IESET.
Hypotheses·housing·rent_control_housing_supply_quality_decay_chain

Binding rent control initiates a three-order causal chain.

FIRST-ORDER: sitting tenants in covered units receive a real transfer — rents are held below market, tenure security rises. This is an acknowledged policy success on its own terms for the intended beneficiaries. SECOND-ORDER: new-build permits and new rental-stock additions contract in affected markets, labour-mobility falls as tenants cannot move without losing a below-market contract, and landlord investment in maintenance declines. THIRD-ORDER: housing stock quality decays, supply-demand mismatch produces queues and waiting lists (Stockholm), distortion into alternative tenure (conversions to owner-occupation, Airbnb, corporate-let exemptions) erodes the rental base; mobility-penalised labour markets show productivity drag. Cases: Berlin Mietendeckel 2020-2021, St Paul 2021, NYC 1947-present, Stockholm continuous queue, San Francisco 1994 expansion.

PARTIALengine/runs/rent_control_housing_supply_quality_decay_chain

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-1, p_perm=0.333; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Do children have a better shot at moving up when schools, housing, and neighborhoods give them access to opportunity, rather than simply because a country redistributes more income?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=-1, p_perm=0.333; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

Housing policy affects rents, mobility, household budgets, and construction. The test looks for measurable effects rather than relying on slogans.

how the test works

It compares 3 country or place units from 1990 to 2024, using a synthetic control design, with fixed effects for city and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Binding rent control indicator
What we checked
  • Rent level for sitting tenants
  • New rental stock growth
  • Tenant mobility rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/rent_control_housing_supply_quality_decay_chain
1007550250199020072024DEUUSASWE
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show rent_level_for_sitting_tenants across 3 sampled countries over 19902024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for rent_control_housing_supply_quality_decay_chain. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/rent_control_housing_supply_quality_decay_chain/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

17 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T13:38:25Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Binding rent control initiates a three-order causal chain. FIRST-ORDER: sitting tenants in covered units receive a real transfer — rents are held below market, tenure security rises. This is an acknowledged policy success on its own terms for the intended beneficiaries. SECOND-ORDER: new-build permits and new rental-stock additions contract in affected markets, labour-mobility falls as tenants cannot move without losing a below-market contract, and landlord investment in maintenance declines. THIRD-ORDER: housing stock quality decays, supply-demand mismatch produces queues and waiting lists (Stockholm), distortion into alternative tenure (conversions to owner-occupation, Airbnb, corporate-let exemptions) erodes the rental base; mobility-penalised labour markets show productivity drag. Cases: Berlin Mietendeckel 2020-2021, St Paul 2021, NYC 1947-present, Stockholm continuous queue, San Francisco 1994 expansion.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if, across the five cases: (a) FIRST-ORDER rent-reduction for sitting tenants is confirmed at p<0.05 (acknowledged success) AND (b) NEW-BUILD and MOBILITY SECOND-ORDER divergence fails to appear (<1.0pp deviation from synthetic control) in at least 3/5 cases AND (c) QUALITY/QUEUE/EXEMPTION THIRD-ORDER divergence fails to appear in at least 3/5 cases. If the first-order rent suppression is confirmed but the second/third-order chain does not materialise, the causal-chain claim is refuted even though the policy mechanism works on its own terms.

formal test & threshold
test:      multi_case_synthetic_control_causal_chain
threshold: FIRST-ORDER rent suppression confirmed at p<0.05 AND new-build growth divergence <=-2pp in at least 3/5 cases at p<0.10 AND quality/queue/exemption divergence appears in at least 3/5 cases at p<0.10

Method

Template
synthetic_control
Fixed effects
city, year
Clustering
city
Sample
3 countries · 19902024
Evidence type
causal

