IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel

higher labor tax wedges predict lower prime-age employment and higher informality over long windows, with larger effects in middle-income economies.

PARTIALengine/runs/ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel

PARTIAL — coef=-0.01506, p=0.833 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-0.01506, p=0.833 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 1990 to 2024, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Tax revenue share
What we checked
  • Labor force participation
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel
1007550250199020072024GLOBAL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show labor_force_participation across 1 sampled countries over 1990–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

17 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callChicago School Monetarismwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callClassical Liberalwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callDegrowth / Ecological Macroeconomicswins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callDemocratic Socialism (Bernsteinian revisionism + modern)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callStructuralist / Developmentalistwins if MIXEDpartial/no-callEco-Socialism / Red-Greenwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callEmpirical Pragmatist (the framework's house position)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callNew Institutional Economicswins if MIXEDpartial/no-callMarket Socialism (Lange-Lerner tradition)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarxian Political Economywins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callMarxism-Leninism (central-planning implementation)wins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callModern Monetary Theorywins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callNew Keynesian (mainstream synthesis)wins if MIXEDpartial/no-callOrdoliberalism (Freiburg School)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callPost-Keynesianwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-callSocial Democraticwins if REFUTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:44Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

higher labor tax wedges predict lower prime-age employment and higher informality over long windows, with larger effects in middle-income economies.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if the primary treatment coefficient has the pre-registered - sign at p<=0.10 with minimum sample gates. REFUTED if the coefficient has the opposite sign at p<=0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL; missing data or failed sample gates are INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
1 countries · 1990 – 2024
Evidence type
associational

Alias-batch panel fixed effects screen. The proxy source is explicitly local and runnable, but exact policy semantics should be upgraded before scoreboard conversion.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
labor_force_participation
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZStier 2
level
tax_revenue_share
treatment
world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZStier 2
level_lagged_one_year
log_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
government_effectiveness
control
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-0.01506, p=0.833 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: higher labor tax wedges predict lower prime-age employment and higher informality over long windows, with larger effects in middle-income economies.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if the primary treatment coefficient has the pre-registered - sign at p<=0.10 with minimum sample gates. REFUTED if the coefficient has the opposite sign at p<=0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL; missing data or failed sample gates are INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_ml_tax_wedge_labor_participation_formality_panel

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -0.01506
  • Std error: 0.07137
  • p-value: 0.833
  • Observations: 2323, countries: 115
  • Within R²: -0.00316
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZS → labor_force_participation (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8302)
  • world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS → tax_revenue_share (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4787)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • wgi:GE.EST → government_effectiveness (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:44+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Source shard: engine/audits/swarm_2026-05-22_200_hypotheses_worker_A_market_liberal.md. Backlog source families: OECD Taxing Wages, ILOSTAT, WDI, WEO, World Bank informality indicators.. Alias proxy used: world_bank_wdi:GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS -> world_bank_wdi:SL.TLF.CACT.ZS. Initial promotion pass left scoreboard mapping empty; mapped by the 2026-05-22 swarm scoreboard conversion v1.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.