IESET.
Movements·turkey_erdogan_akp_2002_present

AKP / Erdoğan governance (Turkey)

TUR·2002present·Justice and Development Party (AKP); post-2018 presidential system with MHP alliance
Leaders: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (PM 2003-2014, President 2014-present) · Ali Babacan (Economy/Deputy PM 2002-2015) · Mehmet Şimşek (Finance 2009-2015; Treasury & Finance 2023-present)
positionsdevelopmentalismchicago_monetarismclassical_liberal

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Two-phase governance. Phase one (2002-c.2011) continued the post-2001-crisis IMF-anchored programme inherited from the Ecevit/Derviş stabilisation: fiscal primary surpluses, banking-sector clean-up, inflation targeting at a de jure independent central bank, EU accession-driven regulatory convergence, and wide privatisation of SOEs (Türk Telekom, Tüpraş, Erdemir). Phase two (c.2013-present) reversed much of the monetary and institutional content: credit-fuelled construction booms, repeated political pressure on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to cut rates despite rising inflation, repeated governor dismissals (2019, 2021), unorthodox "Erdoğanomics" claim that high rates cause inflation, FX-protected deposit scheme (KKM) 2021, and 2018/2021 lira crises. Post-2023 election a partial orthodox pivot under Şimşek restored conventional rate hikes. Institutional quality declined sharply after the 2016 coup attempt and 2017 constitutional referendum consolidating executive power.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · moderate
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
Early-era privatisations + EU-candidacy regulatory alignment; partially reversed by later state-linked contracting.
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
decreased · strong
lower independence (fiscal dominance, politicised appointments)
Repeated governor dismissals 2019-2021 and overt political rate direction mark de facto loss of independence; early-era independence was the baseline being eroded.
~
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
mixed
Tight in 2002-2011 primary-surplus era; looser 2013+ with off-budget guarantees (PPP contingent liabilities, Credit Guarantee Fund).
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Post-2016 mass dismissals in judiciary and civil service; V-Dem and WGI series decline sharply 2013-2023.
judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
decreased · strong
weaker judicial independence
Constitutional Court composition changed; HSK restructured 2017.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
central_bank_independence_and_inflation_anchoring

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
developmentalism
Construction + directed-credit phase has developmentalist features without the export-discipline conditionality of East Asian cases.
opposed
chicago_monetarism
Explicit rejection of Taylor-rule logic post-2013; partial return 2023.
partial
classical_liberal
Early-era EU-convergence liberalisation only.

References

Notes

Two-phase coding is essential; a single axis direction would misrepresent the programme.