Primary: synthetic control per treated case (Berlin, SF 1994, St Paul, Stockholm-continuous as cross-section-with-donor-Nordic- cities). Secondary: Callaway-Sant'Anna staggered DiD when multiple treated cases pool onto common outcome definitions. Follows Diamond-McQuade-Qian 2019 for SF and Kholodilin-Kohl 2023 for Berlin.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
rent_level_for_sitting_tenants
outcome
destatis:immoscouttier 1
bls:CPI-renttier 1
scb:hyresgaststatistik (SWE)tier 1
log_real_rent
new_rental_stock_growth
outcome
destatis:baufertigstellungen (DEU)tier 1
us_census:building_permits (USA)tier 1
scb:nybyggnation (SWE)tier 1
yoy_pct_change
tenant_mobility_rate
outcome
constructed:share of renters moving in past 12 months; US census ACS; SWE SCB migration registertier 5
level_pct
stock_quality_index
outcome
constructed:age of building stock + maintenance complaints where available; destatis:wohngebaeude_baujahr; us_census:ACS; SCB housintier 5
index
airbnb_and_corporate_exemption_share
outcome
constructed:AirDNA Airbnb listings as share of rental stock + corporate-let exemption count; official registries where available (Betier 5
share
waiting_list_length_or_queue_years
outcome
Stockholm bostadsformedlingen; NYC HPD lottery datayears
binding_rent_control_indicator
treatment
constructed:1 in treated city-years (Berlin 2020-2021, SF 1994 expansion post-1995, St Paul 2021+, Stockholm continuous, NYC continutier 5
indicator
metro_population
control
destatis:bevoelkerungtier 1
us_census:populationtier 1
scb:folkmangdtier 1
log_level
metro_employment_growth
control
destatis:arbeitsmarkttier 1
bls:LAU_metrotier 1
scb:arbetsmarknadtier 1
yoy_pct_change
mortgage_rate
control
ecb:interest_rates (DEU)tier 1
fred:MORTGAGE30US (USA)tier 1
riksbank:policy_rate (SWE)tier 1
level_pct

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — rent_control_housing_supply_quality_decay_chain

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=-1, p_perm=0.333; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Binding rent control initiates a three-order causal chain. FIRST-ORDER: sitting tenants in covered units receive a real transfer — rents are held below market, tenure security rises. This is an acknowledged policy success on its own terms for the intended beneficiaries. SECOND-ORDER: new-build permits and new rental-stock additions contract in affected markets, labour-mobility falls as tenants cannot move without losing a below-market contract, and landlord investment in maintenance declines. THIRD-ORDER: housing stock quality decays, supply-demand mismatch produces queues and waiting lists (Stockholm), distortion into alternative tenure (conversions to owner-occupation, Airbnb, corporate-let exemptions) erodes the rental base; mobility-penalised labour markets show productivity drag. Cases: Berlin Mietendeckel 2020-2021, St Paul 2021, NYC 1947-present, Stockholm continuous queue, San Francisco 1994 expansion.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if, across the five cases: (a) FIRST-ORDER rent-reduction for sitting tenants is confirmed at p<0.05 (acknowledged success) AND (b) NEW-BUILD and MOBILITY SECOND-ORDER divergence fails to appear (<1.0pp deviation from synthetic control) in at least 3/5 cases AND (c) QUALITY/QUEUE/EXEMPTION THIRD-ORDER divergence fails to appear in at least 3/5 cases. If the first-order rent suppression is confirmed but the second/third-order chain does not materialise, the causal-chain claim is refuted even though the policy mechanism works on its own terms.

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: DEU
  • event_year: 2020
  • n_donors: 2
  • donor_weights (top): {'USA': 0.5, 'SWE': 0.5}
  • pre_rmse: 1.0
  • pre_period_sd: 0.0
  • mean_post_gap: -1.0
  • end_period_gap: -1.0
  • post_period_years: [2020, 2024]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.3333333333333333
  • n_placebos: 2
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • constructed: share of renters moving in past 12 months; US census ACS; SWE SCB migration register → tenant_mobility_rate (outcome, n=105)
  • constructed: age of building stock + maintenance complaints where available; destatis:wohngebaeude_baujahr; us_census:ACS; SCB housing register → stock_quality_index (outcome, n=1)
  • ecb:interest_rates (DEU); fred:MORTGAGE30US (USA); riksbank:policy_rate (SWE) → mortgage_rate (controls, n=56)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T13:38:25+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

The mechanism link between orders is central: tenants gain transfer (1st), landlords under-invest and new supply dries up (2nd), and the rental base erodes structurally with quality decay and queue rationing (3rd). Falsifying the chain requires null 2nd/3rd-order effects even when the 1st-order transfer is confirmed.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.