IESET.
Movements·philippines_marcos_crony_capitalism_1976_1986

Marcos late-martial-law crony capitalism (Philippines)

PHL·19761986·Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) under Ferdinand Marcos, martial law until 1981
Leaders: Ferdinand Marcos (President) · Cesar Virata (Finance Minister, Prime Minister 1981-1986) · Jaime Laya (Central Bank Governor 1981-1984) · Roberto Benedicto (sugar monopoly) · Eduardo Cojuangco (coconut monopoly)
positionsdevelopmentalismclassical_liberal

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Late-Marcos authoritarian crony capitalism — post-1972 martial-law regime entering its debt-financed decline phase. Economic school: developmentalist rhetoric + IMF programme orthodoxy superimposed on extractive crony-monopoly allocation. Dated policies: coconut-industry levy (Cojuangco-led UNICOM / COCOFED) 1973-1986; sugar monopoly PHILSUCOM/NASUTRA under Benedicto from 1976; 11 IMF standby arrangements 1975-1985; 'eleven major industrial projects' (petrochemicals, copper smelter, nuclear plant) announced 1979; Bataan Nuclear Power Plant completed 1984 (never operated); martial law formally lifted 17 Jan 1981, replaced by Amendment No. 6 effectively continuing rule; Cesar Virata technocrat premiership Jul 1981 attempting orthodox stabilisation; Benigno Aquino assassination 21 Aug 1983 triggered capital flight, 39% peso devaluation Oct 1983, debt-service moratorium Oct 1983 (USD24.4bn external debt). Snap election 7 Feb 1986 stolen; EDSA People Power Revolution 22-25 Feb 1986 ousted Marcos to Hawaii. Left-right: right-authoritarian, rhetorically developmentalist. Popularity: 1978 IBP election KBL ~85%; 1981 presidential 'election' Marcos 88% (boycotted); 1986 snap election Marcos claimed victory over Cory Aquino — NAMFREL count showed Aquino leading, COMELEC walk-out. Coherence: very low — technocrat stabilisation under Virata fought against crony-monopoly allocation, macroeconomic collapse 1983-1986 (GDP -7% 1984, -3.5% 1985).

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

sectoral licensing
regulatory.sectoral_licensing
Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).
decreased · strong
looser licensing, more open entry
Sugar/coconut monopolies granted to cronies; licensing weaponised against non-aligned firms — strong-negative on competition direction of this axis.
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
decreased · strong
weaker property rights
Sequestration of opposition businesses; selective expropriation under PDs.
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · strong
expanded sectoral subsidies
Eleven Major Projects + Bataan Nuclear + crony-firm bailouts 1981-1984.
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · strong
weaker rule of law
Martial law (1972-1981) and Amendment No. 6 continuation; Aquino assassination.
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
unchanged · weak
IMF tariff-reform conditionality partially implemented, offset by non-tariff allocation.

Policies enacted

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
developmentalism
Rhetoric aligned; allocation diverged.

References

Notes

Deep-history tranche 1. Narrower slice of philippines_marcos_authoritarian_economy_1965_1986.