IESET.
Hypotheses·healthcare·imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times

Countries liberalising medical-imaging equipment licensing and private-clinic entry show larger reductions in diagnostic wait times.

REFUTEDengine/runs/imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times

REFUTED — coef=+5.512 (sign opposite claim -), p=0

confidence cueThis test cuts against the claim as written or misses its pre-declared threshold.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

Does the healthcare rule being tested improve access, cost, or outcomes for patients, or does it mainly shift pressure around the system?

plain answer

The data did not support the prediction. coef=+5.512 (sign opposite claim -), p=0

why it matters

This matters because healthcare claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 30 country or place units from 1990 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Policy or institution proxy
What we checked
  • Primary sectoral outcome
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times
1007550250199020072023USAGBRCANAUSNZLDEUFRA
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show primary_sectoral_outcome across 30 sampled countries over 1990–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 4467b9f · 2026-05-02T22:38:16Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:09Z

Countries liberalising medical-imaging equipment licensing and private-clinic entry show larger reductions in diagnostic wait times.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if the treatment coefficient has the predicted sign at p<0.10. REFUTED if the opposite sign is significant at p<0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times
threshold: p<0.10 with pre-registered sign

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
30 countries · 1990 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Proxy-first TWFE screen; upgrade to bespoke replication when exact sector datasets are fetched.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
primary_sectoral_outcome
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SH.MED.BEDS.ZStier 2
level_or_growth_proxy
policy_or_institution_proxy
treatment
constructed:1 for JPN from 1990 onward; KOR from 1995 onward; DEU from 1990 onwardtier 5
indicator_or_level
log_gdp_pc
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
rule_of_law
control
wgi:RL.ESTtier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times

Verdict: REFUTED — coef=+5.512 (sign opposite claim -), p=0

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Countries liberalising medical-imaging equipment licensing and private-clinic entry show larger reductions in diagnostic wait times.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if the treatment coefficient has the predicted sign at p<0.10. REFUTED if the opposite sign is significant at p<0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_imaging_equipment_market_entry_wait_times

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +5.512
  • Std error: 0.4867
  • p-value: 0
  • Observations: 662, countries: 23
  • Within R²: -0.367
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SH.MED.BEDS.ZS → primary_sectoral_outcome (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=4881)
  • constructed: 1 for JPN from 1990 onward; KOR from 1995 onward; DEU from 1990 onward → policy_or_institution_proxy (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=1020)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)
  • wgi:RL.EST → rule_of_law (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5296)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:09+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.