IESET.
Hypotheses·monetary·financial_boe_independence_1997_macroprudential_2013

The Bank of England's operational independence (May 1997, instrument-independence on monetary policy) and its post-GFC macroprudential remit (Financial Policy Committee created April 2013 under the Bank of England Act 2013) are associated with (a) lower realised UK CPI-inflation volatility 1997-2008 vs 1985-1997, (b) flatter UK credit-cycle amplitude 2014-2022 vs 2000-2007, and (c) lower exchange- rate-passthrough volatility post-1997 vs pre-1997.

The hypothesis is tested as a pre/post comparison on three pre-registered metrics; supports if 2 of 3 metrics show statistically significant improvement.

SUPPORTEDengine/runs/financial_boe_independence_1997_macroprudential_2013

SUPPORTED — shape=pre_post, sign matches claim -, |Δ_log|=1.09

confidence cueThis is a clear pass for the claim as written. It still applies only to this sample, period, and method.

policy briefClear support

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether boe independence 1997 is actually linked to better or worse cpi inflation volatility from 1985 to 2024.

plain answer

The data clearly moved in the predicted direction. shape=pre_post, sign matches claim -, |Δ_log|=1.09

why it matters

This matters because monetary claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 1985 to 2024, using a descriptive design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Boe independence 1997
  • Fpc macroprudential 2013
What we checked
  • Cpi inflation volatility
  • Household credit growth volatility
  • Gbp eer passthrough to cpi
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

5 input datasets, 0 unresolved missing series, provenance status: reproducible hash verified.

Results

engine/runs/financial_boe_independence_1997_macroprudential_2013
1007550250198520052024GBR
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show cpi_inflation_volatility across 1 sampled countries over 1985–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for financial_boe_independence_1997_macroprudential_2013. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/financial_boe_independence_1997_macroprudential_2013/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

3 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Chicago School Monetarismwins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedNew Institutional Economicswins if SUPPORTEDschool supportedNew Keynesian (mainstream synthesis)wins if SUPPORTEDschool supported

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T08:07:39Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

The Bank of England's operational independence (May 1997, instrument-independence on monetary policy) and its post-GFC macroprudential remit (Financial Policy Committee created April 2013 under the Bank of England Act 2013) are associated with (a) lower realised UK CPI-inflation volatility 1997-2008 vs 1985-1997, (b) flatter UK credit-cycle amplitude 2014-2022 vs 2000-2007, and (c) lower exchange- rate-passthrough volatility post-1997 vs pre-1997. The hypothesis is tested as a pre/post comparison on three pre-registered metrics; supports if 2 of 3 metrics show statistically significant improvement.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if 2 of 3 metrics show post-period values lower than pre-period values by at least 25% in magnitude, with t-test p < 0.10. PARTIAL if 1 of 3 meets criterion. REFUTED if 0 of 3 meets criterion or any metric shows post-period values higher by >= 25%.

formal test & threshold
test:      pre_post_comparison_three_metrics
threshold: >=2 of 3 metrics with post < pre by 25% at p<0.10

Method

Template
descriptive
Sample
1 countries · 1985 – 2024
Evidence type
associational

Pre/post comparison on three metrics: CPI volatility (5y rolling std) 1985-1996 vs 1998-2008; credit-cycle amplitude (5y rolling std of credit-growth) 2000-2007 vs 2014-2022; and ER-passthrough coefficient pre-1997 vs post-1997. Robustness: rolling-window estimation; structural-break tests at 1997 and 2013.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
cpi_inflation_volatility
outcome
boe:CPI_UKtier 1
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
rolling_std_yoy_5y
household_credit_growth_volatility
outcome
boe:LPMAUYMtier 1
world_bank_wdi:FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZStier 2
rolling_std_yoy_5y
gbp_eer_passthrough_to_cpi
outcome
boe:XUDLBK67tier 1
bis:WS_EERtier 2
regression_coef_xr_to_cpi
boe_independence_1997
treatment
constructed:1997-05-06 Bank of England operational-independence datetier 5
event_date
fpc_macroprudential_2013
treatment
constructed:2013-04-01 Financial Policy Committee statutory creationtier 5
event_date
real_gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
yoy_pct
bank_of_england_policy_rate
control
boe:IUDBEDRtier 1
fred:BOERUKMtier 1
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.