IESET.
Movements·egypt_scaf_transition_2011_2012

SCAF military-transitional government (Egypt)

EGY·2011 – 2012·Supreme Council of the Armed Forces — 20-member military junta assuming executive power after Mubarak resignation
Leaders: Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (Chairman SCAF, de facto head of state) · General Sami Hafez Anan (SCAF Chief of Staff) · Essam Sharaf (Prime Minister Mar-Dec 2011) · Kamal Ganzouri (Prime Minister Dec 2011 - Aug 2012) · Samir Radwan / Hazem El Beblawi / Momtaz El-Said (Finance Ministers)
positionsdevelopmentalism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Military-transitional stewardship — interim rule preserving economic status quo while managing sterling FX reserve drain and negotiating transition roadmap. Economic school: conservative-holding rentier- military management under reserve pressure — IMF $3.2bn standby negotiated then declined under political resistance Jun 2011; reserves fell from ~$36bn Jan 2011 to ~$15bn Jun 2012; tourism and FDI collapsed; wheat-import subsidies preserved. Dated policies: Mubarak resignation 11 Feb 2011; Constitutional Declaration 30 Mar 2011; Maspero clashes 9 Oct 2011; Parliament elections Nov 2011 - Jan 2012 producing Muslim Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party plurality; SCAF dissolution of parliament Jun 2012 via SCC ruling; Morsi presidential win 30 Jun 2012 handover. Left-right: military-conservative holding pattern; no ideological economic programme beyond preservation. Popularity: SCAF popular initially as guardian-of-revolution; declined sharply after Maspero Oct 2011 and Mohamed Mahmoud clashes Nov 2011 with ~50+ protester deaths; street confidence collapsed. Coherence: narrow — intentionally a caretaker arrangement without reform mandate; fiscal situation worsened throughout with reserves bleeding and deficit widening to ~11% GDP by 2011-2012.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · moderate
higher spending share
Transition-period deficit widened to ~11% GDP with public-sector wage and subsidy continuation.
—
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
unchanged · weak
No tariff or FDI regime change; collapse driven by exogenous confidence not policy.
—
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
unchanged · weak
Subsidy architecture preserved without reform; stock continued.
↓
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · moderate
weaker rule of law
Military tribunals for ~12,000 civilians during transition documented by HRW.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
post_revolution_transition_macro_effects

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
developmentalism
State-holding military stewardship without doctrinal frame.

References

Notes

17-month bracketed transition; fills gap between Mubarak late era movement and Morsi movement already in corpus.