IESET.
Hypotheses·institutional quality·austrian_rent_seeking_concentration_olson_growth_drag

In a cross-country panel of OECD and middle-income democracies 1960-2019, the age of stable democratic institutions (years since last constitutional rupture) is positively associated with the density of distributional coalitions (proxied by union density, professional-licensing prevalence, and OECD PMR entry-barrier scores) and negatively associated with TFP growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita and human-capital level.

This is the Mancur Olson "rise and decline of nations" hypothesis, which is a classical-liberal / Austrian-adjacent framing that long- stable polities accumulate rent-seeking coalitions that progressively choke the price-discovery and resource-reallocation processes that drive growth. The pre-registered claim is that countries in the top quartile of institutional age show TFP growth rates at least 0.5 percentage points lower than countries in the bottom quartile of institutional age, controlling for convergence.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/austrian_rent_seeking_concentration_olson_growth_drag

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'oecd_pmr_entry_barriers' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. treatment 'oecd_pmr_entry_barriers' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

why it matters

This matters because institutional quality claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 36 country or place units from 1960 to 2019, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Years since last democratic rupture
  • Union density
What we checked
  • Productivity growth 5y
  • Income per capita growth 5y
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/austrian_rent_seeking_concentration_olson_growth_drag
1007550250196019902019USAGBRDEUFRAITAESPNLD
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show tfp_growth_5y across 36 sampled countries over 1960–2019.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for austrian_rent_seeking_concentration_olson_growth_drag. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/austrian_rent_seeking_concentration_olson_growth_drag/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:16Z

In a cross-country panel of OECD and middle-income democracies 1960-2019, the age of stable democratic institutions (years since last constitutional rupture) is positively associated with the density of distributional coalitions (proxied by union density, professional-licensing prevalence, and OECD PMR entry-barrier scores) and negatively associated with TFP growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita and human-capital level. This is the Mancur Olson "rise and decline of nations" hypothesis, which is a classical-liberal / Austrian-adjacent framing that long- stable polities accumulate rent-seeking coalitions that progressively choke the price-discovery and resource-reallocation processes that drive growth. The pre-registered claim is that countries in the top quartile of institutional age show TFP growth rates at least 0.5 percentage points lower than countries in the bottom quartile of institutional age, controlling for convergence.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

The hypothesis is falsified if the quartile-difference in TFP growth between top and bottom institutional-age quartiles is less than 0.5 pp, OR if the panel-FE coefficient on union density / entry-barrier score on TFP growth is not significantly negative at p<0.05.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_olson_quartile_test_plus_within_country_coalitions
threshold: tfp_growth(top_quartile_age) - tfp_growth(bottom_quartile_age) <= -0.5 pp AND coefficient(union_density → tfp_growth) < 0 OR coefficient(entry_barriers → tfp_growth) < 0 at p<0.05

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
36 countries · 1960 – 2019
Evidence type
associational

Panel FE plus a quartile-comparison robustness. Two-way FE absorbs much of the institutional-age cross-country variation, so the primary identification is the within-country evolution of union density and entry barriers. Heterodox / progressive null is that distributional coalitions (unions, professional licensing) deliver welfare-improving floors and that the productivity-drag claim cherry-picks one outcome (TFP) while ignoring inequality reduction and labour-market security.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
tfp_growth_5y
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
log_diff_5y
gdp_per_capita_growth_5y
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZGtier 2
rolling_mean_5y
years_since_last_democratic_rupture
treatment
vdem:v2x_polyarchytier 4
level
union_density
treatment
ilostat:union_density_ratetier 2
level
oecd_pmr_entry_barriers
treatment
oecd_pmr:barriers_to_entrytier 4
level
log_gdp_pc_ppp_initial
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
human_capital_index
control
pwt:hctier 3
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
gov_consumption_share
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZStier 2
level
rule_of_law
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — austrian_rent_seeking_concentration_olson_growth_drag

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'oecd_pmr_entry_barriers' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In a cross-country panel of OECD and middle-income democracies 1960-2019, the age of stable democratic institutions (years since last constitutional rupture) is positively associated with the density of distributional coalitions (proxied by union density, professional-licensing prevalence, and OECD PMR entry-barrier scores) and negatively associated with TFP growth, after controlling for initial GDP per capita and human-capital level. This is the Mancur Olson "rise and decline of nations" hypothesis, which is a classical-liberal / Austrian-adjacent framing that long- stable polities accumulate rent-seeking coalitions that progressively choke the price-discovery and resource-reallocation processes that drive growth. The pre-registered claim is that countries in the top quartile of institutional age show TFP growth rates at least 0.5 percentage points lower than countries in the bottom quartile of institutional age, controlling for convergence.
  • Falsification rule: The hypothesis is falsified if the quartile-difference in TFP growth between top and bottom institutional-age quartiles is less than 0.5 pp, OR if the panel-FE coefficient on union density / entry-barrier score on TFP growth is not significantly negative at p<0.05.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_olson_quartile_test_plus_within_country_coalitions

Estimate

  • Error: treatment 'oecd_pmr_entry_barriers' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

Variables resolved

  • pwt:rtfpna → tfp_growth_5y (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG → gdp_per_capita_growth_5y (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • oecd_pmr:barriers_to_entry → oecd_pmr_entry_barriers (treatment, publisher=oecd_pmr, n=105)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_gdp_pc_ppp_initial (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • pwt:hc → human_capital_index (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZS → gov_consumption_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9133)
  • wgi:RL.EST → rule_of_law (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)

Variables missing data

  • vdem:v2x_polyarchy; constructed: years since last polity-IV regime change (treatment, name=years_since_last_democratic_rupture) — vintage not on disk
  • ilostat:union_density_rate (treatment, name=union_density) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:16+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Olson (1982 The Rise and Decline of Nations); classical-liberal / public-choice tradition (Buchanan, Tullock, Tollison). Closer to Tullock-public-choice than to canonical Mises/Hayek but the framework places it in the Austrian-adjacent cluster as a market- liberal critique of long-stable institutional accumulations.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.