IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·oecd_bargaining_extension_youth_entry_penalty

In OECD panels from 1990 to 2023, collective-bargaining systems where legal or administrative extension raises bargaining coverage far above union membership predict weaker labour-market entry for young workers and lower new-business density.

The directional claim is that a 10 percentage-point increase in the bargaining-extension gap is associated with at least a 0.7 percentage-point lower youth employment rate and lower new-business density, conditional on the business cycle, education, tax wedge, and institutional quality.

PARTIALengine/runs/oecd_bargaining_extension_youth_entry_penalty

PARTIAL — coef=-0.0329, p=0.681 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether bargaining extension gap is actually linked to better or worse youth employment rate from 1990 to 2023.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=-0.0329, p=0.681 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 1990 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Bargaining extension gap
  • Collective bargaining coverage
What we checked
  • Youth employment rate
  • New business density
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/oecd_bargaining_extension_youth_entry_penalty
1007550250199020072023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show youth_employment_rate across 38 sampled countries over 1990–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for oecd_bargaining_extension_youth_entry_penalty. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/oecd_bargaining_extension_youth_entry_penalty/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:48Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

In OECD panels from 1990 to 2023, collective-bargaining systems where legal or administrative extension raises bargaining coverage far above union membership predict weaker labour-market entry for young workers and lower new-business density. The directional claim is that a 10 percentage-point increase in the bargaining-extension gap is associated with at least a 0.7 percentage-point lower youth employment rate and lower new-business density, conditional on the business cycle, education, tax wedge, and institutional quality.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Refuted if the bargaining-extension gap coefficient is zero or positive for youth employment, or if the coefficient on new-business density is non-negative after controlling for GDP growth, tax wedge, education, and regulatory quality. A result concentrated only in recession years is treated as inconclusive rather than support.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_bargaining_extension_youth_entry
threshold: beta_extension_gap_youth_employment_10pp <= -0.7pp and beta_extension_gap_new_business_density < 0

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 1990 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Two-way FE panel with bargaining-extension gap as the treatment. Robustness checks use five-year averages, exclude countries with Ghent-style union unemployment insurance, and compare youth outcomes to prime-age outcomes as a placebo.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
youth_employment_rate
outcome
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
new_business_density
outcome
world_bank_wdi:IC.BUS.NDNS.ZStier 2
level
bargaining_extension_gap
treatment
oecd:collective_bargaining_coverage_minus_union_densitytier 2
difference_pct_points
collective_bargaining_coverage
treatment
oecd:DSD_TUtier 2
level_pct
real_gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level_pct
low_wage_tax_wedge
control
oecd:taxing_wages_67_percent_average_wagetier 2
level_pct
tertiary_enrolment
control
world_bank_wdi:SE.TER.ENRRtier 2
level_pct
regulatory_quality
control
wgi:RQ.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — oecd_bargaining_extension_youth_entry_penalty

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=-0.0329, p=0.681 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In OECD panels from 1990 to 2023, collective-bargaining systems where legal or administrative extension raises bargaining coverage far above union membership predict weaker labour-market entry for young workers and lower new-business density. The directional claim is that a 10 percentage-point increase in the bargaining-extension gap is associated with at least a 0.7 percentage-point lower youth employment rate and lower new-business density, conditional on the business cycle, education, tax wedge, and institutional quality.
  • Falsification rule: Refuted if the bargaining-extension gap coefficient is zero or positive for youth employment, or if the coefficient on new-business density is non-negative after controlling for GDP growth, tax wedge, education, and regulatory quality. A result concentrated only in recession years is treated as inconclusive rather than support.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_bargaining_extension_youth_entry

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): -0.0329
  • Std error: 0.07995
  • p-value: 0.681
  • Observations: 641, countries: 38
  • Within R²: 0.0566
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → youth_employment_rate (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • world_bank_wdi:IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS → new_business_density (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=2451)
  • oecd:DSD_TU@DF_TU → collective_bargaining_coverage (treatment, publisher=oecd, n=1825)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • world_bank_wdi:SE.TER.ENRR → tertiary_enrolment (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7217)
  • wgi:RQ.EST → regulatory_quality (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5169)

Variables missing data

  • oecd:collective_bargaining_coverage_minus_union_density (treatment, name=bargaining_extension_gap) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:taxing_wages_67_percent_average_wage (controls, name=low_wage_tax_wedge) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:48+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Candidate Worker C spec. This directly tests whether labour-market-control tools that extend negotiated terms beyond union members reduce entry margins, without assuming the answer.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.