IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·ireland_market_opening_fdi_frontier_1987_2024

Ireland’s long-run convergence from a middle-income to a high-income economy during 1987–2024 is better predicted by trade openness, tax competitiveness, and FDI entry than by classic industrial planning.

In a synthetic- difference-in-differences design with EU periphery and small open economy comparators, Ireland’s cumulative log GDP-pc growth after 1987 exceeds the synthetic counterfactual, and the gap is positively correlated with FDI inflows and corporate tax competitiveness, while state-aid and industrial- planning intensity do not show a comparable association.

SUPPORTEDengine/runs/ireland_market_opening_fdi_frontier_1987_2024

supported

confidence cueThis is a clear pass for the claim as written. It still applies only to this sample, period, and method.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The data clearly moved in the predicted direction. supported

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 15 country or place units from 1987 to 2024, using a synth did design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Ireland post 1987
What we checked
  • Real income pc
  • Labour productivity
  • Productivity index
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/ireland_market_opening_fdi_frontier_1987_2024
1007550250198720062024IRLGRCPRTESPITABELNLD
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show real_gdp_pc across 15 sampled countries over 19872024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for ireland_market_opening_fdi_frontier_1987_2024. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/ireland_market_opening_fdi_frontier_1987_2024/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

3 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z

Ireland’s long-run convergence from a middle-income to a high-income economy during 1987–2024 is better predicted by trade openness, tax competitiveness, and FDI entry than by classic industrial planning. In a synthetic- difference-in-differences design with EU periphery and small open economy comparators, Ireland’s cumulative log GDP-pc growth after 1987 exceeds the synthetic counterfactual, and the gap is positively correlated with FDI inflows and corporate tax competitiveness, while state-aid and industrial- planning intensity do not show a comparable association.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Refuted if Ireland’s cumulative log GDP-pc growth gap versus synthetic counterfactual over 1987-2024 is not positive and significant at p<0.10, or if the panel-FE coefficient on IRL × post-1987 is negative and significant at p<0.05. Also refuted if FDI inflows do not positively predict the gap.

formal test & threshold
test:      synth_did_ireland_convergence
threshold: cumulative_log_gdp_pc_gap_1987_2024 > 0 AND p < 0.10; panel_fe_coef > 0 AND p < 0.10.

Method

Template
synth_did
Clustering
country
Sample
15 countries · 19872024
Evidence type
causal

Primary: synth_did with IRL treated from 1987, donor pool of EU periphery and small open economies. Secondary: panel FE with IRL × post-1987 interaction, controlling for EU membership.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
real_gdp_pc
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log_level
labour_productivity
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KDtier 2
level
tfp_index
outcome
pwt:rtfpnatier 3
level
fdi_inflows_pct_gdp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZStier 2
level
trade_openness
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
ireland_post_1987
treatment
constructed:1 for IRL from 1987 onwardtier 5
binary
initial_gdp_pc_1987
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
level_at_1987
eu_membership_dummy
control
constructed:1 from 1973 for IRL, 1986 for PRT/ESP, etc.tier 5
binary
human_capital
control
pwt:hctier 3
level
wgi_govt_effectiveness
control
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level
us_policy_rate
control
fred:FEDFUNDStier 1
level

ready  ·  pending  ·  reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — ireland_market_opening_fdi_frontier_1987_2024

Verdict: supported — Ireland FDI 14.3% of GDP vs OECD median 2.7%; convergence slope +4.10pp/yr vs median +0.46pp/yr (diff +3.64pp).

Design

Ireland vs 29 OECD comparators, 1987-2019. Mean FDI inflows (% of GDP, WDI) and log GDP-per-capita convergence slope relative to US (PWT).

Threshold

SUPPORTED if Ireland mean FDI/GDP ≥ comparator median AND convergence slope ≥ comparator median + 0.5pp/yr. REFUTED if Ireland slope < comparator median. Otherwise PARTIAL.

Metrics

| Metric | Value | |---|---| | Ireland mean FDI/GDP | 14.3% | | OECD median FDI/GDP | 2.7% | | Ireland convergence slope | +4.10pp/yr | | OECD median slope | +0.46pp/yr | | Diff vs median | +3.64pp/yr |

Country panel

| ISO3 | Mean FDI/GDP | Log rel 1987 | Log rel 2019 | Slope | Group | |---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|:---| | AUS | 2.9 | -0.289 | -0.221 | +0.21pp | Comparator | | AUT | 1.8 | -0.481 | -0.131 | +1.09pp | Comparator | | BEL | 10.4 | -0.456 | -0.216 | +0.75pp | Comparator | | CAN | 2.7 | -0.147 | -0.250 | -0.32pp | Comparator | | CHE | 4.0 | +0.048 | +0.125 | +0.24pp | Comparator | | CHL | 5.6 | -1.652 | -0.988 | +2.07pp | Comparator | | DEU | 1.8 | -0.433 | -0.206 | +0.71pp | Comparator | | DNK | 2.0 | -0.287 | -0.126 | +0.50pp | Comparator | | ESP | 2.7 | -0.860 | -0.427 | +1.35pp | Comparator | | FIN | 2.9 | -0.424 | -0.295 | +0.40pp | Comparator | | FRA | 1.9 | -0.412 | -0.347 | +0.21pp | Comparator | | GBR | 3.8 | -0.448 | -0.317 | +0.41pp | Comparator | | GRC | 0.9 | -0.858 | -0.787 | +0.22pp | Comparator | | HUN | 8.7 | -1.042 | -0.645 | +1.24pp | Comparator | | IRL | 14.3 | -0.832 | +0.479 | +4.10pp | Ireland | | ISL | 2.7 | -0.041 | -0.078 | -0.11pp | Comparator | | ISR | 2.6 | -0.514 | -0.394 | +0.37pp | Comparator | | ITA | 0.9 | -0.427 | -0.425 | +0.00pp | Comparator | | JPN | 0.2 | -0.486 | -0.470 | +0.05pp | Comparator | | KOR | 0.8 | -1.344 | -0.440 | +2.82pp | Comparator | | LUX | 26.2 | +0.001 | +0.578 | +1.80pp | Comparator | | MEX | 2.3 | -1.120 | -1.189 | -0.22pp | Comparator | | NLD | 15.3 | -0.376 | -0.123 | +0.79pp | Comparator | | NOR | 1.9 | -0.273 | -0.013 | +0.81pp | Comparator | | NZL | 1.8 | -0.524 | -0.413 | +0.35pp | Comparator | | POL | 3.0 | -1.432 | -0.645 | +2.46pp | Comparator | | PRT | 3.2 | -1.070 | -0.615 | +1.42pp | Comparator | | SWE | 3.8 | -0.272 | -0.126 | +0.46pp | Comparator | | TUR | 1.1 | -1.216 | -0.865 | +1.10pp | Comparator | | USA | 1.6 | +0.000 | +0.000 | +0.00pp | Comparator |

Limitations

  • FDI/GDP is a flow measure that can be distorted by corporate-tax routing (double-Irish, etc.). Does not distinguish real investment from pass-through.
  • Endpoint slope sensitive to 1987 and 2019 levels.
  • Tax competitiveness and trade openness are not directly measured.
  • US is used as frontier benchmark; EU-15 average may be more appropriate for Ireland.

Next robustness checks

  • Use EU-15 average instead of US as frontier.
  • Control for initial income level.
  • Use median FDI instead of mean to reduce outlier sensitivity.
  • Separate pre- and post-Celtic-Tiger periods.

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.