IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·labour_reform_russia_2002_labour_code_employment

Russia's 2002 Labour Code (replacing the 1971 KZoT: fixed-term contract liberalisation, severance recalibration, collective-bargaining recodification) did not produce a measurable formal-employment-share gain by 2007 relative to a synthetic control of post-Soviet peers; the headline Russian labour-market improvement 2002-2007 is dominated by the oil-price-driven domestic-demand expansion.

PARTIALengine/runs/labour_reform_russia_2002_labour_code_employment

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.3991, |gap|/pre_sd=0.23, p_perm=0.75; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether russia labour code 2002 is actually linked to better or worse formal employment share from 1995 to 2010.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=-0.3991, |gap|/pre_sd=0.23, p_perm=0.75; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 8 country or place units from 1995 to 2010, using a synth did design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Russia labour code 2002
What we checked
  • Formal employment share
  • Unemployment rate
  • Real wage index
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/labour_reform_russia_2002_labour_code_employment
1007550250199520032010RUSUKRBLRKAZPOLHUNCZE
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show formal_employment_share across 8 sampled countries over 1995–2010.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for labour_reform_russia_2002_labour_code_employment. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/labour_reform_russia_2002_labour_code_employment/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:15:31Z

Russia's 2002 Labour Code (replacing the 1971 KZoT: fixed-term contract liberalisation, severance recalibration, collective-bargaining recodification) did not produce a measurable formal-employment-share gain by 2007 relative to a synthetic control of post-Soviet peers; the headline Russian labour-market improvement 2002-2007 is dominated by the oil-price-driven domestic-demand expansion.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED (heterodox-favourable null) if synth-DiD gap on Russian formal-employment share is statistically indistinguishable from zero at p<0.10 by 2007. REFUTED (pro-reform claim wins) if formal-employment gap > +1.5 pp at p<0.10. PARTIAL if a small positive gap appears that collapses with oil-price control.

formal test & threshold
test:      Synth-DiD on Russian formal-employment share 2002-2007 vs post-Soviet donor pool with oil-price control, placebo permutation at p<0.10.

Method

Template
synth_did
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
8 countries · 1995 – 2010
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
formal_employment_share
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZStier 2
level
unemployment_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
real_wage_index
outcome
oecd:DSD_EARNtier 2
log
russia_labour_code_2002
treatment
constructed:indicator for 2002-02 Code effective datetier 5
indicator
gdp_per_capita_real
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
terms_of_trade_index
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — labour_reform_russia_2002_labour_code_employment

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.3991, |gap|/pre_sd=0.23, p_perm=0.75; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Russia's 2002 Labour Code (replacing the 1971 KZoT: fixed-term contract liberalisation, severance recalibration, collective-bargaining recodification) did not produce a measurable formal-employment-share gain by 2007 relative to a synthetic control of post-Soviet peers; the headline Russian labour-market improvement 2002-2007 is dominated by the oil-price-driven domestic-demand expansion.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED (heterodox-favourable null) if synth-DiD gap on Russian formal-employment share is statistically indistinguishable from zero at p<0.10 by 2007. REFUTED (pro-reform claim wins) if formal-employment gap > +1.5 pp at p<0.10. PARTIAL if a small positive gap appears that collapses with oil-price control.

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: RUS
  • event_year: 2002
  • n_donors: 7
  • donor_weights (top): {'KAZ': 0.4429, 'UKR': 0.3437, 'HUN': 0.2133, 'BLR': 0.0, 'POL': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 1.053582564590334
  • pre_period_sd: 1.7494537242617576
  • mean_post_gap: -0.3990546982065586
  • end_period_gap: -0.31634982024746616
  • post_period_years: [2002, 2010]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.75
  • n_placebos: 7
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS → unemployment_rate (outcome, n=8106)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → gdp_per_capita_real (controls, n=14131)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, n=10779)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:31+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Treatment dated 2002-Q1 (effective 2002-02-01). Russia is the canonical post-Soviet labour-code modernisation case. The hypothesis is null-leaning by design — the steelman reading is that Russia's recovery is overwhelmingly commodity-driven and the Code is endogenous to broader Putin-era institutional changes.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.