IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·asia_korea_chaebol_reform_2017_2024

South Korea's chaebol-reform attempts under Moon Jae-in (2017-2022, fair-trade enforcement, 2018 commercial-act amendments, minimum wage hikes) and Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-present, partial rollback) did NOT produce a measurable de-concentration of the Korean economy.

Top-30 chaebol value-added share of GDP and broader economic-concentration proxies (industry-level value-added concentration) do NOT decline meaningfully through 2023, and Korea's WGI Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption percentile rank does not rise by more than +5 percentile points 2016 to 2022.

PARTIALengine/runs/asia_korea_chaebol_reform_2017_2024

PARTIAL — shape=pre_post, |Δ_log|=0.0636; threshold 5.0%, observed 6.4%; claim direction ambiguous

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

When minimum wages rise high relative to normal local pay, do lower-skill workers keep their jobs, or does hiring fall at the margin?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. shape=pre_post, |Δ_log|=0.0636; threshold 5.0%, observed 6.4%; claim direction ambiguous

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 1 country or place units from 2010 to 2024, using a descriptive design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Post 2017 reform indicator
What we checked
  • Wgi regulatory quality
  • Wgi control of corruption
  • Wgi government effectiveness
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/asia_korea_chaebol_reform_2017_2024
1007550250201020172024KOR
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show wgi_regulatory_quality across 1 sampled countries over 2010–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for asia_korea_chaebol_reform_2017_2024. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/asia_korea_chaebol_reform_2017_2024/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-05-12T10:32:29Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

South Korea's chaebol-reform attempts under Moon Jae-in (2017-2022, fair-trade enforcement, 2018 commercial-act amendments, minimum wage hikes) and Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-present, partial rollback) did NOT produce a measurable de-concentration of the Korean economy. Top-30 chaebol value-added share of GDP and broader economic-concentration proxies (industry-level value-added concentration) do NOT decline meaningfully through 2023, and Korea's WGI Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption percentile rank does not rise by more than +5 percentile points 2016 to 2022.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

PRIMARY (dispositive): SUPPORTED if WGI Regulatory Quality percentile rank for KOR rises by AT MOST +5 percentile points from 2016 to 2022 (no meaningful regulatory-quality improvement). REFUTED if KOR WGI Regulatory Quality rises by more than +10 percentile points (clear reform success). INFORMATIVE (not gating): WGI Control of Corruption percentile same-window change.

formal test & threshold
test:      korea_chaebol_reform_no_wgi_improvement_2016_2022
threshold: PRIMARY: wgi_regulatory_quality_pct(KOR, 2022) - wgi_regulatory_quality_pct(KOR, 2016) <= 5. REFUTING: same diff > 10. METHOD_VALID: WGI Regulatory Quality available for KOR 2016, 2022.

Method

Template
descriptive
Clustering
none
Sample
1 countries · 2010 – 2024
Evidence type
descriptive

Within-Korea pre-post on WGI percentile ranks. The hypothesis is a non-acceleration claim, so the threshold direction is reversed relative to typical reform-success tests.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
wgi_regulatory_quality
outcome
wgi:RQ.PER.RNKtier 4
level
wgi_control_of_corruption
outcome
wgi:CC.PER.RNKtier 4
level
wgi_government_effectiveness
outcome
wgi:GE.PER.RNKtier 4
level
manufacturing_value_added_pct_gdp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.ZStier 2
level
post_2017_reform_indicator
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for KOR, year >= 2017tier 5
indicator

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — asia_korea_chaebol_reform_2017_2024

Verdict: PARTIAL — shape=pre_post, |Δ_log|=0.0636; threshold 5.0%, observed 6.4%; claim direction ambiguous

Pre-registration

  • Claim: South Korea's chaebol-reform attempts under Moon Jae-in (2017-2022, fair-trade enforcement, 2018 commercial-act amendments, minimum wage hikes) and Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-present, partial rollback) did NOT produce a measurable de-concentration of the Korean economy. Top-30 chaebol value-added share of GDP and broader economic-concentration proxies (industry-level value-added concentration) do NOT decline meaningfully through 2023, and Korea's WGI Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption percentile rank does not rise by more than +5 percentile points 2016 to 2022.
  • Falsification rule: PRIMARY (dispositive): SUPPORTED if WGI Regulatory Quality percentile rank for KOR rises by AT MOST +5 percentile points from 2016 to 2022 (no meaningful regulatory-quality improvement). REFUTED if KOR WGI Regulatory Quality rises by more than +10 percentile points (clear reform success). INFORMATIVE (not gating): WGI Control of Corruption percentile same-window change.
  • Falsification test: korea_chaebol_reform_no_wgi_improvement_2016_2022

Comparison

  • shape: pre_post
  • country: KOR
  • cut_year: 2017
  • pre_mean: 28.33093856333827
  • post_mean: 26.586103041044765
  • delta: -1.7448355222935064
  • log_delta: -0.06356580575487802
  • n_pre: 7
  • n_post: 8

Extracted threshold: {'percent': 5.0}

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NV.IND.MANF.ZS → manufacturing_value_added_pct_gdp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9698)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for KOR, year >= 2017 → post_2017_reform_indicator (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=15)

Variables missing data

  • world_bank_wgi:RQ.PER.RNK (outcome, name=wgi_regulatory_quality)
  • world_bank_wgi:CC.PER.RNK (outcome, name=wgi_control_of_corruption)
  • world_bank_wgi:GE.PER.RNK (outcome, name=wgi_government_effectiveness)

Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-05-12T10:32:29+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Tests effort-vs-outcome on a structural reform agenda. Direct chaebol share data is hard to standardise, so the test relies on broader proxies: WGI governance quality, ratio of top-firm market cap / GDP (informative), and industry concentration via WDI manufacturing-share. Hypothesis predicts the reform attempts did NOT meaningfully shift these.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.