IESET.
Hypotheses·institutional quality·market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.

This tests the state-capacity, policy-credibility, and contract-enforcement channels as a second-wave market-order hypothesis rather than reusing the Heritage latest-year cross-section.

PARTIALengine/runs/market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel

PARTIAL — coef=+1.875, p=0.407 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether government effectiveness wgi is actually linked to better or worse private investment share from 1996 to 2021.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. coef=+1.875, p=0.407 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

why it matters

This matters because institutional quality claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 33 country or place units from 1996 to 2021, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Government effectiveness wgi
What we checked
  • Private investment share
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel
1007550250199620092021AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCZE
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show private_investment_share across 33 sampled countries over 1996–2021.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel/chart_data.json.

Who has skin in the game — schools predicting on this

4 schools list this hypothesis as a test of their position. The chips below are school-level scoreboard outcomes, not a second hypothesis verdict.

hypothesis verdict vs scoreboard outcome

The banner verdict judges this hypothesis as written. The scoreboard asks whether each school's polarity-corrected prediction was right. Raw status is not a school win: SUPPORTED supports schools that needed SUPPORTED, but refutes schools that needed REFUTED.

Classical Liberalwins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callEmpirical Pragmatist (the framework's house position)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callNew Institutional Economicswins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-callOrdoliberalism (Freiburg School)wins if SUPPORTEDpartial/no-call

Pre-registration

registration ordering unverified
first-spec commit 4c8ce8e · 2026-07-18T22:11:21Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:21Z
Run timestamp predates this path's first git-add commit (rebase, rename, or pre-git local run). Spec hash is still the path's first-add commit — not repository HEAD — but ordering is not a clean pre-registration proof.

Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls. This tests the state-capacity, policy-credibility, and contract-enforcement channels as a second-wave market-order hypothesis rather than reusing the Heritage latest-year cross-section.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if the coefficient on government_effectiveness_wgi is positively signed at p<0.10 with at least 30 usable observations after listwise deletion. REFUTED if the coefficient is significantly opposite-signed at p<0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel
threshold: [object Object]

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
33 countries · 1996 – 2021
Evidence type
associational

Primary test is two-way fixed effects with country-clustered standard errors. This is a registered associational hurdle; causal promotion requires a sharper subsequent design.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
private_investment_share
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FPRV.ZStier 2
level
government_effectiveness_wgi
treatment
wgi:GE.ESTtier 4
level
log_gdp_pc_ppp
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2
log
population_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.GROWtier 2
level
trade_openness_control
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2
level
government_consumption_control
control
world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZStier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel

Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=+1.875, p=0.407 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Across a pre-registered narrower OECD/market-peer panel from 1996 to 2021, more effective rule-bound public administration predict higher private fixed-investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls. This tests the state-capacity, policy-credibility, and contract-enforcement channels as a second-wave market-order hypothesis rather than reusing the Heritage latest-year cross-section.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if the coefficient on government_effectiveness_wgi is positively signed at p<0.10 with at least 30 usable observations after listwise deletion. REFUTED if the coefficient is significantly opposite-signed at p<0.10. Otherwise PARTIAL.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_market_order_government_effectiveness_private_investment_share_panel

Estimate

  • Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
  • Coefficient (treatment): +1.875
  • Std error: 2.251
  • p-value: 0.407
  • Observations: 115, countries: 5
  • Within R²: -0.207
  • Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
  • Clustering: country

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.FPRV.ZS → private_investment_share (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=3304)
  • wgi:GE.EST → government_effectiveness_wgi (treatment, publisher=wgi, n=5168)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD → log_gdp_pc_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.GROW → population_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16672)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS → trade_openness_control (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)
  • world_bank_wdi:NE.CON.GOVT.ZS → government_consumption_control (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9133)

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:21+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Second-wave market-order panel test. Do not edit v1 after first run.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.