Pre-registration
Countries that enacted market-oriented structural reforms with credible institutional commitment (Norway handlingsregel 2001, Sweden pension- architecture reform 1999) experienced systematically better post-treatment GDP-per-capita and unemployment trajectories than their own pre-treatment trends would have predicted. Countries that entered the euro area without corresponding structural adjustment (Italy 1999, Greece 2001) experienced systematically worse post-treatment trajectories. The v3 hypothesis predicts a positive within-country effect for the reform group and a negative within-country effect for the fiscal-dominance group, identified off their own pre-treatment baselines via country and year fixed effects. This directly addresses the v1/v2 structural limitation: cross-sectional decomposition cannot see timing, but within-country DiD can.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Not supported if either β_reform or β_stagnation has the opposite sign from the pre-registered expectation (positive for reform, negative for stagnation) at the 90% confidence level on the primary outcome (log GDP per capita PPP). Also not supported if the pre-trend placebo detects spurious effects — that would indicate parallel trends is violated and the identification is not clean. A clean pass requires β_reform > 0 at p < 0.10, β_stagnation < 0 at p < 0.10, and the pre-trend placebo coefficient at |t+<0|<1.65 (not statistically distinguishable from zero).
formal test & threshold
test: within_country_did_signs_and_pretrend_placebo threshold: β_reform > 0 at p < 0.10 AND β_stagnation < 0 at p < 0.10 AND pre_trend_placebo_t < 1.65 absolute
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 10 countries · 1996 – 2023
- Evidence type
- causal
PanelOLS with country + year fixed effects, cluster-robust SEs by country. Specification: outcome_{i,t} = α_i + γ_t + β_reform * reform_post_{i,t} + β_stagnation * fiscal_dominance_post_{i,t} + Xβ + ε_{i,t} Country FE absorb all time-invariant country features (Nordic culture, geography, social trust, population homogeneity, pre-existing institutional quality) — the concern v1 and v2 could not control for. Year FE absorb global trends and common shocks (2008 GFC, 2020 COVID, etc). β_reform identifies the average post-treatment deviation from each treated country's own pre-treatment trend, net of global year effects. This is a staggered two-way fixed effects DiD. TWFE with staggered treatment has known bias under heterogeneous treatment effects (Goodman-Bacon 2021); v3.1 will run Callaway-Sant'Anna as robustness once that package is installed. For v3 v1, TWFE is the simplest identification that tests the core claim. Secondary specs (reported alongside primary): - event study with ±5 year leads and lags around each treatment date - pre-trend placebo: fake treatment at t-5 to test parallel trends - drop-COVID robustness (2020-2021 excluded)
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
log_gdp_pc_ppp outcome | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2 | log |
unemployment outcome | world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZStier 2 | level |
reform_post treatment | constructed:indicator = 1 for country-years on or after the country-specific market-oriented reform date; 0 otherwise. Reform dates:tier 5 | indicator |
fiscal_dominance_post treatment | constructed:indicator = 1 for country-years on or after the country-specific fiscal-dominance-onset date; 0 otherwise. Dates: ITA=19tier 5 | indicator |
log_population control | world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTLtier 2 | log |
urbanisation control | world_bank_wdi:SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZStier 2 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — nordic_outcome_persistence_decomposition_v3
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'reform_post' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
Pre-registration
- Claim: Countries that enacted market-oriented structural reforms with credible institutional commitment (Norway handlingsregel 2001, Sweden pension- architecture reform 1999) experienced systematically better post-treatment GDP-per-capita and unemployment trajectories than their own pre-treatment trends would have predicted. Countries that entered the euro area without corresponding structural adjustment (Italy 1999, Greece 2001) experienced systematically worse post-treatment trajectories. The v3 hypothesis predicts a positive within-country effect for the reform group and a negative within-country effect for the fiscal-dominance group, identified off their own pre-treatment baselines via country and year fixed effects. This directly addresses the v1/v2 structural limitation: cross-sectional decomposition cannot see timing, but within-country DiD can.
- Falsification rule: Not supported if either β_reform or β_stagnation has the opposite sign from the pre-registered expectation (positive for reform, negative for stagnation) at the 90% confidence level on the primary outcome (log GDP per capita PPP). Also not supported if the pre-trend placebo detects spurious effects — that would indicate parallel trends is violated and the identification is not clean. A clean pass requires β_reform > 0 at p < 0.10, β_stagnation < 0 at p < 0.10, and the pre-trend placebo coefficient at |t+<0|<1.65 (not statistically distinguishable from zero).
- Falsification test: within_country_did_signs_and_pretrend_placebo
Estimate
- Error: treatment 'reform_post' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD→ log_gdp_pc_ppp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)world_bank_wdi:SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS→ unemployment (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=6874)constructed: indicator = 1 for country-years on or after the country-specific market-oriented reform date; 0 otherwise. Reform dates: NOR=2001 (handlingsregel), SWE=1999 (pension NDC+funded). DNK, FIN, ISL and all SE countries = never-treated on this indicator.→ reform_post (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=280)constructed: indicator = 1 for country-years on or after the country-specific fiscal-dominance-onset date; 0 otherwise. Dates: ITA=1999 (euro entry without structural reform), GRC=2001 (euro entry + fiscal accommodation). NOR, SWE, DNK, FIN, ISL, ESP, PRT, FRA = never-treated on this indicator.→ fiscal_dominance_post (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=280)world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.TOTL→ log_population (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=14447)world_bank_wdi:SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS→ urbanisation (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16965)
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:23+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
This is the hypothesis the v1 steelman anticipated ("a v3 with within- country decomposition would test a different but related claim"). The related claim is about REFORM TIMING, not average institutional quality. v1 and v2 tested: "are Nordic levels of institutional quality associated with Nordic outcomes?" (mostly no on v1, partly on v2). v3 tests: "did Nordic reform movements at specific dates shift subsequent outcome trajectories?" (testable directly with DiD). Treatment dates are pre-committed and documented in each movement YAML: NOR 2001, SWE 1999, ITA 1999, GRC 2001. All within-sample. DNK, FIN, ISL, FRA, ESP, PRT are never-treated on both indicators; they serve as the comparison group contributing year-FE identification. The four movement YAMLs in movements/ ship together with this spec. Each carries its own steelman and references.