IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·spain_sanchez_economic_trajectory_2018_2023

Spain's headline macroeconomic trajectory under the 2018-present PSOE-led governments is NOT uniformly worse than a peer euro-area donor pool, once euro-area-common shocks (COVID 2020-2021, 2022 energy shock, ECB rate cycle) are absorbed by year fixed effects.

Specifically: (a) on GDP per capita (PPP, constant) Spain tracks or slightly outperforms the euro- periphery donor pool 2018-2023, with a strong 2023 recovery year; (b) on the employment rate (15-64) Spain narrows its gap to the donor pool; (c) on unemployment Spain remains the highest in the pool in levels but the 2018-2023 change is broadly comparable to peers; (d) BUT on real wages net of housing costs and on house-price-to-income ratios Spain's trajectory is materially weaker, particularly in the 2022-2023 energy and rental-cost period. The hypothesis is deliberately nuanced: it pre-registers the expectation that the "Spain is doing badly under Sánchez" framing is UNSUPPORTED on headline output and employment metrics, and that the defensible negative-trajectory finding is on housing affordability and real wages net of housing, not on aggregate growth.

PARTIALengine/runs/spain_sanchez_economic_trajectory_2018_2023

PARTIAL — coef=+0.009504, p=0.808 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=+0.009504, p=0.808 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 9 country or place units from 2005 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Spain post 2018
What we checked
  • Log income pc cost-of-living adjusted constant
  • Employment rate 15 64
  • Unemployment rate harmonised
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/spain_sanchez_economic_trajectory_2018_2023
descriptive sketch · model not yet run
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Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

17 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callChicago School Monetarismwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callClassical Liberalwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callDegrowth / Ecological Macroeconomicswins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callDemocratic Socialism (Bernsteinian revisionism + modern)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callStructuralist / Developmentalistwins if MIXEDpartial/no-callEco-Socialism / Red-Greenwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callEmpirical Pragmatist (the framework's house position)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callNew Institutional Economicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarket Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarxian Political Economywins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarxism-Leninism (central-planning implementation)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callModern Monetary Theorywins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callNew Keynesian (mainstream synthesis)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callOrdoliberalism (Freiburg School)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callPost-Keynesianwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callSocial Democraticwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit bae09ab · 2026-04-29T22:09:42Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:02Z

Spain's headline macroeconomic trajectory under the 2018-present PSOE-led governments is NOT uniformly worse than a peer euro-area donor pool, once euro-area-common shocks (COVID 2020-2021, 2022 energy shock, ECB rate cycle) are absorbed by year fixed effects. Specifically: (a) on GDP per capita (PPP, constant) Spain tracks or slightly outperforms the euro- periphery donor pool 2018-2023, with a strong 2023 recovery year; (b) on the employment rate (15-64) Spain narrows its gap to the donor pool; (c) on unemployment Spain remains the highest in the pool in levels but the 2018-2023 change is broadly comparable to peers; (d) BUT on real wages net of housing costs and on house-price-to-income ratios Spain's trajectory is materially weaker, particularly in the 2022-2023 energy and rental-cost period. The hypothesis is deliberately nuanced: it pre-registers the expectation that the "Spain is doing badly under Sánchez" framing is UNSUPPORTED on headline output and employment metrics, and that the defensible negative-trajectory finding is on housing affordability and real wages net of housing, not on aggregate growth.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

The hypothesis is SUPPORTED if the pre-registered pattern holds: β_spain_post_2018 is non-negative on (log GDP pc, employment rate) AND negative on (real house price to income, real wage net of housing), all at p < 0.10. The hypothesis is REJECTED if Spain is uniformly negative (i.e., also negative on headline output and employment) — this would indicate the "Spain is doing badly" framing is correct in the aggregate, contrary to the framework's pre- registered nuanced expectation. The hypothesis is also REJECTED in the opposite direction if Spain is uniformly positive (including on housing and real wages) — this would indicate the critics' housing concerns are not data-supported. Either uniform direction falsifies the nuanced framing; only the pre-registered differentiated pattern supports it.

formal test & threshold
test:      spain_post_2018_twfe_multi_outcome
threshold: β_spain_post_2018 >= 0 at p < 0.10 on log_gdp_pc_ppp AND employment_rate, AND β_spain_post_2018 < 0 at p < 0.10 on real_house_price_to_income AND real_wage_net_of_housing.

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
9 countries · 2005 – 2023
Evidence type
causal

