Lula third term — Marco Fiscal, industrial policy return (Brazil)

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Return of the Workers' Party (PT) to federal government with a structurally different programme from the 2003-2010 tripod era: (i) a new fiscal framework (Novo Arcabouço Fiscal, Lei Complementar 200/2023) replacing the Teto de Gastos (2016 constitutional spending cap) with a real-spending growth rule of 0.6%-2.5% per year bounded by a primary-balance target band; (ii) a VAT-unification tax reform (EC 132/2023) replacing ICMS/ISS/PIS/Cofins/IPI with a dual CBS+IBS structure with transition through 2033; (iii) Bolsa Família re-expansion from the Bolsonaro-era Auxílio Brasil, with higher floors and restored conditionalities; (iv) Nova Indústria Brasil (January 2024) — industrial-policy package with BNDES concessional credit, green-transition prioritisation, mission- oriented targets in health, agro, defence, and semiconductors; (v) Mercosur-EU trade deal signed December 2024 after two decades of negotiation; (vi) energy transition framing with preserved Petrobras role and revived Eletrobras/strategic-sector intervention rhetoric. Coalition management differs sharply from 2003-2010: PT holds fewer congressional seats, Centrão control of the budget via emendas is institutionalised (post-2019 Orçamento Secreto legacy), and fiscal credibility contests with financial markets produced real-rate tightening 2024-2025. Internal PT economic heterogeneity (Haddad market-respecting wing vs Guido Mantega / developmentalist wing) is observable in public policy debates. Early outcomes: GDP growth ~3% 2023, ~3.4% 2024 (above consensus); unemployment at historic lows ~6.2% by late 2024; BCB real rate held tight; fiscal-framework credibility disputed with markets testing primary-balance trajectory.