Herrera Campins COPEI — counter-shock, 'Viernes Negro' devaluation

Doctrine — stated goals and content

COPEI government confronted the reversal of the oil boom, terminal debt build-up, and the end of the Puntofijo-era fixed-exchange-rate regime. Four doctrinal pillars: (1) "Venezuela Turned Over to Debt" — Herrera Campins inherited ~USD 22bn external debt and public enterprises in deficit; 1979-1980 second oil shock briefly cushioned fiscal; 1981-1982 oil price weakened; (2) November 1982 "Recadi" exchange- control build-up anticipation — capital flight accelerated under 2.15 Bs/USD fixed rate regime in place since 1964; (3) "Viernes Negro" (18 February 1983) — BCV ended the 18-year fixed-rate regime, introduced three-tier exchange rate system (RECADI for essentials at 4.30, priority at 6.00, free market floated), and defaulted on short-term debt-service with nominal maturity extension; inflation rose from 10% to 18%; GDP fell -5.6% (1983); (4) attempted industrial-diversification continuation under "VI Plan de la Nación" (1981-85) — Ciudad Guayana expansion, Caracas metro system commissioning (1983), and highway network continuation despite fiscal retrenchment. Stated school: COPEI Christian-democratic social-market tradition + late-stage Puntofijo developmentalism. Left-right axis: centre-right on economic content; centre on social content. Popularity / legitimacy: December 1978 election Herrera won 46.6% vs AD's Piñerúa 43.3% (closest margin in AD-COPEI alternation); December 1983 succession AD's Jaime Lusinchi won 56.7% vs COPEI's Rafael Caldera 34.5% — COPEI punished for Viernes Negro. Coherence line: defend the Puntofijo fixed-rate developmentalist model until currency-and-debt pressure forced the exchange-rate abandonment that inaugurated Venezuela's two-decade unravelling.