IESET.
Movements·pakistan_khan_pti_2018_2022

Imran Khan PTI — Naya Pakistan / Ehsaas (Pakistan)

PAK·2018 – 2022·Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-led coalition with MQM-P, PML-Q, BAP, GDA; confidence-and-supply arrangements; 149/272 NA seats at formation; military-establishment initial backing
Leaders: Imran Khan (Prime Minister 18 Aug 2018 - 10 Apr 2022, ousted by vote of no-confidence) · Asad Umar (Finance Minister 2018-2019) · Abdul Hafeez Shaikh (Finance Adviser/Minister 2019-2021) · Shaukat Tarin (Finance Minister 2021-2022) · Reza Baqir (Governor State Bank of Pakistan, 2019-2022) · Sania Nishtar (Special Assistant, Ehsaas Programme) · Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa (COAS 2016-2022)
positionssocial_democraticnew_keynesianclassical_liberaldevelopmentalism

Doctrine — stated goals and content

Populist anti-corruption reformist programme — state-welfare expansion branded Ehsaas alongside attempted tax-net expansion, constrained by a front-loaded balance-of-payments crisis and an initial military-establishment reconciliation that ruptured in 2021-22. Core policy content: (i) IMF Extended Fund Facility $6bn 39-month July 2019, triggering ~30% PKR devaluation, policy- rate peak 13.25%, electricity and gas tariff hikes, and primary- balance targeting; (ii) Ehsaas programme (March 2019) — umbrella poverty-alleviation architecture consolidating BISP under new branding, Ehsaas Kafaalat (women cash transfers, eventually ~PKR 14,000/qtr for ~8m households), Ehsaas Emergency Cash during COVID (PKR 203bn to ~15m households, largest single cash-transfer rollout in Pakistan's history); (iii) COVID response: targeted rather than full lockdown, SBP's 'Temporary Economic Refinance Facility' and 'Rozgar' wage-support schemes, construction-sector fiscal package April 2020 with tax amnesty; (iv) Naya Pakistan Housing low-cost mortgage markup subsidy programme; (v) FBR point-of-sale integration, Track-and-Trace system for tobacco/ cement/sugar/fertiliser, retailer documentation push; (vi) CPEC Phase 2 pivot from energy toward Special Economic Zones (Rashakai SEZ inauguration 2021) and ML-1 railway upgrade financing negotiations; (vii) Single National Curriculum education standardisation; (viii) foreign-policy tilt — Saudi / UAE recalibration, refusal of US overflight for Afghanistan operations, overt China alignment; (ix) end-stage policy shift after early 2022 rupture with military leadership — unbudgeted fuel and electricity subsidies (Feb-Mar 2022) suspending the IMF programme. Ousted 10 Apr 2022 by no-confidence vote, the first Pakistani PM removed by parliamentary vote rather than judicial or military intervention. Coherence line: anti-corruption populist doctrine + welfare-state expansion + initial military-establishment partnership, with macro-crisis management constraints and terminal civil-military rupture. Popularity: 2018 election PTI 31.8% / 149 NA seats; approval strong 2018-2020 then eroding under inflation; post-ouster PTI rallies drew historically large crowds; PTI-backed independents won 93/265 directly-contested NA seats in Feb 2024 despite party being barred from its cricket-bat symbol.

Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes

↑
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · moderate
larger transfer footprint
Ehsaas Kafaalat expansion + COVID Emergency Cash (~PKR 203bn to ~15m households) expanded cash-transfer footprint significantly.
~
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
mixed · moderate
IMF-programme consolidation FY20-FY21 offset by COVID response FY20 and end-stage unfunded fuel subsidy Feb-Mar 2022.
↑
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
increased · weak
more progressive (higher top rates, wider spread, larger targeted credits)
FBR documentation push, POS integration, tax-net expansion rhetoric; direct-tax share modestly up but base narrow.
~
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
mixed · weak
Construction package with tax amnesty (Apr 2020) expanded; pre-ouster fuel/electricity subsidy reintroduced.
—
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
unchanged · weak
SOE reform largely stalled; PIA/Steel Mills privatisation did not proceed.
—
energy supply security
regulatory.energy_supply_security
Policy posture toward energy supply security — domestic production capacity, import diversification, strategic reserves, nuclear stance, fossil-fuel mix discipline.
unchanged · weak
Capacity overhang from CPEC Phase 1 continued; circular-debt growth resumed.
↑
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
increased · moderate
greater independence (legal, operational, personnel)
State Bank of Pakistan Amendment Act 2022 (passed Jan 2022) enhanced SBP autonomy, price-stability primary mandate, prohibition on direct government lending — an IMF structural benchmark.
~
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
mixed · weak
Anti-corruption NAB activity intensified against opposition figures; reciprocal politicisation contested.

Policies enacted

What the data says — linked outcome hypotheses

The movement's outcome claims are tied to these hypotheses. Verdicts update as models run.

not yet written
imf_stabilisation_program_effects
not yet written
cash_transfer_poverty_effects
not yet written
central_bank_independence_inflation_effects

Schools of thought aligned or opposed

partial
social_democratic
Ehsaas architecture is explicit expansion of cash-transfer welfare state.
partial
new_keynesian
IMF-programme orthodoxy + SBP independence upgrade.
partial
classical_liberal
Tax-net expansion and FBR documentation push, offset by construction amnesty and end-stage fuel subsidy.
partial
developmentalism
SEZ-oriented CPEC Phase 2 pivot.

References

Notes

First PM in Pakistani history removed by parliamentary vote of no-confidence rather than coup or judicial disqualification — institutionally distinctive. End-stage (Feb-Apr 2022) fuel- subsidy decision is in tension with the preceding IMF-programme discipline and coded as mixed rather than split. PTI's post-ouster electoral performance via independents in Feb 2024 (93/265 directly-contested NA seats) is captured under the successor Shehbaz movement entry.