Two-phase governance. Phase one (2002-c.2011) continued the post-2001-crisis IMF-anchored programme inherited from the Ecevit/Derviş stabilisation: fiscal primary surpluses, banking-sector clean-up, inflation targeting at a de jure independent central bank, EU accession-driven regulatory convergence, and wide privatisation of SOEs (Türk Telekom, Tüpraş, Erdemir). Phase two (c.2013-present) reversed much of the monetary and institutional content: credit-fuelled construction booms, repeated political pressure on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to cut rates despite rising inflation, repeated governor dismissals (2019, 2021), unorthodox "Erdoğanomics" claim that high rates cause inflation, FX-protected deposit scheme (KKM) 2021, and 2018/2021 lira crises. Post-2023 election a partial orthodox pivot under Şimşek restored conventional rate hikes. Institutional quality declined sharply after the 2016 coup attempt and 2017 constitutional referendum consolidating executive power.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes
Repeated governor dismissals 2019-2021 and overt political rate direction mark de facto loss of independence; early-era independence was the baseline being eroded.
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.