Xi Jinping era — common prosperity, SOE reassertion, security primacy

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era — codified in the CCP constitution (2017) and state constitution (2018). Economic school: statist-right-populist within a one-party system — supply-side structural reform, SOE reassertion as "stronger, better, bigger", national-security primacy across economic policy, Made in China 2025 (2015) indigenous-innovation industrial policy, and "common prosperity" (共同富裕, 2021) as redistributive frame. Left-right axis: combines statist-right content (SOE reassertion, security-first technology policy, strongman-nationalist populism, demographic and social conservatism) with statist-populist redistributive framing ("common prosperity", platform-monopoly crackdown, education-tutoring ban) — not classifiable on a Western left-right axis; within the CCP spectrum this is the statist-nationalist pole distinct from the Jiang-Zhu and Hu-Wen reformist currents. Core policy content: (i) anti-corruption campaign (2012+, ~4.7M CCDI investigations through 2022) consolidating control and disciplining Party-state; (ii) Belt and Road Initiative announced September-October 2013; (iii) Made in China 2025 (May 2015) sectoral-subsidy industrial policy across ten strategic sectors; (iv) one-child policy replaced with two-child (January 2016), then three-child (May 2021), alongside marriage/fertility promotion; (v) supply-side structural reform (2015-2018) addressing coal/steel overcapacity and zombie SOEs; (vi) 2017 19th Party Congress removal of presidential term limits (enacted March 2018); (vii) US-China trade war and Phase One deal (Jan 2020); (viii) property-sector "three red lines" (August 2020) deleveraging framework, precipitating Evergrande default 2021 and the 2022-2024 property market contraction; (ix) "double reduction" (双减, July 2021) education-tutoring ban; (x) platform / fintech crackdown (Ant IPO suspended Nov 2020, DiDi app removal Jul 2021, Alibaba antitrust fine Apr 2021); (xi) common prosperity programme (August 2021) — third distribution, tax enforcement, regional rebalancing; (xii) zero-COVID (2020-2022, abandoned December 2022); (xiii) housing market collapse response (2023-2024) — mortgage-rate cuts, "white list" project financing, PBoC RMB500bn relending for unsold-housing purchases (May 2024); (xiv) "new quality productive forces" (新质生产力, 2023-2024) EV / battery / solar industrial-policy frame. Popularity / legitimacy: NPC confirmation votes unanimous (Xi presidential re-election 2018 received 2,970 / 2,970; 2023 third term 2,952 / 2,952); 2018 constitutional removal of term limits passed 2,958 to 2; plenum outcomes delivered without visible split (Third Plenum 2024 signalled continuity); protest / unrest incidence — late- 2022 "A4 / white paper" protests ended zero-COVID; localised bank-run protests 2022 (Henan village banks) and mortgage-strike movement 2022; "mass incidents" no longer officially reported; stated-survey approval of central government (Harvard Ash Center longitudinal) declined from ~93% pre-2019 toward high-80s by 2023 but remained high. Coherence line: trade political-economy efficiency of Jiang-Zhu reform era for party-centred security, demographic-national-industrial autonomy, and resilience against external shock — an explicit reweighting from growth-maximisation to regime-durability objectives.