IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·labour_reform_chile_2001_lagos_temporal

Chile's 2001 Lagos-government labour reform (Law 19,759: collective-bargaining strengthening, dismissal-cost recalibration, working-time provisions) raised the share of workers under collective-bargaining coverage by at least 3 pp by 2006 relative to a synthetic control of Latin- American peers, without producing a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline.

PARTIALengine/runs/labour_reform_chile_2001_lagos_temporal

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-2.633, |gap|/pre_sd=1.1, p_perm=0.714; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether chile law 19759 2001 is actually linked to better or worse collective bargaining coverage from 1995 to 2010.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=-2.633, |gap|/pre_sd=1.1, p_perm=0.714; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 7 country or place units from 1995 to 2010, using a synth did design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Chile law 19759 2001
What we checked
  • Collective bargaining coverage
  • Employment to population ratio
  • Unemployment rate
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/labour_reform_chile_2001_lagos_temporal
1007550250199520032010CHLMEXBRACOLPERURYARG
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show collective_bargaining_coverage across 7 sampled countries over 1995–2010.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for labour_reform_chile_2001_lagos_temporal. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/labour_reform_chile_2001_lagos_temporal/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:15:30Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Chile's 2001 Lagos-government labour reform (Law 19,759: collective-bargaining strengthening, dismissal-cost recalibration, working-time provisions) raised the share of workers under collective-bargaining coverage by at least 3 pp by 2006 relative to a synthetic control of Latin- American peers, without producing a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Chilean collective-bargaining coverage > +3.0 pp by 2006 AND employment-rate gap is not statistically more negative than -0.5 pp at p<0.10. REFUTED if employment-rate gap < -1.0 pp at p<0.10 (employment-margin cost dominates) OR if collective- bargaining-coverage gap is < +1.0 pp.

formal test & threshold
test:      Synth-DiD on Chilean collective-bargaining coverage and employment rate 2001-2006 vs LATAM donor pool, placebo permutation at p<0.10.

Method

Template
synth_did
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
7 countries · 1995 – 2010
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
collective_bargaining_coverage
outcome
oecd:DSD_LFStier 2
level
employment_to_population_ratio
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZStier 2
level
unemployment_rate
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
chile_law_19759_2001
treatment
constructed:indicator for 2001-Q4 Law 19,759 enactmenttier 5
indicator
gdp_per_capita_real
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
trade_openness
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
terms_of_trade_index
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — labour_reform_chile_2001_lagos_temporal

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=-2.633, |gap|/pre_sd=1.1, p_perm=0.714; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Chile's 2001 Lagos-government labour reform (Law 19,759: collective-bargaining strengthening, dismissal-cost recalibration, working-time provisions) raised the share of workers under collective-bargaining coverage by at least 3 pp by 2006 relative to a synthetic control of Latin- American peers, without producing a statistically distinguishable employment-rate decline.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Chilean collective-bargaining coverage > +3.0 pp by 2006 AND employment-rate gap is not statistically more negative than -0.5 pp at p<0.10. REFUTED if employment-rate gap < -1.0 pp at p<0.10 (employment-margin cost dominates) OR if collective- bargaining-coverage gap is < +1.0 pp.

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: CHL
  • event_year: 2001
  • n_donors: 6
  • donor_weights (top): {'COL': 0.8009, 'URY': 0.1991, 'MEX': 0.0, 'BRA': 0.0, 'PER': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 6.125068261439049
  • pre_period_sd: 2.392952708823696
  • mean_post_gap: -2.6334100452341156
  • end_period_gap: -1.8106437131795712
  • post_period_years: [2001, 2010]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.7142857142857143
  • n_placebos: 6
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS → unemployment_rate (outcome, n=8106)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → gdp_per_capita_real (controls, n=14131)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness (controls, n=10779)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:30+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Treatment dated 2001-Q4 (Law 19,759 enactment). Chile is the canonical "social-democratic recalibration of a Pinochet- era flexibilisation" case. The hypothesis tests whether partial re-strengthening of labour protections compresses employment — a heterodox prediction the spec lets win.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.