Primary: TWFE with country + year fixed effects. Year FE absorb euro-area-common shocks (COVID, energy crisis, ECB tightening) that dominate 2020-2023 and would otherwise swamp any Spain- specific content signal. β_spain_post_2018 identifies the Spain-specific trajectory deviation from the donor-pool time- average. Run separately for each outcome: log GDP pc PPP, employment rate, unemployment rate, real house-price-to-income, real wage index, and a constructed "real wage net of housing" outcome that divides the real wage index by the real house-price-to-income index. The hypothesis expects β_spain_post_2018 to be zero-or-positive on GDP per capita and employment, negative on the housing and real- wage-net-of-housing outcomes. Pre-registering this expected differentiation is the entire methodological point: the framework rejects the lazy "Sánchez = economic decline" framing and tests the more defensible "Spain's aggregate trajectory is fine but housing and real-purchasing-power are worse" framing. Synthetic-control robustness for the GDP and employment outcomes.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_gdp_pc_ppp_constant
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
employment_rate_15_64
outcome
eurostat:lfsi_emp_atier 1
level
unemployment_rate_harmonised
outcome
eurostat:une_rt_atier 1
level
real_house_price_to_income_index
outcome
oecd:OECD.ECO.MPDtier 2
index_2015_base
real_wage_index
outcome
oecd:OECD.ELS.SAEtier 2
cumulative_index_2018_base
spain_post_2018
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 if country=ESP and year >= 2018; 0 otherwise. Tests whether Spanish trajectory deviates from the euro-areatier 5
indicator
log_population
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTLtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
log_gross_fixed_capital_formation_pct_gdp
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZStier 2
log
euro_area_indicator
control
constructed:1 if country uses euro as of year, 0 otherwise. Absorbed by country FE but retained for interaction robustness.tier 5
indicator

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — spain_sanchez_economic_trajectory_2018_2023

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=+0.009504, p=0.808 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Spain's headline macroeconomic trajectory under the 2018-present PSOE-led governments is NOT uniformly worse than a peer euro-area donor pool, once euro-area-common shocks (COVID 2020-2021, 2022 energy shock, ECB rate cycle) are absorbed by year fixed effects. Specifically: (a) on GDP per capita (PPP, constant) Spain tracks or slightly outperforms the euro- periphery donor pool 2018-2023, with a strong 2023 recovery year; (b) on the employment rate (15-64) Spain narrows its gap to the donor pool; (c) on unemployment Spain remains the highest in the pool in levels but the 2018-2023 change is broadly comparable to peers; (d) BUT on real wages net of housing costs and on house-price-to-income ratios Spain's trajectory is materially weaker, particularly in the 2022-2023 energy and rental-cost period. The hypothesis is deliberately nuanced: it pre-registers the expectation that the "Spain is doing badly under Sánchez" framing is UNSUPPORTED on headline output and employment metrics, and that the defensible negative-trajectory finding is on housing affordability and real wages net of housing, not on aggregate growth.
  • Falsification rule: The hypothesis is SUPPORTED if the pre-registered pattern holds: β_spain_post_2018 is non-negative on (log GDP pc, employment rate) AND negative on (real house price to income, real wage net of housing), all at p < 0.10. The hypothesis is REJECTED if Spain is uniformly negative (i.e., also negative on headline output and employment) — this would indicate the "Spain is doing badly" framing is correct in the aggregate, contrary to the framework's pre- registered nuanced expectation. The hypothesis is also REJECTED in the opposite direction if Spain is uniformly positive (including on housing and real wages) — this would indicate the critics' housing concerns are not data-supported. Either uniform direction falsifies the nuanced framing; only the pre-registered differentiated pattern supports it.
  • Falsification test: spain_post_2018_twfe_multi_outcome

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +0.009504
  • Std error: 0.03909
  • p-value: 0.808
  • Observations: 171, countries: 9
  • Within R²: 0.573
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_gdp_pc_ppp_constant (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • eurostat:lfsi_emp_a → employment_rate_15_64 (outcome, publisher=eurostat, n=634)
  • eurostat:une_rt_a → unemployment_rate_harmonised (outcome, publisher=eurostat, n=634)
  • oecd:OECD.ELS.SAE,DSD_EARNINGS@DF_EARN,1.0 → real_wage_index (outcome, publisher=oecd, n=622)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 if country=ESP and year >= 2018; 0 otherwise. Tests whether Spanish trajectory deviates from the euro-area donor pool from the June 2018 PSOE government onward. → spain_post_2018 (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=171)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTL → log_population (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=14447)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS → log_gross_fixed_capital_formation_pct_gdp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9870)

Variables missing data

  • oecd:OECD.ECO.MPD,DSD_AN_HOUSE_PRICES@DF_HOUSE_PRICES,1.0 (outcome, name=real_house_price_to_income_index) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed: 1 if country uses euro as of year, 0 otherwise. Absorbed by country FE but retained for interaction robustness. (controls, name=euro_area_indicator) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:02+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Donor-pool choice: FRA, ITA, PRT, GRC are euro-periphery/large peers subject to similar euro-area shocks; DEU, NLD, BEL anchor the euro- core; IRL is included as high-growth comparator but excluded from baseline post-2015 due to FDI-GDP distortion. Non-euro economies deliberately excluded because the monetary channel is exogenous to Spain (ECB-bound) and including non-euro countries would conflate monetary-regime effects with Sánchez-era policy-content effects. The 2018 cutoff corresponds to the 1 June 2018 no-confidence vote that installed the Sánchez government. The treatment indicator covers the entire 2018-2023 period including COVID; year fixed effects absorb the COVID + energy shocks, so the Spain-specific coefficient identifies what is left after those shocks are removed. The "solo sí es sí" law and related criminal-law content are NOT tested here — see hypotheses/labour/spain_reported_sexual_assault_ rate_definition_controlled for the separate, independently-pre- registered test of the reported-assault-rate series with the 2022 definitional change controlled.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.