Pre-registration
Between 2002 and 2007 the US effective Federal Funds Rate ran on average more than 200 basis points below the rate prescribed by a standard Taylor rule (1.5 inflation-gap, 0.5 output-gap weights, 2% natural rate). The 2008 housing bust and MBS write-downs constitute a canonical case of malinvestment in the inter-temporal capital structure: residential investment as a share of GDP rose 1.5 SD above its 1990-2001 mean, household mortgage debt rose by more than 40 percentage points of GDP, and the post-bust write-down of housing-sector capital exceeded $4 trillion. The Austrian interpretation — Greenspan-era loose money distorted the relative price of long-duration capital goods — is consistent with the multi-metric pattern of pre-bust extremes and post-bust collapse.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Hypothesis is supported if at least 4 of 5 canonical metrics meet their thresholds; refuted if fewer than 3 do. The "canonical" framing requires the pattern to be unambiguous in the data, not borderline.
formal test & threshold
test: malinvestment_canonical_pattern_count threshold: metrics_met >= 4 of 5 → supported metrics_met <= 2 of 5 → refuted
Method
- Template
multi_metric_checklist- Sample
- 1 countries · 1990 – 2012
- Evidence type
- canonical_case_multi_metric
Pre-registered multi-metric pattern test: was the 2002-2007 window a canonical malinvestment episode? Each metric is independently sourced and would have to fail to justify rejecting the canonical case framing. Mainstream/Keynesian readers would attribute the bust to global savings-glut + financial-regulation gaps, not to Fed deviation from Taylor; the multi-metric checklist does not adjudicate between Austrian and savings-glut narratives, only whether the canonical pattern holds in the data.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
residential_investment_share_gdp outcome | fred:PRFIC1tier 1 | level |
household_mortgage_debt_to_gdp outcome | fred:HMLBSHNOtier 1 | level |
case_shiller_home_price_index outcome | shiller:us_home_price_realtier 3 | log |
fed_funds_rate treatment | fred:FEDFUNDStier 1 | level |
taylor_rule_deviation treatment | constructed:FEDFUNDS minus standard Taylor rule (1.5 pi-gap, 0.5 y-gap, 2% r*, 2% pi*)tier 5 | level |
cpi_inflation control | fred:CPIAUCSLtier 1 | yoy |
cbo_output_gap control | fred:GDPC1tier 1 | pct_dev_potential |
long_term_yield_10y control | fred:DGS10tier 1 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — abct_fed_funds_below_taylor_rule_capital_misallocation_2002_2007
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (6)
Pre-registration
- Claim: Between 2002 and 2007 the US effective Federal Funds Rate ran on average more than 200 basis points below the rate prescribed by a standard Taylor rule (1.5 inflation-gap, 0.5 output-gap weights, 2% natural rate). The 2008 housing bust and MBS write-downs constitute a canonical case of malinvestment in the inter-temporal capital structure: residential investment as a share of GDP rose 1.5 SD above its 1990-2001 mean, household mortgage debt rose by more than 40 percentage points of GDP, and the post-bust write-down of housing-sector capital exceeded $4 trillion. The Austrian interpretation — Greenspan-era loose money distorted the relative price of long-duration capital goods — is consistent with the multi-metric pattern of pre-bust extremes and post-bust collapse.
- Falsification rule: Hypothesis is supported if at least 4 of 5 canonical metrics meet their thresholds; refuted if fewer than 3 do. The "canonical" framing requires the pattern to be unambiguous in the data, not borderline.
- Falsification test: malinvestment_canonical_pattern_count
Estimate
- Error: insufficient observations after listwise deletion (6)
Variables resolved
fred:PRFIC1→ residential_investment_share_gdp (outcome, publisher=fred, n=19)fred:HMLBSHNO→ household_mortgage_debt_to_gdp (outcome, publisher=fred, n=81)shiller:us_home_price_real→ case_shiller_home_price_index (outcome, publisher=shiller, n=134)fred:FEDFUNDS→ fed_funds_rate (treatment, publisher=fred, n=73)fred:CPIAUCSL→ cpi_inflation (controls, publisher=fred, n=80)fred:GDPC1→ cbo_output_gap (controls, publisher=fred, n=80)fred:DGS10→ long_term_yield_10y (controls, publisher=fred, n=65)
Variables missing data
constructed: FEDFUNDS minus standard Taylor rule (1.5 pi-gap, 0.5 y-gap, 2% r*, 2% pi*)(treatment, name=taylor_rule_deviation) — vintage not on disk
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:51:48+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Canonical Austrian case from Taylor (2007), Schwartz (2009), White (2009 "How Did We Get into This Mess?"). The hypothesis tests pattern, not mechanism — a Bernankean savings-glut account would also predict several of these metrics, so a "supported" verdict here does not uniquely confirm ABCT.