that AMLO avoided. Sits on the centre- left on the economic axis with a pronounced statist tilt on institutional variables. The signature event of the first months was the judicial reform package passed between 4-15 September 2024 (by the outgoing legislature, enacted the day before Sheinbaum's inauguration and carried forward as the governing programme): constitutional amendment making all federal judges — including the Ministers of the Suprema Corte — subject to popular election, with the first extraordinary election held 1 June 2025 renewing the Supreme Court and a large share of the federal bench; reduction of the SCJN from 11 to 9 Ministers; creation of a Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial. Companion constitutional changes passed Oct-Dec 2024: (i) abolition of seven autonomous bodies including INAI (transparency), Cofece (competition), IFT (telecoms regulator), CRE (energy regulator) — their functions absorbed by line ministries; (ii) elevation of the National Guard to armed-forces control (constitutional); (iii) constitutionalisation of social programmes (pensions, scholarships) to restrict future reversal. Fiscal / energy continuity: Plan México industrial strategy launched Jan 2025 with nearshoring framing; Pemex financial support continued; CFE-priority dispatch preserved; minimum wage pathway continued; universal pension indexed. Popularity: Sheinbaum won 2 June 2024 with 59.75% of valid votes (~35.9m votes, widest margin in modern Mexican history); Morena+PT+PVEM took ~364 of 500 Cámara seats (qualified supermajority) and 83 of 128 Senate seats (working super-majority with a single additional vote); Sheinbaum approval has held 65-80% across 2024-2025 per most trackers, briefly rising after her measured public handling of the Trump-era tariff threats and USMCA review preparations. Coherence line: the economic-content direction is continuity with AMLO (state primacy in energy, social-transfer expansion, fiscal orthodoxy on aggregates), while the institutional direction is materially more interventionist — the judicial and autonomous-bodies reforms structurally reshape Mexican separation of powers in ways AMLO advocated but could not pass without the 2024 supermajority. Framework implication: scoring institutional. judicial_independence and institutional.rule_of_law strongly negative is load-bearing for this movement.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
decreased · strong
weaker judicial independence
All federal judges including SCJN Ministers subject to popular election; SCJN reduced from 11 to 9; first election 1 June 2025.
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Abolition of INAI, Cofece, IFT, CRE, four other autonomous bodies; functions absorbed into executive ministries.
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · moderate
weaker property rights
Regulatory predictability reduced by abolition of independent sector regulators + elected judiciary.
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
decreased · moderate
more restrictive regulation, higher entry barriers
Cofece's enforcement role transferred to executive; IFT telecoms-regulator role ended; continuity of CFE-priority dispatch.
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
decreased · weak
looser licensing, more open entry
Continuity of AMLO-era energy model; no new Rondas; Plan México selective industrial targeting.
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · moderate
larger transfer footprint
Constitutionalised social programmes (pension, Becas Benito Juárez, Sembrando Vida); new expansions to women 60-64.
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · weak
higher spending share
2025 budget raised deficit target; Pemex support continued; energy-ministry absorption of regulators.
labour market flexibility
regulatory.labour_market_flexibility
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
decreased · weak
less flexible (stronger employment protection)
Minimum-wage trajectory continued; 40-hour working week reform under discussion.
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
unchanged · weak
Banxico autonomy formally preserved; cooperative executive-CB tone.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
cash_transfer_poverty_effects
refuted
privatisation_productivity_effect
refuted — GBR TFP growth FELL post-1984 (-0.51pp/yr, pre +0.97% → post +0.46%) AND underperformed the comparator-OECD mean (-0.55pp/yr; comparator post +1.01%). The productivity-from-privatisation premise does not show in PWT country-level TFP.

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned
developmentalism
Plan México industrial strategy; state primacy in energy.
partial
social_democratic
Transfer expansion + minimum-wage trajectory preserved.
opposed
institutionalism
Institutional direction is materially negative — elected judges, autonomous bodies abolished.
opposed
classical_liberal
Continuity of AMLO's energy model + institutional retrenchment.
partial
empirical_pragmatist
Macro aggregates stable; institutional experiment unprecedented — outcome evidence still emerging.

References

Notes

Separate movement record from AMLO preserves content coding: energy and social-transfer content is continuity; institutional content is a step-change (the judicial reform is structural and without modern precedent in OECD-adjacent economies). Evaluating the two movements as one would mask that institutional step-change.