IESET.
Movements·philippines_marcos_authoritarian_economy_1965_1986

Philippines Marcos authoritarian economy

PHL·19651986·Nacionalista Party then martial-law personalist regime (from 1972)
Leaders: Ferdinand E. Marcos (President 1965-86) · Cesar Virata (Finance / PM) · Imelda Marcos (Human Settlements) · Roberto Benedicto and Eduardo Cojuangco (favoured cronies)
positionsdevelopmentalisminstitutionalismclassical_liberal

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Authoritarian developmentalist project that degenerated into kleptocracy. Early Marcos years (1965-72) continued import- substitution industrialisation behind tariffs and the peso peg. Martial law (21 Sept 1972) centralised economic control, created state marketing monopolies for sugar (PHILSUCOM) and coconut (UCPB / coconut levy), launched debt-financed 'eleven major industrial projects' (KKK) and Metro Manila beautification, and directed bank credit to cronies. World Bank and IMF lending financed balance-of-payments deficits through the late 1970s. A 1981 corporate-debt crisis (Dewey Dee flight), 1983 Aquino assassination, and 1984-85 balance-of-payments crisis produced two peso devaluations (1983, 1984), IMF standby arrangements, and severe contraction (GDP -7% in both 1984 and 1985). The regime ended in the February 1986 EDSA People Power uprising leaving $28bn external debt, documented plunder estimated at $5-10bn, and a decade of lost growth — a canonical failure case of authoritarian developmentalism without institutional constraint.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
decreased · strong
looser licensing, more open entry
State marketing monopolies, licensing captured by cronies, restriction of entry in sugar, coconut, banking, media.
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Martial law, suspension of habeas corpus, selective use of the judiciary, extrajudicial repression.
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · strong
weaker property rights
Sequestration of political opponents' enterprises; takeovers transferred to cronies.
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · strong
expanded sectoral subsidies
Debt-financed 'behest loans' and large industrial projects directed to favoured firms.
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
decreased · moderate
more protectionist
High effective protection for ISI sectors; partial liberalisation under 1980 World Bank SAL reversed in the 1984 crisis.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
developmentalist_state_growth_performance
not yet written
currency_crisis_capital_flight_dynamic

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

opposed
developmentalism
Cited as the standard cautionary case — the developmental-state template without effective bureaucratic insulation or performance discipline.
opposed
institutionalism
Canonical illustration of extractive institutions sensu Acemoglu-Robinson.

References