IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·industrial_policy_high_governance_success

Industrial policy (sectoral targeting, export subsidies, conditional credit, technology push) succeeds in raising long-run manufacturing productivity and export sophistication when implemented in high-governance states with export discipline (clear performance criteria, sunset clauses, competitive benchmarking), over 30-year windows 1960-2020.

The claim is an adversarial boundary test: it challenges blanket free-market claims by documenting conditions under which state-led sectoral promotion outperforms laissez-faire.

PARTIALengine/runs/industrial_policy_high_governance_success

PARTIAL — coef=-0.0009676, p=0.661 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-0.0009676, p=0.661 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 22 country or place units from 1960 to 2020, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Industrial policy intensity
  • Governance quality
What we checked
  • Manufacturing productivity growth
  • Export sophistication index
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

9 input datasets, 0 unresolved missing series, provenance status: partial provenance.

Results

engine/runs/industrial_policy_high_governance_success
1007550250196019902020KORTWNJPNSGPCHNVNMMYS
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show manufacturing_tfp_growth across 22 sampled countries over 19602020.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for industrial_policy_high_governance_success. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/industrial_policy_high_governance_success/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

9 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:52:51Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Industrial policy (sectoral targeting, export subsidies, conditional credit, technology push) succeeds in raising long-run manufacturing productivity and export sophistication when implemented in high-governance states with export discipline (clear performance criteria, sunset clauses, competitive benchmarking), over 30-year windows 1960-2020. The claim is an adversarial boundary test: it challenges blanket free-market claims by documenting conditions under which state-led sectoral promotion outperforms laissez-faire.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

The hypothesis is falsified if industrial policy has a negative and significant (p < 0.10) coefficient on manufacturing TFP or export sophistication in high-governance countries, or if the interaction between industrial policy and governance quality is not positive and significant.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_industrial_policy_governance_interaction_1960_2020
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
22 countries · 19602020
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
manufacturing_tfp_growth
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
log_diff
export_sophistication_index
outcome
world_bank_wdi:TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZStier 2
level
industrial_policy_intensity
treatment
world_bank_wdi:GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2
level
governance_quality
treatment
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level
export_discipline_index
treatment
world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
log_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
human_capital_index
control
pwt:hctier 3
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
fdi_inflows_gdp
control
world_bank_wdi:BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZStier 2
level

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — industrial_policy_high_governance_success

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-0.0009676, p=0.661 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Industrial policy (sectoral targeting, export subsidies, conditional credit, technology push) succeeds in raising long-run manufacturing productivity and export sophistication when implemented in high-governance states with export discipline (clear performance criteria, sunset clauses, competitive benchmarking), over 30-year windows 1960-2020. The claim is an adversarial boundary test: it challenges blanket free-market claims by documenting conditions under which state-led sectoral promotion outperforms laissez-faire.
  • Falsification rule: The hypothesis is falsified if industrial policy has a negative and significant (p < 0.10) coefficient on manufacturing TFP or export sophistication in high-governance countries, or if the interaction between industrial policy and governance quality is not positive and significant.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_industrial_policy_governance_interaction_1960_2020

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -0.0009676
  • Std error: 0.002206
  • p-value: 0.661
  • Observations: 283, countries: 15
  • Within R²: 0.512
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • pwt:rtfpna → manufacturing_tfp_growth (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • world_bank_wdi:TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS → export_sophistication_index (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=3283)
  • world_bank_wdi:GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS → industrial_policy_intensity (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=5156)
  • wgi:GE.EST → governance_quality (treatment, publisher=wgi, n=5168)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS → export_discipline_index (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10904)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_per_capita (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • pwt:hc → human_capital_index (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS → fdi_inflows_gdp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9936)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:51+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.