IESET.
Movements·iran_pezeshkian_reformist_2024_present

Pezeshkian reformist-aligned government (Iran)

IRN·2024 – present·Reformist Front alliance backing an independent Majles-veteran candidacy under Supreme Leader Khamenei; cabinet mixes moderate-reformist technocrats (Zarif as VP for Strategic Affairs initially) with principlist-approved security/justice ministers; 12th Majles (elected Mar 2024) principlist-dominated, constraining executive scope
Leaders: Masoud Pezeshkian (President from 28 Jul 2024) · Mohammad Javad Zarif (VP for Strategic Affairs, resigned Mar 2025) · Abbas Araghchi (Foreign Minister, chief nuclear negotiator) · Mohammad Reza Farzin (CBI Governor, continued) · Abdolnaser Hemmati (Minister of Economy 2024-2025, impeached Mar 2025)
positionsnew_keynesianclassical_liberaldevelopmentalism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Reformist-aligned fiscal reformism constrained by Supreme-Leader institutions: nuclear-talks reopening attempt, subsidy-reform gradualism under inflation shock, and crisis-management under full-scale Israel-Iran war. Core programme — (i) Pezeshkian elected 5 Jul 2024 runoff with 53.7% vs Jalili on ~49.8% turnout after Raisi helicopter death 19 May 2024; inaugurated 28 Jul 2024; (ii) immediate escalation with Haniyeh assassination in Tehran 31 Jul 2024, second direct Iran-Israel missile exchange 1 Oct 2024, Israeli reprisal strikes on Iranian air defence and missile production 26 Oct 2024; (iii) full-scale Israel-Iran-US war Jun 2025 (Israeli "Rising Lion" campaign against nuclear sites 13 Jun; US B-2 strikes on Fordow/Natanz/Isfahan 22 Jun), ceasefire announced 24 Jun 2025 but Iranian nuclear programme substantially degraded; (iv) inflation 30-45% range through 2024-2025, rial collapse from ~600,000/USD mid-2024 to >1,000,000/USD during war peak; (v) fuel-subsidy reform postponed repeatedly under political constraint; energy-rationing and blackouts winter 2024-2025; (vi) FATF re-engagement signalled but not delivered; nuclear-talks indirect via Oman resumed Apr 2025, suspended by war, restarted after ceasefire; (vii) Hemmati economy-minister impeachment Mar 2025 by principlist Majles over rial depreciation; Zarif resignation same month; (viii) hijab-law enforcement de-prioritised at executive level, contested with Majles/Judiciary. Left-right within clerical-theocratic system: reformist-liberal pole, though policy scope is tightly bounded by Supreme Leader, Guardian Council, and IRGC. Popularity: 53.7% runoff vote share, ~49.8% turnout (low by historical standards but above 2024 Majles election); approval eroded through 2024-2025 currency crisis and war damage; urban reformist constituencies retain allegiance while principlist press treats cabinet as sanctions-concessional. Coherence line: reopen-negotiations doctrine + subsidy-gradualism + wartime crisis-management, constrained by principlist Majles, IRGC security architecture, and Israel-US military campaign against nuclear programme.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · weak
more open trade
Indirect nuclear-talks reopening via Oman Apr-Jun 2025 and post-ceasefire resumption; FATF re-engagement signalled; actual sanctions regime unchanged through 2025.
—
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
unchanged · weak
Fuel-subsidy reform postponed under inflation shock and war; energy rationing substituted for price reform.
↓
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
decreased · moderate
lower independence (fiscal dominance, politicised appointments)
Persistent monetisation under war and sanctions; rial collapse to >1,000,000/USD during Jun 2025 war.
—
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
unchanged · weak
Executive de-prioritisation of morality-enforcement contested by Majles/Judiciary; net institutional change ambiguous.
↓
energy supply security
regulatory.energy_supply_security
Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.
decreased · strong
lower supply-security posture (single-supplier dependence, early phase-outs)
Israeli strikes on gas infrastructure Oct 2024 and Jun 2025 war damage; winter 2024-2025 blackouts; refinery and oil-depot strikes during Jun 2025 campaign.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
sanctions_effect_on_growth
not yet written
rentier_state_non_oil_development

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
new_keynesian
Reformist cabinet rhetoric favoured disinflation and FATF compliance; blocked by principlist Majles and war.
partial
classical_liberal
FX-liberalisation signalling and talks-reopening orientation, bounded by clerical-theocratic system.
partial
developmentalism
Retains state-oil-revenue-led investment frame; reduced resistance-economy emphasis.

References

Notes

Ongoing movement; axes directions provisional pending end of 2025-2026 policy cycle. Israel-Iran war of Jun 2025 and its ceasefire are dominant exogenous factors.