IESET.
Movements·us_trump_tariffs_2018_2019

Trump trade war tariffs

USA·20182019·Republican (Trump) — over objections of Republican free-trade traditionalists
Leaders: Donald Trump · Robert Lighthizer (USTR) · Peter Navarro (trade advisor)
positionsdevelopmentalismaustrianchicago_monetarism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Section 232 (steel, aluminium), Section 301 (China) tariffs + renegotiated NAFTA → USMCA. Framework D.3.1 calls this out as a canonical case of state-intervention-under-Republican-coalition: should NOT be coded as "market-oriented" because the policy content (trade restriction + industrial policy) is state-interventionist. Right-implemented state intervention is still state intervention per Invariant 3.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
decreased · strong
more protectionist
Average US tariff on imports from China rose from ~3% to ~19%.
sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
increased · moderate
tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · moderate
expanded sectoral subsidies
Tariff revenue offset via farm bailouts to soybean growers hit by retaliation.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
trade_protection_output_effects

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

References

Notes

Explicitly cited in D.3.1 as content-over-coalition: Republican = free market is the error this case corrects.