IESET.
Movements·bolivia_arce_mas_2020_present

Arce MAS model-preservation and dollar crisis (Bolivia)

BOL·2020 – present·MAS-IPSP (Arcista faction after 2023-24 split with Evista faction)
Leaders: Luis Arce (President 2020-present) · David Choquehuanca (Vice-President) · Marcelo Montenegro (Economy & Finance Minister)
positionsdevelopmentalismpost_keynesianclassical_liberal

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Return of the Morales-era finance minister and self-described architect of the "Modelo Económico Social Comunitario Productivo" to the presidency on a platform of restoring the pre-2019 growth-with-redistribution formula: maintain the fixed exchange-rate peg (USD/BOB 6.96 since 2011), preserve universal fuel subsidies, continue cash transfers, and finance state-led industrialisation of lithium (YLB, contracts with Chinese CBC and Russian Uranium One signed 2023) and urea. The model began cracking in 2022-2023 as BCB net international reserves fell below USD 2bn, gas export revenues collapsed with reserve depletion, and a parallel dollar market emerged at 30-50% premium. The June 2023 debt-ceiling fight and 2024 fuel-import shortages (queues at pumps, subsidy bill ~USD 3bn/yr) exposed the peg-plus- deficit vulnerability. Politically, the MAS split between Arce and Morales hardened in 2024 — Morales barred from running — and a short-lived military uprising led by General Zúñiga occurred June 26 2024. Arce entered 2025 with single-digit approval and fuel crisis unresolved.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · strong
expanded sectoral subsidies
Universal fuel subsidy maintained despite fiscal cost and dollar scarcity.
↑
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · moderate
larger transfer footprint
Bono contra el Hambre 2020; pre-existing bonos maintained and indexed.
↓
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
decreased · strong
lower independence (fiscal dominance, politicised appointments)
BCB reserves drawn to defend peg; gold monetisation law 2023 authorised reserve sales.
↑
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
increased · moderate
tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating
YLB state monopoly on lithium with Chinese/Russian technology partners.
~
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
mixed · weak
Mercosur full membership raised formal regional integration, while FX rationing continued to restrict imports in practice.
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · weak
weaker rule of law
MAS internal split contested via judicial decisions on party registration; Morales barred from 2025 race.

Policies enacted

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned
developmentalism
partial
post_keynesian
opposed
classical_liberal

References

Notes

Arce won 2020 with 55.1% first round. The framework should pick up the peg-plus-deficit stress test forecast under the 2006-2019 umbrella entry.