IESET.
Hypotheses·energy·nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exit

Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain.

FIRST-ORDER: the policy delivers on the green-ambition narrative — reactors are closed, nuclear-dependency ends, and the political commitment is honoured. This first-order success is real and we acknowledge it on its own terms. SECOND-ORDER: wholesale and industrial electricity prices rise (gas-fired generation fills the dispatchable gap), grid reliability metrics weaken, and carbon- intensity of power generation rises in the transition window. THIRD-ORDER: energy-intensive industry (chemicals, steel, aluminium) reduces capacity or relocates out of the jurisdiction — BASF Ludwigshafen contraction, ArcelorMittal and Salzgitter steel curtailments, aluminium smelter closures in Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands. Investment and FDI flows in energy-intensive sectors redirect abroad. Cases: Germany Atomausstieg 2011-2023, Belgium nuclear phaseout schedule (now partly reversed), Germany Kohleausstieg interaction.

PARTIALengine/runs/nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exit

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.04357, |gap|/pre_sd=8.7, p_perm=0.25; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether nuclear phaseout event or schedule is actually linked to better or worse nuclear share of generation from 2000 to 2024.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=+0.04357, |gap|/pre_sd=8.7, p_perm=0.25; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

This matters because energy claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 4 country or place units from 2000 to 2024, using a synth did design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Nuclear phaseout event or schedule
What we checked
  • Nuclear share of generation
  • Industrial electricity price
  • Grid reliability saidi
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exit
1007550250200020122024DEUBELFRANLD
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show nuclear_share_of_generation across 4 sampled countries over 20002024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exit. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exit/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

17 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit bae09ab · 2026-04-29T22:09:42Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:51:39Z

Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain. FIRST-ORDER: the policy delivers on the green-ambition narrative — reactors are closed, nuclear-dependency ends, and the political commitment is honoured. This first-order success is real and we acknowledge it on its own terms. SECOND-ORDER: wholesale and industrial electricity prices rise (gas-fired generation fills the dispatchable gap), grid reliability metrics weaken, and carbon- intensity of power generation rises in the transition window. THIRD-ORDER: energy-intensive industry (chemicals, steel, aluminium) reduces capacity or relocates out of the jurisdiction — BASF Ludwigshafen contraction, ArcelorMittal and Salzgitter steel curtailments, aluminium smelter closures in Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands. Investment and FDI flows in energy-intensive sectors redirect abroad. Cases: Germany Atomausstieg 2011-2023, Belgium nuclear phaseout schedule (now partly reversed), Germany Kohleausstieg interaction.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if: (a) FIRST-ORDER nuclear phaseout is achieved as legislated (trivially confirmed for DEU 2023) AND (b) SECOND- ORDER industrial electricity-price divergence vs synthetic control is <10 EUR/MWh once gas-price and ETS are controlled for at p<0.10 AND (c) THIRD-ORDER energy-intensive sector output or FDI shows no divergence vs synthetic control. If the price gap is entirely absorbed by gas prices and ETS (i.e. no independent phaseout effect once those are controlled), the chain claim is refuted.

formal test & threshold
test:      synth_did_germany_belgium_causal_chain
threshold: FIRST-ORDER phaseout confirmed AND industrial price gap >=12 EUR/MWh vs synthetic control after gas-ETS control AND energy-intensive production divergence <=-3% vs synthetic control at p<0.10

Method

Template
synth_did
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
4 countries · 20002024
Evidence type
causal

Synthetic DiD with DEU as primary treated unit, donor pool of non-phaseout European power systems (FRA, ESP, SWE, FIN, CZE). Event-study around Mar-2011 Fukushima decision. Secondary: BEL as treated unit. Placebo test on pre-2011 DEU. Robustness: control explicitly for gas-price shock via interaction terms.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
nuclear_share_of_generation
outcome
entsoe:generation_mixtier 1
iea:electricity_statisticstier 2
agora:energiewende_stromdatentier 3
share
industrial_electricity_price
outcome
eurostat:nrg_pc_205tier 1
level_real_eur_per_mwh
grid_reliability_saidi
outcome
bnetza:stoerungsstatistik (DEU)tier 1
minutes_per_year
power_sector_carbon_intensity
outcome
eea:greenhouse_gas_inventorytier 2
iea:co2_emissions_from_fuel_combustiontier 2
gco2_per_kwh
energy_intensive_sector_output
outcome
eurostat:sts_inpr_atier 1
yoy_pct_change
energy_intensive_fdi_outflow
outcome
oecd:FDI_statisticstier 2
unctad:FDItier 2
log_level_real_usd
nuclear_phaseout_event_or_schedule
treatment
constructed:DEU Atomausstieg Mar-2011 decision + final closures 2023; BEL 2003 law + 2015 amendment + 2022 reversal; DEU Kohleausstitier 5
indicator_and_schedule_intensity
natural_gas_price_ttf
control
eex:TTFtier 2
ice:TTFtier 2
log_real_eur_per_mwh
co2_ets_allowance_price
control
eex:EUAtier 2
log_real_eur_per_tonne
wind_solar_capacity_installed
control
entsoe:transparency_platformtier 1
irena:capacitytier 2
gw

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — nuclear_phaseout_energy_cost_industry_exit

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=+0.04357, |gap|/pre_sd=8.7, p_perm=0.25; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Policy-driven nuclear phaseouts produce a three-order causal chain. FIRST-ORDER: the policy delivers on the green-ambition narrative — reactors are closed, nuclear-dependency ends, and the political commitment is honoured. This first-order success is real and we acknowledge it on its own terms. SECOND-ORDER: wholesale and industrial electricity prices rise (gas-fired generation fills the dispatchable gap), grid reliability metrics weaken, and carbon- intensity of power generation rises in the transition window. THIRD-ORDER: energy-intensive industry (chemicals, steel, aluminium) reduces capacity or relocates out of the jurisdiction — BASF Ludwigshafen contraction, ArcelorMittal and Salzgitter steel curtailments, aluminium smelter closures in Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands. Investment and FDI flows in energy-intensive sectors redirect abroad. Cases: Germany Atomausstieg 2011-2023, Belgium nuclear phaseout schedule (now partly reversed), Germany Kohleausstieg interaction.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if: (a) FIRST-ORDER nuclear phaseout is achieved as legislated (trivially confirmed for DEU 2023) AND (b) SECOND- ORDER industrial electricity-price divergence vs synthetic control is <10 EUR/MWh once gas-price and ETS are controlled for at p<0.10 AND (c) THIRD-ORDER energy-intensive sector output or FDI shows no divergence vs synthetic control. If the price gap is entirely absorbed by gas prices and ETS (i.e. no independent phaseout effect once those are controlled), the chain claim is refuted.

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: DEU
  • event_year: 2011
  • n_donors: 3
  • donor_weights (top): {'FRA': 0.7184, 'NLD': 0.2816, 'BEL': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 0.038921663488719
  • pre_period_sd: 0.005015085859368759
  • mean_post_gap: 0.04357068285230375
  • end_period_gap: 0.04115360349990996
  • post_period_years: [2011, 2024]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.25
  • n_placebos: 3
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • eurostat:nrg_pc_205 (industrial electricity price band IE) → industrial_electricity_price (outcome, n=725)
  • eurostat:sts_inpr_a (industrial production index, NACE chemicals, basic metals) → energy_intensive_sector_output (outcome, n=1252)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:51:39+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Chain: phaseout achieved (1st) -> industrial electricity prices up + grid reliability stressed (2nd) -> energy-intensive industry contraction + FDI outflow (3rd). Identification depends on separating the phaseout-specific effect from the gas-shock confound in 2022-2023.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.