IESET.
Hypotheses·distribution·tax_inequality_russia_2001_flat_tax_13pct

The 2001 Russian Putin-Kasyanov 13 percent flat income tax (replacing a three-bracket schedule with top rate 30 percent) produced a measurable rise in reported tax compliance and a discrete jump in the Russian top-1 pretax income share over 2001-2005, with most of the apparent share rise attributable to compliance/reporting gain rather than real redistribution.

The discriminating test is the magnitude of measured compliance gain (Gorodnichenko-Martinez-Vazquez-Sabirianova-Peter Engel-curve evidence) vs the top-share level shift.

REFUTEDengine/runs/tax_inequality_russia_2001_flat_tax_13pct

REFUTED — sign + OPPOSITE claim -, ATT=+10.73, p=0, N=43, treated_countries=1

confidence cueThis test cuts against the claim as written or misses its pre-declared threshold.

policy briefNeeds review

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The data did not support the prediction. sign + OPPOSITE claim -, ATT=+10.73, p=0, N=43, treated_countries=1

why it matters

Distributional claims often sound morally clear but are empirically complex. This test asks whether the proposed channel explains real differences across places.

how the test works

It compares 6 country or place units from 1995 to 2010, using a did callaway santanna design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Rus flat tax post 2001
  • Top marginal income tax rate
What we checked
  • Top 1pct pretax income share
  • Inequality disposable income
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

0 input datasets, 0 unresolved missing series, provenance status: no input vintages recorded.

Results

engine/runs/tax_inequality_russia_2001_flat_tax_13pct
1007550250199520032010RUSUKRBLRKAZGEOARM
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show top_1pct_pretax_income_share across 6 sampled countries over 1995–2010.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for tax_inequality_russia_2001_flat_tax_13pct. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/tax_inequality_russia_2001_flat_tax_13pct/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

1 school list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Social Democraticwins if MIXEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-05-15T20:30:43Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

The 2001 Russian Putin-Kasyanov 13 percent flat income tax (replacing a three-bracket schedule with top rate 30 percent) produced a measurable rise in reported tax compliance and a discrete jump in the Russian top-1 pretax income share over 2001-2005, with most of the apparent share rise attributable to compliance/reporting gain rather than real redistribution. The discriminating test is the magnitude of measured compliance gain (Gorodnichenko-Martinez-Vazquez-Sabirianova-Peter Engel-curve evidence) vs the top-share level shift.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if Russian top-1 share rises by at least 1.5 percentage points 2001-2005 AND independent compliance proxies (consumption- income gap from Engel curves) tighten by at least 5 percentage points over the window at p<0.10. REFUTED if top-share rise is below 0.75 pp or compliance proxies fail to tighten at p<0.10.

formal test & threshold
test:      Russia time-series structural-break + post-Soviet comparator panel around 2001Q1.

Method

Template
did_callaway_santanna
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
6 countries · 1995 – 2010
Evidence type
associational

Callaway-Sant'Anna DiD with RUS treated 2001 against post-Soviet comparator pool. Robustness with synthetic_control.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
top_1pct_pretax_income_share
outcome
owid:top-1-share-of-total-incometier 2
level
gini_disposable_income
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.GINItier 2
level
rus_flat_tax_post_2001
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 for RUS, year >= 2001tier 5
indicator
top_marginal_income_tax_rate
treatment
owid:top-marginal-income-tax-ratetier 2
level
log_real_gdp_per_capita
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
oil_price_real
control
imf_pcps:POILBREtier 1
real_yoy_pct_change
cpi_inflation
control
world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — tax_inequality_russia_2001_flat_tax_13pct

Verdict: REFUTED — sign + OPPOSITE claim -, ATT=+10.73, p=0, N=43, treated_countries=1

Pre-registration

  • Claim: The 2001 Russian Putin-Kasyanov 13 percent flat income tax (replacing a three-bracket schedule with top rate 30 percent) produced a measurable rise in reported tax compliance and a discrete jump in the Russian top-1 pretax income share over 2001-2005, with most of the apparent share rise attributable to compliance/reporting gain rather than real redistribution. The discriminating test is the magnitude of measured compliance gain (Gorodnichenko-Martinez-Vazquez-Sabirianova-Peter Engel-curve evidence) vs the top-share level shift.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if Russian top-1 share rises by at least 1.5 percentage points 2001-2005 AND independent compliance proxies (consumption- income gap from Engel curves) tighten by at least 5 percentage points over the window at p<0.10. REFUTED if top-share rise is below 0.75 pp or compliance proxies fail to tighten at p<0.10.

Estimate (Callaway-Sant'Anna staggered DiD, TWFE approximation)

  • coefficient: 10.728219079302255
  • std_error: 0.3424071198408305
  • p_value: 0.0
  • n_obs: 43
  • n_countries: 4
  • n_treated_countries: 1
  • cohort_years: [2001]
  • method: Callaway-Sant'Anna (TWFE approximation, country-clustered)
  • dropped_controls_due_to_overlap: []

Variables resolved

  • owid:top-1-share-of-total-income → top_1pct_pretax_income_share (outcome, n=3294)
  • world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.GINI → gini_disposable_income (outcome, n=2430)
  • constructed: indicator = 1 for RUS, year >= 2001 → rus_flat_tax_post_2001 (treatment, n=96)
  • owid:top-marginal-income-tax-rate → top_marginal_income_tax_rate (treatment, n=590)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_real_gdp_per_capita (controls, n=14066)
  • imf_pcps:POILBRE → oil_price_real (controls, n=222)
  • world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG → cpi_inflation (controls, n=9066)

Generated by scripts/run_did_callaway_santanna.py at 2026-05-15T20:30:43+00:00

Notes

Tax-inequality candidate, swarm-S6 batch 6. Russian flat-tax episode is often cited supportively in flat-tax advocacy literature; this hypothesis disambiguates the compliance-vs-real-redistribution channels.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.