IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·labour_reform_mexico_2019_outsourcing_reform

Mexico's 2019 labour reform (recognition of authentic collective-bargaining, pre-USMCA labour-side-letter compliance) and the 2021 outsourcing prohibition increased the formal-employment share by at least 2 pp by 2023 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with the largest gains concentrated in manufacturing-export states.

PARTIALengine/runs/labour_reform_mexico_2019_outsourcing_reform

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-8.467, |gap|/pre_sd=11, p_perm=0.143 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether mexico 2019 2021 reform is actually linked to better or worse formal employment share from 2010 to 2023.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=-8.467, |gap|/pre_sd=11, p_perm=0.143 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 7 country or place units from 2010 to 2023, using a synth did design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Mexico 2019 2021 reform
What we checked
  • Formal employment share
  • Informal employment share
  • Unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/labour_reform_mexico_2019_outsourcing_reform
1007550250201020172023MEXCOLCHLPERBRAARGURY
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show formal_employment_share across 7 sampled countries over 2010–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for labour_reform_mexico_2019_outsourcing_reform. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/labour_reform_mexico_2019_outsourcing_reform/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:15:30Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Mexico's 2019 labour reform (recognition of authentic collective-bargaining, pre-USMCA labour-side-letter compliance) and the 2021 outsourcing prohibition increased the formal-employment share by at least 2 pp by 2023 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with the largest gains concentrated in manufacturing-export states.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Mexican formal-employment share > +2.0 pp by 2023 AND the gap is concentrated in manufacturing-export states. REFUTED if formal-employment gap is < +0.5 pp OR if state-level distribution is inconsistent with manufacturing concentration.

formal test & threshold
test:      Synth-DiD on Mexican formal-employment share 2019-2023 vs LATAM donor pool, plus state-level event study; placebo permutation at p<0.10.

Method

Template
synth_did
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
7 countries · 2010 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
formal_employment_share
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZStier 2
level
informal_employment_share
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
unemployment_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
mexico_2019_2021_reform
treatment
constructed:indicator for 2019-Q2 collective-bargaining reform + 2021-Q2 outsourcing bantier 5
indicator
gdp_per_capita_real
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
terms_of_trade_index
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — labour_reform_mexico_2019_outsourcing_reform

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=-8.467, |gap|/pre_sd=11, p_perm=0.143 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Mexico's 2019 labour reform (recognition of authentic collective-bargaining, pre-USMCA labour-side-letter compliance) and the 2021 outsourcing prohibition increased the formal-employment share by at least 2 pp by 2023 relative to a synthetic control of Latin-American peers, with the largest gains concentrated in manufacturing-export states.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Mexican formal-employment share > +2.0 pp by 2023 AND the gap is concentrated in manufacturing-export states. REFUTED if formal-employment gap is < +0.5 pp OR if state-level distribution is inconsistent with manufacturing concentration.

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: MEX
  • event_year: 2019
  • n_donors: 6
  • donor_weights (top): {'COL': 1.0, 'CHL': 0.0, 'PER': 0.0, 'BRA': 0.0, 'ARG': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 5.094428100058599
  • pre_period_sd: 0.7603591987416941
  • mean_post_gap: -8.467199999999998
  • end_period_gap: -6.825999999999999
  • post_period_years: [2019, 2023]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.14285714285714285
  • n_placebos: 6
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS → unemployment_rate (outcome, n=8106)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → gdp_per_capita_real (controls, n=14131)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, n=10779)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:30+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Two-stage treatment: 2019-Q2 (constitutional reform on collective-bargaining) and 2021-Q2 (outsourcing prohibition effective). 2020-2021 COVID window flagged. Mexico is important because the reform is bundled with USMCA enforcement.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.