IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·mena_iran_sanctions_economic_effect_2018_2024

The May 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent maximum-pressure sanctions regime (re-imposition 2018-2019, oil-buyer-waiver elimination 2019, expanded financial sanctions 2020-2024) caused a measurable Iranian economic contraction visible in real GDP, oil exports, FX market dislocation, and household real-consumption proxies.

The pre-registered claim is that, in a synthetic-control design with oil-exporting EM peers with comparable pre-2018 structural profile (Russia, Venezuela pre-2017, Iraq, Algeria, Nigeria, Kazakhstan), Iran's cumulative log-real-GDP-pc growth 2018-2024 falls at least 20 log-points below the synthetic counterfactual AND oil-export volume falls at least 50% from pre-sanction baseline. The null counter-claim is that Iran's pre-2018 economic trajectory was already deteriorating due to domestic-policy and demographic pressures, and the post-2018 contraction is statistically indistinguishable from the pre-existing trend extrapolated forward.

PARTIALengine/runs/mena_iran_sanctions_economic_effect_2018_2024

PARTIAL — mean_gap=+772.4, |gap|/pre_sd=4.3, p_perm=0.857 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=+772.4, |gap|/pre_sd=4.3, p_perm=0.857 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 7 country or place units from 2010 to 2024, using a synth did design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Maximum pressure indicator
  • Sanctions intensity
What we checked
  • Real income pc
  • Oil export volume
  • Cpi inflation yoy
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/mena_iran_sanctions_economic_effect_2018_2024
1007550250201020172024IRNRUSVENIRQDZANGAKAZ
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show real_gdp_pc across 7 sampled countries over 2010–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for mena_iran_sanctions_economic_effect_2018_2024. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/mena_iran_sanctions_economic_effect_2018_2024/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:15:31Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

The May 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent maximum-pressure sanctions regime (re-imposition 2018-2019, oil-buyer-waiver elimination 2019, expanded financial sanctions 2020-2024) caused a measurable Iranian economic contraction visible in real GDP, oil exports, FX market dislocation, and household real-consumption proxies. The pre-registered claim is that, in a synthetic-control design with oil-exporting EM peers with comparable pre-2018 structural profile (Russia, Venezuela pre-2017, Iraq, Algeria, Nigeria, Kazakhstan), Iran's cumulative log-real-GDP-pc growth 2018-2024 falls at least 20 log-points below the synthetic counterfactual AND oil-export volume falls at least 50% from pre-sanction baseline. The null counter-claim is that Iran's pre-2018 economic trajectory was already deteriorating due to domestic-policy and demographic pressures, and the post-2018 contraction is statistically indistinguishable from the pre-existing trend extrapolated forward.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if EITHER (a) cumulative log-GDP-pc gap 2018-2024 is greater than -20 log-points (i.e. less contraction than threshold) at p_perm < 0.10, OR (b) oil export volume decline from 2017 baseline is less than 50%, OR (c) the sanctions- intensity panel coefficient is not negative on log_gdp_pc at p < 0.05 (no dose- response), OR (d) Iran's pre-2018 trajectory extrapolated forward fits the post- 2018 path better than the synthetic counterfactual (indicating pre-existing trend decline rather than sanctions causation).

formal test & threshold
test:      synth_did_with_dose_response_and_pretrend_validation
threshold: cumulative_log_gdp_pc_gap_2018_2024 <= -0.20 at p_perm < 0.10 AND oil_export_volume_decline >= 0.50 from 2017 baseline AND intensity_panel_coef significant negative at p < 0.05 AND synthetic_counterfactual_RMSE < pretrend_extrapolation_RMSE

Method

Template
synth_did
Clustering
country
Sample
7 countries · 2010 – 2024
Evidence type
causal

Primary: synth_did with IRN treated from 2018Q2 and oil-exporter peer donor pool. Secondary: Callaway-Sant'Anna DiD with non-sanctioned oil exporters as control. Robustness drops Russia post-2022 and uses Venezuela pre-2017 only (separate sanctions episode). The sanctions-intensity ordinal supports a dose-response panel specification as tertiary test.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
real_gdp_pc
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
pwt:rgdpetier 3
imf:NGDPRPCtier 2
log_level
oil_export_volume
outcome
imf:Iran_oil_exportstier 2
world_bank_wdi:TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UNtier 2
log_level
cpi_inflation_yoy
outcome
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
imf:PCPIPCHtier 2
yoy
rial_usd_unofficial_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:PA.NUS.FCRFtier 2
log_level
maximum_pressure_indicator
treatment
constructed:1 for IRN from 2018-05 onwardtier 5
binary
sanctions_intensity
treatment
constructed:ordinal 0 (pre-2018) → 1 (2018 re-imposition) → 2 (2019 oil-waiver elimination) → 3 (2020-2024 expanded financial sanctitier 5
ordinal
brent_oil_price
control
fred:DCOILBRENTEUtier 1
log_level
us_policy_rate
control
fred:FEDFUNDStier 1
level
terms_of_trade
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level
vdem_political_stability
control
vdem:v2x_polyarchytier 4
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — mena_iran_sanctions_economic_effect_2018_2024

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=+772.4, |gap|/pre_sd=4.3, p_perm=0.857 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

Pre-registration

  • Claim: The May 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent maximum-pressure sanctions regime (re-imposition 2018-2019, oil-buyer-waiver elimination 2019, expanded financial sanctions 2020-2024) caused a measurable Iranian economic contraction visible in real GDP, oil exports, FX market dislocation, and household real-consumption proxies. The pre-registered claim is that, in a synthetic-control design with oil-exporting EM peers with comparable pre-2018 structural profile (Russia, Venezuela pre-2017, Iraq, Algeria, Nigeria, Kazakhstan), Iran's cumulative log-real-GDP-pc growth 2018-2024 falls at least 20 log-points below the synthetic counterfactual AND oil-export volume falls at least 50% from pre-sanction baseline. The null counter-claim is that Iran's pre-2018 economic trajectory was already deteriorating due to domestic-policy and demographic pressures, and the post-2018 contraction is statistically indistinguishable from the pre-existing trend extrapolated forward.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if EITHER (a) cumulative log-GDP-pc gap 2018-2024 is greater than -20 log-points (i.e. less contraction than threshold) at p_perm < 0.10, OR (b) oil export volume decline from 2017 baseline is less than 50%, OR (c) the sanctions- intensity panel coefficient is not negative on log_gdp_pc at p < 0.05 (no dose- response), OR (d) Iran's pre-2018 trajectory extrapolated forward fits the post- 2018 path better than the synthetic counterfactual (indicating pre-existing trend decline rather than sanctions causation).

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: IRN
  • event_year: 2018
  • n_donors: 6
  • donor_weights (top): {'DZA': 0.9959, 'VEN': 0.0041, 'RUS': 0.0, 'IRQ': 0.0, 'NGA': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 586.8229698409368
  • pre_period_sd: 181.04156804445728
  • mean_post_gap: 772.4152390741693
  • end_period_gap: 1082.0873251611347
  • post_period_years: [2018, 2024]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.8571428571428571
  • n_placebos: 6
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD; pwt:rgdpe; imf:NGDPRPC → real_gdp_pc (outcome, n=14131)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG; imf:PCPIPCH → cpi_inflation_yoy (outcome, n=9066)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:31+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Data-gated on Iranian SCI / CBI series (variable quality, occasionally suspended) and IMF Article IV staff estimates. Oil-export volume relies on shipping-trace and IEA estimates because Iranian official trade data understate sanctions-evasion flows. The hypothesis is structured to permit the pre-trend-extrapolation alternative to win.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.