IESET.
Movements·thailand_prayut_junta_pprp_2014_2023

Prayut Chan-o-cha — NCPO junta then Palang Pracharath elected-junta (2014-2023)

THA·2014 – 2023·National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) military junta 2014-2019; then Palang Pracharath-led coalition 2019-2023 (PPRP + Bhumjaithai + Democrat + minor parties) under the 2017 constitution
Leaders: Prayut Chan-o-cha (Army Chief, NCPO Head, then PM 2014-2023) · Prawit Wongsuwan (Deputy PM, PPRP leader) · Anupong Paochinda (Interior Minister) · Somkid Jatusripitak (Deputy PM for economy, 2015-2020, EEC architect) · Uttama Savanayana (Finance Minister, PPRP) · Arkhom Termpittayapaisith (Finance Minister, 2020-2023) · Veerathai Santiprabhob (BoT Governor 2015-2020) · Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput (BoT Governor from 2020)
positionsdevelopmentalismclassical_liberalinstitutionalismsocial_democratic

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Military-junta-then-elected-junta programme of constitution-engineered political continuity fused with pragmatic technocratic economic management. Economic school: dual-track developmentalism — orthodox macro aggregates (inflation targeting preserved, fiscal prudence, public-debt ceiling observed), an activist Board of Investment pushing targeted industrial policy through the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC Act 2018) and "Thailand 4.0" upgrading narrative, alongside populist continuity on minimum-wage rises (300-baht floor preserved from Yingluck then stepped up toward 328-354 across 2017- 2022), rice-farmer support, welfare cards, and village funds. Political-institutional content is materially negative: 2014 coup (22 May), NCPO interim constitution, suspension of the 2007 constitution, prolonged martial law then Section 44 absolute-power orders, 2017 junta-drafted constitution (appointed 250-seat Senate that votes for PM for five years, MMA electoral system engineered against large parties), 20-Year National Strategy (Oct 2018) binding future governments, Future Forward Party dissolution (Feb 2020), pro-democracy protest wave 2020-2021 met with lèse-majesté prosecutions. Sits authoritarian on the institutional axis, centre- right-with-populist-redistribution on the economic axis, and conservative-royalist on the cultural axis. Popularity / seats: 2019 election under junta rules delivered PPRP 116/500 House seats on ~23.7% party-list vote, Pheu Thai 136/500, Future Forward 81/500 — Prayut retained PM with the appointed Senate's 250 votes locking in continuity; 2023 election PPRP collapsed to 40/500 seats and United Thai Nation (Prayut's new vehicle) took 36/500, ending the continuation and opening the path to Pheu Thai's return.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↓
judicial independence
institutional.judicial_independence
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
decreased · strong
weaker judicial independence
NCPO appointments to Constitutional Court and Election Commission; 2017 constitution-engineered judicial veto points; Future Forward dissolution Feb 2020.
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Section 44 absolute-power orders during junta phase; prolonged martial law; expanded lèse-majesté (Article 112) enforcement.
—
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
unchanged · weak
Macro property-rights environment stable; foreign-investor regime preserved; no major expropriations.
↑
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · moderate
expanded sectoral subsidies
EEC BOI incentives, Thailand 4.0 targeted S-curve industry support, rice-pledging replaced by direct farmer support.
↑
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · moderate
larger transfer footprint
State welfare card (Bat Sawasdikan Haeng Rat) 2017 expanded; elderly allowance; village funds continued.
↑
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · weak
higher spending share
Gradual spending rise; COVID fiscal response 2020-2022 raised public debt ceiling from 60 to 70% of GDP.
↓
labour market flexibility
regulatory.labour_market_flexibility
Ease of hiring/firing, collective-bargaining scope, minimum wage rigidity, temporary/permanent contract regulation.
decreased · weak
less flexible (stronger employment protection)
Minimum-wage floor preserved and stepped up 2017-2022; migrant-worker regularisation tightened.
↑
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · weak
more open trade
RCEP signed 2020 and ratified 2021; continued bilateral FTA engagement; EU-Thailand FTA negotiations relaunched.
↑
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
increased · moderate
tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating
EEC special-zone licensing regime lowered entry friction for targeted industries in three eastern provinces.
—
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
unchanged · weak
BoT inflation-targeting regime and operational independence preserved.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
structural_reform_absence_and_post_euro_stagnation
not yet written
currency_crisis_capital_flight_dynamic

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

aligned
developmentalism
EEC + BOI-led targeted industrial policy is textbook East Asian developmentalist.
opposed
classical_liberal
Institutional direction strongly negative; targeted subsidies crowd out neutrality.
opposed
institutionalism
Constitution-engineered supermajority requirement, appointed Senate, party-dissolution doctrine.
partial
social_democratic
Minimum-wage and welfare-card transfers preserved; civil-liberties record is the opposite.

References

Notes

Separate movement record from the Pheu Thai successor preserves content coding: economic-axis direction here is mixed (market-friendly BOI + populist transfers), while institutional axis is strongly negative (coup, junta-drafted constitution, party dissolutions). 2017-2022 minimum-wage trajectory overlaps with the Srettha-era 400-baht trajectory and is coded in a separate policy file.